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Part I 
Introduction 
 
This part of the dissertation consists of the introductory chapter, which presents the 
background and the general research question addressed by the empirical study. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Objective and Theme of the Dissertation 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine leadership and the effectiveness of leadership 
development. Many organizations view leadership as a source of competitive advantage and 
are investing in its development accordingly (McCall, 1998; Vierce & Fulmer, 1998). This 
has turned leadership into the most extensively studied topic in the social, behavioral, and 
management sciences. Although leadership and leadership development have grown into a 
multibillion dollar industry (Yukl, 2006, p. 386), many of the reported insights are trivial and 
consist largely of a collection of decontextualized facts. One reason for this might be that 
there is little agreement across empirical studies regarding the defining characteristics of 
leadership (Hogan, 2006) and no consensus concerning the essential features of effective 
leadership and leadership development (Day, 2001; Hogan, 2004; Barker, 1997). Relatively 
little is known about what is actually developed (Day & Halpin, 2004). Within the field of 
leadership development, most of the focus has been on the various methods used to develop 
leaders (e.g. Conger & Benjamin, 1999; McCauley, Moxley, & Van Velsor, 1998; Vierce & 
Fulmer, 1998) rather than about what will be developed. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that leadership matters because it concerns building and 
maintaining effective teams, persuading people to give up, for a while, their selfish interests 
in order to pursue common goals that are important for the responsibilities and welfare of 
their groups (Hogan & Kaiser, 1994). It is important to distinguish between a person’s short-
term and long-term interest: Actions that promote the group also serve an individual’s long 
term welfare. History mournfully suggests, however, that without an external threat to their 
group, people largely pursue their short-term interests. 
Leadership only occurs when others willingly adopt, for a period of time, the goals of a 
group as their own. Leadership is persuasion, not domination, and persons who can require 
others do their bidding because of their powers are not leaders. Dixon (1993) states that 
leadership development involves building the capacity for groups of people to learn their 
way out of problems that could not have been predicted, or that arise from the disintegration 
 3
of traditional organizational structures and the associated loss of sense-making (Weick, 
1993). Thus, leadership concerns building cohesive and goal-oriented teams, and there is a 
causal and definitional link between leadership and team performance (Hogan, Curphy, 
Hogan, 1994).  
Various writers have convincingly argued that our evolutionary history makes us selfish 
(Dawkins, 1976) and yet able to identity the welfare of our social unit—perhaps because 
individual survival sometimes depends on group survival (Eibl-Eibesfeld, 1989, J. Hogan, 
1978). When leadership is conceptualized in the context of human origins, it is consequential 
for the success of organizations and the well-being of their members and their countries’ 
citizens and represents a powerful adaptive tool for individual and group survival (Hogan, 
2006; Hogan, Curphy, Hogan, 1994). This evolutionary perspective is also consistent with 
the definition of leadership development proposed by McCauley et al. (1998) as expanding 
the collective capacity of organizational members to engage effectively in leadership roles 
and processes.  
This requires that both leadership and leadership development must attend to the social and 
interpersonal nature of their phenomenon. It requires a social context, and therefore can not 
be directly developed unless groups of people are brought together. This is because 
leadership development depends on fostering social relations among individuals in a group, 
team, or organization (Day, 2000); people are nested in teams, and teams are nested in 
organizations. Leadership development is about developing the abilities of group members 
to continually reinvent themselves, which is an effort that requires that these processes be 
linked and connected to a broader organizational strategy (Hall & Seibert, 1992; Latham & 
Seijts, 1998).  
Furthermore, Day (2000) argued that there is a fundamental difference and distinction 
between leader development and leadership development. The emphasis within leader 
development typically is on individual-based knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with 
formal leadership roles. Leader development is a result of purposeful investment in human 
capital. The purposes of leadership development are to build the intrapersonal competence 
needed to form an accurate model of oneself (Gardner, 1993, p. 9), to engage in healthy 
attitude and identity development (Hall & Seibert, 1992), and to use that self-model to 
perform effectively in any number of organizational roles. These capabilities contribute to 
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enhanced individual knowledge, trustworthiness, and personal power, which have been 
proposed as the fundamental leadership imperatives (Zand, 1997), at least from a traditional, 
individualistic leadership perspective. What most organizations describe as their leadership 
development effort should more accurately be labeled as leader development. The reason is 
that most development approaches focus exclusively on the individual and ignore the social 
context. The underlying assumption is that developing individual leaders will result in better 
leadership, which is at best a tenuous assumption. Within leadership development, the 
emphasis is on the social nature of this competence and on the idea that effective 
development best occurs in an interpersonal (i.e. social) context. This makes leadership 
development a more complex endeavor than one concerned solely with individual leader 
development.  
In his latest book, Personality and the Fate of Organizations, Professor Hogan claims that 
“nowhere in our educational system is there any systematic training for leadership. 
Competent leadership training does not occur in business schools, and it does not occur in 
the military academies” (2006, p. 108-109). His statement represents a challenge, especially 
for the military academies, because their purpose is to educate and develop young men and 
women so that they are able to build and maintain effective teams to pursue a common goal 
that is important for society in general. Leadership and leadership development is their 
primary focus and raison d’être. Their focus is to train and develop officers to cope with 
today’s conflicts and the conflicts in the years ahead. Norway has three military academies 
whose aim is to fulfill this important purpose through their leadership development 
programs. 
This dissertation will investigate the effectiveness of the leadership development program at 
the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (RNoNA) located in Bergen, which I will do by 
asking the following overall and general research question:  
Is the leadership development program at the Royal Norwegian Academy effective in 
preparing officers to execute leadership in today’s conflicts and the conflicts in the years 
ahead? 
Because of the small body of research addressing leadership development, this study is 
exploratory in its orientation and aims at theory generation and development of propositions 
 5
for leadership development in general, although this study is conducted within the military 
realm. 
1.2 The Context of the Dissertation 
Since the RNoNA was established in 1817, the main purpose has been, and still is, to 
educate and train officers to lead others into combat on behalf of the nation. This demanding 
challenge seems to have grown even larger because the Norwegian Armed Forces and other 
western militaries have—because the end of the Cold War—experienced an accelerating 
revolutionary change driven both by rapid technological innovation and by an extraordinary 
globalization of military affairs. Since the fall of the USSR and the rise of groups like al 
Qaida, officers are now realizing that many of their long-established leadership and 
warfighting models are inadequate to help them understand or deal with today’s military 
conflicts. Where military leaders once operated with a machine model of their world, which 
was predicated on concepts developed during the Industrial Revolution, such as linear 
thinking, control, and predictability, they now find themselves struggling with something 
more organic and non-linear, where limited control and a restricted ability to predict are the 
norm. The major reason for this is that the primary cause of conflict in the 21st century has 
evolved to become a condition–disconnectedness–and not a religion (Islam), nor any 
particular place, nor even the style of conflict known as “terrorism” (Barnett, 2004, 2005).  
These developments within the military realm and the new military landscape after the Cold 
War, and especially after the 9/11 attacks define a world that is nonlinear, organic, and 
characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability. We are experiencing the disintegration of 
traditional organizational structures and the associated loss of sense-making (Weick, 1993). 
In today’s fast-changing environment, the ones who will win are the ones who are able 
constantly to adapt and evolve because we are now facing an enemy that does not have a 
formal army. Each engagement is particular unto itself and in its unique setting. We are 
facing an adversary that is connected through a “nervous system,” an overarching political 
idea that not only binds them together, it also coalesces a social energy which promotes 
disconnectedness from the wider world. Our adversaries are different from our military, 
whose nervous system is hierarchical and relatively static. Our adversaries’ nervous systems 
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are complex adaptive systems, “rhizomatic1” Smith (2005) or starfish-like (Brafman & 
Beckstrom, 2006). Such a command system operates with an apparently hierarchical 
structure above ground, visible in the operational and political arenas, and with another 
system, the real control system, centered in the roots out of sight. It is a horizontal and 
decentralized system with many discrete groups. It develops to suit its surroundings and 
purposes in a process of natural selection, with no predetermined operational structure. Its 
foundation is that of the social structure of its locale.  
The rhizomatic command system is difficult to attack, just as rhizomatic weeds are difficult 
to eradicate. In agronomy, rhizomes are eradicated by one of three methods: digging them 
up, removing the nutrients from the soil, or penetrating the roots with a systemic poison. 
Analog methods must be used to deal with organizations that have adopted rhizomatic 
command-and-control systems. Cutting off their visible heads by, for example, killing their 
“known leaders” may at best cause them to lie dormant for a season, during which they 
operate with catalysts—spiritual and cultural leaders. Attacking their visible command 
structures, therefore, could be considered as attempting to solve the problem “within the 
context of war,” on the physical level. As seen today in both Afghanistan and Iraq, such 
actions are often a spur to action other directions. We have to realize that no act of force will 
ever be decisive because the true enemy is a social and economic condition, 
disconnectedness itself, which requires an understanding of war in the context of such 
widely diverse fields as politics, economics, and sociology—in other words, “war in context 
of everything else” (Barnett, 2004). This requires that all leadership development efforts be 
linked into this context, making organizational reinvention and sense-making possible.  
At the same time it is important to keep in mind that neither human nor organizational life 
merely resembles natural ecosystems; rather, they all share fundamental properties, 
specifically nonlinear processes, because they are complex adaptive systems and thus follow 
the same deep laws. These laws, however, will not play out in exactly the same way in 
military affairs as they do in biology because in military affairs, people make conscious 
decisions, whereas in biology there is no such conscious intent.  
                                                 
1 This is a botanical analogy that is consistent with complex adaptive system theory. Rhizomatic plants can propagate either 
by spreading fertilized seed, or vegetatively through their root systems, even when the root is severed from the parent body. 
This allows the plant to survive a poor growing seasons or disturbance to the soil. 
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1.3 An Holistic Approach to Leadership Developement 
Unfortunately, leadership research has been based primarily on minitheories of personality 
rather than on more comprehensive models of team and organizational behavior (Kaiser & 
Hogan, 2006). This forced me to look elsewhere for a theoretical foundation to answer my 
research question, and the search led me to the ideas and work of U.S. Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd (1927-1997). He was a receptive and original thinker who synthesized ideas from 
across disciplines to formulate his own philosophy about warfare, competition, decision 
making, and the nature of leadership. Although his work was conducted within the military 
realm, during the last five years, six books have been published on his life and work, and 
both foreign policy analysts (Barnett, 2005) and business strategists (Richards, 2004) are 
beginning to recognize Boyd’s influence. In his latest book, for example, best selling 
business guru Tom Peters called Boyd a “revolutionary military strategist” (2003, p. 19), and 
he also described Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loops in business (p. 219). 
There are several reasons why Boyd’s work provides a useful foundation for research in 
leadership development. Boyd was the first in the modern era, to propose a comprehensive 
theory of strategy that is independent of size or technology and to identify an organizational 
climate for achieving it. In contrast to one of the most famous military thinkers in history, 
Carl von Clausewitz (1984), whose theory held that numbers dominate, unless other factors 
somehow override, numbers were essentially irrelevant to Boyd. Recent research has 
confirmed the accuracy of Boyd’s observation (Biddle, 2004; Rotte & Schmidt, 2002). They 
found that factors like numerical superiority convey at most a weak advantage, and 
technological superiority none at all. It is cohesion and morale, not numbers and technology, 
that instill courage and confidence in ordinary soldiers to perform extraordinary deeds under 
seemingly hopeless circumstances, and that requires leadership.  
Second, he was also the first to propose that the two most successful forms of modern armed 
conflict—maneuver (blitzkrieg) warfare and guerrilla warfare—are based on the same 
underlying principles. They both stress measures including preparation of the opponent, 
deception, and clouded signatures as the basis for penetrating the opponent and forcing 
surrender or collapse without the need for major battles.  
Third, Boyd also was the first to observe that the common underlying mechanism involved 
tactics that distort the enemy’s perception of time. He identified a general category of 
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activities to achieve this distortion, the ability to change the situation faster than the 
opponent could comprehend, which he called “operating inside the Observation–
Orientation–Decision–Action (OODA) loop.” Building on a tradition in strategy going back 
to Sun Tzu, Boyd noted that operating in such a fashion generated not only mental effects, 
such as confusion, but moral ones, and that enemies confronted by these tactics often simply 
gave up and fled the battlefield. This basic strategy is now widely accepted by agile military 
forces such as the U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land Team (SEALs), the most elite of American 
military units: “Military analysts say we [U.S. Navy SEALs] are becoming skilled disciples 
of John Boyd. That is, we execute the Boyd Loop—observation, orientation, decision, action 
(OODA)—far better and quicker than our enemies” (Couch, 2004, p. 258). Boyd’s theories 
stand in stark comparison to the fire-power based attrition doctrines that were followed, and 
to a large extent still are, by the major Western military forces (Vandergriff, 2006). 
Finally, Boyd was one of the first major strategists to base his organizational concepts for 
accomplishing these effects on what complexity theory now calls “self-organization,” which 
at the time he proposed it was a clear break from the top-down “command and control” 
mentality that all U.S. military services and other Western militaries employed. Boyd’s 
alternative was to generate and focus creativity and initiative throughout the ranks, and he 
proposed a specific organizational climate to accomplish it. Again, Boyd was not the first to 
appreciate initiative, even by privates and sailors, but he was the first to tie a specific climate 
based on initiative to the ability of teams to generate rapid changes, which he called 
“transients,” in combat and other conflicts. Until Boyd, military forces stressed tighter 
control, “knowing where everybody is on the battlefield,” to enable commanders to move 
units around as if they where chess pieces. This, unfortunately still is the idea behind the 
ongoing technology-driven development of “network-centric” warfare within NATO, which 
stands in opposition to Boyd. 
Because leadership concerns the building of cohesive and goal-oriented teams, leadership 
development is an effort within a social context to increase the abilities of leaders and 
members to build such teams. An important ingredient in creating effective teams in a 
modern conflict or business setting is expanding the abilities of all members to take on 
different roles as the team develops and confronts unexpected challenges. A leadership 
development program, therefore, requires tools for measuring the competency for workable 
relations in organizational contexts. SPGR (Sjøvold, 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007) which is 
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an acronym for “Strengthening the Person-Group Relation,” represents such a tool set. It 
consists of tools created over the last 20 years to measure the competence of individuals, 
groups, and organizations for developing and maintaining functional relations. The 
theoretical foundation of the SPGR model combines Bion’s model for Group Emotionality 
(Bion, 1987), Parsons’ suggestions of pattern variables (Parsons & Shils, 1953; 1951), Mills 
(1984) work on group development, and Bales Theory of Social Interaction Systems (Bales, 
1999). The structure of the methodology is a further development of the structure found in 
Bales SYstematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) method (Bales and 
Cohen, 1979). As such it contains insights from both Moreno’s (1953) sociometry and 
Lewin’s (1952) field theory. Besides integrating different theoretical perspectives, the SPGR 
system is a model and a procedure for visualizing how organizations, teams, and individual 
team members can contribute to the development of organizations, teams, and team 
members. It provides a helpful tool for improving the development of leaders and leadership.  
Boyd’s syntheses, especially his notions of time distortion and competitive team behavior in 
situations characterized by complexity and stress, together with SPGR’s theory, methods, 
and psychometrics, provide the necessary foundation for investigating the effectiveness of 
leadership and leadership development within an understanding of leadership as an adaptive 
tool for both individual and group survival. By applying this fundament, this empirical study 
seeks to avoid insignificant insights and decontextualized facts concerning leadership and 
leadership development. 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into eight main parts (Part I to VIII). Part I consists of this 
introductory chapter. Part II is devoted to the context and the theoretical foundation of this 
dissertation and consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 provides a description of the context 
within which most military officers will perform leadership. It describes the world of the 21st 
century and the challenges for today’s military and for an effective leadership development 
program to deal with these challenges. This chapter also answers two central questions: (1) 
Training to do what?  (2) Against whom? It also provides the underlying insights needed to 
understand war “in the context of everything else,” that is , as relevant to the political 
environment of the 21st century. Chapter 3 provides a foundation for military leadership in 
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21st century conflict by covering the essentials of Boyd’s theory needed to answer this 
dissertation’s research question.. Chapter 4 presents both a theory and method for 
implementing Boyd’s theory of competition and conflict. Part III of this dissertation consists 
of chapter 5, where the general conceptual framework underlying my empirical model will 
be discussed, and the relationships to be studied in the empirical study will be outlined as a 
result of Part II. Part IV consists of two chapters that are the direct result of the conceptual 
model needed to outline the research questions presented in part VI. Chapter 6 covers 
personality while chapter 7 covers culture. Part V consists of one chapter that describes the 
Royal Norwegian Naval Academy and its approach to leadership development. Part VI 
covers research and methodology and consists of two chapters. Chapter 9 outlines seven 
additional questions that supplement and help to answer the main research question, while 
chapter 10 is a discussion of the methodology applied in this dissertation. Part VII, results 
and analysis, consists of three chapters where the research questions outlined in chapter 9 are 
presented, analyzed and discussed. The final part, part VIII, includes the last chapter, which 
is devoted to an overall discussion of the results found in Part VII and their implications for 
our ability to resolve today’s conflicts and those in the future. It also suggests implications 
for the theory and practice of leadership development. This part includes a discussion of the 
limitations of this study, suggestions for further research, and ideas for improving leadership 
development at the RNoNA and in the Norwegian armed forces. 
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Part II 
The Context and Theoretical 
Foundation  
This part consists of three chapters that put this dissertation into context. Chapter 2 describes 
the nature of war and conflict in the 21st century, answering three central questions: 1) 
training to do what? 2) Where? and 3) Against what types of organizations? Chapter 3 
outlines Boyd’s theory of competition and conflict, while chapter 4 is a follow up on chapter 
3 presenting a theory and method that connect the theories presented in chapter 3.  
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2. War and Conflict in the 21st Century 
2.1 Introduction 
The world has changed. During my short time in the Norwegian armed forces, beginning in 
June 1981, the world has gone through significant changes. In 1981 I was part of an 
institution that was created in the aftermath of World War II (WWII). The standard 
assumption in the 1980s was that the Western world had about 8-9 minutes to respond to a 
Soviet launch of nuclear Armageddon, where Norway would form a flank. Specifically, we 
prepared to defend the northern flank from a Soviet invasion. Since then we have seen a 
dramatic downshifting in the nature of war. Within a few years the standard will be that 
Western military forces must be able to operate an unmanned aerial vehicle on the far side of 
the earth to identify, recognize, target, and if necessary employ a small missile to kill an 
individual, all within 8-9 minutes (Barnett, 2004, C-Span). Warfare has changed from taking 
on a massive nuclear war to taking down a terrorist halfway around the world.  
A closer look at the latest wars and conflicts in the 1990s reveals an interesting pattern. In 
Somalia, war was waged to eliminate the warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed and his clan. In 
the former Yugoslavia it was Milosevic and his lieutenants. In Afghanistan it was al Qaida 
and Osama bin Laden, and finally in Iraq it was a deck of cards (Barnett, 2004). What we 
have witnessed in the aftermath of the Cold War is a completely new military demand 
pattern. We are now facing an enemy like al Qaida, an enemy who does not use conventional 
military force. So what will our adversaries do? The answer is that they will wage fourth 
generation warfare (4th GW). Fourth generation warfare provides us with a challenge 
because it is still developing. Unfortunately this challenge has not yet been fully realized by 
the military and the political establishment. If it had, we would not have bought a “high 
tech” military, and ended up fighting “low tech” wars. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have clearly demonstrated the limits of modern technology: It can defeat virtually any 
conventional military force, but it provides no special advantages in prolonged insurgency. 
Joint Direct Attack Munitions and television-guided antitank missiles can not distinguish 
between insurgents and noncombatants or help soldiers to speak Arabic.  
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This development seems to be very hard to grasp, but its essentials must be understood if 
leadership development is to be linked to a context and broader organizational strategy that 
is relevant to 21st century warfare. In this chapter I will provide the essentials of this 
development by presenting in section 2.2 the “generations of war” concept, while section 2.3 
describes the environment that we will most likely face in today’s and tomorrow’s conflicts. 
Finally, section 2.4 summarizes this chapter by focusing on the new expanded and altered 
military role and its leadership requirements.  
2.2 The “Generations of War” Concept 
In this section I present a summary of the development of warfare using the generations of 
war concept. This concept is the most widely used scheme to break the history of modern 
warfare into overlapping evolutionary generations (Hammes, 2004; Lind, Nightengale, 
Schmitt, Sutton, & Wilson, 1989; Vandergriff, 2002) that define major changes in 
warfighting and leadership styles. The concept of “generations2” was first proposed in a 
1989 paper published in the Marine Corps Gazette. The authors (Lind, et al., 1989) began 
their numbering system with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established the modern 
state system in Europe, and the count of generations now stands at four. Each generation is 
not confined to a specific historic period, however, but can be seen somewhere in the world 
today, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
First generation warfare (1st GW) was close-quarters, linear fighting tracing its roots back to 
the Greeks and Romans through the Middle Ages and into the age of Napoleon. The tactics 
of this generation consisted of the column and line—regularity driven primarily by the need 
to mass firepower from short range smoothbore muskets. The first generation of war, 
however, reflected not just the limits of technology but also the political, economic and 
social structures that Europe developed as it transitioned from a feudal system to a system of 
nation-states ruled by monarchs (Hammes, 2004).  
                                                 
2 Lind et al. (1989) uses the term “generation” as a shorthand for a dialectically qualitative shift within modern war. As 
Lind states: “For you Hegelians out there, “generations” is short hand for dialectically qualitative shifts, and working with 
the U.S. Marines, to use the phrase ‘dialectically qualitative shift’ guarantees that the entire audience at that is reading the 
label on their beer bottles. So we have tried to simplify the terminology” (2001, p. 19-20). 
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Figure 2.1  The “Generations of War” Scheme (Richards, 2005, p. 21) 
 
The first generation of modern war evolved slowly in consonance with the societies of 
Western Europe until it peaked with the enormous armies of the levee en masse and the 
Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th century.  
Politically, warfare of Napoleonic size and complexity required the emergence of the nation-
state. Only the resources of a nation-state could raise, train, equip and sustain the massive 
armies required by the French Revolution and then by Napoleon. The nation’s transition 
from the private domain of a monarch allowed for mobilization of its entire wealth, 
ingenuity and manpower in support for war. Economically, major advances in agriculture 
and transportation were essential to generating the wealth and resources required to field and 
sustain large armies. Socially, the development of a genuine feeling of patriotism in the mass 
of men making up the armed forces was essential to enabling such warfare. By the end of the 
Napoleonic period, warfare did not involve just royalty, a small professional army, and the 
treasure of a country; it consumed the entire population.  
The military culture that evolved during the first generation was a culture of order, embodied 
in ranks, saluting, uniforms, drill, etc., in accordance with a typical bureaucracy. The 
philosophy of first generation warfare is that army that is the best at doing these things will 
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win. Hence, first generation warfare was (and to some extent is) characterized by rule-based 
practices, including specification of authority and the limits of that authority, specification of 
hierarchy of authority, supervision of the exercise of the authority, the continuous and 
ongoing nature of the exercise of authority, the continuing and ongoing nature of 
administrative activities, differentiation of person from office, and specialization of work 
activities based on expertise and documents as the bases for official business (Weber, 
1947)3. 
At the time that it evolved, it was consistent with the battlefield, which was dominated by 
order. The ideal army was a perfectly oiled machine and that was what the military culture 
of order sought to produce. Initiative by the ranks was not valued nor largely even tolerated. 
Officers of this period were from the aristocratic class, possessed little or no professional 
training, and operated under one commander who made most if not all tactical and strategic 
decisions. Because the issue was decided at the line of the battle, there really was no 
operational level in 1st GW. Although a few commanders, such as Gustavus II Adolphus, 
Frederick the Great, and the young Napoleon employed some of the practices of maneuver 
warfare, 1st GW is mostly focused on attrition warfare, where the aim is to compel the 
enemy to surrender by exploiting destructive force. The Napoleonic wars are considered the 
epitome of 1st GW, and their magnitude, combined with new and more lethal technologies, 
spurred the transformation from first to second generation warfare (Lind et al. 1989).  
Second generation warfare (2nd GW) was characterized by Materialschlacht or an industrial 
war of attrition. The period dominated by 2nd GW spans most of the post-Napoleonic era 
through World War II and the Vietnam War. From 1800 to 1915, the West witnessed a 
combination of increased gross domestic product (GDP) per person, major population 
increases, and significantly better government control. These factors, along with the rapid 
industrialization of Western Europe and North America, massively increased the wealth 
available to the national governments of Europe. This was important in the evolution of war 
because 2nd GW required both the wealth generated by an industrial society and the sheer 
volume of output that only such a society can produce. 
                                                 
3 Weber used the Prussian Army as a model when he described the bureaucratic organization.  
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Although technology developed rapidly, the military culture still remained a culture of order, 
and so 2nd GW is often represented by the French methodical battle. This entailed a step-by-
step approach to the battle, an emphasis on firepower, a belief that the defense was stronger 
than the offense, and strict obedience to orders from the top down. Under this concept, the 
locus of decision making had to remain at the highest levels, because a higher commander 
had to have greater control in order to coordinate the actions of numerous subordinate units. 
The entire system was designed to be propelled forward by pressure from above, rather than 
being pulled from below. When combined with the increase in lethality provided by 
industrial age weaponry, such rigid command structures produced the enormous increase in 
attrition that we associate with 2nd GW. 
Third generation warfare (3rd GW) evolved during World War I as a German bottom-up, 
idea-based, and technologically supported reaction to the Allies’ material superiority, and it 
restored maneuver to the battlefield. Rather than methodical battle, the Germans emphasized 
continuous operations—3rd GW is in some sense the triumph of “operational art,” which 
describes maneuvering between or even in place of battles. They stressed the importance of 
penetration, and if a breakthrough were made, the attacking troops would push as far as 
possible. The Germans emphasized mobility: The objective of the leading elements was not 
destruction of enemy soldiers. Rather, it was to seek penetration by attacking the weak spots 
of the enemy’s resistance, which they located and even created through tactics that exploited 
decentralization and initiative. The Germans also emphasized pulling from below. They 
recognized that while strategic or operational-level concepts had to be formulated by higher-
level commanders, the success of those concepts depended upon lower-level commanders 
having the flexibility and freedom to capitalize upon any momentary advantage that they 
might gain. To make the most of these tactical innovations, the Germans also evolved a 
leadership philosophy, often called the blitzkrieg philosophy (although the Germans did not 
use that name), under which a commander could act according to the circumstances of the 
moment and even sometimes ignore a directive or a control measure such as a boundary, if 
his actions contributed to the accomplishment of the unit’s mission.  
Such an approach relies on highly trained units led by well educated and experienced leaders 
trusted to make on-the-spot decisions to bypass enemy strengths and penetrate to attack 
vulnerable areas such as headquarters, supply depots, and artillery units. At the tactical level, 
it involves nonlinear tactics focused on making penetrations and is based on ideas such as 
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surface and gaps, reconnaissance pull, multiple thrusts4, and decentralized Auftragstaktik, 
all harmonized by the ideas of commander’s intent and Schwerpunkt (focus of effort). The 
key to its success was that the Germans already possessed a culture that emphasized 
decentralization and rapid decision-making by its officers and NCOs.  
Biddle (2004) has empirically shown that the modern system, which is 3rd GW, is the key to 
success in state-on-state warfare. At the same time he warns that:  
Modern-system offensive tactics are extremely complex, and demand high levels of 
training and skill to be implemented properly… While effective if implemented properly, 
they demand high level of skill both from troops and leaders… Such operations put a 
premium on judgment, mental agility, and individual initiative at all level of commands… 
(2004, p. 38 -44) 
The conclusion is straightforward: you win only by becoming better at 3rd GW than your 
opponent, rather than by achieving a material or even technological superiority over him. 
However, as noted, it seems that the age where advanced states settle life-or-death issues 
through conventional combat is over, and state-versus-state warfare in cases where one or 
both parties posses nuclear weapons will more resemble military theater than real war. This 
suggests that most warfare in the future must be something other than 1st, 2nd, or 3rd 
generation war. 
To describe fourth generation warfare (4th GW) is a difficult task because it is still evolving. 
What we know is that the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
have moved warfare away from contests between state armies and down to the individual 
level, which corresponds to the “first image” in a system proposed by Waltz5 (1959). This 
kind of warfare has been given many labels: Lind et al. (1989) labeled it 4th generation 
warfare and saw it as an extension of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation warfare. Van Creveld 
(1991) labeled it “nontrinitarian warfare6,” Smith labeled it “war amongst the people” 
                                                 
4 Multiple thrusts in business are sometimes called “exploratory marketing” (Hamal and Pralahad, 1994). The basic idea is 
to start a number of things and reinforce the ones that succeed. 
5 Waltz’s other two images are the individual and the international system. Within the individual image, wars start because 
there are evil people in the world, while within his third image, wars start because there is no Hobbesian leviathan to 
prevent them. 
6 Nontrinitarian warfare: The Clausewitzian Universe rests on the assumption that war is conducted predominately by states 
and governments. Until the Peace of Westphalia (1648), however, war was waged by many different kinds of social 
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(2005), while two Chinese colonels, Liang and Xiangsui (2002), labeled it “unrestricted 
warfare,” which includes; Trade War, Financial War, New Terror War (in contrast to 
Traditional Terror War7), Ecological War, Psychological Warfare, Smuggling Warfare, 
Media Warfare, Drug Warfare, Network Warfare, Technological Warfare, Fabrication 
Warfare, Resource Warfare, Cultural Warfare and International Warfare (pp. 36-46). They 
claim that any of these methods of operation can be combined resulting in a completely new 
method of operation. It appears that we are approaching Sun Tzu’s “total war”.  
Sun Tzu insisted that all warfare be as irregular (“formless”) as possible, which indicates 
that he made no fundamental distinction between different kinds of warfare. Whatever we 
label this kind of warfare, it contradicts the Clausewitzian Universe, which rests on the 
assumption that war arises as the logical result of policy decision made by states and 
governments. What we have witnessed since the end of the Cold War and what some 
strategists call “Globalization III”8 is that war now is waged by different kinds of social 
entities, and they wage war for a nearly endless variety of reasons.  
Van Creveld (2004), summarized modern warfare as: 
                                                                                                                                                      
entities, such as barbarian tribes, the Church, feudal barons of every rank, free cities, and even private individuals. His 
threefold division into government, army, and people does not exist in the same form when conducted by these other 
entities. Present-day armed violence often does not fit the Trinitarian pattern because it does not distinguish between 
governments, armies, and people (see especially van Creveld, 1991, p. 49-62). 
7 New Terror War describes terrorists who use the latest technology, and set themselves against humanity as whole. 
8 Globalization I, from 1870 through 1914, was largely based on the uncompetitive movement of raw materials from the 
colonies to Europe. When that system of global economy self-destructed in two great world wars, Western Europe along 
with Japan and Australia was connected to America’s new version of globalization, Globalization II, from 1945-1980. It 
was based on free markets, free trade, transparency, democracy, and collective security. The Western-defined globalization 
process renewed its march eastward with the collapse of the Communist bloc in 1989, with China predating that conversion 
by several years as a result of Deng Xiaophing’s “four modernizations” push in the early 1980s, which marked the 
beginning of Globalization III, 1980-2001. Globalization IV was entered as a result of 9/11 (Barnett, 2005, p.273-274). 
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A form of war in which the entire system of regular force, their maneuvers, and their 
operations collapses. In which the opponents are no longer uniformed forces, like yourself, 
fighting overtly in one way or another; advancing, retreating, maneuvering, firing, and so 
on and on, but, where you get a completely different kind of opponent who no longer wears 
a uniform, who no longer fights overtly, who may often no longer be a part of a regular 
chain of command. You are a part of a regular chain of command, you are being 
commanded from the top down. That is not true in 4th generation warfare, where to give 
Iraq as an example, there may be a dozen different groups all commanded—to the extend 
that they are commanded—by different people and different money. So, 4th generation 
warfare is a completely different kettle of fish. It is different, above all, not only in the 
tactics, but in the identity of the forces that fight it. 
We have seen front lines disappear and the distinction between friend, foe, and 
noncombatant become vague to nonexistent9. A decade before 9/11, van Creveld (1991) 
claimed that: “…the Clausewitz Universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no longer 
provide us with a proper framework for understanding war” (p. 58), and the same would be 
true for Waltz’s “second image,” the nation state. This fact seems to be difficult for both 
politicians and the military establishment in the Western world to understand as long as they 
are locked into a 2nd generation warfare orientation resting on an orderly culture. Van 
Creveld goes as far as claiming that: 
Many, particularly in Western-Europe, seem to be putting their heads in the sand, 
pretending non-trinitarian war does not exist or does not concern them and trying to 
preserve their structure even as the economic resources at their disposal as well as their 
order of battle continue to shrink. Others simply pray that it will go away so they can have 
a sigh of relief and return to ‘real soldiering’ (2003, p. 8) 
On the organizational level, the Norwegian and other Western militaries are facing an 
adversary that is a flat, organic, relatively leaderless, non-hierarchical network, rhizomatic, 
or starfish-like10. On the social level this network is bound together with personal ties that 
assure loyalty, trust, and cooperation. For this reason, fourth generation warfare has also 
been described as “netwar” (Hammes, 2004). Members of the network also share the same 
                                                 
9 Mary Kaldor (1999) gives a good description of this kind of warfare is her book, New & Old Wars: Organized violence in 
a global area. 
10 See section 2.5 for a more in-depth description of the starfish organization. 
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ideals, enabling them to create a social order11. As a result, there seem to be two doctrinal 
practices that especially suit netwar actors. First, they organize and present the network in 
way that is as “leaderless” as possible by having no single leader who stands out or by 
appearing to have multiple leaders, like the First Intifada that started on December 8, 1987. 
Here the Palestinians “created a web-like organization, a network that was not subject to 
decapitation, as a hierarchical organization would be. The networked nature of the 
leadership made it virtually impossible to destroy. This is a definitive characteristic of a 4th 
GW organization” (Hammes, 2004, p. 101). The other common doctrinal practice used by 
netwar participants is swarming tactics. As Robb (2004) describes it, rather than massing 
large, visible units on a battlefield, netwar leaders employ a myriad of small units that are 
normally kept dispersed. At a specified time or upon a signal, these dispersed units converge 
on a target from multiple directions, conduct an attack, and then redisperse to prepare for the 
next operation.  
Hammes also suggests that as the leadership of successful 4th GW groups has shifted the 
focus away from near-term tactical effectiveness—or from even winning battles—to 
continually improving the organization’s political viability, they have moved warfare into 
the context of everything else, besides merely war. In particular, they see themselves as 
webs of individuals unified by ideas and commonly-held stories and narratives but not as 
military organizations in the usual sense. Such stories seem to be important because they 
express a sense of identity and belonging—of who “we” are, why we have come together, 
and what makes us different from “them.” They also communicate a sense of cause, purpose, 
and mission. They express aims and methods as well as what “we” believe in, what we mean 
to do, and how. 
I will now examine in more detail developments in the international environment since the 
end of the Cold War that define the type of leadership development program that will be 
required. 
                                                 
11 This effect will be further addressed in section 3.6. in the discussion of Einheit, which is a German word that has the 
connotation of “unity” or “mutual trust.”  It implies a common outlook towards military or business problems built through 
common experience. The purpose of Einheit is to align individual orientations, although not rigidly, see Figure 3.1. 
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2.3 What Will We Actually be Facing? 
This is a difficult question to answer, but the metaphors of the starfish and the spider 
provide insight, see Brafman and Beckstrom (2006). The spider is a creature with eight legs 
coming out of a centralized body. If you chop off the spiders head, it dies. A starfish at first 
glance is similar to a spider in appearance. Like the spider, the starfish appears to have a 
bunch of legs coming out of central body, but that is where the similarities end. With a 
spider, what you see is what you get: The head does what heads usually do, the body houses 
the central organs, and so on. But starfish are very different. The starfish is decentralized and 
doesn’t even have a head. The major organs are replicated throughout each and every arm so 
that if you cut a starfish in half, it will not die, and pretty soon you will have two starfishes 
to deal with. The starfish can achieve this magical regeneration because it is a neural 
network—instead of having a head with a distinct brain, like a spider, the starfish functions 
like a decentralized network, and there is no central command. In the military world the 
starfish would be al Qaida12, while the spider would appropriately represent the Western 
military.  
As we saw with the attack on Afghanistan, it is easy to mistake military starfish, like al 
Qaida, for spiders, because we are looking for organizations that have structures, rules, 
hierarchies, and of course leaders. We are used to seeing the world through a centralized 
lens, and so decentralized organizations don’t make much sense. To make matters worse, 
when attacked, such a decentralized organization tends to become even more open and 
decentralized. Because there is no central intelligence and control, it can function as a open 
system, and the intelligence is distributed throughout the organization. A starfish-like 
organization is often able to respond more quickly than a spider because each member has 
access to knowledge and intelligence and also has the ability to make immediate use of 
them. This spells trouble for a spider organization because its members’ orientations make it 
difficult for them to recognize, when a decentralized organization is about to become a 
threat, even if they recognize it at all.  
This is a development that has been fueled by the Internet, making the mutation of a 
decentralized organization easy, and the result can be incredibly quick growth. This points to 
                                                 
12 Other organizations that functions like a starfish are Alcoholics Anonymous, Wikipedia, Skype, and Apache 
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the fact that when industries become decentralized, e.g. like the music record industry, 
overall profit decreases. So within business, when a starfish enters the equation there will be 
no more high profits. 
Even a starfish-like organization, however, requires some measure of cohesion; otherwise it 
would dissolve into a cloud of floating cells. The glue that holds decentralized organizations 
like al Qaida and the Taliban together is their ideologies (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006; Roy 
2004). Like the Apaches that fought the Spanish for more than two hundred years, both al 
Qaida and the Taliban hold their ideology so strongly that they are willing to fight and 
sacrifice themselves for their cause (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006). The Internet has allowed 
people who share this ideology to become virtual members, and they can in a sense join al 
Qaida without leaving home (Roy, 2004). As these organizations become more virtual, they 
also become more amorphous and more difficult to identify. This process creates circles of 
members that are independent and autonomous, yet glued together by ideology. They do not 
have hierarchy and structure, but they are not lawless. Instead of long lists of written rules, 
they largely depend on norms implied by their ideology. There is also another pattern to such 
decentralized organizations that may seem mysterious to modern structured militaries, and 
that is the presence of a catalyst—a spiritual and cultural leader who cedes daily operational 
control to other members. The catalyst’s leadership role is to enable the organization thrive 
on its own by transferring ownership and responsibility to the circle. A catalyst, like Osama 
bin Laden or the Apaches’ Nant’ans, is an inspirational figure who spurs others into to 
action by developing ideas, sharing them with converts, and leading by example. When 
organized into circles and cells united by a powerful ideology, starfish organizations can be 
extremely effective in 4th GW. 
By contrast, the typical military more fits the definition of a spider organization, which, 
when attacked, tends to become even more centralized, and unproductive activities (entropy) 
start building up inside it. Such organizations, like spiders or other “higher” organisms, 
employ a centralized command-and-control philosophy where the aim is to enforce order by 
issuing commands from the top and monitoring their execution at the bottom. Such an 
organization must closely track the activities of its members (to ensure that orders are being 
followed), making it unlikely that low ranking members will take risks and innovate. It is 
natural that spider-like military organizations will assume that all other armed forces are also 
spiders and will try to attack what seems to be their organizational structure and eliminate 
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their leaders. However, a starfish organization is not like the Sopranos: If the catalyst is 
identified and destroyed, another may rise to its place and the organization may continue to 
function, as the Israelis experienced during Intifada I and the United States has confronted in 
its struggle with insurgents in Iraq, see Hammes (2004, p . 179). 
So what do we do then? To take out a starfish there are two effective alternatives. The first 
involves polluting or raising the temperature of its water (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006). For 
a decentralized organization, like al Qaida, its “water” is the appeal of its ideology. We 
know that slums have been hopeless places where terrorists have easily recruited members, 
so when life is hopeless they might just as well join terrorist cells. The other proven strategy 
is to induce the starfish to start behaving more like a spider—to encourage or force it to 
adopt a more centralized structure, for example, which can then be dealt with through 
conventional police and military means. The Israelis successfully used this strategy against 
the first Intifada by reintroducing the (centralized) PLO into the occupied territories 
(Hammes, 2004). Both strategies require an understanding of war in the context of 
“everything else” and not solely within the context of war. I will develop this theme further 
in the next section. 
Operating against starfish-like organizations requires an expansion of the traditional military 
role. This is not, however, a new requirement. In 1997, The Center for Strategic & 
International Studies in their panel report Professional Military Education: An Asset for 
Peace and Progress stated that:  
Today, a young Army captain standing at a road juncture between formerly warring parties 
in Bosnia is equal parts soldier, diplomat, negotiator, provider of humanitarian relief, and 
law enforcer. In the future, he will have to deal with such things as information warfare and 
cyber crime ( Cheney, p. 18). 
It is clear that this expansion of the military role also requires an expansion of leadership 
development in order to provide the military teams capable of operating effectively in this 
new, complex, and amorphous environment.  
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2.4 Summary 
Leadership and leadership development must echo the future of warfare as represented by 
warfare in the context of everything else, which means 4th GW—“asymmetric” conflict 
pushed to its limits by starfishlike organizations. Our development efforts must enable 
officers to lead in conflicts in increasingly urban environments because the spread of 
urbanization will influence how armed forces conduct their future missions. Cities, once 
separated by maneuverable terrain, are increasingly connected with concrete. Whereas in 
earlier wars, most cities could be bypassed and isolated, this will not be the case as the 21st 
century progresses, as we can see from the streets of Baghdad and Beirut. Large cities now 
dominate the landscape in what Barnnet calls the “Gap.” Third World countries that have not 
integrated their economies into the developed “Core,” (Barnett, 2004) and potential enemies 
are likely to capitalize on this by forcing commanders to enter them13. If attacking forces 
enter cities behind a wall of massive firepower, as we have seen partly done in Iraq, civilian 
deaths will occur, something that undermines our struggle on the moral level. Future 
opponents representing or under the influence of superempowered individuals like bin Laden 
will use buildings as havens and fortresses, egging Western forces on to use firepower to 
protect soldiers’ lives, resulting in an attrition approach to conflict—war only within the 
context of war. 
Leadership development must also move away from exclusively inculcating military tactics. 
In today’s conflicts where the objectives are moral, we must ask ourselves why should our 
opponents, with an infinitely diverse array of options to choose from, want to enmesh 
themselves in a web of their own making and use means of warfare that are limited to the 
realm of the force of arms? Our future opponents, most of whom will be lacking the latest 
technological wonders, will employ moral and psychological tools enhanced by extensive 
study, along with off-the-shelf commercial technology, to counter and exploit the Western 
way of war. They can not succeed by use of overwhelming military power, nor even by the 
presence of causalities and bloodshed, but by continuing to evolve the concept of 4th 
                                                 
13 Sun Tzu’s approach to conflict has been used by guerrilla commanders, particularly by Mao Zedong. This is not 
surprising, given Sun Tzu’s emphasis on deception and formlessness, because guerrillas that become predictable are 
quickly eliminated. See Boyd, 1986, p. 90-91, for the essence behind guerrilla campaigns and p. 107-108, for counter-
guerrilla campaigns. 
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generation warfare. This represents our ultimate leadership and leadership development 
challenge. 
Few officers and soldiers in Norway and the other Western militaries possess sufficient 
mental preparation for this type of conflict, which goes beyond the traditional military 
doctrine and training. However, this is a reality that all officers must face, because the goal 
behind this kind of warfare will encompass more than merely “using all means that involve 
the force of arms to force the enemy to accept one’s own will.” Rather the goal might be “to 
use all means whatsoever—means that involve the force of arms and means that do not 
involve the force of arms, means that involve military power and means that do not involve 
military power, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties—to force 
the enemy to serve one’s own interests” (Liang & Xiangsui, 2002, p. 43). 
Military leadership development programs in the future must produce officers capable of 
operating in this new environment, of being better 4th GW warriors than their “terrorist” 
opponents who are organized into starfish-like organizations. These new officers will serve 
in organizations that are hybrids, retaining some elements of centralized control—
commanding officers, for example, who are subject to their countries’ political leaderships—
but also embodying some degree of starfish characteristics. When confronting a 
decentralized, ideological, networked enemy in the Gap, these organizations and their new 
officers must be able to adapt on the spot and act appropriately, which will often not involve 
the use of overwhelming military force. 
The most significant strategist of the post-World War II era to examine this problem and 
propose comprehensive solutions was John R. Boyd, and the next chapter will examine the 
essential elements of his approach. 
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3. John Boyd’s Philosophy of Conflict  
3.1 Introduction 
Fourth generation warfare differs from the more “normal” forms of war in such fundamental 
ways that an entirely new philosophy of conflict is needed to describe not only the conflict 
itself but the demands it will place upon leadership development.  The strategic theories of 
the late John R. Boyd provide the most comprehensive description of the changes in conflict 
and, as noted in previous sections, form the basis for the doctrines of the elite units of the 
American military. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the essentials elements of 
Boyd’s work in order to describe how military units in the future can absorb enough 
“starfish DNA” to successfully prosecute 4th GW.  
His work can be considered an updating and an affirmation of Sun Tzu, to which Boyd 
added insights from complexity theory, quantum mechanics, foundations of mathematics, 
evolutionary biology, neurophysiology and thermodynamics. It is especially important to 
note that his strategic concepts are independent of size or technological sophistication. Thus, 
using the concepts identified by Boyd, smaller but more cohesive and agile organizations 
can often defeat larger, more technologically sophisticated opponents, as we are seeing in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon today. Because his strategy is based around the moral and 
mental dislocations brought upon by rapid change, as contrasted to attrition from massed 
firepower, his work is particularly relevant in today’s conflict scenarios—4th GW and 
warfare within the context of everything else.  
Boyd focused on using a time advantage to reduce the enemy’s will to resist (moral effects) 
and by creating and exploiting weaknesses before the opponent could comprehend—make 
sense of—the situation, to cause confusion so that any resistance would not be effective. He 
identified an organizational climate that enables organizations to accomplish these effects.14 
                                                 
14 This climate is consistent with Barney (1986) and Pffefer (1995) who state that for an internal characteristic to provide a 
sustained competitive advantage it must be valuable, rare and imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1986; Barney & Hansen, 1994; 
Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 1995). 
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To create his organizational climate, Boyd relied on what now is called “self-organization,” 
a concept within complexity theory. This was a clear break from the top-down “command 
and control” or leadership mentality that all U.S. services employed. His alternative was to 
create and focus initiative and creativity throughout the organization, and thereby build the 
capacity for groups of people to learn their way out problems that could not have been 
predicted. Boyd was actually the first to a tie a specific climate based on initiative to the 
ability to generate fast transients, defines as abrupt changes in the environment, in combat 
and conflict situations.  
Section 3.2 gives a rationale for why applying the theories of John Boyd by discussing the 
criticism raised against his work. Section 3.3 outlines Boyd’s operational climate or culture 
which takes us into his world of leadership and the leadership philosophy that corresponds to 
his climate—Auftragstaktik. Section 3.4 covers the OODA loop, its speed, its central dialog, 
and its connection to command and control. Section 3.5 is a summary which also covers the 
fundamental differences between war and business. 
3.2 The Arguments Against the Work of John Boyd 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Boyd developed his ideas on conflict and military strategy during a time of significant 
scientific turbulence—the three decades of 1960-90—and the scientific debates and insights 
gained during this period strongly influenced his thinking. As science progressed and created 
a new language to address and explain the dynamics of living systems, Boyd evolved his 
mental concepts accordingly, see Osinga 2005 for detailed discussion of this topic. This 
reliance on new science, however, has also made him vulnerable to criticism. The majority 
of the criticisms against Boyd stem from two sources, one raised from an academic 
perspective and another from the military community. These need to be addressed and I will 
start with the latter.  
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3.2.2 Criticism from the Military Community 
The objections raised by some in the military community reveal an overly simplified concept 
of the OODA loop that implies an exclusive focus on speed of decision making, while 
obscuring other themes, theories and arguments that lie behind and should be incorporated in 
it. Based on this conception the following arguments are raised: 
 
1. The OODA loop can be negated by going slow, that is, by not immediately acting or 
reacting to the opponent’s moves. 
2. A competitive advantage may be gained by taking the time to make more accurate 
observations and better decisions rather than by going through the loop more quickly. 
Both of these arguments are based on the conception of the OODA loop as a simple O to O 
to D to A cycle, and if that were the case they would have some validity. However, if the 
concept Boyd actually drew (see section 3.4) is adopted, these no longer apply. According to 
Boyd, (1987a, 1987b) the important elements in applying the OODA loop to a conflict 
situation are: 
1. Keeping orientation as accurate as possible at all times - removing fixations that 
cause orientation to "stick" or lock, and 
2. Having an inventory of potentially effective actions that flow smoothly and 
intuitively from orientation. 
Under this concept, the "speed" element of the loop virtually disappears, and both of the 
objections become irrelevant.  Orientation will initiate actions when it is time to do so, not 
just when the loop happens to cycle back around to it.  
A more complete understanding of Boyd’s theory, which will be given in this dissertation, 
reveals a contest between orientations, that is, between opposing efforts to comprehend a 
rapidly changing and often poorly observed universe. When orientation becomes relatively 
inaccurate, that is, when one side's mental model of the universe no longer matches as well 
to reality as the other's, then some of the less accurate side’s actions will be ineffective 
because the situation will have changed.  To put this another way, the competitor who does a 
better job of keeping an accurate orientation will have opportunities to exploit inaccuracies 
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in his opponent's orientation - to "operate inside his OODA loop15." This “real” concept of 
the OODA loop also easily explains the primary physical manifestation of operating inside 
an opponent’s OODA loops, "fast transients," because orientation can simply trigger 
different actions in rapid sequence, which will appear as transients to outside observers.   In 
other words, it can set up the cheng, and then when it senses that the time is right, it can 
launch the ch'i -- the effect on the opponent will be a fast transient, see section 3.4.1. 
Another important contribution, and perhaps one of his most important and one that is rarely 
mentioned by those who criticize Boyd by only focusing on the incomplete version of the 
loop, concerns the non-physical effects on the opponent with the less accurate orientation. 
These fall into two categories:  
1 Mental, for individuals and groups. It includes surprise, ambiguity, confusion, shock, 
etc. 
2 Moral, for groups.  The most important moral effect is probably the emergence of 
many non-cooperative centers of gravity, which magnifies friction 
I will now turn my attention to the most important criticism as seen from an academic 
perspective, that raised by the Swedish engineer Niklas Zettering (2004). 
3.2.3 Criticism from an Academic and Scientific Perspective 
Zetterling’s criticism concerns Boyd’s use of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, 
Heizenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics in his essay 
Destruction and Creation (1976).  Any valid criticism of this essay would undercut much of 
Boyd’s theory because Destruction and Creation forms the basis of Boyd’s work and his 
way of thinking.  
Zetterling’s argument, which embodies the fundamental premise of all positivistic criticism, 
is that constructs and theories from the natural sciences cannot be applied to the study of 
human nature. While this argument is, in general, valid, it is important to examine how Boyd 
                                                 
15 In an award- winning essay Jim Snorr (2001), a British officer, even denied anything like an OODA loop exists: ”There 
is no OODA loop. The idea if getting inside the enemy decision cycle is deeply flawed” (p. 39). 
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actually used the three principles as part of his argument.  The fundamental question is 
whether metaphors, inspirations, and ideas from the natural sciences may be used to generate 
new understanding and knowledge within the social sciences. The obvious answer to this is 
yes, and even Zetterling finds such an approach valid: “With such a methodology, these 
sciences could be applied in generating ideas or as metaphors” (2004, p. 309, my 
translation). A deeper and more thorough reading of Boyd would have revealed that this is 
indeed his approach. Boyd never claimed that Heisenberg, for example, applied directly to 
the problems of human competition, but he used changing metaphors, thought association, 
and somewhat forced analogies to explore for insights and the relations between them.  
It is, in fact, generally recognized that there is great merit in developing and using metaphors 
to improve understanding of complex and perhaps yet unknown phenomena. As Robert 
Shaw noted, “you don’t see something until you have the right metaphor to let you perceive 
it” (Gleick, 1987, p. 262). Thus, the nuances, analogies, and metaphors uncovered through 
analyses produce new concepts. “They’re there,” says Boyd, “it’s just that they are prisoners 
of other concepts, and you need to liberate them. It’s a sort of guerrilla warfare of the mind” 
(Hammond, 2001, p. 184-185).  
Boyd never used the natural sciences as scientific evidence for the social sciences—as 
axioms which represented a stable center for further work—but as a starting point for 
understanding human behavior. This was Boyd’s way of thinking, his method which is 
described in Destruction and Creation, and the methods are neither true nor false, but either 
useful or not useful. Both Kuhn (1970) and Schumpeter (1994), for example, recognized the 
destructive side of creativity. But Boyd was unique in his explanation of how this process is 
grounded in fundamentals, such as those discovered by Gödel, by Heizenberg and by 
entropy, and he provided a compelling explanation for the destructive side of creativity.  His 
method of argument was that these destructive principles are found in every system that has 
been scientifically examined, and there is no reason to believe that they are not also present 
in social systems.  He then proceeds to give copious examples from the practice of armed 
conflict (Boyd, 1986, pp. 9-125). However, Boyd does not describe how nature behaves, but 
focuses on war and conflict within a mind-time-space, a framework for analyses and 
synthesis that incorporates all three aspects.  
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3.2.4 The Importance and Relevance of Boyd’s work 
It is fair to say that Boyd’s complete work represents an attack on American and Western 
doctrine and training, which apply formulaic answers, checklists, and school solutions and 
which shun openness, nonlinearity, and Auftragstaktik in favor of technology, attrition, and 
mass. Neither did his theories offer specific guidelines for designing military campaigns, like 
the more recent air power theorist John Warden (1995). Boyd’s ultimate aim was not to 
convince people about the validity of this or that doctrine, but instead to create a way of 
thinking, a thought process that revolves around the theme of adaptability (Hammond, 
2001). To reach this aim Boyd took on a very orderly culture which disliked the political 
aspects of war and preferred merely to apply military force to the targets selected. Strategy 
then equals targeting. The number and nature of targets destroyed represents the best 
measure of success. When the enemy can no longer endure the pain of this destruction, the 
war is over.  We are still encountering this mentality in Iraq and Afghanistan, with their 
daily counts of insurgents killed. 
This is an attrition approach to war that ignores the reality that is an intelligent, adaptable, 
and determined adversary who determines whether he will surrender, when, on what terms. 
Despite using terminology stressing strategic effort (e.g., “effects based operations”), the 
western military establishment still tends to focus on inputs, e.g. keeping score of targets, 
instead of on outcomes—the effects they seek to achieve. Boyd’s approach, which stressed 
mental agility, is an attack on an anti-intellectual orderly culture, see Vandergriff (2002) for 
a discussion of this topic.   
The distinguished English strategist Colin S. Gray (1996) characterized modern American / 
Western military culture by eight central attributes: 1) An indifference to history, 2) The 
engineering style and technical fix, 3) Impatience, 4) Blindness to cultural  differences, 5) 
Continental weltanschauung, maritime situation—war is incorrectly equated with “war in 
Europe,” 6) Indifference to strategy, 7) The resort to force, belated but massive, and 8) The 
evasion of politics. These attributes unfortunately led many modern military leaders to 
dismiss Boyd’s ideas as antiquated and too theoretical, ignoring the fact that his work 
represents an updated general theory of competition—independent of the technology 
employed—that dates back at least 2500 years, and to which I will now turn my attention. 
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3.3 Boyd’s Organizational Climate for Operational Success 
and its Leadership Consequenses 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Boyd worked his way back through history and found that many of the elements that 
characterized German military tactics and strategy of World War II also could be found 
throughout history, although the Germans were the first to codify them in their present form 
and to give them the distinctive terminology that we still use today. The German approach 
represents the starting point for his development of an organizational climate created in 
initiative and creativity throughout the military organization. His organizational climate 
represented a clear break from the traditional military approach to command and control16 
which was, and still is, the dominant approach within most military organizations today, 
especially those in Western Europe. This climate is a product of 1st and 2nd generation 
warfare and the culture of order which was further fueled by the “scientific management” 
approach.  
The aristocratic tradition, the top-down command and control system, the slavish addiction 
to the “Principle of Concentration”, and the drill regulation mind-set, all taken together, 
reveal an “obsession for control” by high-level superiors over low-level subordinates that 
restrict any imagination, initiative, and adaptability needed by a system to evolve the 
indistinct-irregular-mobile tactics that could counter the increase in weapons lethality 
(Boyd, 1986, p. 62). 
According to Boyd, this represented “a top-down mentality applied in a rigid or mechanical 
(or electrical) way that ignores as well as stifles the implicit nature of human beings to deal 
with uncertainty, change, and stress” (Boyd, 1987a, p. 35).  
To fully grasp how different his proposed organizational climate is, I will first look at 
leadership from a traditional military perspective, which interprets it as a command and 
                                                 
16 The traditional military approach to command refers to the ability to direct, order, compel with or without authority or 
power. While control means to have the power or authority to regulate, restrain, verify, (usually against some standard) 
direct or command. Comes from Medieval Latin contrarotulus, a “counter roll” or checklist (contra, against plus rotulus, 
list) (Boyd, 1987a, p. 37). 
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control question. This will be done in the first part of this section while the second part 
focuses on his organizational climate and its consequences for leadership. 
3.3.2 The Different Approaches; a Historical Perspective 
In any school of leadership, the function of command can be carried out by three different 
methods: by direction, by plan, or by influence. Each of these three methods responds to the 
commander’s underlying and pervasive quandary, uncertainty,17 and each of these methods 
of command grapples with uncertainty in its own way. Generally, the directing commander 
attempts to prioritize uncertainty, the command-by-plan commander seeks to centralize 
uncertainty, and the influencing commander prefer to distribute uncertainty (which was the 
idea behind the German approach). Viewed from a historical perspective these three 
methods can be grouped into two exclusive doctrinal architectures and approaches to 
command and control that have evolved for fighting wars. The first is direct, containing the 
command-by-direction and command-by-plan methods, while the second is the indirect, 
command-by-influence. 
The direct approach is based on the idea that one must exert close control over 
organizational energy, and it is seen within armed forces that rely on mass mobilization and 
a force of amateurs to fight their wars, e.g., like the Norwegian conscript model. Done 
correctly, this results in top-down flow or enforced integration via an imposed structure and 
is most suited for attrition warfare. Because of this, some commentators also label this kind 
of warfare “synchronization warfare” (Vandergriff, 2002). The function of command in this 
approach has been carried out in two ways, by direction or by plan (van Creveld, 1985).  
Command-by-direction is the oldest of methods—virtually the sole method until the middle 
of the 18th century, and largely in disfavor since (van Creveld, 1985). As armies grew larger, 
commanders realized that even if they could find a vantage point from where they could see 
the entire battle, distances prevented them from playing any role other than observer. This 
circumstance forced commanders to adopt one of two compromise approaches to command. 
In the first approach they could either attach themselves to one element of the force, judging 
                                                 
17 According to van Creveld (1985) insufficient information concerns not the quantity of information, but getting the 
necessary quality of information in the right form, at the right place, and at the right time. 
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it to be the decisive one, and thereby direct some of the forces all the time, while depending 
on communication, if any, with the other units. The second variant involved the commander 
moving from unit to unit as the situation seemed to warrant, thereby directing some or all of 
the forces some of the time. Both variants of command-by-direction fell short of the 
commander’s dream to direct dynamically all of the forces all of the time and instead forced 
him to attempt to prioritize uncertainty (Czerwinski, 1998). 
In recognition of the difficulties with command-by-direction, Fredrick the Great tried to 
break out of the limitation imposed in commanding-by-direction. He resorted to command-
by-plan, thereby opting for comprehensiveness over dynamism. The effort consisted of 
trying to plan every move in advance, relying on highly trained troops and strict discipline to 
carry out the scheme as ordered (van Creveld, 1985). This approach, the highly centralized 
command-by-plan formula, evolved into the norm for command of modern military forces. 
However, as with all plan regimes, increased complexity has more than kept pace with 
heightened competency. The reason is that command-by-plan inherently fights the disorderly 
nature of war as much as it does the adversary. It is a futile quest to will order upon chaos. 
This method is illustrated with the French approach towards the German attack in 1940 and 
the NATO air campaign methods used during the Gulf and Kosovo campaigns. This method 
is characterized by trading flexibility for focus, propelled forward by pressure from above, in 
order to concentrate on identifying and neutralizing centers of gravity or targets sets in a 
campaign. It operates exclusively at the strategic and operational levels of war. It reduces 
information requirements by focusing on perceived centers of gravity and honing associated 
targets list into prioritized and increasingly synchronized and simultaneous operations. 
Command-by-plan is a drastic simplification of the organization to enable it to operate with 
less information by preplanning the majority of its responses.  
Both command-by-direction and command-by-plan are supported by the capabilities of 
modern information technologies and especially the ongoing development of network centric 
warfare, which represents an evolution toward the concept of command-by-plan. The 
digitized battlefield is intended to equip commanders with dynamic, near real-time 
capabilities to enable them to synchronize their efforts according to the plan.  
Van Creveld (1985) insists that command-by-direction is an inadequate approach, regardless 
of the technology employed, and stands in the danger of becoming self-defeating because it 
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will lead to an extreme inward focus and thus result in increased entropy. The second 
approach, command-by-plan, which attempts to increase the performance of command 
through “drastic simplification of the organization so as to enable it to operate with less 
information” is like the first approach, also inadequate and likewise stands in danger of 
being self-defeating because such organizations do not interact with the unfolding and 
unanticipated events in their environment. A good example of this can be witnessed in the 
recent (July-August 2006) war between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Hezbollah. The 
IDF with its American-style hi-tech “precision weaponry,” killed ten times as many civilians 
as enemies, while Hezbollah with their rockets which are anything but precise killed more 
soldiers than civilians18. Israel can hit anything it can target, but against a Fourth Generation 
enemy, it can target little. This also raises the question of who is the real “terrorist.” Terror 
bombing by aircraft is still terror, so Hezbollah may not only be winning at the moral and 
mental levels and at the strategic and operational levels, but at the physical and tactical 
levels as well (Lind, 2006).  
When an organization is confronted with insufficient information to carry out a task in an 
unpredictable environment, which is the case both with command-by-direction and 
command-by-plan, the second doctrinal architecture, the indirect, can offer a solution. Van 
Creveld described the essence of indirect architectures, which include maneuver warfare, by 
observing that in unpredictable and confused circumstances, a military organization must: 
… react by designing the organization, or indeed the task itself, to operate on the basis of 
less information, relying on the division of the task into various parts and to the 
establishment of forces capable of dealing with each of the parts separately on a semi-
independent basis. It is a central theme… through every change… (and) technological 
development that the third one will remain superior… in virtually every case (1985, p. 269) 
This method takes disorder in stride as inevitable and even, in so far as it affected the enemy, 
as desirable. The aim here is to unleash power in a focused way. Done correctly, the result is 
a bottom-up flow or natural harmony via an evolved structure. The function of command in 
this approach is command-by-influence (van Creveld, 1985). Command-by-influence was 
                                                 
18 According to Lind (2006) who quotes the Associated Press, as of the 10th of August, Lebanese dead total at least 642, of 
whom 558 are civilians, and only 55 Hezbollah fighters. In contrast, of 97 Israeli dead, 61 are soldiers and only 36 
civilians. 
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developed by the Germans in the latter stages of World War I and refined in World War II. 
The modern German approach to warfighting started as a reaction to the Prussian defeat by 
Napoleon in 1807, it was conceptually complete by 1918, and it was successfully applied in 
1939-40 (Jacobsen, 1996), indicating a focus on adaptation and evolution. Van Creveld 
(1982) compared command-by-plan, the American way, and command by influence, the 
German way, and found that the Germans, using the second approach, far exceeded 
Americans (who largely embodied command-by-plan) in fighting power.19  
The Wehrmacht was able to deploy such powerful forces because they had evolved a 
superior system for dealing with people. They built their army around the needs, social and 
psychological, of the individual fighting man. They believed in mutual trust, a willingness to 
assume responsibility, and that it was the right and duty of subordinate commanders at all 
levels to make independent decisions and carry them out. To generate independence, 
freedom had to be granted. To train men towards responsibility, authority had to be 
delegated. To create trust, they had to assure reliability and long standing relationships. They 
looked for character and the capacity for independent action, while careerism was frowned 
upon. The ability to generate and maintain trust was counted as the single most important 
virtue. This led them to focus on personality, character, professional competence, and 
achievements. By “character” they meant: honesty, selflessness, readiness to commit oneself, 
and a sense of responsibility (van Creveld, 1982). 
Though American officers were also to lead men in combat, this was regarded essentially as 
a “human engineering” problem. The senior leadership of the U.S. Army did not pay strong 
attention to the needs of the soldier, but relied on the new theories of “scientific 
management” and on techniques to ensure the optimum distribution and deployment of 
resources. To become a qualified “personnel technician,” an officer had only to acquire the 
tricks of the trade. The differences between these two approaches are reflected by their 
thought-processes and even by their language. A German officer confronted by some task 
would ask: worauf komme es eigentlich an? While the American officer trained in the 
“engineering approach” to war, would inquire: what are the problem’s component parts? 
                                                 
19 The term fighting power is the mixture, in one combination or another, of discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, 
courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary to die. Fighting power, is defined as the sum 
of the total mental qualities that make armies fight (van Creveld, 1982, p. 3)  
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(van Creveld, 1982). Interestingly this indicates that Western modern militaries, for the most 
part, find themselves in a tradition extending from Hegel through Marx and Durkheim to 
modern-day sociologists and social psychologists, who believe that when a person is placed 
in a leadership role, e.g. as a commander of a submarine, that person is, by definition, a 
leader, and that most people are fungible—it does not particularly matter who is in the role 
because individual differences in the talent for leadership are irrelevant. They expect that 
subordinates will respect the role and abide the role player. On the other hand the German 
approach aligned with Sigmund Freud, Thomas Carlyle, and Max Weber, evolutionary 
theory, and Sun Tzu, a tradition that argues that leadership is a function of the characteristics 
of individuals. This means that some people have more talent for leadership than others, and 
that who we are is how we lead (Hogan, 2006). 
According to Boyd (1986, 1987a) the German codification rested on the following cultural 
attributes; Einheit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt20. It was this 
codification that Boyd further developed and polished to the “Principles of the Blitzkrieg” 
(see Boyd, 1986). He derived these partly from established German doctrine and partly from 
his interviews with senior Wehrmacht commanders (see Richards, 2004, p. 134). Boyd, 
however, did not like the term “Principles of Blitzkrieg” because of its connotations. He 
preferred to call these four, “An Organizational Climate for Operational Success,” thereby 
tying it to any type of organization, not just military units (Richards, 2004). According to 
this scheme, any culture or leadership climate will work if it advances these four attributes. 
So what did the Germans do? 
The German success in 1940 ultimately rested on a cultural foundation that stressed 
character and the capacity for independent action. They emphasized continuous operations 
and stressed the importance of penetration, and if a breakthrough were made, the attacking 
troops would push as far as possible. The objective of the leading elements was not 
destruction of enemy soldiers. Rather, it was to seek penetration by attacking the weak spots 
                                                 
20 Fingerspitzengefühl is a Zen-like quality of intuitive understanding, an ability to sense when the time is ripe for action 
that is built through years of progressively more challenging experience. Einheit - has the connotation of "mutual trust" and 
implies a common outlook towards organizational problems. This is built through common experience and represents 
Fingerspitzengefühl at the organizational level. Schwerpunkt—which is any concept that gives focus and direction to our 
efforts. In ambiguous situations, it answers the question, "What do I do next?” This requires leadership. Auftragstaktik—
convey to team members what needs to be accomplished, get their agreement to accomplish it, then it hold them strictly 
accountable for doing it—but it doesn’t prescribe how. It requires high levels of mutual trust.  
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of the enemy’s resistance through exploitation of the principles of decentralization and 
initiative. They emphasized pulling from below while at the same time they recognized that 
strategic or operational-level concepts had to be formulated by higher-level commanders. As 
Richards (2004) points out, successful military organization are not participatory 
democracies. There is a commander whose intent is paramount and whose lawful orders 
must be obeyed. Highly effective military organizations have found ways to harmonize this 
commander’s intent with the initiatives of all other members of the organization, which is 
the ultimate force multiplier. The success of those methods depends upon lower-level 
commanders having the flexibility and freedom to capitalize upon any momentary 
opportunities they might gain. Under the German leadership philosophy, a subordinate 
commander could act according to the circumstances of the moment and even sometimes 
ignore a directive or a control measure such as a boundary if his actions contributed to the 
accomplishment of the unit’s mission.  
They also considered leadership as an art, which the introduction of their Truppenführung of 
1936 reveal: “War is an art, a free creative activity resting on scientific foundations. It makes 
the highest demands on a man’s entire personality” (van Creveld, 1982, p. 28-30). 
German commanders were able to obtain a high operational tempo and rapidly exploit 
opportunities because of their approach to leadership. A German commander made sure that 
his subordinates knew his intent, his Schwerpunkt (the main focus of effort). Through use of 
this scheme, subordinates were not micromanaged; they were instead given Auftrag 
(“mission orders”). They understood their commander’s overall intent and they knew that 
their job was to do whatever necessary to fulfill that intent. The essence here was the 
interplay between Absicht, Auftrag, and Entschluss. The Germans’ Absicht is translated as 
the intent. The commander then assigned Aufträge (tasks) to subordinate units to carry out 
his Absicht. The subordinate commander then decided upon a specific course of action, the 
Entschluss, which became his resolution or decision (Hughes, 1986). According to the 
German Truppenführung a subordinate commander could change or abandon his task within 
the framework of the higher commander’s overall Absicht. Exactly this ability to separate 
Absicht (intent) at higher level from Aufträge (tasks) and Entschluss (resolution/decision) 
was critical both to their legendary battlefield flexibility and to the initiative of its 
commanders at all levels. As a result of this concept, both subordinate and commander 
shared a common outlook. They trusted each other, and this trust was the glue that held this 
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apparently formless effort together and permitted implicit rather than explicit 
communication. Trust was simply the unifying concept.  
3.3.3 Boyd’s Climate 
Boyd developed the approach described in the previous section into an “Organizational 
Climate for Operational Success.” One way to visualize Boyd’s climate is to start with the 
individual and work upwards (Richards, 2004), which also underlines that we as human 
beings are nested in teams, and teams are nested in organization. It is not teams that behave, 
it is people, and in so doing, they create team-level and organizational phenomena. 
Individuals cultivate and polish their Fingerspitzengefühl, intuitive competence, for the jobs 
they hold. This comes through years of experience and self-discipline. It provides its owner 
an uncanny insight into confusing and chaotic situations often described as the “ability to 
feel the battle”21. Einheit or “unity” or “mutual trust” can be thought of as a super-
Fingerspitzengefühl—and it suggests the competence of the group, working together to 
accomplish some purpose. As such, the Einheit aligns the individuals, although not rigidly. 
The Schwerpunkt provides focus and direction to aim the entire organization towards that 
goal or purpose. “Focus and direction” is how Boyd usually translated Schwerpunkt which: 
… represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of 
effort as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true 
decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing 
cohesion of overall effort.  
or put another way 
Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of 
many subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress 
time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to 
unfolding circumstances (Boyd, 1986, p.78). 
As mentioned, the Schwerpunkt is also the ch’i (see Boyd, 1986, p. 147, 151, 153, and 157), 
and so it requires that all other organizational activities support it. To do so, it has to provide 
                                                 
21 See especially Klein (1998) to get an impression of the importance of this ability) 
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real and actionable guidance in those situations, such as an abrupt change in battlefield or 
market conditions, where there has not been time to issue new formal directions. People who 
find themselves in such circumstances must understand what the main effort is and how they 
can support it. Then they can use their initiatives to accomplish the organization’s mission 
until they receive further orders. People don’t wait around for the commander to make a 
“decision” before taking action. They show initiative, and they gain the confidence to do so 
through experience and trust—Einheit—among people throughout the organizations. The 
effect of many people within a unit taking the initiative (harmonized by the commander’s 
intent) is that the unit can rapidly change direction. This rapidity or quickness is critical, 
because a gap in the enemy’s position—or in a competitor’s product line—will only be an 
opportunity for a brief period, until the adversaries or competitors reorient.  
The concept of Schwerpunkt, focus-and-direction, satisfies a necessary condition for the 
successful employment of mission orders, or Auftrag. According to Boyd22, the Auftrag or 
mission can be thought of as a virtual contract between superior and subordinate. The 
subordinate agrees to undertake actions that will serve the superior’s intent in terms of what 
is to be accomplished, while the superior agrees to give the subordinate wide freedom to 
exercise imagination and initiative in terms of how intent is to be realized. As part of this 
concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge or question the feasibility of the 
mission if the subordinate feels the superior’s ideas on what can be achieved are not in 
accordance with the existing situation or if the superior has not provided adequate resources 
to carry it out. Likewise, the superior has every right to expect the subordinate to fulfill the 
mission contract when agreement is reached on what can be achieved consistent with the 
existing situation and resources provided (Boyd, 1986, p. 76). 
One way to understand the Auftrag is to apply Weick’s (1983) streamlined, but different 
version of it, here known as the commander’s intent statement. Weick’s version contains 
five facets: 
1. Here’s what I think we face. 
2. Here’s what I think we should do. 
                                                 
22 Boyd never uses the word Auftragstaktik in his presentations but used “mission” instead. 
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3. Here’s why. 
4. Here’s what we should keep our eye on. 
5. Now, talk to me. 
However, there are limitations with the mission concept that need to be dealt with because: 
“…it does not suggest ways to coordinate or harmonize activities among many superiors and 
subordinates as a collective group” (Boyd, 1986, p. 76). This was solved by joining the 
Auftrag to the Schwerpunk. The Auftrag,which is personal, between a superior and a 
subordinate, is designed to allow maximum room for individual initiative, while still 
accomplishing the unit’s mission (either directly assigned or inferred from the Schwerpunkt) 
during the chaos and complexity of conflict and war. It can be thought of as “fine-tuning” 
the orientations of individuals. It is the Schwerpunkt, on the other hand, that provides 
harmony for the entire group, providing guidance for the infinity of circumstances that 
neither can be enumerated nor foretold. Without both Schwerpunkt and Auftrag (mission) 
there can be no orientation to deal with both present and future because the Schwerpunkt is 
the harmonizing agent, a medium to realize superior’s intent without impeding initiative in 
order to produce vigorous effort in the organization and is thus a key element in harmonizing 
the orientations of all members of the group. 
Because the future is the future—uncertain, ambiguous, and at least partially under the 
control of others who do not wish us well—we will from time to time have to shift our focus. 
There cannot be a formula for this process, although in general, the Schwerpunkt aims the 
organization while the Auftrag (mission), provides the energy, the motive force to encourage 
the members of the group toward accomplishment of the common goal.  
The German approach produced organizations with leaders who were able to build stable 
relationships with individual members, which is largely a function of their integrity and 
social skill. Leaders with social skill and integrity are able to recruit individuals, in a 
psychological sense, to group participation. Those who lack social skills or integrity can 
only form a group by demanding the obedience of their staff, and such groups generally do 
not hold together well under pressure. Conversely, it tended to eliminate poor officers, who 
often lacked social skills or integrity, were unable to build relationships, and were therefore 
unable to build and maintain effective fighting units. Another important way the Germans 
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were able to bind people to a team was by providing participants with a creditable rationale 
for their membership (van Creveld, 1981). 
They were able to project a vision that the individuals found attractive23, a vision consistent 
with their own identities and that gave meaning and purpose to their participation in the team 
task, which is what results from applying Auftragstaktik and employing the Schwerpunkt, see 
Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1  A Graphical Representation of Boyd’s Organizational Climate 
for Operational Success (Richards, 2004, p. 129-130) 
 
Leaders with imagination can project a vision (which requires the ability to synthesize) and a 
Schwerpunkt that participants find attractive, morally compelling, and worthy of allegiance, 
                                                 
23 According to van Creveld “the average German soldier in World War II was not psychotically inclined. He did not fight 
to gain social prestige, at any rate after the winter of 1941. He did not as rule fight out of a belief in Nazi ideology – 
indeed; the opposite may have been nearer the truth in many cases. Instead he fought for the reasons that men have always 
fought: because he felt himself a member of a well-integrated, well-led team whose structure, administration, and 
functioning were perceived to be, on the whole and spite of the inevitable existence of Drückengerger (shrikers) and 
“Golden Pheasants” (party hacks in gorgeous uniforms), equitable and just” (1982, p. 163-154 ).  
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whereas incompetent leaders unwittingly project visions that are distasteful, incongruent 
with identity of status motivations) to people. 
In summary, people were linked to groups by virtue of the personality of the officer. It is this 
“climate” that offsets the tendency of a team or an organization to lose effectiveness as a 
result of the transfer of entropy across organizational boundaries, resulting in increased 
entropy—manifest as disorganization and wasted energy—within the group itself.  
3.4 The OODA Loop 
Boyd’s approach to strategy—the mental tapestry which suggests that individuals’ efforts 
and actions must converge to an emerging pattern in order to accomplish a higher purpose 
(1987b, p. 58)—rests on his conclusion that the pattern of winning and losing comprises four 
key qualities: insight, initiative, adaptability, and harmony24 (Boyd, 1986, p. 185) and their 
interaction played out on the physical, mental, and moral level. These are the key features 
that permit teams and other organizations to shape and adapt to an ever-changing 
environment (Boyd, 1986). To do so, they must be able to pull the adversary apart by 
restricting the flow of energy into its system, which increases its entropy, produces paralysis, 
and collapses any remaining will to resist. In 4th GW terms, these features enable units to 
“poison the water” of their starfish-like adversaries. 
Boyd created a most effective technique for accomplishing this at the tactical level where 
leadership is put into action to: 
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops to enmesh 
adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, 
chaos,… and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he can not cope with 
events/efforts as they unfold (1986, p. 177) 
The focus is on disrupting the adversary’s perception, initiative, and trust, or what Boyd 
called the mind-time-space dimension of an adversary, rather than on achieving a 
                                                 
24 Boyd used two variants of the set of these four elements, this is the second one, while the first one was 
variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative, see Boyd, 1986, p. 12. 
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quantitative advantage in firepower. Obviously this turns the OODA loop into a central part 
of Boyd’s approach as well as any leader’s, manager’s, or commander’s activity because it 
controls the range of available of available actions. 
Even though it is called a “loop,” it is not, and Boyd put the word inside quotes in his last 
briefing (1995). Unfortunately, most of the time it is presented as a loop, e.g., see the NJDD, 
2000, Part A, p. 64. However, as Figure 3.2 illustrates this is not the case. The OODA loop 
is not a sequential cycle of observe, then orient, then decide, then act, then back to observe. 
If this were correct, then the OODA loop would be nothing more than an ordinary “stage 
model.” In any competitive situation, however, we can never afford to quit observing while 
we try to orient or make decisions. All the elements of the OODA loop must operate 
simultaneously. Action must flow smoothly, in an organic way, from orientation, usually 
without an intervening and often delaying decision step. This important point is illustrated 
with the red implicit guidance & control arrows from orientation to action in Figure 3.2.  
The OODA loop represents an approach to organizational behavior which focuses on ways 
to improve organizational compositeness, where the essential purpose of the OODA loop is 
to help people understand how to change their environments before their opponents can 
comprehend, that is, by operating inside their opponents’ loops. 
 
 
Figure 3.2  The OODA Loop (Boyd, 1995) 
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This is done thorough interaction. Interaction, in its various forms, is the glue that binds any 
social system together by balancing stability with entropy. By juxtaposing the positive and 
negative features of various activities and linkages, Boyd derives the concept that interaction 
represents “a many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, 
correlation, and rejection” (1987a, p. 10-11). Projection represents a collision of ideas and 
hypothesis, which is the Popperian process of conjecture and refutation. Next Boyd observes 
that orientation seen as a result (i.e., not as a process) represents “images, views, or 
impressions of the world shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, 
and unfolding circumstances” (1987a, p. 13). Now he has brought together different 
synonyms for mental models—schemata, memes, and tacit knowledge—in a dynamic 
relation with the environment. He has also incorporated Polanyi’s vision of knowing, while 
the relationship with the environment clearly points toward complexity theory as previously 
discussed. By bringing together the conceptual lenses for observation, which is the source of 
images, views, or impression, with interaction he gives a description of the “end state” of 
orientation, that is, as a process: 
Orientation is an interactive process of many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, 
empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and shapes the interplay of genetic 
heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, unfolding circumstances, and analyses 
and synthesis (1987a, p. 15) 
This is a heavily synthesized description that indicates that orientation is a dynamic process 
which results in views, images and impressions. According to Boyd, effective orientation—
the many-sided, implicit cross-referencing process—requires the ability to deconstruct any 
problem in a number of ways, draw ideas from across a range of disciplines, and discern 
common patterns (Richards, 2004). Orientation, then, is best considered as a continuous, on-
going, far-from-equilibrium process that is partly constituted by our interactions with a 
confusing and rapidly changing environment. But at the same time it also suggests that our 
interactions are subject to modification, which is also true of our views, images, and 
impression. Therefore: 
Orientation is the Schwerpunkt. It shapes the way we interact with the environment—hence 
orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act. In this sense 
orientation shapes the character of present observation-orientation-decision-action loops—
while these present loops shape the character of future orientation (Boyd, 1987a, p. 16). 
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Orientation is a damping mechanism because it controls not only what action we are going 
to take but the whole range of actions available to us (Beckerman, 1999). Orientation limits 
how many states are available, otherwise we would produce an infinity of states, which 
would simply be chaos or stochastic equilibrium, where any one of them is as likely as any 
other. Because action is flowing out of orientation, until our orientation changes our range of 
available actions can not change. Orientation is the dissipative structure making adaptation 
to novelty possible. The loop, like the whirlpool, only exists when it is moving, hence when 
it is dissipating entropy out of the system so it can continue to self-organize and continue to 
process energy through it.  
3.4.1 OODA Loop Speed 
The concept of OODA loop speed, which most militaries wrongly considers equivalent to 
decision making speed, involves the entire loop, all 33 or so arrows. OODA loop speed is 
fundamental to an understanding of how OODA loops produce decisive effects in war and 
other conflicts. This most definitely does not mean that just executing OODA loop cycle 
more rapidly than one’s opponent is the key to victory.  
When action is flowing smoothly and nearly instantaneously from orientation, as it should 
the vast majority of the time, then the speed that counts reflects the time to reorient in 
response to changing external and internal conditions. With a more rapid reorientation, or 
equivalently, with an orientation that is at any point in time better matched to the 
environment than the opponent’s, opportunities will arise to set up and exploit deception and 
surprise—“play the cheng/ch’i game,” as described by Sun Tzu (from cheng, meaning 
orthodox or expected and ch’i meaning shocking or unexpected. When this is successful, the 
slower side, that is, the victim of the deception, will have to spend time to recover from the 
deceptive act. This will allow the quicker side to continue changing the situation. Fourth 
generation combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan are playing this game quite effectively by 
combining attacks with improvised explosive devices with attempts to ambush the survivors 
and rescuers. 
However, it can not be emphasized too strongly that the key to playing the cheng/ch’i game 
is accurate orientation. In Boyd’s concept, a competitive unit will quickly understand the 
situation, recognize the possibilities for cheng/ch’i at all levels, and through its implicit 
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guidance and control, will be able to set up and exploit effective surprise and deception 
operations. At the same time, it will learn from the experience (decision/hypothesis), which 
might result in reorientation and perhaps also in a wider repertoire of future actions.  
The “quickness” of OODA loops is manifested in the ability to make rapid switches between 
cheng and ch’i to produce the jerky, abrupt asymmetric fast transits that causes adversaries 
to hesitate and their abilities to function break down. Quickness, or agility, in this sense of 
asymmetric fast transients, is partly dependent upon an organization’s ability to expand the 
envelope of its intuitive capabilities, its Fingerspitzengefühl, so most of the time it can 
exploit lower level initiative, while at the same time realize higher-level intent, thereby 
diminishing entropy and compressing time through what is unstated or not communicated to 
one another in an explicit sense. Mental agility with an attached time vector to the main 
purpose is the key to remaining adaptive and unpredictable.  
It is therefore important that we, or any organization, suppress the tendency to build up 
explicit internal arrangements—a complex organization, for example, or a culture of 
bureaucracy, or a high degree of dependence on technology—that hinder interaction with the 
external world. Boyd found that smaller or less technologically advanced forces often won 
(see Boyd, 1986, p. 89, Richards, 2004, p. 39-40), largely because of their ability to rapidly 
shift the focus of their main efforts and thereby excel in the cheng/ch’i game. This enabled 
smaller forces to “operate inside their opponents’ OODA loops,” which Boyd defined as the 
ability to create and exploit opportunities before the larger forces could comprehend and 
then reinforce or take other effective action. As a result, Boyd insisted throughout his life on 
“people, ideas, and hardware” in that order, because there are few instances where 
technology or size alone was able to change the situation quickly enough to overcome 
deficiencies in people or ideas (Biddle, 2004; Coram, 2002; Hammond, 2001; van Creveld, 
1989).  
This is of utmost importance since commanders must simultaneously observe any 
mismatches between their conceptions of ongoing events and the way they really are. 
Serious mismatches should cause them to reorient to new confusing and threatening 
situations, and force them to generate new ideas to deal with them (Richards, 2004, p. 65). In 
those situations, the quickness of the whole loop will be determined by the time it takes to 
reorient in response to what is happening in the environment. Reorientation then is done 
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through explicit decision, that is, through an ongoing process of hypothesis and test, Boyd’s 
alternate labels for decision and action. Explicit decisions are also made when implicit 
decisions are not sufficient. In such a situation, it is necessary to explicitly reharmonize the 
action of groups of people, i.e., to reorient them to a new goal or purpose. This is illustrated 
with blue colors in Figure 3.3. Because explicit decision making, action, observation, and 
reorientation always take time, there is an interval during which an organization will remain 
locked into its existing orientation by its implicit guidance and control link. This existing 
orientation will influence the ongoing actions until we are reoriented and have changed the 
range of available actions.  
 
Figure 3.3 The OODA Loop and Explicit Decisions 
 
3.4.2 The OODA loop in play: The central dialectic 
The OODA loop puts us into a central dialectic—a struggle involving our orientations, 
adversaries’ orientations, and an unfolding of events or patterns in the environment—that 
underlies our conscious reality. The danger is that we might become alienated, which in 
conflict and war is more than merely a psychological sense of unhappiness with the world as 
it is. Alienation means the ironic relationship of being controlled by the product of one’s 
own orientation, which is illustrated in the OODA loop figure with an asterisk besides the 
feedback arrow that goes from action to orientation in Figure 3.2. To avoid alienation we 
must be able to create mental images—dynamic patterns—that match the dynamic, ongoing 
activity in the world and thereby reduce our own entropy.  
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Commanders therefore, must always look for mismatches and live by the general rule that 
bad news is the only thing that will do them any good. To thrive, we must be able to find 
data that do not fit with our current orientation and we must do this while there still is time. 
This requires interactions, emphasizing again the process nature of orientation: If we do not 
interact continuously with as wide a variety of sources as possible, our brains can not cope 
with the new developments that come from the environment, and we will not be able to 
reorient. We will not have an adequate variety of responses, resulting in an overload of 
stress. While we are doing this, we must also deny our adversary the possibility of 
uncovering or discerning those patterns that match our activity or other aspects of reality in 
the world. If we are successful, this will increase our adversary’s entropy. If we are not 
successful, there is the possibility that the adversary will change the world before we can 
comprehend what has changed, and we will become disoriented and find ourselves in the 
position of playing catch-up. As a result we will most certainly lose the initiative. 
The red arrows in the OODA loop (Figure 3.2) reflect Boyd’s conclusion that most decision 
making can and should be implicit, and that quite often, orientation controls actions 
implicitly without the need for explicit decisions at all (Richards, 2004, p. 64). The ability to 
dispense with explicit decisions and rely instead on implicit guidance and control requires 
harmony in form of cohesion, mutual trust, and common orientation/outlook25. This can only 
be gained by exposing commanders with different skills and abilities, hence with a high 
degree of diversity, through training, against a variety of situations as close to a conflict 
environment as possible, whereby each commander can observe and orient simultaneously to 
the others and to the variety of changing situations (Boyd, 1987a, p. 18). The common 
outlook or Einheit26 is “created” when commanders make their Schwerpunkt or intent known 
to their own subordinates. Once this is achieved, subordinates do not need to be 
micromanaged; instead they can be led, using Auftrag.  
The result of this process is that subordinates and their commander begin to develop and 
share a common outlook. This means that they understand and know their commander’s 
                                                 
25 Boyd’s use of “common outlook” is similar to the concept of shared mental models that allows team members to 
generate common predictions about the task and team demands in absence of communication among team members (see 
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 1997; Tannenbaum, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996).  
26 Boyd also used the German word Einheit to describe Common outlook. 
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overall intent and they know their job is to do whatever necessary to fulfill that intent. Only 
in such an environment of harmony, trust, and focus that commanders can successfully 
employ implicit communication. At the same time, trust will evolve as a consequence of the 
similar mental images or impressions that the commander and each member of the unit 
create and commit to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of experience in the 
same way (Boyd, 1987a, p. 18). As the doctrine of the one U.S. service that has adopted 
maneuver warfare summarizes it: 
…it is not more command and control that we are after. Instead we seek to decrease the 
amount of command and control we need. We do this by replacing coercive command and 
control methods with spontaneous, self-disciplined cooperation, based on low-level 
initiative, a commonly understood commander’s intent, mutual trust, and implicit 
understanding and communication (MCDP 6, 1996, p. 110). 
This might seem close to groupthink. Groupthink, however, arises when an organization 
starts writing down doctrine and dogmas, checklists, list of procedures and principles, etc., 
and starts punishing people if they do not follow the procedures. There is enough natural 
variation built into to almost any group of human beings, and if we manage to stay implicit, 
we will avoid groupthink. However, this requires an organization built on mutual trust and 
common experiences, which makes it possible to have quite a wide diversity within the 
common outlook: They all align, but no two of them are exactly alike, as illustrated in Figure 
3.1. 
3.4.3 The OODA Loop: the Essence of any Command and Control 
System 
Boyd concluded that the OODA loop represents the essence of any command and control 
system because “the nature of any command and control system must permit one to direct 
and shape what is to be done as well as permit one to modify that direction and shaping by 
assessing what is being done.” (Boyd, 1987a, p. 31). Command must give direction in terms 
of what is to be done in a clear unambiguous way. In this sense, command must interact with 
system to shape the character or nature of that system in order to realize what is to be done; 
whereas control must provide an assessment of what is being done, also in a clear 
unambiguous way. In this sense, control must not interact nor interfere with the system but 
must determine (not shape) the character or nature of what is being done (1987a, p, 31).  
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The OODA loop provides an alternative to the traditional military approach to command and 
control, an approach that greatly disturbed Boyd (Boyd, 1987a). Command by definition 
means to direct, order, or compel while control means to regulate, restrain, or to hold a 
certain standard as well as to direct or command. His approach to command seemed more 
closely aligned to leadership and appreciation, instead of command and control because 
appreciation includes the recognition of worth or value and the idea of perception. He also 
found it difficult to believe that leadership even could exist without appreciation. This led 
him to:  
Appreciation, as part of leadership, must provide assessment of what is being done in a 
clear unambiguous way. In this sense, appreciation must not interact nor interfere with 
system but must discern (not shape) the character/nature of what is being done or about to 
be done, whereas leadership must give direction in terms of what is to be done also in a 
clear unambiguous way. In this sense, leadership must interact with system to shape the 
character or nature of that system in order to realize what is to be done (1987a, p. 34). 
The implication of this is that assessment and discernment should be invisible and should not 
interfere with operations while direction and shaping should be evident to the organization, 
unit, and or team. Otherwise appreciation and leadership would interfere with each other and 
not provide an effective means to improve our fitness to shape and cope with unfolding 
circumstances. Simply put, we would be changing the situation as we were trying to observe 
and understand it (1987a, p. 24). This illustrates how Boyd built his approach to leadership, 
which he defined as “the art of inspiring people to enthusiastically take action toward the 
achievement of uncommon goals” (1987a, p. 37). 
3.4.4 OODA Loop Summary 
The essentials of the OODA loop, as presented above, suggest that future officers must be 
trained and developed in a way that enables them to create a climate which fosters the four 
key qualities of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative, which would permit them to shape 
and adapt to a rapidly and unpredictable changing environment. Then they will be able to 
turn adversaries into relatively closed systems. If we can operate inside their OODA loops, 
then we can make them appear to be closed with respect to us. This notion of relative 
closeness takes us out of the world of physics and into the world of strategy. If we can do 
that—operate at higher OODA loop speeds than our adversaries—they will start to appear 
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closed with respect to us, and as a result start to generate entropy within their teams. The 
entropy inside their systems acts as Clausewitz’s friction and generates chaos (1984), 
confusion, and makes it hard or even impossible for them to adapt to the rest of the world. In 
a combat situation, the build-up of entropy will cause them to hesitate, bicker among 
themselves, or even fracture into separate and largely non-cooperative sub-teams. Leaders 
operating in the Gap against a 4th GW “starfish” must stay alert for this and understand its 
causes—disorientation and entropy made worse by an internal focus.  
From a leadership development perspective it is important to keep in mind that orientation is 
the central variable, which comprises several variables that either enable or hinder us in 
generating the necessary harmony and initiative. Orientation, therefore, is the key factor that 
indicates whether we are able to improve our ability to shape and adapt to unfolding 
circumstances. Improving orientation processes and our ability to harmonize them within an 
organization are critical components in military leadership and in leadership development 
programs for 21st century operations.  
OODA loop speed as defined above would then be an indication of the effectiveness of the 
ongoing leadership development. If we are successful in our development and training 
approaches our OODA loop speed will be relatively quicker than our adversary’s—which is 
what “fast OODA loop” really means.  
When commanders or any decision makers fully understand the OODA loop, they are able to 
compress time—that is, the time between when the situation changes and when action is 
taken. When the commander has developed a Fingerspitzengefühl for changing situations, 
tempo picks up and actions will seem to flow instantaneously from orientation. Such a 
commander can sense and exploit fleeting opportunities before the slower side understands 
what is happening. This mismatch denies the adversary the opportunity to cope with the 
ongoing events or efforts as they unfold, which can be important in a 4th GW environment, 
with many units operating widely dispersed from other units. As long as we continue to be 
the quicker side (in the sense of quicker OODA loops), we can continue to increase 
ambiguity, confusion, panic and chaos on the adversary’s side. 
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3.5 Summary and Some Words of Caution 
I have outlined the essence of Boyd’s theory of competition and conflict. I believe it is fair to 
say that Boyd’s theory provides unique insights while at the same time pointing towards the 
need for human organizations to exhibit the same innovation and creativity at the top as 
biological organic organizations. Such organizations are complex adaptive systems, and the 
name of the game, according to complexity theory transformed to organizational life, is to 
constantly adapt and evolve through operating optimally as a complex adaptive system, or to 
return to Boyd’s words “it is a strategic game of interaction and isolation” (Boyd, 1987b, p. 
33).  
In the types of conflicts that Norwegian military units will likely conduct, this means 
interacting within our own units and the local population and isolating the “terrorists” from 
popular support. At the most basic level, the combination of variety, rapidity, harmony, and 
initiative—particularly their interaction—seems to be the key that will permit commanders 
in the field, particularly in the Gap, to shape and adapt to ever-changing environments and 
fulfill our strategic aim. 
3.5.1 War versus Business: the Fundamental Difference 
Although Boyd’s ideas have spread into the world of business, there is still a need to 
distinguish between warfare and business. This is also an important distinction when it 
comes to educating and developing officers. While we speak about business as a form of 
warfare—and there are some parallels in the dynamics—certain fundamental differences 
segregate the military sphere from the civil and all the aspects encompassed by the latter, 
including business, the stock market, personal relations, romance and sports. Boyd’s 
organizational climate and the use of time as the basis for shaping competition could 
generally be used in business. But this path alone will not lead to success in business 
because of fundamental differences between business and war. War is at heart a two-sided 
conflict, where the goal is to compel an opponent to do something they would rather not do. 
The ultimate purpose of war is to brutalize, conquer, slay, and exterminate. Direct action to 
achieve these purposes is not only permissible, but also required. As a result, the specific 
strategies and tactics of war are coercive and destructive in nature. Although business 
executives may speak about “eliminating their competitors,” and that in business, as in war, 
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one should “avoid strengths and attack weaknesses,” these are merely metaphors subject to 
individual interpretation. In a business setting, an organization should find or create areas 
where competitors are vulnerable, that is, develop products and services that customers will 
buy instead of its competitors’. Another major complication for business involves the need 
to control cost and boost profitability, which are not themes in Boyd’s approach to warfare.  
The underlying weakness in the “business is war” approach is that business, in contrast to 
war, is, or at least it is supposed to be, attractive and constructive. Topologically, commerce 
is a many-sided conflict (the firm, customers, and competitors) where the battle remains 
solely for costumers’ minds, attracting them to give money to us instead of to our 
competitors. This is a “battle” that is waged by creating and manipulating perceptions rather 
than direct attacks. It could be said that 4th GW—because of its emphasis on attracting 
populations and isolating terrorists—shares more characteristics with business than does 1st, 
2nd, or 3rd generation warfare. 
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4. The Systematizing Person-Group Relation  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present both a theory and method that makes it possible to understand 
and investigate the social interaction of teams and organizations. The aim is to connect this 
theory and method with Boyd’s work on the nature of 21st century conflict that was outlined 
in the previous chapter. This is important since we know that human nature is inherently 
social, social interaction is a crucial human preoccupation, and role-taking ability is the “g” 
factor in social interaction27 (Hogan & Roberts, 2004). All social interactions have three 
essential components:  
1. Agenda, the reason for interaction;  
2. Roles to play, because we only interact with others in the context of roles, which 
provide the needed structure and predictability. There are important differences in 
peoples’ abilities to define and play roles, and skillful players generally do better in 
the game of life.  
3. The rules of the game, ritual, or ceremony in which a person is involved (Hogan, 
2006).  
We also know that attention and status are the result of social interaction. When we gain 
status, it is natural for others to begin to resent us even as they congratulate us. Conversely, 
acceptance is gained by conforming to the expectations of others, which makes achievement 
difficult. As such, there is an inherent tension beneath the surface of social life as people try 
to advance themselves without alienating others. An ability to deal with this tension is one of 
the things that make leadership an art since it involves persuading people to give up their 
selfish interests and pursue a common goal. Because leadership concerns the building of 
cohesive and goal-oriented teams, leadership development involves efforts within a social 
context to expand the participants’ role-taking abilities. According to Collins (1997), it is 
                                                 
27 Here Hogan and Roberts (2004) are heavily influenced by Mead’s (1934) work. 
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necessary to have a large role set in a complex modern society, where “role set” refers to the 
combination of the different roles that any particular individual plays.  
“Systematizing Person-Group Relations” (SPGR) represents both a theory and a method for 
research and human-relations consulting in organizational settings, it is a field-theory of 
social interaction. The SPGR was chosen since it represents an analytical tool that provides 
means of bringing an organization into its full-fledged or proactive stage. The most 
significant characteristic of a group at this level of maturity or of a proactive organization is 
its orientation towards options in its external environment and its ability to take advantage of 
these options, hence play the interaction and isolation game and being able to dissipate 
entropy. The major premise in such a group or organization is that all members adjust their 
objectives and goals to improve the organization and increase organizational learning. In 
other words all organizational members display behavior that is usually defined by executive 
behavior. This is in accordance with the essence of Auftragstaktik while it contradicts the 
model of leader-employee relationships found in classical management theory and in 2nd 
GW. 
In this chapter, I will outline the fundamentals of the SPGR model including: (1) a short 
background and presentation to the SPGR; (2) the basic group functions; (3) the principle of 
balance and maturity; (4) group and leadership development including the dynamics of the 
SPGR; and (5) the relevance and importance of SPGR for implementing Boyd’s theory of 
competition and conflict. SPGR also includes a measurement part that will be covered in 
section 10.3.1 where I describe the data collection instruments used in this dissertation. 
4.2 SPGR Background 
The SPGR (Sjøvold, 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007) is an integrated set of special, tailored 
tools created over the last 20 years to measure the competence of individuals, groups, and 
organizations to develop and maintain functional relations, and it provides a useful 
instrument for focusing on those interaction variables that permit vitality and growth. The 
theoretical foundation of the SPGR model combines Bion’s model for Group Emotionality 
(Bion, 1987), Parsons’ suggestions of pattern variables (Parsons & Shils, 1953; 1951), Mills 
(1984) work on group development, and Bales Theory of Social Interaction Systems (Bales, 
1999). The structure of the methodology is a further development of the structure found in 
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Bales SYstematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) method (Bales and 
Cohen, 1979). As such it contains the insights from both Moreno’s (1953) sociometry and 
Lewin’s (1952) field theory. It is worth mentioning that today’s SPGR model bears little 
resemblance to its SYMLOG origins (Sjøvold, 2007).  
The SPGR system, besides integrating different theoretical perspectives, is a model and a 
procedure for visualizing how organizations, teams, and individual team members can 
contribute to the development of their organizations, teams, and themselves. It represents a 
helpful tool to improve leadership in organizations, groups, and individuals, which makes it 
suitable for the development of leaders and leadership.  
4.3 The Basic Group Functions 
The concept of ‘group functions’ was first introduced by Parsons (1951; 1953), and the 
concept is central to the further discussion. The idea that the predominant behavior of a 
group varies during the course of its existence is be well-established. It also appears that 
most models agree on the behavior that relates to the type of problem facing the group. 
While Parsons (1953) suggests four basic functions of groups, Tuckman and Jensen (1977) 
describe four phases of group development and McGrath (1991) four modes in which groups 
may perform. It is fairly easy to see how the four functions, phases or modes are assumed to 
meet similar challenges. Even the more psychoanalytical models, like Bion’s (1961) model 
of group emotionality reflect similar patterns. The SPGR model for group and team 
development builds on Parsonian thinking.  
The theoretical core of the SPGR consists of four basic functions: Control (C), Nurture (N), 
Opposition (O), and Dependence (D). The basic idea is that at any given time, a team 
activates the function best suited to meet the specific problem they face. If the problem at 
hand is instrumental, then the Control function is activated; if the problem is relational, the 
Nurture function is activated and so on. When one of the functions is activated, the 
predominate behavior of the group members reflects that active function. When the Control 
function is active, for example, analytical, task-oriented or even autocratic behavior 
dominates; when the Nurture function is active, caring, empathic or even spontaneous 
behavior dominates; if the Opposition function is active, critical, assertive or even self-
sufficient behavior dominates; and when Dependence is active, conforming, passive, and 
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obedient behavior dominates. Since an active group function is always reflected in group 
behavior, see Table 4.1 for an overview, systematic observation of behavior is an efficient 
tool to investigate these phenomena. This is the approach used to study the groups referred 
to in this dissertation. 
Further paring of the four functions yields two of the four SPGR dimensions: (1) Control 
versus Nurture28 (C-N) and (2) Opposition versus Dependence (O-D). The effect of any 
behavior associated with a basic function varies depending on the intensity with which it is 
manifested. This is especially true in conflicts, where emotional power tends to oscillate 
between poles in a battle to gain influence. In SPGR this important aspect of group relations 
is caught by its third dimension: (3) Influence versus Passivity (I-P). The Influence-versus-
Passivity dimension is an embedded dimension that appears as an aspect of each of the other 
dimensions and so is not shown in Table 4.1. The W-S dimension will be covered in section 
4.4 
Table 4.1  
Elements of Group Constitutions 
Dimension Group function         Short description  
C-N Control Structure, logic, authority 
 Nurture Caring, social orientation, openness 
O-D Dependence Loyalty, conformance, submission 
 Opposition Criticism, rebellion 
W-S Withdrawal Passive resistance  
 Synergy Engagement, constructive goal-oriented teamwork  
  
Within each group, the basic group functions are supported by a distinct set of behaviors. 
Groups differ in the predominant behavior they display, and one may interpret these 
differences as a measure of the cultural characteristics of groups. The results of these 
dimensions are presented in more detail along twelve vectors in the SPGR factor analytical 
                                                 
28 Within the leadership literature this has been discussed as autocratic versus participative, initiating structure versus 
consideration, self-assertive versus empowering, task-oriented versus people oriented, forceful versus enabling, and Theory 
X versus Theory Y (Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan & Kaiser, 2003a; Kaplan & Kaiser, 2003b), or the leadership dilemma (Stogdill, 
1974). 
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space. The vectors are shown in Figure 4.1 and described in Table 4.2. The vector code 
indicates which dimension it belongs to; Control vectors are labeled C1 and C2 and so forth.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 The SPGR 12 vector 
 
Table 4.2 
The SPGR Behaviors Vectors 
SPGR Vector  Codification Typical behavior 
Engagement S1 Engaged, inviting others to contribute
Caring N1 Taking care of others, attentive to relations  
Acceptance D2 Passive, accepting 
Creativity N2 Creative, spontaneous 
Criticism O1 Critical, opposing 
Resignation W1 Sad appearance, showing lack of self-confidence 
Self-sacrifice W2 Passive, reluctant to contribute 
Assertiveness O2 Assertive, self-sufficient 
Ruling C2 Controlling, autocratic, attentive to rules and procedures 
Loyalty D1 Obedient, conforming 
Task-orientation C1 Analytical, task-oriented, conforming 
Empathy S2 Showing empathy and interest in others 
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4.4 The Principle of Balance and Maturity 
The construct of ‘group constitution’ is defined as the balance of the basic group functions. 
A team may activate one function to solve a specific problem and activate another to solve 
another problem. On the other hand, a group may be stuck in one function even though that 
function is not adequate to meet the challenge the group actually faces. This makes the 
concept of balance between the basic functions within the group dynamic central to 
understanding SPGR. These four basic functions—control, nurture, opposition and 
dependence—are necessary for a group’s functioning, and they will influence the group or 
the organization with different strengths throughout their existence. To be a well-functioning 
group the members have to agree on how to cooperate and on the sanctions (Control) that 
will follow when the working rules are broken. At the same time, individuals must be taken 
care of and the relationships between them must be maintained (Nurture). Typically, a good 
leader will evaluate what behavior or action is most appropriate, both in a given situation 
and over the long term, and then make a choice. In a mature group, this will work according 
to Boyd’s OODA loop, and most of the time, these choices will flow implicitly from a 
shared group orientation, without explicit decisions. To cope successfully with changing 
contexts, new tasks, or internal issues, group members need to be able to shift from 
behaviors reinforcing efficient production (Control functions) to Nurture functions and vice 
versa. This is social action as role taking. In other words, a group needs to balance the 
Control and Nurture functions over time (Bales 1953). Just as the Control-versus-Nurture 
dimension must be balanced, so must the Opposition-versus-Dependence dimension. In the 
longer time span, we need to have a correcting attitude, hence Opposition, to how we do 
things today and what we can improve, enabling us to grow and survive in the long run. It is 
also necessary that we be willing to do what needs to be done, hence Dependence, without 
excessive discussion. Figure 4.2 illustrates this balance. Balance is an important concept of 
the SPGR model. ‘Balance’ is, however, not equivalent to the concept of equilibrium like 
Bales (1953, 1955), who described it as a homeostatic controlled status quo. Balance is a 
constant shift and polarization between active group functions. Consequently members of a 
team free themselves from fixed roles, and they become capable of performing behaviors 
that support all functions. 
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Figure 4.2  The Balance of the Basic Group Functions in the SPGR Model 
(the arrow-and-circle in this figure illustrates the important difference 
between the dynamic balance and static equilibrium) 
 
This is a state of free flow that is characteristic for highly creative teams (Csikszentmihalyi 
and Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). A well-functioning or well-balanced group can be compared to 
a gyroscope. It is the speed of rotation that makes it stable and robust. The ‘one person–one 
role’ group may balance the group function by having an equal number of supporting roles, 
but such a group will respond very slowly and be vulnerable to environmental change, 
particularly those caused by enemies, customers, and competitors. So when one of the basic 
functions is predominant, this will, over time, most likely hamper learning and development 
and the group’s ability to explore the environment for new ideas that might be valuable to it 
(Sjøvold, 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
Domination by one of the functions may last for just a few seconds, for several months or 
even for years. When a group is dominated by one of the functions, the activities of the 
group become predictable because the focus is on preserving the status quo, leading to a lack 
of initiative, adaptability and harmony, and as such the group and its members are not able to 
interact effectively with their environment.  In competition and conflict any lack of initiative 
and adaptability—slower OODA loops, in Boyd’s terminology—makes it easier for an 
adversary to predict and then exploit group actions. These basic functions will have a strong 
impact because they also represent a group’s affective (under) structure or culture (Bion, 
1987). They will govern the way group members think, feel about, and perceive events 
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within and outside the group and thus influence the members’ views of reality. Simply put, 
they have a strong impact on the group members’ orientations. 
SPGR uses the term maturity to describe the development of groups. The key to the 
development of groups and leadership lies in the balance of these four functions, because the 
transition to a higher degree of maturity and development depends on how well the group 
manages to balance these functions and which they choose to operate within. A group at the 
highest level of maturity is characterized by its ability to balance the basic functions over 
time in such a way that all the members can perform all the different roles in smooth 
interchange (Sjøvold, 2006, 2007). Then we have the first of two more aspects of group 
constitutions, namely Synergy. Synergy appears in groups where the basic group functions 
are well-balanced and characterized by engagement and constructive goal-oriented 
teamwork. The second additional aspect of group constitution is Withdrawal, which is found 
in less mature teams. Here, members tend to take on roles according to their zone of comfort, 
and limit their behavior to support one basic function; they tend to restrict themselves from 
contributing to the common group work, which in turn results in passive behavior and 
resistance, i.e. Withdrawal. In such groups, one member may be the caring person (Nurture), 
another person the achiever (Control) and so on.  
However, balance is not just a matter of like-size subgroups of members adhering to 
opposing functions, or dimensional poles. Balance can be skewed towards one of the 
functions with fewer members (one might in some cases be enough) if these members exert 
considerable influence on the group. There might be situations where such a preponderance 
of influence may be a good solution for a group, but over time the influence-versus-passive 
dimension must also be balanced. Extremely dominant individuals in a group tend to freeze 
the group in a fixed pattern of roles, which in the end makes the group predictable, giving an 
adversary the opportunity to operate inside the group’s OODA loops.  
Research has shown that that a single person’s traits and behavior can change the situation 
(Barry & Stewart, 1997; Stewart & Barrick, 2004; Williams & Sternberg, 1988). Williams & 
Sternberg found that even one overly zealous or domineering member in a group 
significantly inhibited the quality of that group’s performance. They also found that some 
groups performed better than others because the characteristics of these groups created a 
state of internal harmony, Einheit in Boyd’s climate, indicating a higher level of maturity in 
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SPGR terms, which resulted in the maximization of productivity. Groups marked by internal 
harmony are free to utilize the full talent of their members in terms of both cognitive and 
social-cognitive abilities. Kaplan and Kaiser (2003a) labeled a similar concept of balance, 
versatility, defined as capability on both sides of the duality as well as the ability to judge 
which approach is most appropriate for the situation29. The opposite of versatile would be 
“lopsided,” either doing too much or too little (Kaplan, 1996, Kaplan & Kaiser, 2003a, 
Kaplan & Kaiser 2003b). They found, in particular, that versatile executives received higher 
ratings of effectiveness than lopsided executives (Kaplan & Kaiser, 2003a), a finding which 
was consistent with the findings of Bachman (1988). 
Bales (1999) defined group dynamics as the perpetual shift between polarization and 
unification in a group. In the SPGR model such polarization occurs when members take 
stands associated with functions representing the poles in the basic dimensions (Sjøvold, 
2007). For example, a dispute might ensue between (a) a commander who is not on the spot 
but claims to know the “correct solution” and who demands prompt execution (Control 
function) of orders and (b) members of the unit who call for continued discussions to ensure 
that all the members’ voices have been heard so that his intention can either be corrected or 
correctly understood (Nurture function)30. This kind of polarization may be brief (seconds) 
or become a permanent conflict that might have disastrous results for those involved. The 
brief polarization is characteristic of optimal group dynamics; the latter is dysfunctional.  
The salience of different basic functions changes over time, a point that is illustrated by a 
rotating movement between the functions in Figure 4.2. Groups of different maturity move 
between functions with different velocities. High speed and the ability to dissipate entropy 
are typical for groups of high maturity, where members have developed competency in all 
functional roles and can smoothly shift among these when needed. Low speed is typical for 
less mature groups, where functional roles are tightly bound to individuals. In such “one-
person-one-functional-role” groups, the rigidity of the person-role connection restricts 
                                                 
29 Kaplan and Kaiser are mostly concerned with the forceful-versus-enabling balance, and as such their perspective is at a 
lower level of complexity than the SPGR. 
30 This does not imply that legal orders should not be followed, but it is about creating a command climate that contributes 
to Auftragstaktik.  
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flexibility and adaptability. Negotiations among members about who should be allowed “on 
stage” cause significant loss of energy and time, and the result is an increase in entropy.  
Team maturity, as defined here, is closely related to role structure. The more specific the 
roles that team members assume, the less flexible and responsive the team will be. The 
interdependence of individual and team development is also obvious. As members expand 
their behavioral repertoire and skills, the team also becomes a better arena for learning. The 
individual needs the team to develop, and the team will only develop through its members 
(Mills 1984). Innovative teams have a high capacity to learn and are, in our terminology, 
mature. However, all teams do not need to be innovative or mature to be effective. Team 
effectiveness is a highly flexible concept (McGrath 1991, Gersick 1988, Hackman 1983, 
1992, 2002). Effectiveness is always related to team task and context. The more complex 
tasks are, and the more unpredictable the context is, the more mature the team needs to be 
for success. The analysis of operational requirements presented in chapter 2 shows that a 
high maturity level is required to perform effectively in a 4th GW environment.  
The SPGR model suggests four levels of maturity where, at each level, group members 
achieve new shared capabilities. The detailed descriptions of these levels will be outlined in 
the next section. 
4.5 Team and Leadership Developement 
Team development31 constitutes the fourth dimension of the SPGR model: Withdrawal 
versus Synergy. This is illustrated with Figure 4.3. In a new or otherwise immature group, 
members tend to stick to what they are good at, which means taking roles that fulfill 
functions within their comfort zones. A person who is of a nurturing nature will typically fill 
a nurturing role. A structured and analytical person will easily fill a Control-function role, 
and so on. Figure 4.4 illustrates the different roles within the SPGR space32.  
                                                 
31 For an overview of models for group development, see Chidambaram and Bostrom (1996), Jern and Hempel (1999), 
Poole and Hollingshead (2004) or Sjøvold (2006). 
32 The SPGR space and its Field diagram are outlined in section 10.3.2 and Figure 10.2 illustrates this space; see also 
appendix A. 
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Figure 4.3  Withdrawal versus Synergy 
 
At an immature stage in group development, no learning is required. Members slip into the 
most convenient roles and stay in them. Members of a new group or new members in a 
group spend most of their energy probing for an answer to the question, “What is in this 
relation for me?” As a consequence they withhold their resources and contributions. The 
group as a whole is close to the Withdrawal pole of the fourth SPGR dimension. The ability 
to perform other group functions implies learning, pushing, and expanding the boundaries of 
individual comfort through a process such as leadership development. The group and each 
individual member of the group will, throughout their development, if successful, add new 
role systems to the old one, but the old ones are not discarded (Mills, 1984).  
Role taking is a general, all-purpose device by which individuals construct new social 
actions and replace old ones (Collins, 1997). If group development doesn’t succeed, the 
members are blocked out from new roles, and the members’ energies and mental capacities 
do not become available to the group. This might always be a possibility because growth is 
not automatic but occurs through the vision and effort of the group members. An important 
aspect, according to Mills (1984, p. 132), which is fully integrated in the SPGR system, is 
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that the potentials for individual and group growth are maximized under the same set of 
conditions because “the opportunities for the development of the individual member as a 
person, and group development, are of course interrelated”. 
 
 
Figure 4.4  The SPGR Space and the Different Roles 
 
A prerequisite for such learning is a shared commitment to the group and its members, 
intent, and mission by giving up, for a while, their selfish interests. Such commitment 
benefits the group as a whole as well as the individual members because they are willing to 
give each other unconditional help to succeed, which is what leadership is all about. This 
also indicates that competency in multiple functional roles increases as a group approaches 
the Synergy pole. 
In the next section, I will elaborate on the dynamics that make this role-taking possible. 
4.5.1 The SPGR Dynamics 
I will now look further into the dynamics suggested by the SPGR model and connect it to the 
essence of Boyd’s theory of competition and conflict. The SPGR model assumes that 
dimensional balance is obtained through a circular movement among the four functions 
(Control, Nurture, Opposition, and Dependence) and that growth is achieved in a spiraling 
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movement from the Withdrawal to the Synergy pole. Sjøvold (2006, 2007) uses the spinning 
top as an explanatory metaphor. Growth in SPGR is a result of a free flow between the 
different basic functions, which captures the essence of Boyd’s agility concept, which is 
sometimes also illustrated by a spinning metaphor, often a whirlpool or tornado. It is the 
degree of agility that makes possible rapid and smooth shifts among the basic functions so 
that that each member’s innovation and creativity can be used to reach the Schwerpunkt.  
Low agility implies a low maturity and a lack of ability to dissipate entropy because there is 
no internal harmony. In a group with a low maturity, entropy will build up inside the group 
and ‘kill’ it with equilibrium, in particular, a static one-person-one-role situation. Both the 
SPGR balance, see section 4.4, and Boyd’s agility display a paradoxical dynamic that is both 
stable and unstable. However, it seems to be difficult to hold the paradox of both balance 
and imbalance simultaneously in order to make sense of it in the context of leadership and 
team development. Agility in a mature group is obtained because all members are capable of 
performing roles and exerting behavior outside their previous normal comfort zones. All 
members have the opportunity to contribute to the group’s work without being inhibited by 
one another or by fixing role obligations.  Such dynamic role-taking behavior defines the  
group’s internal harmony, in Boyd’s language, or maturity within the SPGR concept, that 
allows it to dissipate rather than build up entropy. 
From the perspective of developing both leadership and leaders, the SPGR functions may be 
treated as emotional states, or types of culture (Sjøvold, 1995). Emotional strength can result 
either from a majority of the members sharing the same belief or from a minority exerting 
such high influence that they assume the role of “religious” leaders. The strength of 
emotionality, therefore, is important in assessing the potential for development. Similarly, 
groups with strong cultures are less likely to change than groups with weak cultures, so 
commanders must understand a group’s culture in order to intervene successfully to improve 
its performance. Seen from the perspective of this dissertation, the major task of an 
intervention during a leadership development program is to propel a group towards the 
Synergy pole, because this pole provides experience in all functions to all members. To 
generate such important and necessary opportunities, fixed role structures must be broken; 
fluctuations induced; influence more evenly distributed, avoiding “bad apples” and overly 
domineering members; and the group forced to leave its predominant function.  
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Before development can occur, an intervention must identify through assessment the primary 
functional mode in which the group is currently operating and address associated concerns. 
The primary concern of a Nurture group is commitment; a Dependence group, authority; a 
Control group, work; and an Opposition group, identity. The nature of an intervention will 
vary according to the distribution of influence in the group and which primary function the 
group is about to enter because some functions are more permeable and open to development 
interventions than others. According to Sjøvold (1995, 2006, 2007) the most likely sequence 
of accessibility is: Nurture -> Dependence -> Control -> Opposition, which is illustrated in 
Figure 4.5. 
Complex problems in changing, unpredictable environments are best solved by mature 
groups, which is the case for today’s conflict scenarios (see chapter two) and therefore for 
any military leadership development program. This also explains why some groups may 
jump to one of the basic functions and stay there without having to pass through phases of 
development in a fixed sequence. For example, if we have a military group operating in 
Dependence, where reactivity and passivity predominate, it may be effective in a stable and 
structured context if all members fulfill their prescribed subtasks in a coordinated manner 
under a strong leader. Even this kind of group, consisting of a strong leader with committed 
followers, probably went through a period focusing on Nurture functions before starting 
work. However, even if it is likely for new groups to pass through Nurture and Control 
functions as phases in their development, this is not a necessity in the SPGR model. 
Sjøvold (2005, 2002, and 1995) found that there is a connection between the group’s level 
on the nurture-dependence-control-opposition spectrum and the particular function that is 
distinctive in the group. By observing the group’s most distinctive interaction behavior, it is 
possible to identify the group’s culture. Bion (1987) claimed that the culture represented 
focal points that a subgroup may form in the continuous process of polarizations and 
unification. If a group is inhibited by the presence of one of the functions or cultures, the 
group might not have the ability (or will) to act rationally to overcome the emotional 
inhibition the actual function represents. Nonproductive norms caused by the one of the 
functions can be highly dysfunctional. To be able to operate according to Auftragstaktik, the 
group’s maturity must be increased, which means that the basic functions must be 
challenged, and the group and its members must expand their roles to increase the group’s 
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capacity to enact the basic leadership tasks needed for collective work. This requires the 
ability to rapidly shift among the functions.  
In order to describe how this shifting process occurs within the process of group 
development, I will need to define the functions in greater detail: 
1. The Dependence function is the individual’s receptivity to a wider range of information 
about oneself, others, own groups, own and other societies, and the physical 
environment. It is each individual’s receptivity that leads to an increase in openness at 
the group or team level, hence an increase in the range, diversity, and effectiveness of the 
channels of intake of information from the outside world (Deutsch, 1963, p. 140). This 
requires openness to new freedoms, responsibilities, roles that leads to an increased 
capacity to extend the scope of the group’s contacts and obligations beyond its current 
boundaries. To do so, individuals must have the necessary flexibility to modify their own 
ideas, beliefs, personal norms, and emotional attachments without the loss of intellectual 
or moral integrity. This will help to build the capacity of a group or team to alter its 
customs, rules, and techniques to accommodate new information and new contacts, 
thereby increasing its adaptability.  
2. The Control function concerns the individual’s capacity to postpone immediate 
gratification and to evaluate an increasing number of avenues for gratification. At the 
group or team level this indicates a capacity to hold goal-seeking efforts in abeyance 
while alternative goals are considered. This requires the capacity to de-commit oneself 
from one goal, to recommit to new and additional goals, and to learn how to attain them, 
which gives the group capacity to shift to, or add, new goals.  
3. The Nurture function, integration, concerns the capacity to perform an expanded 
repertoire of roles and variety of social relations without suffering diffusion of personal 
identity. The individual’s integration will give the group or team the capacity to 
differentiate into subparts while maintaining collective unity, to retain the capacity to 
export resources without becoming impoverished, and to send emissaries without losing 
their loyalty.  
4. The Opposition function is each individual member’s capacity for deeper emotional 
involvement with others without surrendering oneself, thereby extending the group’s 
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capacity to receive new members and to transmit to them its culture and capabilities. 
Increasing an individual’s ability to convey personal experience, learning, and capability 
to others will result in the group’s capacity to capture, in permanent form, the group’s 
experience and learning and to convey them to other groups and to posterity.  
The different maturity levels with the predominant functions of each are presented in Figure 
4.5 (Sjøvold, 2006, 2007).  
 
               
1) RESERVATION - Predominant                                 2) TEAM SPIRIT - Predominant functions 
functions Nurture                                                            Dependence and Nurture 
  
             
3) PRODUCTION – Predominant                              4)  INNOVATION – 
Functions Nurture, Dependence and Control           All functions equally present  
Figure 4.5  SPGR Maturity Levels and Group Development with Dominant 
Functions Illustrated 33 
 
                                                 
33 This is symbolized by having the dominant functions orbiting closer to the Withdrawal – Synergy stem.  
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Movement from one maturity level to the next depends upon two conditions: (a) success in 
accomplishing the lower maturity level and (b) conceiving, conveying, and inducing 
members to accept the more advanced notion of their purpose. The critical steps in the entire 
progression are reconstitution of the group through adding new role systems and reorienting 
the group through the induction of a more advanced purpose. In many ways, this might 
resemble Boyd’s approach to progress, which he considered to be confusion at a higher 
level. The essence is that leadership and team development requires commitment, deliberate, 
and very hard work. In the next section I will show how SPGR and the theories of Boyd 
work together and that the SPGR captures the essence behind Boyd’s strategic game of 
interaction and isolation. 
4.6 The SPGR System and Boyd’s Theories - an 
Integrative View 
This aim of this section is to show that there is an underlying theme that makes it possible to 
integrate the theories of John Boyd and the SPGR. I argue that the SPGR and its approach to 
team and leadership development represents a field theory of social interaction that captures 
the essence of Boyd’s theories and especially the fundamental concepts within the OODA 
loop applied to all organizational levels. In his essay, Destruction and Creation, Boyd 
(1976) provided the philosophical foundation for his theories. He integrated Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. From this he concluded that to maintain an accurate or effective grasp of 
reality one must undergo a continuous cycle of interaction with the environment—the 
OODA loop—to assess how it constantly changes. By expanding Darwin’s Theory of 
Evolution, he suggested that natural selection applies not only in biological but also in social 
contexts such as the survival of nations during war or business in free market competition. 
By integrating these two concepts, he stated that the OODA loop (covered in section 3.3), 
and especially orientation because it is the Schwerpunkt, was the central mechanism of 
adaptation in a social context, and that increasing one’s own rate and accuracy of assessment 
vis-à-vis one’s counterpart’s rate and accuracy of assessment provides a substantial 
advantage in war and in all other forms of competition. He further added, as previously 
discussed, that the most effective organizations have a highly decentralized chain of 
command that utilizes Auftragstaktik in order to harness the mental capacity and creative 
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abilities of individuals and commanders at each level. This would create a flexible 
organization, or what could be considered an open system—as compared to a hierarchical 
one—that would be quicker to adapt to rapidly changing situations. Such an organization 
would require an organizational climate as discussed in section 3.3 and illustrated with 
Figure 3.1, because any highly decentralized organization relies upon a high degree of 
mutual trust and a common outlook arising from prior shared experiences.  
Conversely, the ability to synthesize alternatives and to adapt quickly to unpredictable 
events helps individuals, organizations or nations survive. Furthermore, those who have the 
better understanding of the directions and shape of change than others may well be able to 
exploit this and survive on their own terms. Boyd, following in the tradition of Sun Tzu 
insisted that success rests on the cultivation of internal organizational harmony, which is an 
effort to keep the entropy34 produced within the system as low as possible: 
High entropy implies low potential for doing work, a low capacity for taking action or a 
high degree of confusion and disorder. Low entropy implies just the opposite. […] From 
this law it follows that entropy must increase in any closed system, or for that matter, in 
any system that can not communicate in an ordered fashion with other system or 
environments external to itself (1976, pp. 5-6). 
The essential point is that a relatively closed social entity tends to forget its original purpose 
and naturally, as time passes, becomes increasingly dysfunctional. It will spend more time 
and effort examining itself by focusing on internal processes and procedures and when 
confronted with a challenge from the external world, the inevitable result will be increasing 
                                                 
34 Entropy is an essential part of thermodynamics, the science that deals specifically with irreversible, time-oriented 
processes. The distinction between reversible and irreversible processes was introduced in the mid-19th century through the 
concept of entropy associated with the second law of thermodynamics. In Greek, entropy simply means “evolution”, and 
according to this law, irreversible processes produce entropy, hence evolution, while reversible processes leave the entropy 
constant. An implication is that there is an arrow of time in which the only direction is forward into the future (Prigogine, 
2003, 1997). 
The second law of thermodynamics is an inequality: The entropy, S, of an isolated system  increases monotonically until it 
reaches its maximum value at thermodynamic equilibrium. We therefore have dS ≥ 0 for the change of entropy over the 
course of time. If we then extend this statement to systems that are not isolated we must distinguish among two terms of 
entropy change, dS. The first, deS, is the transfer of entropy across the boundaries of the system. The second, diS, is the 
entropy produced within the system. We then have: dS = deS + diS. The second law can now be expressed by stating that 
whatever the boundary conditions, entropy production diS is positive, that is, diS > 0 and as such irreversible processes are 
always creating entropy (Prigogine, 1997; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977, 1989). 
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confusion and disorder. Eventually, such an organization will fragment into many “non-
cooperative centers of gravity,” or power centers, which further leads to disillusions with the 
original goals and loss of faith in their possible attainment. This will cause organizational 
members to seek other alliances, or just become demoralized and stop doing anything 
productive. Unless an organization is able to obtain and use input from the outside, that is, to 
reestablish the flow of negative entropy, it will gradually slide into this ‘entropic’ state, and 
“die”. In other words, continuing to focus internally in an attempt to solve organizational 
problems will not improve matters but will only make them worse. 
The Belgian scientist Ilya Prigogine, who pioneered research in this field and won the Nobel 
Chemistry Prize in 1977, argues that at the most fundamental level of matter, it is the 
individual variability of entities and the interactions between them that lead to change in 
populations of ensembles. This is a process he argues is extending to every level, including 
that of human action (1997, 2003; Prigogine & Stengers, 1988). It was these phenomena 
Bales observed within the groups he studied in the 1950’s. In his last book he discusses the 
flavor of social interaction in real time and here he makes an interesting statement:  
…the complex nature of interdependence among persons and the sense of dynamic process 
were so disorderly. In particular, the categories failed to explain why the process was so 
disorderly. If I had known today, I might have recognized that these small groups were 
“complex self-organizing systems” operating “on the edge of chaos”… (1999, p. 160). 
Unfortunately Bales didn’t think that such a perspective would have helped him. Instead he 
focused on equilibrium and chose to label it as a: “social-interaction-system” in an effort to 
capture the idea of an “energy system” (Bales, 1999, p. 160). Since all life and development 
feed on a “negative entropy flow” (Prigogine, 1997), it is obvious and natural that Bales 
would observe groups as “energy systems” on “the edge of chaos.” The essence here is that 
the fluctuations present in groups reflect the variety of individuals and their individual 
orientations. If they are too similar to each other there will be little variation, and the result 
will be little or no fluctuation and little or no adaptability. But if the members of the group 
preserve their different orientations and different behaviors, the group will have more 
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fluctuations and therefore greater variety35. This is very well demonstrated with the SPGR 
and is a critical element of Boyd’s theory as well. 
A group with little fluctuation will, according to SPGR theory, most likely be dominated by 
one of the SPGR functions, and such a group will be close to equilibrium. This might be the 
case when a few members dominate, influence the group strongly, and dampen out the 
fluctuations. There is no organic whole but a collection of individuals somewhat 
synchronized by domination. For all practical purposes this tells us that we have only one 
OODA loop running, that of the dominant individual. 
In complex situations, like warfighting, agility is essential because it enables groups to 
continue the whirl of reorientation, mismatches, analyses, and synthesis as they shift roles 
between active group functions over and over, ad infinitum. Agility provides a basis to 
comprehend, shape, and adapt to an unfolding and evolving reality that remains uncertain, 
ever-changing, and unpredictable. Agile individuals and groups can play the interaction 
(with one’s allies) and isolation (of one’s enemies) game and can survive on their own terms 
or improve their capacity for independent action. On the other hand, a team, or a 
commander, who takes a long time to shift between the basic functions, would in SPGR 
terms, be characterized as immature. This team will use considerable energy dealing with 
each function, and because they have a low ability to change between them, they will have 
poor agility and a slow OODA loop. The team is in a steady state, and the entropy remains 
constant over time. When the situation changes, they will not able to comprehend and cope 
with the novelty that arises out of their environment. As such they will be vulnerable to 
pressure from the environment because their lack of agility will make them predictable. In a 
complex situation, where such a team or an organization will be facing a creative adversary, 
in 4th GW, for example, they might easily be overwhelmed because they lack the ability to 
adapt and influence the situation. This will contribute to an increased level of entropy, S. 
Hence we have an external perturbation—the adversary actions—representing transfer of 
entropy, deS, across the boundaries of the team, and this most likely will lead to 
disintegration and defeat. The solution to this is to create an organizational climate which 
would make Auftragstaktik possible in way that would dissipate the entropy transferred 
                                                 
35 In SPGR analysis, groups like this become distinct when one looks at a group field diagram and the scatter diagrams that 
show the behavioral variety among the members. See appendix A for an example. 
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across the boundaries by being relatively more open than our adversary resulting in a low 
level of internal entropy, diS, or in SPGR terms be able to operate at a higher maturity level 
than our opponent. 
Another danger of immature groups is that their members tend to take on and perform only 
roles that they are comfortable with. There is a danger that personal comfort might lead to a 
permanent role structure. In a group with such an evolved, permanent role structure, the 
inward focus will lead to increased entropy, which will manifest to the external world as 
slow and predictable OODA loops. The group will be influenced by strict order and 
discipline and members will use most of their energy to adapt to role expectations and to 
conform to existing norms, while they exert control to ensure that all members fulfill their 
roles in the structure. A group like this can easily develop a culture with an “us” against 
“them” attitude, and because predictability is secured by being careful and nice with each 
other, they will lack the mutual trust necessary to develop the common outlook needed to 
gain adaptability and initiative in an unpredictable world.  
A mature group, on the other hand, is an organic group able to shift rapidly between the 
basic functions. It would be a highly agile organization. A mature group will have been 
exposed to increasingly complex situations, and as a result, it will have developed more 
advanced role systems as dynamic relations between purpose, requirements, and capabilities. 
A mature group, through interactions and shared experiences, will have developed 
adaptability, initiative, and mutual trust. Long periods of interaction and shared experiences 
also ensure that a mature group will possess a common outlook—a Schwerpunkt. Finally, a 
mature group will have an outward focus that will help keep its members’ orientations 
matched to the real world. When we put these aspects together as Boyd (1995) did, we see 
that “the OODA loop represents an evolving, open-ended, far-from-equilibrium process of 
self-organization, emergence, and natural selection” (p. 5) and so mature groups will 
naturally function with quick OODA loops. 
The maturity development from Withdrawal towards Synergy also corresponds well with 
Sun Tzu’s notion of “formlessness”: “Thus the army does not maintain any constant 
strategic configuration of power, water has no constant shape. One who is able to change 
and transform in accord with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual” (Sun Tzu, 
1984, p. 71). This emphasizes the importance of remaining adaptable and flexible, of varying 
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behavior not only to suit individual circumstances but also to avoid becoming predictable. 
While “never change a winning strategy” is considered a cardinal rule of sports competition, 
thought should also be given to Sun Tzu’s dictum not to repeat a winning strategy (1984, p. 
71). Otherwise, the adversary will eventually discern the patterns of control and the methods 
of conquest and conceive tactics to thwart them by exploiting any inherent weakness.  
Low maturity in a group, unit, or staff consists of more “form” with discernable patterns, e.g. 
like a permanent role structure, while at the highest maturity level, Innovation, the group 
demonstrates adaptability, variety and agility, which produce “formlessness” in the mind of 
the opponent. The ability to reduce perceived form by functioning at a high level of maturity 
will be extremely important in 4th GW, where Norwegian and other western forces will 
likely stand out physically from the local population. In Patterns of Conflict we can clearly 
see that Boyd had a love-hate relationship with systems, that is, with form. He wanted the 
minimum of system on his side, because it always tended to focus a force inward, resulting 
in an increased level of entropy. Many of Boyd’s strategic ideas were designed to create and 
then exploit the pathologies of systems—feedback loops, interface problems, complexity, 
etc.—which in the confusion and stress of conflict would act to destroy the moral bonds that 
permit an organic whole to exist (1986, p. 122). In this sense, the more system there is, the 
more “form” there will be and the less maturity, therefore the easier it will be to attack. This 
is illustrated and summarized in Figure 4.6. Given the choice, Boyd would have maximized 
the use of advanced systems—by his opponents. 
On the other hand, some organization, hence form, is always necessary, and by applying the 
SPGR it seems possible to achieve Boyd’s organizational climate for success through 
leadership development. So by pumping up our adversary’s entropy (through variety and 
rapidity), while reducing our own (through harmony and initiative), we can keep our entropy 
lower than the adversary’s at all times. 
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Figure 4.6  SPGR Synergy versus Withdrawal and the Ideas of Boyd and 
Sun Tzu 
 
This will allow us to compress our own time and so retain the opportunity to exploit variety 
and rapidity in a directed way, or as Boyd expressed it:  
Altogether Variety/Rapidity/Harmony/Initiative enables one to: Operate inside adversary’s 
observation-orientation-decision-action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of 
uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos, …and/or fold 
adversary back inside himself so that he can not cope with events/efforts as they unfold 
(1986, p. 177) 
This chapter has showed that he SPGR system and its theoretical foundation align with 
Boyd’s theoretical perspectives which make it especially suitable for approaching his 
theories and leadership development.  
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Part III 
The Conceptual Framework 
This part consists of chapter 5. It builds on Part II and constitutes the overall conceptual 
model for this dissertation, the orientation part of the OODA loop 
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5. The Conceptual Model Outlined 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present my conceptual framework, which is the foundation 
for my empirical investigation, and is based on the OODA loop, as described in section II. 
We are facing adversaries that thrive in a dynamic, novel, and unstable world by operating 
as systems that are more open than we are. They can, for example, blend into their own 
populations, while learning about our societies by studying and living in our countries and 
by using the Internet from anywhere. So far we, the Western militaries, have experienced 
considerable difficulty adapting to this reality, which, as Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate, 
has resulted in our inability to shape it for our own ends. We have tried to solve our 
problems within in the context of war alone and primarily on the physical level, although 
partly on the mental level, but paying little attention to the moral level, which is the essence 
of 4th Generation Warfare. It is the moral level which fuels and gives our adversaries their 
social energy to continue their fight. This indicates a lack of reorientation on the part of 
virtually all modern military forces and reinforces the previously stated conclusion that the 
ability to reorient under conditions of stress and uncertainty is the key to success in 21st 
century warfare. For this reason, a deep understanding of the OODA loop and developing an 
ability to reorient and act under stress must form the basis of any leadership development 
program. 
5.2 Leadership Development; The OODA loop and 
Orientation 
The main task and raison d’être for the RNoNA is to prepare future officers to function 
effectively during conflicts in the years ahead, where the abilities to function as open 
systems and to operate inside an opponent’s OODA loop will be the central mechanisms 
enabling officers to gain a competitive advantage. The ability to generate trust—mutual trust 
or Einheit—and a common outlook are the most important virtues that will make this 
possible. They create the organizational climate that speeds execution of OODA loops, 
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permit implicit communication, and together, they provide the harmonizing agent that 
encourages individual initiative via Auftrag. People are much more likely to seek initiative 
in a climate of trust than in a climate of fear (Richards, 2004). Mutual trust is created from 
mutual experience, by working hard together, and it is a powerful social force. An effective 
leadership development program must thus help each cadet enhance a unique self 
understanding, and at the same time, the program must function as an integration strategy by 
helping cadets to understand how to relate to others. An effective program will enact 
leadership by applying self-understanding to social and organizational imperatives (Hogan, 
2006; Mead, 1934; Parsons, 1953), which is the essence of orientation in the OODA loop.  
This requires a military leadership development program that exposes cadets who have 
different skills and abilities against a variety of developmental experiences, founded in an 
understanding of future conflicts and the necessary leadership qualities that challenge each 
of them. During the course of the program, each individual can, through assessment and 
support, observe and orient himself simultaneously to the others—including those whom the 
cadet leads—and to a variety of changing situations. By forcing cadets to deal together with 
such chaotic environments, to repeatedly share the same variety of experiences in the same 
way, the development process creates a common harmony, focus and direction, among the 
cadets that they will take forward into their professional lives.  
A program which is not able to establish implicit connections or bonds via similar mental 
images or impressions, as the basis to cope with a many-sided uncertain and changing 
external environment such as war or conflict, will result in no leadership development and in 
the end will instead produce leaders who can not cope with the highly chaotic and uncertain 
nature of 4th Generation Warfare. Put another way, a military leadership development 
program that does not provide realistic and tough training will kill the troops it was supposed 
to protect (Toner, 1995). This might also explain why the traditional lecture-based, 
classroom training found in most formal leadership programs is at best only marginally 
effective at preparing leaders for 21st century conflict, as I will show in chapters 11 and 13. 
Unfortunately, the benefits of traditional classroom programs do not last much beyond the 
end of the program (Dotlich & Noel, 1998, Dixon, 1999). Therefore, an effective leadership 
development program should arrange settings and circumstances so that cadets, whether 
acting as leaders or subordinates, are given the opportunity to continuously interact with the 
external world, and with each other, because leadership development means helping them to 
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more quickly make many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, 
correlations, and rejections as well as create similar images or impressions, hence the similar 
implicit orientations, that they will need to be effective in 4th Generation Warfare. The SPGR 
can measure and document this process and provide guidance to both faculty and students. 
5.3 The Conceptual Model for Leadership Development; 
Orientation 
The discussion so far reveals that the variables that constitute orientation are important since 
they control how well we are able to dissipate entropy and as such it also has a large 
influence on each individual’s role-taking ability which is a necessity for team and 
leadership development. According to Boyd orientation involves our genetic heritage, our 
social environment (culture), previous experiences, unfolding circumstances, and the results 
of analyses we conduct and the synthesis that we form (Boyd, 1995). This gives us the 
following suggestion for a variable list: 
1 Genetic heritage 
2 Cultural tradition 
3 Previous experiences 
4 Unfolding circumstances 
5 Analyses and synthesis 
 
Genetic heritage and cultural tradition could be approached by measurement, previous 
experience, analyses, and synthesis, although they contribute to shaping our orientation, are 
not directly measurable. They will influence, however, the ways we interact socially and can 
be covered implicitly by the SPGR. Unfolding circumstances are not a variable that could be 
measured as such. However, the different exercises and events in a leadership development 
are the unfolding circumstances created to see how the cadets perform interaction and 
isolation. I will now return to the problem of measuring genetic heritage and cultural 
tradition. 
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To measure genetic heritage directly through analysis of DNA would be far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. I have chosen instead to approach this aspect from a personality 
view instead of genetics. Although there some disagreement remains among contemporary 
personality theorists about the meaning of personality (see Saucier and Goldberg (2003) for 
a detailed discussion of the many definitions of personality), there is agreement that what 
people do is influenced by stable characteristics, that is, by their personality. McCrae and 
Costa (1989) define personality as enduring emotional, interpersonal, experimental, 
attitudinal, and motivational styles that explain behavior in different situations. Funder 
(2001) defines personality as “an individual’s characteristic pattern of thought, emotion, and 
behavior, together with the psychological mechanisms—hidden or not—behind those 
patterns”, while Hogan (1991) argues that personality has two different meanings and that 
failure to separate them leads to confusion. Personality traits refer to the characteristics that 
are stable over time, provide the reasons for the person’s behavior, and are psychological in 
nature. They reflect who we are and, in the aggregate, determine our affective, behavioral, 
and cognitive styles. This can be done by the Five Factor Model (FFM), also labeled “The 
Big Five.” The FFM argues that individual differences in social behavior, and the structure 
of personality measurement data, can be adequately described in terms of five broad 
dimensions. These dimensions are (a) extraversion (sociable, active, energetic), (b) 
agreeableness (cooperative, considerate, trusting), (c) conscientiousness (dependable, 
organized, persistent), (d) emotional stability/neuroticism (calm, secure, unemotional), and 
(e) openness to experience (imaginative, intellectual, artistically sensitive). Furthermore, 
research has shown that the origins of personality traits, as measured by the Five Factor 
Model like the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) are strongly influenced by 
genes, see Pervin (2002), Pervin and John (2001) p. 314-329, and Rowe (1997) for a 
discussion of the genetic influence on personality, utility, and possibilities. 
All five factors are heritable; in fact, some estimates find the strongest evidence of 
heritability for Openness to Experience (McCrae et al., 2000). Riemann, Angeleitner, and 
Strelau (1997) demonstrated that broad personality traits are strongly measured by genetic 
influences and that their heritability estimates for the five factors, range from .66 to .79, 
which are higher than the .50 usually cited. The remaining 21% to 34% of the variance 
might include unshared influence from the psychological environment, such as peer groups, 
but it might also reflect wholly biological sources, such as prenatal hormonal environment, 
minor brain damage or infection, or simply the imperfect operation of genetic mechanisms 
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(McCrae et al., 2000). The prevailing assumption is that personality traits are the result of 
the action and interactions of many genes (Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2003). McGue, 
Bacon, and Lykken (1993) found that stability of personality was associated with genetic 
effects and changes with environmental factors. According to Pervin and John (2001) the 
behavioral genetic data indicate that roughly 40-50% of the variance for single personality 
characteristics and personality overall are determined by genetic factors. The rest of the 
population variance consists of some combination of environmental effects and 
measurement error. 
The effect of environment is through the nonshared environment, the set of experiences 
unique to different children in the same family, because environmental influences shared by 
children in the same family have little or no effect on adult personality (Plomin & Daniels, 
1987). They suggest that in addition to the 40% or so of personality that stems from genetic 
factors, approximately 35% is caused by the effects of unshared environments, and 5% 
because of shared environments, the rest being from measurement error (Dunn & Plomin, 
1990). 
Another important argument which justifies the focus on personality is the emphasis Sun 
Tzu had on the characteristics for any general, see especially the chapter entitled “Initial 
Estimations.” The Art of War actually yields a comprehensive portrait of an ideal 
commander. It naturally follows that the absence of desirable qualities or the presence of 
their opposites constitute serious flaws that an adversary will deliberately seek out and 
exploit. Thus both research and military experience justify using personality in the OODA 
loop as a surrogate for genetic heritage. This gives the following revised OODA loop (note 
the balloon labeled “personality”). 
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Figure 5.1  A Revised OODA Loop 
 
The previous sections established that an effective leadership development program requires 
activities that expose cadets—whether acting as leaders or as subordinates—to a variety of 
situations, increasingly more complex and chaotic, while fostering social interaction and 
teaching the cadets to maintain a focus on the external environment. The design of the 
program, therefore, must provide activities that permit vitality and growth while avoiding 
any tendency towards isolation that could lead the cadets to develop an internal focus.  
The SPGR, which is a field-theory of social interaction introduced in chapter 4, enables the 
measurement of the social interaction within a leadership development program. In addition 
culture and personality must be measured to explore how these variables play together, and 
the next part of the dissertation will focus on these two important issues.
 85
 
 
 
Part IV 
Theoretical Aspects 
This part consists of two chapters that are the direct result of part III and the conceptual 
model. Chapter 6 examines personality and how it is related to work, teams, and especially 
leadership. Chapter 7 covers culture and how it is related to leadership, leadership 
development, and Auftragstaktik. 
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6. Personality 
6.1 Introduction 
Although strategists from Sun Tzu (1984) to van Creveld (1982) have documented the 
impact of personality on military leadership, there has been a huge controversy within the 
academic community concerning research on the topic. Since the early 1990s, however, 
personality psychology has experienced a dramatic comeback. The rebirth was largely 
stimulated by demands from the business community, although academic research, 
particularly Bowers, played a part in the beginning. The development of the Five Factor 
provides an agreed-on-taxonomy of the major dimensions of personality and their content, 
although see Block (1995) for a contrarian view. Unfortunately, according to Kaiser and 
Hogan (2006), leadership research has been primarily based on minitheories of personality 
rather than on more comprehensive models of team and organizational behavior. One major 
reason for this is, according to Hogan, that personality has two different meanings, as 
described in Chapter V, and the failure to separate those leads to confusion. Hogan’s 
perspective, which also applies the FFM, is known as Socioanalytic theory and it represents 
a perspective which is important when it comes to leadership and leadership development. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the importance of personality. Section 6.2 will 
summarize what we know about personality in general, section 6.3 discusses personality and 
leadership, personality and teams is discussed in section 6.4, and the dark side of personality 
that can lead to failure is covered in section 6.6. Hogan’s Socioanalytic theory will be 
discussed in section 6.7 with a focus on leadership and leadership development. This chapter 
is summarized in section 6.8.  
6.2 Personality in General 
Barrick and Mount (2005) insist that personality matters because it predicts and explains 
behavior at work. One major reason for this is the recent advancement in understanding the 
structure of personality and improved ways of assessing personality constructs as discussed. 
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Here, a number of meta-analyses (Table 6.1) have helped because they have made it possible 
to extract fairly clear answers to the validity of the Big Five traits.  
Table 6.1  
Summary of Meta-Analytic Findings of the Relationship Between Personality and 
Job Performance 
Study N E O A C 
Barrick & Mount 1991 
Tett, Jackosen, & Rothstein (1991) 
Salagado (1997) 
Hurtz & Donovan (2000) 
Barrick, Mount, & Judge (2001) 
Hogan & Holland (2001) 
.07 
.22 
.18 
.14 
.13 
.37
.10 
.16 
.14 
.09 
.15 
.30
-.03 
.27 
.02 
.05 
.07 
.31 
.06 
.33 
.02 
.10 
.11 
.28 
.23 
.18 
.26 
.22 
.27 
.31
Note: N= Neuroticism, E= Extraversion, O= Openness to Experience, A= Agreeableness, C= Conscientiousness. 
Coefficients are corrected for predictor and criterion unreliability.  
These meta-analyses have shown that the validities of Conscientiousness and Neuroticism 
generalize in the prediction of overall performance. The Conscientiousness trait refers to the 
willingness to follow rules and exert effort, and the Neuroticism trait to the capacity to 
allocate resources to accomplish tasks. Conscientiousness and Neuroticism can be viewed as 
measures of trait-oriented work motivation, and it appears that they affect performance in all 
jobs through “will do” motivational components. General mental health ability affects 
performance in all jobs primarily through “can do” capacities (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). 
This research also revealed that the three other personality traits, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Openness to Experience, are important in specific niches (Barrick et al., 
2001). Extraversion has been found to be related to job performance in occupations where a 
significant portion of the job involves interacting with others, particularly when that 
interaction is focused on influencing others, as in leadership behavior (Barrick, Mount, & 
Judge, 2001). Being sociable, gregarious, assertive, and energetic is likely to contribute to 
success. Agreeableness also has been found to be an important predictor in jobs that involve 
significant interpersonal interaction. However, it matters only when interacting involves 
helping, cooperating, and nurturing others. Thus, if working in a team forms an important 
component of the work, Agreeableness may, according to Mount, Barrick, and Stewart 
(1998), be the single best personality predictor. Employees who are low on this trait will be 
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argumentative, inflexible uncooperative, uncaring, intolerant, and disagreeable, are likely to 
be less effective at teamwork, and engage in more contra-productive behavior. This suggests 
that Agreeableness is an important trait when it comes to leadership development. 
Openness to Experience has been found to be related to creativity, divergent thinking 
abilities, being able to “think outside the box,” and to influence the ability to adapt to change 
(George & Zhou, 2001; LePine, Colquitt, & Erez, 2000; McCrae, 1987). Openness and 
flexibility, in turn, are related to having the imagination to think of how things could be, not 
just how they are. By being receptive to different ideas, people, and situations, open people 
are able to have at their disposal a wide range of thoughts, feelings, and problem-solving 
strategies, the combination of which may lead to novel and useful solutions or ideas 
(McCrae, 1987). 
Although Conscientiousness is consistently beneficial in work settings, the findings of 
George & Zhou (2001) and LePine et al. (2000) indicate that high Conscientiousness may 
serve to inhibit creative behavior and sound decision making when the situation encourages 
the conformist and controlled tendencies of employees who are high on conscientiousness. 
Conscientiousness, per se, does not appear to be detrimental. Rather, it is the combination of 
high Conscientiousness and a situation and a culture that simultaneously encourage 
conformity, being self-controlled, meeting predetermined expectations, and that lacks 
support for creative behavior. However, Feist (1998) found that creative people are more 
autonomous, introverted, and open to new experiences, norm-doubting, self-confident, self-
accepting, driven, ambitious, dominant, hostile, and impulsive, which might not be desirable 
traits for a leader. Creative people have a tendency to question social norms and to be 
relatively independent of group influence and social dispositions. To be creative, one must 
be able to spend time alone and away from people. This clearly indicates that personality 
traits matter at work, and what are especially important are the specific personality traits that 
are relevant to leadership. 
6.3 Personality and Leadership 
The result of the personality debates of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s was that personality had at 
best a checkered reputation as predictor of work outcomes (see Guion and Gottier, 1965; 
Michel 1968; Davis-Blake and Pfeffer, 1989). The early trait studies generally were of two 
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forms: (a) attempts to identify the traits that differentiated leaders from their followers (the 
great man theory of leadership), or (b) attempts to identify the traits that characterized 
successful as opposed to unsuccessful leaders. Neither of these approaches yielded 
consistent findings, and early and often-cited reviews of the leadership trait literature by 
Mann (1959) and Stogdill (1948) concluded that personality traits, by themselves, explained 
little about leadership. One possible explanation of this is that some of the indicators of the 
abandonment of the trait approach could be found in the wide variability of the trait terms 
used in the studies that formed the subject of Mann’s (1959) and Stogdill’s (1948) reviews. 
Because various labels were ascribed to the same or similar traits, these early reviewers 
concluded that no trait had been consistently associated with leadership effectiveness, and 
they understandably offered an explanation of this finding in the form of situational 
variables.  
However, several theorists (e.g. Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Lillibridge & Williams, 
1992; Vickers, 1995) have challenged this view. They have proposed that the utility of the 
trait approach in understanding leadership has been erroneously undervalued. Judge, Bono, 
Ilies, and Gerhardt (2002) conducted a meta-analytic study of the links between personality, 
defined in the terms of the FFM, and leadership, in terms of emergence and effectiveness. 
They reported the following estimated corrected correlations: (a) Neuroticism, -.2436; (b) 
Extraversion, .31; (c) Openness, .24; (d) Agreeableness, .08; and (e) Conscientiousness, .28; 
with a multiple R, using the five dimensions overall of .4837. For leadership effectiveness, 
the correlations were; (a) Neuroticism, -.22; (b) Extraversion, .24; (c) Openness, .24; (d) 
Agreeableness, .21; and (e) Conscientiousness, .16. More recently, Hogan and Holland 
(2003) confined their investigation and reported the following estimated true validities: (a) 
Emotional Stability (Neuroticism), .43, (b) Extraversion and Ambition, .34; (c) 
Agreeableness, .36; (d) Conscientiousness, .36; and (e) Intellect and Openness, .34. What is 
important with the Hogan and Holland study is that they confined their investigation to one 
inventory, the Hogan Personnel Inventory (Hogan & Hogan, 1995), rather than trying to 
                                                 
36 Low Neuroticism indicates high Emotional Stability. A negative correlation indicates that a lower level of Neuroticism is 
positively related to leadership. 
37 Leadership effectiveness refers to a leader’s ability to influence subordinates, while leadership emergence is a within-
group phenomenon. The multiple R for emergence was .53 and for effectiveness it was .39 (Judge et al., 2002). 
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combine scales across inventories, and they carefully aligned predictors with relevant 
criteria.  
The study performed by Judge et al. (2002) also reported the relationship between the FFM 
and Leadership by study setting, see Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2  
Summary of Meta-Analytic Findings of the Relation Between Personality and 
Leadership by Study Setting 
DOMAIN Business Government/Military Students 
Neuroticism 
Extraversion 
Openness 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
-.15 
.25 
.23 
-.04 
.05 
-.23 
.16 
.06 
-.04 
.17 
-.27 
.40 
.28 
.18 
.36 
  
Especially worth noting is the low correlation between leadership and Openness in a 
government or military setting. According to Judge et al. (2002), the student setting is seen 
as more unstructured, with few rules or formally defined roles; government organizations 
tend to be relatively bureaucratic; and military organizations, besides being bureaucratic, are 
also rule oriented. The business setting falls somewhere in between. Research by LePine, 
Colquitt, & Erez (2000) indicates that that adaptability seems to be a function of 
Conscientiousness and Openness in situations characterized by sudden changes, novelty, and 
ambiguity. Those with high Openness made better decisions, and, unexpectedly, those with 
low Conscientiousness also made better decisions. This revealing effect for 
Conscientiousness was the trait’s reflecting dependability (i.e., order, dutifulness, and 
deliberation), rather than volition (i.e., competence, achievement striving, self-discipline). 
This strongly indicates the importance of Openness for dealing with conflicts in the 21st 
century, but it also provides an argument for a balance between these two important traits. 
Openness has been found to be related to creativity and to influence the ability to adapt to 
change, while Conscientiousness predicts both job and leadership performance. 
Agreeableness was found the least relevant of the FFM in the study of Judge et al. (2002), 
The Hogan and Holland (2003) study and the findings of Mount et al. (1998), however, 
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underline the importance of Agreeableness. Silverthorne (2001) found in a study comparing 
leaders from the U.S., the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Thailand that effective managers 
differ from less effective ones in describing themselves as more extraverted, more agreeable, 
more conscientious, and less neurotic in all three cultures, and that U.S. managers also 
described themselves as more open to experience.  
There is empirical evidence to demonstrate that situational strength moderates the 
personality-behavior relation (Barrick & Mount, 1993; Beaty, Cleveland, & Murphy, 2001; 
Gellatly & Irving, 2001; Hochwarter, Witt, & Kacmar, 2000). This underscores the fact that 
we must broadly account for the situational effects to determine whether personality is 
relevant to behavior and whether those effects extend beyond the requirements of the job. 
Studies have also demonstrated the effect of situational strength, rather than personality, by 
showing that situation can control how an individual behaves. When situations are 
exceptionally strong (e.g. like. Goffman’s classical description of behavior in the elevator 
(1963, p. 137-139), or attending a funeral), all individuals tend to behave in the same way 
regardless of their personality traits. As a natural result, strong situations have been shown to 
decrease the observed relation between personality and behavior. In contrast, weak situations 
are characterized by few expectations and many ambiguous demands, and consequently 
individuals have considerable discretion in how to behave. This is descriptive of the highly 
political nature of 4th GW. As a result, the validity of personality traits in predicting 
performance has been found to be larger than when the situation is characterized as “weak” 
rather than “strong.” The important factor to consider here is discretion (Kaiser and Hogan, 
2006), which will be discussed in section 6.8. 
6.4 Personality and Teams 
Because the RNoNA conducts leadership development through the use of teams, research on 
team composition and the role of personality is important (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & 
Mount, 1998; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; Neuman, Wagner, & Christiansen, 1999). Although 
most of this research has targeted the main effects in team effectiveness (Barrick et al., 
1998), results show that the traits of the team’s members influence the group processes 
(Neuman et al. 1999) and that these influences vary based on the contextual demands 
inherent in the group and the amount of team interdependence (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). 
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This requires that the situation be broadly defined because situational strength, along with 
group and organizational context, influence personality. Another complicating factor is that 
a person’s traits can also change the situation (Stewart & Barrick, 2004). “One bad apple” in 
a team can adversely affect the work environment. Just one person who is disagreeable or 
neurotic (low on Agreeableness and or high on Neuroticism) has been shown to lead to less 
communication, lower interdependence, less work load sharing, and more conflict (Barrick 
et al., 1998). Barry and Stewart (1997) found that teams were unable to function effectively 
if they had too many or to few extraverts in a team setting. Chidester, Helmreich, Gregorich, 
& Geis (1991) showed that flight crew performance was significantly correlated with the 
personality of the captain. Crews with captains who were warm, friendly, self-confident, and 
able to stand up to pressure (i.e., high Agreeableness and emotional stability) made fewest 
errors. Conversely, crew with captains who were arrogant, hostile, boastful, egotistical, 
passive aggressive or dictatorial made the most errors (c.f. Chidester et al., 1991; Foushee & 
Helmreich, 1988). These findings agree with the previously mentioned study by Williams 
and Sternberg (1988), who found that even one overly zealous or domineering member in a 
group significantly inhibited the quality of that group’s performance. 
6.5 Personality and Failure: The Dark Side of Leadership 
It is also worth mentioning that research on derailment (Lombardo, Ruderman, & McCauley, 
1988; McCall & Lombardo, 1983; Hellervik, Hazucha, & Schneider, 1992; Peterson, 1993; 
and Peterson & Hicks, 1993) has revealed that managerial incompetence is associated with 
untrustworthiness, overcontrol, exploitation, micromanagement, irritability, unwillingness to 
use discipline, and an inability to make good staffing or business decisions (or both). 
Leaders often fail because they no longer can rely solely on their own skills and efforts. That 
is, they have been promoted into positions that require them to work through others to be 
successful. Witt, Burke, Barrick, and Mount (2002) showed that highly conscientious 
workers who lack interpersonal sensitivity (i.e., low on Agreeableness) are less effective, 
particularly in jobs requiring extensive cooperation or interaction with others, which is a 
crucial part of leadership. This indicates a shift from “getting ahead” towards “getting 
along”, where the main difference seems to be Agreeableness. 
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The dark side of personality refers to the impressions we make when we let down our guard 
when we are stressed, tired, or do not care how we are perceived (Hogan & Hogan 2001)—
when we are “backstage” (Goffman, 1959). Dark side tendencies originate in efforts to get 
along and get ahead and they are agenda-driven (Hogan & Hogan, 2001). They rest on 
flawed assumptions, and they yield short-term benefits at the expense of long-term losses. 
The dark side is the key to understanding leadership failure because they are the flawed 
interpersonal strategies that prevent leaders from building a team, forming alliances, and 
gaining support for their vision and plans. The dark side resembles the three self-defeating 
styles that Horney (1950) identified for managing anxiety in relationships (Hogan & Hogan, 
1997). These dysfunctional coping strategies are motivated by excessive concerns for 
security, recognition, and approval. Each of them rests on a particular interpersonal strategy: 
gaining security by intimidating others; winning recognition through flirtation and 
seduction; and obtaining approval by becoming indispensable. We know that it is difficult to 
predict behavior in a specific episode, but stable individual differences emerge from 
cumulative performance and aggregate trends in behavior (Epstein, 1979). Especially 
important in this is the level of discretion because dark side tendencies will be most apparent 
in “weak situations,” implying senior positions where there are fewer constraints. However, 
because these are flawed interpersonal strategies, they will come into play in a leadership 
development program, especially if discretion is high. 
On the basis of these reviews, it appears that who we are is how we lead. In the next section 
I will explore a more comprehensive theory developed by Hogan and his colleagues.  
6.6 Socioanalytic Theory 
The purpose of this section is to provide a more fundamental theory of personality. I will 
present in this section a personality theory developed by Hogan and his colleagues. This 
perspective is known as Socioanalytic theory (Hogan, 1983, 1991, 1996; Hogan & Roberts, 
2004; Hogan & Smither, 2001) also applies the FFM but it is rooted in interpersonal 
psychology (Carson, 1969; Leary, 1957; Sullivan, 1953; Wiggins, 1979) and describes a 
model of human nature that synthesizes thinking about human evolution, which is essential 
for understanding leadership and leadership development.  
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This section will cover this theory, its motivational forces, its approach to maturity and 
development, and its links to leadership development. 
6.6.1 Personality: Identity and Reputation 
Socioanalytic theory suggest that the inner core of personality—our motivation—is 
composed of needs that primarily concern the desire to be liked and accepted, to have status, 
power, or control over others, and to make sense out of the world. The surface of our 
personality, which is our conscious and unconscious intentions, consists of strategies we 
have developed to gain acceptance, to gain power, and to make the world predictable, all in 
the context of modern life. Our need for acceptance and social contact leads to behaviors 
intended to get along. Our need for status results in behaviors designed to get ahead. And our 
need for predictability and order leads to behaviors designed to make meaning. These needs 
are met during social interaction, and the most important differences among people concern 
how well we get along with others, how much status we have, and how we make sense out 
of our lives. Some people are more successful than others in attaining these goals, and it is 
these individual differences that socioanalytic theory tries to explain and that are important 
when it comes to understanding leadership development. 
Our personality consists of two components: identity and reputation. There is the actor’s 
view of personality, personality from the inside, the inner perspective. It concerns the “you” 
that you know—your identity, which also includes your values and is ultimately the same as 
the self. Mead (1934) describes our identity as a result of other people teaching us who we 
are, but at the same time we also choose identity from a “menu” that is available in our 
culture. Hogan claims, like Mead, that the self is the core of personality and that it is created 
during social interaction based on feedback from others. When the self is formed, it guides 
our actions vis-à-vis others, and feedback from others then further shapes the self. 
The observer’s view of personality is personality from the outside, the outer perspective, and 
it concerns the “you” that the rest of us know, the person others think you are, based on your 
overt behavior—your reputation38. Identity is the stories we tell ourselves and others about 
                                                 
38 Hogan, in contrast to Alport (1961), claims that our reputations are an important part of personality, because: (a) 
Reputations develop quickly and are stable over time. (b) Most people spend a great deal of time and energy trying to 
establish and maintain their reputations. (c) Since the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, and because 
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ourselves; it is the generic part we play during social interaction. Reputation, on the other 
hand, is the summary evaluation of our past performances during interactions as shared by 
the members of our team or organization. These two concepts further serve two different 
functions for us. We use reputation to describe our past performances and predict future 
performance. Hence reputations are used to describe or predict behavior. Identity is used to 
explain behavior. Reputations concern what we do, and identity concerns why we do it.  
Social interaction requires an identity because it is our identity that controls the roles we are 
willing to adopt and how we play them. Our performance and experience in these roles 
shape both our identities and reputations. For example, all cadets at the RNoNA are 
supposed to participate in the leadership role, but how they do so varies widely, depending 
on their identities. At the same time, these identities vary enormously, which explains 
differences between people.  
There are two sets of reasons that account for these individual differences. The first set is 
biological, while the second set concerns how we analyze the world because what we do 
depends on what is in our minds, and some people are more insightful than others about how 
to conduct themselves. The mental models that account for individual differences are (a) our 
identities and (b) the interpersonal behaviors we have developed to express and defend our 
identities—which are known as self-presentational behaviors. Successful people know how 
to manage their reputations and they manage them one interaction at a time. This is self-
knowledge from the actor’s perspective, which involves becoming aware of our identities 
and the self-presentational strategy that we use to support them—being mindful of what we 
are doing when we interact with others, a perspective which resembles Goffman’s (1959) 
“frontstage and backstage.” While self-knowledge, from the observer’s perspective, involves 
becoming aware of how others perceive and describe us.  
Figure 6.1 represents core elements of a science of personality as described by Hogan and 
Roberts (2004). This model evaluates (a) how we see ourselves—our identity; (b) how 
others see us—our reputation; (c) the manner in which we interact with others in social 
                                                                                                                                                      
reputations reflect a person’s past behavior, reputations are quite useful for predicting many, if not most, aspects of social 
performance. (d) There is a well-developed taxonomy of reputations, namely the Five Factor Model. (e) Our reputations 
reflect the amount of social acceptance and status we have within our community (Hogan, 1996) 
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roles; and (d) how our identity, reputation, and interaction strategies influence our ability to 
get along with other people and achieve our goals. 
During every interaction, we run a major risk of minor embarrassment and a slight risk of 
utter humiliation because our reputations are evaluated after each interaction. Furthermore, 
most people can describe their identities, which is the person we know, but few can 
accurately describe their reputations, even though they usually care deeply about them. This 
is the person that others know.  
At the same time it is important to realize that there are three sets of unconscious causes that 
underlie our social behavior. The first set of unconscious causes is biological in nature. We 
as people are born predisposed toward certain characteristic moods and emotions. Because 
we live inside our own mood states, they color our perception like tinted glasses, and we 
tend to think they are universal, that others see the world as we do. They focus our 
orientations in ways that are simultaneously profound, idiosyncratic, and unconscious, and it 
has been shown that becoming aware of our characteristic moods can cause problems 
(Hogan & Smither, 2001). The second set is a function of our natural ego-centrism that we 
tend to be unaware of, or even ignore: what others expect or believe during interactions. 
Hogan and Smither (2001) argue, referring to Eibl-Eisenfeldt (1989), that the rules that 
govern our interactions are “prewired” in our nervous systems, so that our responses to 
others do not depend on understanding others or knowing what they expect. Much of our 
behavior during social interaction occurs automatically and is therefore unconscious. 
Politicians, actors, and other entertainers understand this and often undergo elaborate 
coaching in order to master and control these subtle and otherwise unconscious interpersonal 
behaviors. Such training should be a major component of any good leadership development 
program. The third set of unconscious causes comprises the values, attitudes, and norms of 
our culture that we assume are true and therefore do not question or evaluate. These include, 
among others, the concept of maturity, which determines how we should treat people above 
or below us on the corporate ladder. 
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Figure 6.1  Core Elements of a Science of Personality (Hogan & Roberts, 
2004) 
 
6.6.2 Maturity 
The socioanalytic model of maturity defines maturity in two ways. One is from the 
observer’s perspective, where maturity concerns the degree to which a person is liked, 
admired and respected in his or her community. Well-liked and admired people share three 
broad but indispensable characteristics: First, they are rewarding to deal with because they 
praise, support, and encourage others and they maintain a positive mood. Unrewarding 
people criticize, abuse, and demean others, whom they also subject to displays of negative 
emotions such as anger and cynicism. Second, well-liked people are consistent, which means 
that we know what to expect when we deal with them. They maintain a steady mind, honor 
their commitments, respect confidences, and play by the rules. Third, well-liked people 
contribute to their groups. When these qualities are translated into the Five Factor Model of 
personality, a mature person from the observer’s viewpoint would be agreeable (supportive 
and warm), emotionally stable (consistent and stable), and conscientious (honoring 
commitments and plays by the rules).  
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The other socioanalytic definition of maturity is from the actor’s perspective, which 
concerns the characteristics inside people that explain why they are liked, admired, and 
respected. The first internal aspect of maturity concerns low neuroticism and is related to 
success in love and work. At the same time there are many people who seem selfish, self-
absorbed, insensitive, rude, and unable to learn from experience. These tendencies reflect 
poor role-taking ability. Role taking ability has two components (Mead, 1934). First, it 
involves thinking about oneself from the perspective of others. Second, it involves regulating 
one’s behavior based on what one thinks others expect. When role-taking ability is translated 
into the lexicon of the FFM, it seems to be a combination of agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and openness. This is consistent with Alport’s (1961) view, who noted 
that maturity involves tolerance, a capacity to develop and maintain close relationships, and 
self-insight. A mature person is resilient, unselfish, and able to laugh at him or herself. 
As in the SPGR framework, maturity from the inside is reflected in greater adjustment and 
role-taking ability, which in the FFM translates into higher agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
openness, and emotional stability. Maturity from the outside is reflected in a reputation for 
being agreeable, conscientious, and emotionally stable. Fulfillment of the master motives of 
getting along, getting ahead, and achieving predictability are positively associated with 
maturity. Success in certain roles like occupational performance and leadership seems to 
depend on greater maturity (Judge, et al., 2002; Judge & Bono, 1999; Judge, Erez, & Bono, 
1998). Figure 6.2 illustrates Hogan & Roberts (2004) understanding of maturity. 
Maturity depends on balancing one’s egoistic and altruistic impulses as well as one’s self-
critical and self-accepting tendencies. Mature people are both comfortable with themselves 
and open to critical feedback. They are both actively engaged in helping others and 
reasonable about advancing their own self-interest. A sign of maturity, therefore, is the 
degree to which individuals are integrated into their society without losing a sense of who 
they are vis-à-vis others. A commitment to social causes and to the welfare of others is 
necessary to overcome egocentrism, and a critical distance from those causes is necessary in 
order to avoid becoming a true believer. Similarly, a measure of maturity is the degree to 
which one is self-accepting, while at the same time realizing that one is not perfect. Within 
the context of self-approval, mature people listen carefully to negative feedback from others, 
especially others with lower status than themselves. The concept of maturity takes into 
account the relationship between the individual and society. 
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Figure 6.2  Socioanalytic Theory and Maturity 
 
People who develop maturity at a younger age will have smoother transitions into the world 
of work, have fewer problems with supervisors and coworkers, and be more successful in 
terms of their occupational status and earnings (Judge, Higgins, Thoreson, & Barrick, 1999). 
Those who lack one or more of the characteristics that define maturity may confront many 
problems in their careers, both in the initial transitions and in the establishment of an 
occupational record. 
6.6.3 Socioanalytic Theory and Leadership Development 
People’s identities drive their reputations. Most of us are preoccupied with our identity, our 
own self-evaluations. It is, however, others’ evaluations of our performance that are 
substantially more consequential in terms of real world payoff. We know that self-ratings of 
leadership performance are poorly correlated with actual leadership performance (Hogan, et 
al., 1994), although some are better at making these self-appraisals accurately than others. 
What I say about myself is largely my theory about my own performance. According to 
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Hogan (2006) that theory is rarely tested or evaluated, and in some cases it is shockingly out 
of touch with reality. In short, self-evaluations of performance capabilities and successes are 
not reliable data sources, while other people’s evaluations are important sources of 
information. These evaluations are reliable in the sense that if properly collected, they will 
converge. They are occupational performance because social behavior is in large part guided 
by forces or processes outside our awareness, or what Boyd labeled our orientation.  
Many of these unconscious determinants can be made conscious through social feedback, 
education, and self-relation. The distinction between self-knowledge and other knowledge is 
a key consideration for leadership development. It is a matter of importance to know how the 
team evaluates its members’ intrapersonal skills and interpersonal skills in the sense that 
people can be made aware of the fact that others perceive them as impulsive, insubordinate, 
bad tempered, not being approachable, responsive, or attentive. Then they can construct 
strategies for dealing with the negative consequences of poor intrapersonal and interpersonal 
skills. That we change our identities based on feedback regarding our reputations shows that 
social interaction is the vehicle for leadership development. To the degree that these 
unconscious determinants and feedback regarding our reputations remain unconscious, we 
are liable to act in ways that are foolish, self-defeating, or even immoral.  
6.7 An Integrative View and Summary 
The findings presented above show quite clearly that personality and leadership are closely 
connected—and in many ways they confirm that who you are determines how you lead. For 
the purpose of leadership development, however, it is necessary to have a deeper and more 
through understanding of personality. The key factor is maturity because improving 
leadership development and leadership performance depends on improving maturity. 
Furthermore, the fulfillment of the master motives of getting along, getting ahead, and 
achieving predictability are positively associated with maturity. 
The research findings suggest that higher levels of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and 
Emotional Stability will enhance team performance. Although Agreeableness and Emotional 
Stability do not predict individual job performance as well as cognitive ability and 
conscientiousness, when aggregated, they are important predictors of team performance and 
team development. Openness to Experience is also important because it is related to 
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creativity, divergent thinking abilities, and to the ability to adapt to change. It is a key 
element in the ability to make timely decisions within a climate of uncertainty and 
ambiguity, while it is also an important influence on the willingness to learn. This 
emphasizes the importance of personality. Hogan and Kaiser (2005, 2006) have developed 
the model presented in Figure 6.4, which suggests that personality predicts leadership style, 
leadership style impacts employee attitudes and team functions, and these relationships, 
taken together, predict organizational effectiveness. 
 
Figure 6.3  Leaders’ Impact on Organizational Effectiveness (Hogan & 
Kaiser, 2005, Kaiser & Hogan, 2006) 
 
Within an organizational context, it is important to distinguish between two types of 
influences. The first is the influence leaders exert in social interaction, which is the main 
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leadership in an organization. The second is the indirect influence that leaders exert through 
their decisions about direction, organizational structure, and objectives. This is leadership of 
an organization, guiding collective action impersonally by setting goals, defining roles and 
staffing positions, allocating resources, and establishing policies. Direct influence is an 
essential activity for all leaders in an organization; indirect influence is a key activity for 
strategic senior leadership (Hogan and Kaiser, 2006).  
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Leadership in organizations concerns the behaviors that directly motivate employees and 
galvanize teams, as opposed to the behaviors that demoralize employees and weaken teams. 
Leadership of organizations involves making decisions about strategy, structure, staffing, 
and policy that indirectly influences employees by creating a “strong situation” in their work 
environment. 
Because the leader’s role is to facilitate team performance, a leader’s impact across three 
levels of organizational analyses—the individual, the team, and the organization—creates 
the context for performance. Because contexts are conducive to performance, these actions 
affect a team’s performance in competition with rivals and translate directly into 
organizational effectiveness, which is the ultimate measure of leader effectiveness (Hogan & 
Kaiser, 2005). It must be acknowledged that a leader’s activities in conducting 
organizational analyses do tend to focus attention inward, which can increase entropy. 
However, if as a result, maturity is improved and the ultimate focus is kept external, any 
increase in entropy will be temporary and more than offset by the resulting increase in 
organizational effectiveness. 
Figure 6.4 shows that there are several moderators of a leader’s personality that have an 
influence on organizational effectiveness. Most important is the moderating effect of 
discretion which constrains a leader’s range of actions. When leaders have little discretion; 
their range of action is constrained. When they have an abundance of discretion, they do as 
they wish. The implication is that when discretion is low, there is little relationship between 
leader personality and organizational effectiveness. Discretion often increases with 
hierarchical level, and when discretion is high, leader personality predicts organizational 
performance. The Germans understood this and, because their system was based on 
Auftragstaktik, focused accordingly on personality and character-building in their officer 
training (van Creveld, 1982). Simply put, all other efforts taken to command and control, 
including command-by-direction and command-by-plan, have not taken this issue seriously. 
They have followed the dominant logic of “once you have stripes on your sleeves you are a 
leader.”  
The organization and development of forces and resources within most militaries, like the 
Norwegian, and which has preoccupied them for the last 15 to 20 years, has generally been 
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settled within the old paradigm39. We have turned inward, yielding wholeheartedly to our 
culture’s obsession with mechanical and administrative wizardry. All this can be seen in 
documents concerning Network Centric Warfare, Network Enabling Capabilities and NATO 
Network Enabling where thousands of words are deployed in order to communicate a need 
for updated hardware and administration. This overwhelming rhetoric is meant to suggest 
purposeful audacity. It is not difficult, however, to detect a remarkable passivity, a latter day 
expression of the Maginot Line mentality. It could be argued that we are on the brink of 
failing—our people, structures and process have become appropriate for only one particular 
segment, “interstate industrial war” or 2nd Generation Warfare. When the environment 
changes as it has by evolving into 4th Generation Warfare, the kind of people, process, and 
structures developed for earlier forms of warfare are no longer viable. The results that we 
now are producing in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate a lack of success in our approach. 
                                                 
39 In 1990-91 NATO had 392 destroyers’ frigates and 51 battle and cruisers. Still Norway decided to buy five brand new 
frigates replacing the old ones by 2010, clearly indicating decision making within the old paradigm (Smith, 2005). The 
crucial point is that those who took these decisions were a result of the ASA because structure and processes are outcomes 
of the behavior of kinds of people in the organization rather than the determinants of their behavior (Schneider, 1987).  
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7. Culture 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will first discuss the function of culture, one of the five components of 
orientation in the OODA loop. As discussed in section 3.3.3, Boyd concluded that a small 
set of principles formed the foundation for the German victory and that they were primarily 
cultural. The Germans had no advantage in numbers and lagged in technology, yet they won 
and “their strategy was so powerful that in one two-week period, it set aside 300 years of 
military history” (Richards, 2004, p. 19). Boyd took these underlying principles and codified 
them, as discussed in section 3.3 and illustrated in Figure 3.1. It was this culture that gave 
the Germans their competitive advantage, which also is true of Toyota’s Production System 
(Richards, 2004). This perhaps nonintuitive observation led Boyd to conclude that the 
Toyota Production System (Ohno, 1988), the model for “lean production,” was another 
implementation of this culture, (Richards, 2004). It is important, therefore, to understand the 
effect a culture might have on leadership and leadership development. I will also introduce 
an approach to culture—The Cultural Orientation Framework—and outline its 
organizational impact. Finally, I will describe how this framework corresponds to Boyd’s 
organizational climate and particularly how it affects the use of Auftragstaktik. 
7.2 The Function of Culture 
Culture is a set of assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people (e.g. the 
Germans or Toyota) and that guide that group of people’s interaction with each other (Lane, 
DiStefano, & Maznevski, 2006). Although it is a group-level phenomenon, it influences 
indivduals’ perceptions, values, and behaviors, especially with respect to social interaction. 
It consists of a shared, commonly held body of general beliefs and values that defines the 
“shoulds” and “oughts” of life. The beliefs and values are taught to people so early and so 
unobtrusively that they are usually unaware of their influence (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 
1961). Culture serves two important functions for groups that affect leadership (Maznevski, 
DiStefano, Gomez, Noorderhaven, & Wu, 2002; Lane, DiStefano, & Maznevski, 2006). 
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First, it makes action simpler and more efficient. It provides “software” for the group’s 
interactions, or what might be thought of as a sort of oil that greases the machine of the 
society. The shared cultural system allows members to interact with each other efficiently 
without questioning every motive or action, and with relatively smooth flow of activity. It 
also provides guidance for decision making so that basic criteria need not be discussed at 
length. These basic cultural criteria—behavioral scripts, expectancy, and conflict 
resolution—are captured by the implicit guidance and control arrow from orientation to 
action in the OODA loop in Figure 3.2. Behavioral scripts help people know what to expect 
of each other and how to reciprocate appropriately to express conflict and resolve it. Culture 
also provides an important source of social identity for its members. 
Culture and individuals interact in many ways. Culture is a characteristic of groups and is 
defined in terms of what group members share. However, individuals within a given culture 
are all different and subscribe to the culture’s assumption and values to a greater or lesser 
degree (Lane, et al., 2006). To understand this influence, there is a need to understand the 
basic role of assumptions, or orientations, and perceptions and how they influence our 
thoughts and actions. An assumption is an unquestioned, taken-for-granted belief about the 
world and how it works. Assumptions, like orientations, create our worldview, or the 
cognitive environment in which we operate. They come in many different varieties and some 
of them are so deeply ingrained and unquestioned that it is difficult even to surface them, 
and even then they are not testable.  
The concept of culture incorporates many of these deep assumptions, while others are 
learned, and, once learned they are taken for granted without further questioning. They also 
influence the process of perception, or what we notice and how we interpret events and 
behavior. As such they are absolutely necessary. If we did not make these innumerable 
assumptions about the world, we would be paralyzed by the need to inquire about the 
meaning of events and the motives of others. This requires that our assumptions be well 
matched with the real world. Lane et al. (2006) claim that there are two ways to regain 
constancy when our assumptions do not fit the ongoing activity in our environment. First, we 
could change our perceptions of the evidence to match the assumptions, questioning the 
other, or second, change our assumptions to match the evidence, question ourselves. 
However, we are more inclined to invoke the first method than the second because it 
requires a great deal less energy, and it is often reinforced by others who hold the same 
 106
assumptions, a real danger in organizations lacking variety. Instead of solving this issue by 
distorting perception there is another option: altering one’s own assumptions or aligning 
one’s own orientation with the ongoing activity. The second option, changing our orientation 
to match reality, emphasizes the importance of identifying and understanding assumptions in 
order to get a better match between our orientation and the ongoing events in the external 
world. This can be achieved through leadership development. 
7.3 The Cultural Orientation Framework  
Several researchers (e.g., Adler, 1997; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997) have recommended 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) “cultural orientation” framework to investigate the 
impact of national culture on managerial issues. This framework provides a taxonomy of 
cultural orientations, founded both on empirical and experimental support, that can be 
conceptualized and measured at the individual as well as group level of analysis. Before 
examining this framework, it is useful to note that there also exist other culture maps, see 
Hall (1960), Hofstede (1980), Bond & Hofstede, (1989), Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 
(1993), and Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1998). 
The Cultural Orientation Framework (COF) was initially presented by anthropologists 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck in 1961. The basic premise underlying COF is that there are 
common themes in the problems that different societies have faced throughout time and that 
these universal issues provide a way of viewing culture more objectively. Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck and their colleagues analyzed hundreds of ethnographic studies and they 
proposed that there is a limited set of questions—called “cultural orientations”—and a 
limited set of possible answers for each question—called “variations”—which each society 
must answer in order to operate in an effective and cooperative way. They identified and 
validated six orientations in a study of members of five cultures found in the Southwestern 
United States. These cultural orientations are: (a) relationship to the environment, (b) 
relationship among people, (c) mode of activity, (d) human nature, (e) time and (f) space. 
These six orientations are problems or issues that all societies throughout recorded history 
faced, but different societies have developed different ways of coping with these orientation.  
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Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) also articulated three important assumptions concerning 
these cultural elements that make this framework well-suited for research connected to 
leadership development.  
1. They stated that individuals hold preferences for variations, and the cultural pattern is 
defined by the aggregation of individuals’ preferences. Therefore, we can 
conceptualize and measure these dimensions at the individual level of analysis, 
aggregate measures to develop descriptions of cultures, and examine variance both 
within and between cultures. 
2. All dimensions are presumed to be found in all societies, but each society is likely to 
exhibit, at the aggregate level, a defining rank order of elements within each 
orientation. This assumption allows us to analyze the dynamics within cultures, as well 
as identify major aggregate trends. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) assert that these 
variations in patterns are inevitable and even necessary for societies to function 
effectively as a whole and to change over time. 
3. The dimensions are proposed to be conceptually independent, even within orientations. 
For example, Relationships-individual is independent from Activity-being, but also 
Relationships-individual from collective, and Activity-doing from being. Researchers 
can therefore examine the effects of culture more extensively than we can with a less 
complex, bipolar framework.  
The COF focus on how individuals believe the world should work and on their assumptions 
about how the world does work. These assumptions are naturally a reflection of the culture 
to which that individual belongs, so individuals are reporting on their own cultures. These 
assumptions are typically not questioned, nor are they even normally discussed.  
Cultural orientations compromise the individual’s assumptions about social organizations 
and elements outside the individual. As with Boyd’s conception, the orientations serve as 
perceptual filters that screen information and potential choices about behavior (Erez and 
Earley, 1993), and provide scripts for social interactions (Maznevski and Peterson, 1997). 
Values generally focus on the value-holder. Values are motivators of individual behavior. 
The COF through an understanding of values will help us understand individual motivations 
and will illuminate many elements of individual behavior alone and in social settings, within 
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and across cultures (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz and Sagiv, 
1995). In addition, the COF provides an understanding of social behavior patterns, organized 
systems and decision-making and it represents an important tool for understanding and 
comparing cultures. The next section will focus on the COF in relation to its organizational 
impact concerning leadership, teams, and organizational structures to mention some of the 
most important ones.  
7.4 The Cultural Orientation Framework’s Organizational 
Impact  
This section will discuss how the different orientations and variations of the COF influence 
organizations and as such have bearing for the performed leadership and organizational 
structures. This will illustrate the importance of culture and show that some of the variations 
of the COF will have both an enabling and constraining effect on the leadership development 
program at the RNoNA depending on how dominant they are. A culture’s orientation to 
Relationships among people is associated both with leadership and with how well and 
effectively teams function. Organizational structures, communication and influence patterns, 
reward systems, teamwork, and managerial processes are all influenced by the relationship 
orientation (Lane et al, 2000, 2006). This orientation would have a pervasive influence on 
leadership practice and policy. In cultures where individualistic values are dominant, 
individuals are given considerable attention in the organizational culture. 
Although organizational structures show power relationships, people in individualistic 
cultures see the lines in organizational chart as guidelines for decision-making authority and 
communication, not as strict power relationships. Relationships are treated informally, 
behavior within the structures is flexible, and such a culture would maintain multiple, open 
arrangements to be used on an as-needed basis. In a group-dominated culture, more attention 
is given to horizontal differentiation, and this culture would stress within-group patterns. In 
hierarchical cultures, relationships of power and responsibility are arranged such that those 
lower in the hierarchy are obligated to submit to the will of those higher in the hierarchy, an 
approach that is close to command-by-direction and attrition warfare. In return, they have 
the right to expect that those higher in the hierarchy will look after, protect, and provide for 
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them. A hierarchical culture emphasizes vertical differentiation and uses authority-based 
communication.  
Teamwork is strongly affected by a culture’s orientation to relationships among people. All 
cultures work in teams, but they do so in different ways, and it is a common misconception 
that collective cultures engage more in teamwork than individualistic cultures do. Within 
individualistic cultures, team members have specific roles and responsibility, and the team 
can identify each person’s contribution. The leadership role may also change depending on 
which part of the task needs to be emphasized. In collective cultures, roles are much more 
fluid, and commitment is to the team itself. Each person is also responsible for helping the 
group as a whole to function well. In hierarchical cultures, team members have specific 
levels and roles in the hierarchy, and the team is directed clearly by the leader. People 
contribute to meetings and discussion in accordance with their place in the hierarchy (Lane, 
et al., 2000, 2006).  
Hierarchies tend to be stable over time and develop the most rigidly obeyed structures. 
Research has consistently shown that the more hierarchical an organization, the more 
difficulty it has adapting to change (Lane et al., 2000, 2006; Burns and Stalker, 1961). Many 
hierarchical societies also develop a strong collective orientation within hierarchical levels. 
This is characteristic of aristocratic societies and those with a caste system. All data 
collected on industrialized cultures have revealed that these cultures have preferred either 
individualism or collectivism first and hierarchy has always been preferred last. Anglo 
cultures tend to prefer individualism the most, followed closely by collectivism. Lane, et al 
(2000, 2006) claims that in today’s dynamic environment, it would almost be impossible to 
have an organization with a dominant preference for hierarchy over the long term. This is 
also in accordance with the development I have described for the military realm. The 
strategic game of interaction and isolation in today’s moral conflicts requires an enabling 
culture of empowerment, a combination of Collectivism and Individualism, and not the 
constraining culture represented with hierarchy.  
Beliefs about basic human nature orientations do not reflect how one thinks about 
individuals but rather one’s belief about the inherent character of the human species. This 
orientation asks two basic questions. First, are humans primarily evil, good, neutral (neither 
good nor evil), or mixed (a combination of good and evil)? This is not a question about 
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behavior, but about basic nature. The second question is whether the fundamental nature of 
people is changeable or unchangeable?  
The most obvious impact of this orientation can be seen on the extent of control systems in 
an organization, e.g. like the military’s approach to command and control. A dominant evil 
orientation is likely to contribute to a tight control system based on an underlying suspicion 
of people. Cultural orientations dominated by neutral and mixed values are likely to produce 
moderately tight controls, with modification based on leaders’ experiences with the people 
involved. Leaders who operate with the assumption that goodness is the basic human trait 
are likely to favor control systems based primarily on the need for leadership information, 
rather than for surveillance, checking, and control. This orientation provides an indication on 
the level of trust within the organization, and it also tends to affect leadership style. A 
culture with a dominant evil orientation supports autocratic management styles characterized 
by such concept as close supervision, Theory X, and a dominant Control function. Neutral or 
mixed dominant orientations encourage moderate supervision and consultative managers. At 
the other end of the spectrum, managers are encouraged to engage in a laissez-faire style or 
practice participate management, Theory Y, and a dominant Nurture function. An 
organization’s climate may be consistent with the culture’s orientation on the human nature 
dimension. We know that Auftragstaktik requires a high degree of trust—some 
commentators label it as “trust tactics”—and to most North Americans and Europeans, 
peoples’ basic natures are, at best mixed (Maznevski, et al., 2002), which might indicate that 
in these cultures trust is a two way street that must be earned through cooperation. 
The fifth cultural orientation in the COF is time. There are two ways to think about time: The 
first involves a general orientation toward time while the second concerns how people think 
about or use specific units of time. A culture’s general orientation to time reflects the time-
related criteria used to make decisions, interpret events, or prioritize actions. In a past-
oriented culture, people respond to a new challenge by looking to tradition and wondering, 
“How have others dealt with this kind of problem before?” Past-oriented cultures are more 
likely to recreate past behavior when planning, while present-oriented leaders will have 
shorter-term concerns, and future-oriented leaders are more likely to consider long-term 
effects. Rewards, like promotions, in past-oriented cultures are more likely to be based on 
historically determined systems. This orientation will also influence the organization’s 
ability to adapt to a new and constantly changing environment. A dominant past variation 
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might also contribute to predictable OODA loops because it will influence behavior and 
decision making to be consistent with past practice. Such practice will most likely make any 
commander predictable. Another aspect of time and its influence on behavior concerns 
questions like: “What are the most important units of time?” and “How does time flow?” In 
monochromic cultures, time is broken into small, specific units and flows in linear fashion. 
In these cultures, such as Anglo cultures, time is a valuable commodity. People save, spend 
and waste time. People live by their schedules, and punctuality is valued. In polychromic 
cultures, time is seen as elastic and these cultures are often collective. Units of time may be 
small or large, depending on what is being done or experienced at the time.  
The Activity orientation of the COF refers to the desirable focus of activity and there are 
three variations found in cultures. The being variation is characterized by spontaneity, which 
is typical of the Dionysian mode. Here the present is experienced to the fullest. The doing 
variation represents the Promethean mode. The relentless striving to achieve and compulsive 
attempts to accomplish are the core of the “doing” orientation, which is often associated with 
the Protestant work ethic. The thinking variation is the Apollonian mode, in which senses are 
moderated by thought, and mind and body are balanced. Thinking-oriented cultures value 
rationality and carefully thinking everything through before taking action. Lane et al. (2000, 
2006) found doing and thinking to be the dominant variations, which also should be the case 
in the military, because it is a striving and achieving organization. The priority is to achieve 
a set of specific goals efficiently. At the same time we know that maneuver conflict requires 
a high mental content, and one would expect the thinking variation should have a strong 
influence as well.  
The variation Relation to Environment reflects how people in society orient themselves to 
the world around them and the supernatural. What do people direct their attention to, and 
what do they see as their roles in the environment? Within a harmony variation, the 
imperative is to behave in concert with the physical and other systems in the world around 
us, to see the environment and ourselves within a systematic whole, and to keep the system 
in balance. The second variation is mastery over environment, which builds on a profound 
belief that if enough time, money, and brains are applied to a goal, nearly anything is 
achievable. The last variation is subjugation to the environment. Here people see themselves 
as dominated by physical forces or subject to the will of a Supreme Being. The pervasive 
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scope of this variation causes it to influence leadership in many ways, including the strategy 
for competition and the mitigation of economic and social influences.  
Lane et al. (2000, 2006) found that the important cultural differences on this variation seem 
to be whether mastery or harmony is dominant and the degree to which subjugation is 
assumed in a relative way, rather than whether it is preferred to the other variations in an 
absolute way. Members of a military organization typically see themselves as dominating 
the environment, with their focus on controlling specific parts and fixing problems, 
indicating a dominant mastery variation on the Environment relation. This might also 
indicate a need for mastery and control that is not achievable, leading to an illusion of 
control. A strong and dominant mastery variation contradicts Sun Tzu’s harmonious 
approach to warfighting.  
7.5 Summary 
Based on the attributes of Auftragstaktik discussed in section 3.3, the culture needed to 
succeed in the forms of conflict most likely to confront the Norwegian Armed Forces, as 
expressed with the COF, appears to be:  
1. On the variation Relationship Among People: high on Collectivism and 
Individualism, and low on Hierarchy.  
2. The Human Nature orientation would be from neutral or mixed to good, and not evil. 
3. The Time orientation would be Future and Present oriented and not Past focused in 
compliance with Sun Tzu‘s dictum: “Thus a victorious battle strategy is not 
repeated” (1984, p.71). By applying the Past we might be predictable and the 
adversary will find it easier to operate inside our OODA loop.  
4. Concerning the orientation Relation to the Environment, the variation would be 
Mastery over, or equal to, Harmony and low on Subjugation because this concerns 
the need for initiative to create, find, and explore penetrations through multiple 
thrusts.   
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5. The mode of Activity requires both the Doing and Thinking variation because of the 
need for initiative and high mental content involved in the cheng/ch’i game. 
 
 
Part V 
The Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy 
This part consists of one chapter that gives a brief description of The Royal Norwegian 
Naval Academy, and their approach to leadership and leadership development is outlined in 
greater detail to understand how it is related to Auftragstaktik. 
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8. The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy’s (RNoNA) and its approach to leadership development. This will be done by first 
describing very briefly the education at the RNoNA followed, by a more detailed description 
of their approach to leadership development. That section, 8.2, will cover the approach 
chosen by the academy and their developmental goal. Then the reward system at the RNoNA 
will be covered before the chapter is summarized in section 8.4. 
8.1  The Education at the RNoNA 
The education at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (RNoNA) is a three year bachelor’s 
degree study, and the Academy is organized into three branches: Operative Branch, 
Technical Branch, and Supply/logistic Branch. The main task for the Academy is to provide 
future officers with competence for specific jobs as well as—through their leadership 
training—to develop their capabilities to function as leaders under the extreme conditions 
that will characterize future conflict. To fulfil this goal, the RNoNA concentrates its 
leadership education and leadership development program into the first year, see Table 8.1, 
the one-year common core education.  
Table 8.1  
An Overview of the Time Spent on Leadership Development Throughout the 
Bachelor’s Program 
 First year Second year Third year 
 Semester 
I 
Semester 
II 
Semester 
III 
Semester 
IV 
Semester 
V 
Semester 
VI 
Leadership development 15 w1 & 3 d 5 w & 3d 1 w & 3 d 2 w2, 2 d 1w & 3 d 1 w 
Notes: 1) w = weeks, d = days. 2) Just for the Supply/Logistic branch and parts of operative branch  
 The two last years focus primarily on academics subjects. In the first year, approximately 
61% of the cadets’ time is devoted to leadership development, decreasing to a maximum of 
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11% for some branches (see note 2 in Table 8.1) and about 6% for the remaining cadets the 
second year, while during the third year, it is approximately 7% for all cadets40. 
Education at the RNoNA has always had a strong position in the Norwegian society, and it 
has served the country well. The educational program at the RNoNA has been stable with 
only minor changes in content and form throughout the last 100 years (Nissestad, 1998). 
During the 1990’s, attention paid to leadership and leadership development increased, 
resulting in a major change in 2001, when the use of SPGR was introduced. The next year 
the leadership development program was expanded to 10 weeks through the use of the bark 
Statsraad Lehmkuhl41. 
During the first year at the Academy, the cadets are organized in teams consisting of six to 
eight cadets each. Cadets are randomly assigned to their teams by the Academy staff, 
blending branches, previous experience, and gender. Each team also has its own 
facilitator/coach who follows it through this first year of education and training. During their 
second and the final years, they are organized in classes according to their branches. During 
this period, which is largely academic, each branch has one facilitator/coach who is in 
charge of leadership development during these two years. 
8.2 The Leadership Development Program at RNoNA 
Since, January 2000, when the Chief of Defence signed the first version of the Norwegian 
Joint Defence Doctrine (NJDD) with the intention to change the Norwegian armed forces by 
implementing the philosophy of maneuver warfare and mission command, or Auftragstaktik, 
as the fundamental leadership doctrine42. Maneuver warfare and Auftragstaktik represent 
guiding ideas for the military profession; a way of thinking of war and a philosophy for 
leading soldiers in war and crises. As such, Auftragstaktik represents the Schwerpunkt for the 
ongoing leadership development program at the RNoNA. 
                                                 
40 The academic year at the RNoNA consists of approximately 35 weeks, 17 weeks in semester I and 18 weeks in semester 
II. 
41 A bark is a three-masted sailing ship with a fore-and-aft sail on the rear (mizzen) mast. 
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To reach this Schwerpunkt, the essential parts of the leadership development are carried out 
during the first year at the RNoNA as illustrated in Table 8.1. By doing this, the academy 
ensures that those officers who already have a bachelor’s degree or are supposed to attend a 
civilian academic institution to get one, are going through most of the same leadership 
development as those officers who are commissioned from the RNoNA. The first year 
consists of Military Leadership, Defence Studies, and Language, in addition to the 
leadership development program that is built around five exercises within a time frame of 14 
weeks. This first year is a blend of academic and practical leadership exercises that are 
brought together to create a synergetic effect.  
The leadership development program at the RNoNA builds on three central factors—
assessment, challenge, and support—to make the developmental experience more powerful 
(Van Velsor & McCauley, 2004). The driving idea behind the RNoNA’s approach is that 
throughout their education, the Academy tries to stretch each cadet and provide both 
feedback and a sense of support to stimulate the leadership development process. The 
RNoNA approach to leadership development aligns closely to the pipeline metaphor of 
Hicks and Peterson (1999), as illustrated in Figure 8.1, and their approach to learning.  
In Figure 8.1, Insight concerns the question, “Do cadets know what to develop?” This 
requires first and foremost assessment and an understanding of what the organization needs 
from them, which in turn requires knowledge of the organization’s doctrines, structure, and 
system of rewards and punishments (chapters 2 and 3). Insight includes a sense of how a 
person’s responsibility and actions connect to the organization’s actions and purpose, as well 
as how others view them and their own abilities. Motivation concerns a cadet’s willingness 
to invest the time and energy it takes for development. New skills and knowledge concern the 
question of whether cadets know how to acquire the new capabilities they need. Real-world 
practice concerns application—to provide the cadets with opportunities to try their new 
skills at work. We need to apply what we have learned and reflect on those experiences to 
solidify learning. Accountability concerns the internalizing of the new capabilities to 
improve performance and results. New knowledge and skills must be incorporated into the 
                                                                                                                                                      
42 Mission command is the English translation of Auftragstaktik, I will use Auftragstaktik throughout this dissertation, while 
maneuver warfare is equivalent to Boyd’s maneuver conflict when applied to armed conflict. 
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cadets’ regular work repertoire so they expand their role repertoire. This is most likely to 
occur where there is personal or organizational accountability that sustains commitment. 
 
Figure 8.1  The Development Pipeline (Hicks & Peterson, 1999) 
 
The main purpose of this metaphor is to illustrate that a “development pipeline” defines 
conditions that must exist for the learner. A wide pipe allows a plentiful and smooth flow of 
development, whereas even one narrow section of the pipe restricts development to trickle. 
This also indicates that leadership development is considered to be a process that requires 
both a variety of developmental exercises and the ability to learn from those experiences. 
The developmental experience and the ability to learn have a direct impact on each other. 
Cadets who are engaged in developmental experiences can enhance their abilities to learn, 
and being more readily able to learn can lead them to draw more development from any set 
of experiences. At the same time, the leadership development process must be embedded in 
a particular context that includes the Academy’s strategy, its culture, and its various systems 
and processes. This context, and the Academy’s understanding of the context, shapes the 
leadership development process, how it is focused, how well integrated and systemic it is, 
and who is responsible for it. This has led the RNoNA to develop a goal for its ongoing 
leadership development process. 
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8.2.1 The Development Goal at the Academy 
Based on the current leadership philosophy for the Norwegian Armed Forces at the NJJD, 
Auftragstaktik outlined from maneuver warfare combined with a study of by Bachman 
(1988) of superior leaders in the U.S. Navy, the RNoNA has formulated a development goal 
with the aim of guiding the development process. Bachman found that the best commands 
were run not by Captain Ahab types, but by “nice guys.” The superior leaders managed to 
balance a people-oriented personal style with a decisive command role. They did not hesitate 
to take charge and to be purposeful, assertive, and businesslike. The most effective leaders, 
however, were generally more positive and outgoing, more emotionally expressive and 
dramatic, warmer and more sociable (including smiling more), friendlier and more 
democratic, more cooperative, more likeable and “fun to be with,” more appreciative and 
trustful, and even gentler than those who were merely average. By contrast, mediocre navy 
leaders reflected the classic stereotype of the military taskmaster. They were lopsided and 
overbalanced toward being forceful and away from enabling (Kaplan and Kaiser, 2003). 
They were legalistic, negative, harsh, disapproving, and egocentric. Compared to superior 
commanders, the average ones were more authoritarian and controlling, more domineering 
and tough minded, more aloof and self-centered, and needed to show they were right more 
often. They led by the book, through the rules and assertions of the raw power of their 
position. These studies document that the emotional tone set by any leader ripples downward 
with remarkable precision, supporting the findings of Park and Houben (1985), who found 
that the behavior by someone who is dominant and who is liked leads to modeling and 
contagion of that behavior. The superior officers were also close to the qualities described by 
Sun Tzu, in his Art of War, see especially chapter one, Initial Estimations, and chapter eight, 
Nine Changes.  
The field diagram in Figure 8.2 shows a comparison between the RNoNA’s chosen profile; 
labeled “A,” and a average of Nordic leaders, “B,” which have proven to be successful 
within business (Sjøvold, 2002). This indicates that there exists a difference between the 
leadership behavior in a military context and a civilian business context. 
 119
 
Figure 8.2  The RNoNA - and the Nordic Leadership Profile Presented in 
the SPGR Field Diagram43 
 
If we look more closely at these differences, using the SPGR 12-vector profile diagram as 
shown in Figure 8.3, we see how they manifest themselves in leadership behavior. The major 
differences between the military profile and the Nordic profile are that the military leaders 
should be more loyal, D1, Loyalty, more task-oriented, C1, Task-orientation, and more 
caring, N1, Caring. In sum this both gives, and requires that, military leaders have a larger 
role repertoire available.  
 
                        The RNoNA profile       The Nordic profile  
Figure 8.3  The SPGR 12-vector Profiles of the RNoNA and the Nordic 
Profile 
                                                 
43 See section 10.3.1 for a more detailed description of the SPGR Field diagram 
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This should give them the necessary flexibility to adapt, respond and handle changing 
conditions in their internal and external environments. This development goal is sought by 
means of the RNoNA’s assessment, challenge, and support approach, which is outlined in 
appendix B, see also Van Velsor and McCauley (2004, p. 1-22). 
8.3 The Reward System: Military Development Grade 
Auftragstaktik as discussed represents a leadership philosophy that demands a high level of 
mutual trust. To succeed, it requires that the RNoNA implement and enforce a reward 
system that promotes the development of the chosen leadership philosophy. At the RNoNA 
this is done through the use of the Military Development (MD) grade. The MD grade is a 
rating of each cadet’s suitability as officer and it is also supposed to provide feedback to 
each cadet on how he or she performs as an officer (SKSK, 2005, p. 10). The rating of the 
MD grade is done on a scale from A to F, where A is outstanding and F is not qualified to be 
commissioned.  
Creating such a reward system is a complex and difficult task. In 1990 the “Lieberg 
commission” asked if the service academies were built on a self-fulfilling prophesy, because 
the criteria used for entrance at the Academy is also used when they are commissioned. The 
commission was afraid that the dominant system orientation and rule-obedient behavior 
among the cadets would inhibit creativity and not contribute to their development as officers. 
As the commission noted, already at this stage in their careers, careerism tended to be the 
cadets’ primary motivational force, a motivational force that definitely not would promote 
Auftragstatktik.  
8.4 Summary 
The above described approach at the academy blends the two strong traditions that exists 
within the world of pedagogy when it comes to learning The first is the tradition of 
phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, which assumes that people construct mental models 
of the world and then use the models to interpret reality and guide their behavior, which is 
consistent with the role of orientation in the OODA loop. Here learning is equivalent to 
constructing new or enhanced mental models, which basically is reorientation. The second is 
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the tradition of behaviorism, which defines learning as a change in behavior after an 
experience such as training or experimenting. Leadership development involves acquiring or 
changing behaviors. Behaviorism also covers the concept of skill because a skill is a 
particular kind of well-honed behavioral capacity. As illustrated by the approach taken at the 
RNoNA both traditions are important when it comes to leader and leadership development 
because people learn skills, “knowing how,” and they also learn ways of conceptualizing 
reality, “knowing that.” Piaget claimed that “thought follows action” and Dewey, “we learn 
by doing.” These are connected in the sense that thought follows behavior. Reflecting on the 
outcomes of our actions allows us to understand both their consequences and the reasons for 
behaving that way in the first place. The chosen assessment, challenge, and support approach 
at the RNoNA contribute to improve team members’ capabilities for: “(1) evaluating the 
mental model that they hold regarding their capabilities and others’ expectation of their 
performance; and (2) how these mental models are expressed in overt or behavioral terms 
(which is social skill)” (Hogan & Warrenfeltz, 2003, p. 76). In both traditions, which are 
captured by the OODA loop, it is failures, or mismatches, that challenge our understanding 
and drive us to reorient or reconceptualize the world. We learn far more from our failures 
than our successes: Reorientation depends on mismatches or failures, not rewards, because 
success carries limited information and simply reinforces that we should continue doing 
what we have been doing.  
Leadership development involves both learning and education through and expansion of 
role-taking ability. The development processes described above with assessment, challenge, 
and support is similar to Lewin’s (1952) well known approach of unfreeze, move, and freeze, 
which can is illustrated and summarized with Figure 8.4. 
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Figure 8.4  The Leadership Development Process at the RNoNA44 
 
This chapter has shown that the RNoNA has a systematic and valid approach to leadership 
development that aligns well with what is considered to be state of the art within this field, 
see especially Van Velsor and McCauley (2004). 
 
 
                                                 
44 The colors used are the same as used in SPGR, see section 10.3.1 and appendix A.  
 123
 
 
 
Part VI 
Research Questions and 
Methodology 
This part of the dissertation consists of two chapters. In chapter 9, seven research questions 
are outlined. Chapter 10 covers the methodology, including research design, the chosen data 
collection instruments, considerations on statistical techniques, and the sample procedure 
applied in this dissertation. 
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9. The Reaserch Questions 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to answer the general research question stated in 
section 1.1 which was:  
Is the leadership development program at the Royal Norwegian Academy effective in 
preparing officers to execute leadership in today’s conflicts and the conflicts in the years 
ahead? 
The purpose of chapter 2 was to put the RNoNA’s leadership development effort into 
context by focusing on those developments within the military realm that indicate a need for 
reorientation from understanding war in the context of war to understanding “war in the 
context of everything else.” Today’s reality indicates that we are facing an adversary that 
does not resemble a traditional hierarchical organization. We are facing, instead, something 
more organic, dynamic, and flexible that resembles an open system. Al Qaida is a prime 
example. In chapter 3, I covered the essentials of Boyd’s work, which provides a strategic 
framework for success in this effort, an effort that requires an emphasis on leadership and 
leadership development. To succeed we must be able to interact and adapt to a confusing 
military and political environment in a way that creates sense-making and avoids 
disintegration of own organizational structures. History has shown that the Germans found a 
way to meet such challenges (albeit against conventional military forces) through a 
particular organizational climate that Boyd codified. According to the theories behind the 
SPGR, which were outlined in chapter 4, it is the teams’ and organizations’ maturity 
levels—which are the direct results of their individuals’ role-taking abilities and represent 
the capacity to dissipate entropy—that are the keys to Boyd’s organizational climate. A 
team, or any organization for that matter, on a low maturity level will not be able to dissipate 
the entropy created by an agile adversary because there will be little ability to reorient. 
Organizations at a low maturity level posses an organizational climate that does not foster 
variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative and therefore provides limited adaptability.  
Boyd’s concept of Orientation emphasizes the importance of the commander’s personality 
(as representative of genetic heritage, see section 5.2) together with the nation’s culture. 
Research on personality and especially the FFM indicates that personality is particularly 
important when the opportunity for discretion is high, which is the case with Auftragstaktik, 
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the chosen leadership philosophy in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Hogan, like SPGR theory 
(see section 4.4), argues that role-taking ability is a characteristic of a mature person, and 
that maturity can be translated into the FFM (see section 6.7.2), which builds a theoretical 
and conceptual link between these two approaches. This has made it possible for me to 
present seven research questions that will contribute to investigating the effectiveness of the 
leadership development program at the RNoNA. 
These questions will be now be outlined. 
Research Question Number One 
The purpose of the leadership development program at the RNoNA is to prepare future 
officers to perform leadership in such a way that they can play the interaction and isolation 
game (interacting with allies and the uncommitted, while isolating opponents), particularly 
in 4th GW. That would require that the team they are part of reaches the maturity level of 
Innovation. At this maturity level, the team would be able to operate in very dynamic, 
unstable environments with a high level of ambiguity, which is a requirement as long as our 
adversaries resemble an open system, which seems to be the case today with both al Qaida 
and the Taliban movement. An effective leadership development program should then result 
in an expansion of each cadet’s role-taking ability. If successful, this would result in an 
increased level of maturity, which indicates an increased level of Synergy. This provides the 
following research question: 
Q1: Did the leadership development program at the RNoNA result in an increase in 
Synergy, hence an increase in maturity and an expansion of role-taking capacity 
performance among cadets? 
The answer to this research question, as well as to the main general research question will 
also answer three important questions asked by Hogan (Hogan, 2006): (1) Can people 
change their behavior? (2) Can people change their identities? and (3) Can people change 
their reputations? An increase in Synergy and expanded role-taking ability requires a 
behavioral change, and we know that people can change their behavior if they want to. 
When it comes to changing identity, people often change the way that they think about 
themselves, sometimes for better and sometimes not. Such a development would be captured 
with the SPGR. However, as Hogan and Roberts (2004) show, it is our identity that either 
contributes to or restricts our role-taking ability, which is the expressed social behavior. This 
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behavior is in large part guided by forces or processes outside our awareness, or what Boyd 
labeled our orientation. However, many of these unconscious determinants can be made 
conscious through social feedback, education, and self-relation. The distinction between 
self-knowledge and other knowledge is a key consideration for leadership development. An 
effective leadership development program would be able to adjust that and the result would 
be an increase in Synergy. A change in reputation, on the other hand, involves changing 
other peoples’ perceptions and orientations. This is hard work, and according to Goldman, 
people might have to change their behavior 100% to get a 10% change in how others 
perceive them (Hogan, 2006). The overall key to the change process is a change in behavior. 
If we behave differently, we will begin to perceive ourselves differently, and in time, others 
will, too. A change in reputation indicates change in leadership behavior and an effective 
leadership program would drive this change toward increased Synergy. However, as 
discussed in section 6.7, both of these two last issues require a certain level of maturity on 
the individual level and that makes personality important, which is an issue that will be 
covered under research question number four. 
Any development towards Synergy would be a good and clear indicator of an effective 
leadership development program. 
Research Question Number Two 
A development toward Synergy would also require an expansion and adjustment of each 
cadet’s orientation phase of the OODA loop concerning their implicit beliefs, convictions, 
and assumptions about the attributes and behaviors that distinguish leaders from followers, 
effective leaders from ineffective leaders, and moral leaders from evil leaders (Lord, Foti, & 
DeVader, 1984). According to Hare, Hare, and Koenigs (1996) an individual’s social 
perception is influenced by that individual’s ideal, which is part of that individual’s 
orientation. These beliefs, convictions, and assumptions are referred to as individual implicit 
theories of leadership. Implicit leadership theory argues that those theories held by 
individuals influence the way they view the importance of leadership, the values they 
attribute to leadership, and the values they place in selected leader behaviors and attributes. 
Implicit leadership theory also predicts that the behaviors seen as effective for organizational 
leaders will be different for the behaviors seen as effective for other types of leaders (Lord & 
Maher, 1991a; Hanges, Lord & Dickson, 2000). A major assertion of implicit leadership 
theory is that leadership is in the “eye of the beholder.” That is, leadership is a social label 
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given to individuals if either (a) their personality attributes, and behaviors sufficiently match 
the observer’s belief about leaders or (b) the observer attributes group success or failure to 
the activities of perceived leaders (Lord & Maher, 1991b).  
Hanges and Dickson (2004) have provided convincing evidence that people within cultural 
groups agree in their beliefs about leadership and that there are statistically significant 
differences between cultures in leadership beliefs. This is important because this agreement 
within cultural groups validates the aggregation of individual ratings to the organizational 
and societal level of analysis. Then, each cadet’s orientation of the type of leadership 
behavior that constitutes a good officer would, according to this, become an important aspect 
in the leadership development program. This orientation represents each cadet’s individual 
Schwerpunkt because it defines the ideal that the cadet is striving to achieve. At the same 
time the RNoNA has developed a common Schwerpunkt for this process—their leadership 
development goal that constitutes the leadership behavior needed to handle today’s and 
tomorrow conflicts, hence to thrive in a 4th GW environment. These various Schwerpunkts 
may differ widely. 
An effective leadership development program, therefore, must align the cadets’ different 
Schwerpunkts’ with the Academy’s Schwerpunkt—the individuals’ goals to the Academy’s 
development goal, as illustrated in Figure 8.2 and 8.3. According to implicit leadership 
theory, it is of the utmost importance that these Schwerpunkts’ align; if not, the various 
conceptions of leadership would form many noncooperative centers of gravity, resulting in 
no effective leadership development. This led to the following research question:  
Q2: Did the leadership development program at the RNoNA influence the cadets’ 
orientations of the leadership behaviors needed to be an officer in the 21st century? 
An effective leadership development program would contribute to reorientation of the 
needed leadership behaviors to operate successfully in a 4th GW environment. This would 
indicate a reorientating toward the RNoNA’s chosen leadership profile. 
Research Question Number Three 
Boyd characterized strategy as a changing set of intentions for improving interaction among 
the members of our team while at the same time isolating our opponents from themselves, 
internally, and from the world outside (1987b, p. 33). The purpose of strategy, and the test of 
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a good strategy, is whether it improves our ability to shape and adapt to the unfolding 
circumstances that define conflict (1987b, p. 58). Experience from Sun Tzu to the present 
day suggests that this can only be done in an organizational climate with a high degree of 
mutual trust and personality traits that foster individual and collectively maturity (Shay, 
1998, 2002). The list of desirable traits suggested by strategists is quite long: Sun Tzu (1963, 
1984) identified the following as requisite characteristics for any general: wisdom, 
credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness. In addition to these strengths, an officer 
should also be knowledgeable, skilled in analysis, and unconcerned by fame and 
punishment, that is, an officer should not be affected by careerism. An officer should be 
qualified by personal characteristics, intelligence, knowledge, and command skills. Officers 
should be persons of virtue in every sense—benevolent, courageous, righteous, 
incorruptible, and caring. Officers must not only manifest these positive characteristics, but 
they must also be free from the innumerable character flaws that can doom a campaign or 
can be easily exploited, such as arrogance, greed, frivolity, cowardice, indecisiveness, 
laziness, slowness, brutality, selfishness, argumentativeness, carelessness, doubt, irascibility, 
and dejection. Intelligence—knowledge gained from study and experience and the wisdom 
to make appropriate evaluations—was also a requirement.  
All of these aspects have always been important for the military, but today’s conflicts, with 
their high moral content, have made them even more important. These requisite traits have 
much in common with traits expressed with the FFM, and both the idea behind the RNoNA 
leadership development program and the ultimate purpose of the Academy are based on the 
recognition that personality will have a great effect on leadership behavior, especially since 
our leadership doctrine, Auftragstaktik, emphasizes high discretion. It is important, therefore, 
to view personality together with the social interaction analyses from SPGR. Initial findings 
by Sjøvold & Nissestad (2005), for example, underline the importance of balancing the 
influence-versus-passivity dimension. They found that the development and the social 
interaction within a team could be seriously hampered if these problems are not dealt with, 
resulting in predictable OODA loops and no effective leadership development. Once again 
this points to the importance of maturity on the individual level. Maturity from the inside is 
reflected in greater adjustment and role-taking ability, which in the FFM translates into 
higher agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and emotional stability (Hogan & 
Roberts, 2004). These concern the individual leadership theories held by each cadet. When 
these theories are measured by the FFM they are found to be stable. Still, we know that these 
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theories might change (Hogan, 2006), which is confirmed by research (Piedmont, 1998). 
However, there is no reported study that has examined whether these theories changes as a 
result of extensive leadership development. This led to the following research question: 
 Q3: Did the military leadership development program at the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy have any impact on the cadets’ personality? 
Research Question Number Four 
This research question concerns social interaction and is directly linked to the revised 
OODA loop, Figure 5.1 presented in chapter 5: 
Q4: How did personality influence the social interaction patterns within the team, and how 
did it influence the leadership development process? 
The purpose of this question is to gain a better understanding of the leadership development 
process. This requires that personality and SPGR must be seen together. Research question 3 
might be an indicator of the effectiveness of the leadership development while number 4 
focuses on the program and its processes. 
Research Question Number Five  
The ongoing process which was the issue of the previous research question should align in a 
culture, or organizational climate, that ought to be accordance with the attributes of 
Auftragstaktik, as discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 7. This suggests that a culture of 
Auftragstaktik would be in accordance with the Culture Orientation variations hypothesized 
in Table 9.1. An orientation that is consistent with the attributes of Auftragstaktik would then 
contribute to a smoother development and function as a catalyst for effective leadership 
development, hence increased role-taking ability and a higher level of Synergy. This makes 
culture an important variable and led to the following research question:  
Q5: Do the cadets educated at the RNoNA inhabit a culture that enables Auftragstaktik? 
Table 9.1  
The Culture of Auftragstaktik and COF Hypothesized Preference of Variance 
 130
Orientation Hypothesized Preferences of Variations 
Relationship among people Collectivism ≥  Individualism > Hierarchy 
Nature of Human Good ≥  Mixed of Bland Slate > Bad 
Time Present = Future ≥  Past 
Relation to the Environment Mastery > Harmony > Subjugation 
Mode of Activity Doing  ≥Thinking > Being 
“>” indicates a significant difference at the p < .05 level, “≥ ” indicates significance from the  p < .05 
level to non-significant and “=” indicates a non-significant difference. 
 
Research Question Number Six 
Effective leadership development should contribute to reorientation, where culture is a 
central variable. Many military observers have claimed that implementing maneuver warfare 
and Auftragstaktik in the Norwegian Armed Forces would require a fundamental change in 
orientation (Rekkedal, 1999a, 1999b), and one of the most important change agents would 
be the military academies and their leadership development programs. No culture is static or 
completely homogeneous: Cultures change, and the individuals within cultures differ from 
each other (Lane, et al., 2000). This is considered to be a normal process, while an effective 
leadership development program would significantly speed up this process. This generated 
the following question: 
Q6: Did the military leadership development program at the RNoNA have any impact on the 
cadets’ cultural orientations and variations? 
Results from this question would provide an indicator of the effectiveness of the leadership 
development program at the RNoNA. Because one of the RNoNA’s central missions is to be 
an intermediary of Norwegian Navy’s culture, its leadership development program should 
also contribute to a culture that promotes the chosen leadership philosophy, Auftragstaktik.  
Research Question Number Seven 
Another important aspect of the effectiveness of any leadership development program would 
be its reward system. Auftragstaktik, as discussed, represents a leadership philosophy that 
demands a high level of mutual trust. To succeed, it requires that the RNoNA implement and 
enforce a reward system that promotes and enforces the development of the chosen 
leadership philosophy. At the RNoNA this is done through the use of the Military 
Development (MD) grade as described in section 8.3.  
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The overall aim of the leadership development program at the RNoNA requires that the 
cadets be evaluated according to those qualities needed to exercise leadership using 
Auftragstaktik as expressed through the RNoNA leadership development goal. This means 
that they will be evaluated against requirements needed to cope with the 4th generation 
conflicts that will likely characterize future warfare. This led to the following research 
question: 
Q7: Did the reward system represented with the MD grade at the RNoNA promote 
leadership behavior that is in accordance with Auftragstaktik? 
Summary 
The answers to these seven research questions would contribute to determining whether the 
leadership development program at the RNoNA is effective. They may also prove useful to 
businesses and other organizations in designing effective leadership development programs. 
The next chapter will discuss the methodology to investigate these questions in a valid and 
reliable manner.  
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10. Methodology 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the method and design chosen to answer the seven 
research questions outlined in section 9.2. This study will be performed in natural settings, 
which suggests that the chosen design will have more threats to its internal validity than 
what would be the case if this could have been performed as a randomized experimental 
design. This issue, which concerns the research design, will be discussed in section 10.2 
where the aim is to outline an approach to answer my overall question. Section 10.3 outlines 
the data collection instruments used in this dissertation that concerns internal and external 
validity and statistical conclusion validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979). This section is 
followed by a discussion of some important considerations concerning the techniques used 
to determine statistical validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Finally, section 10.5 covers the 
sample and procedures for this dissertation. 
10.2 Research Design 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the effectiveness of the leadership development 
program at the RNoNA that takes place during the first year of their education at RNoNA. 
The leadership development program at the RNoNA represents, as described in chapter 8, a 
systematic approach to developing and transforming the cadets to become more effective 
leaders so they can apply Auftragstaktik to cope with the demands of 4th Generation Warfare. 
This indicates a quasi-experimental design, and I found it appropriate to use The One-Group 
Pretest-Posttest Design (Cook & Campbell, 1979). In such a design, all the cadets are 
observed, and, following a pretest (O1) measurement, all of them are exposed to the 
leadership development program (the treatment X). The effect of the leadership development 
program would then be estimated simply by examining the average difference between the 
posttest measurement, O2, and the pretest measurement, O1. This is a widely used design, but 
unfortunately it has several weaknesses that must be considered. According to Cook and 
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Campbell (1979) the most important ones are history, statistical regression, maturation, and 
testing.  
One of the unique features of the leadership development program at the RNoNA is that it is 
carried out in real life settings where the respondents work together, performing their normal 
duties. This increases the validity of this study, especially its external validity, because the 
experimental situation reflects the natural setting or situation to which I want to generalize. 
Furthermore, they are also representative because this study covers the whole population of 
cadets within each cohort of cadets, and because this empirical study covers four cohorts of 
cadets, it is reasonable to assume that they are representative for those officers 
commissioned from the RNoNA (Frankfort-Nacmias & Nachmias, 1996).  
It would have been unethical (and impossible) to assign individuals to either a control group 
—cadets that did not participate in the leadership development program—or to an 
experimental group—those that participated in the program. Although the chosen design is a 
one-group pretest-posttest design it contains many of the characteristics of a classic 
experimental design because the teams are composed the same way each time, and they are 
exposed to the same treatment under similar conditions where data is collected. This 
contributes to increasing the reliability of treatment implementation and the random 
heterogeneity of respondents which reduces this effect on statistical conclusion validity 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). Concerning the latter issue the population at hand could be 
considered to be homogenous while the RNoNA focuses on variation to maximize the 
leadership development effect. Furthermore, the dependent variable can be adjusted equally 
for the teams within each cohort. All the teams in Cohort 2002, for example, participated in 
exercise Magellan, giving them all the same treatment, while this exercise was not in the 
curriculum for Cohort 2001. The cadets are in the similar environment, the treatment 
environment, most of the time that they are awake. During exercise Magellan, they are in the 
environment 24 hours per day for 10 to 11 weeks. This significantly reduces the threat of 
history, since they are in fact partly physically isolated. It also contributes to reducing 
random irrelevances in the experimental setting and thereby increases the statistical 
conclusion validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979). These are factors which normally can 
threaten a quasi-experimental design with existing leader and work teams because they 
usually operate in and out of different environments, exposing them to a range of variables 
that can threaten the design and the predictive validity of the study. Because the 
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development program is an intensive program of one year duration, the difference between 
the posttest and pretest would most likely not be a result of any historical events intervening 
during this period.  
As previously discussed the aim of the leadership development program is to expand each 
cadet’s role-taking ability, hence maturation. This indicates that an effective program would 
result in a difference between pretest and posttest. Then if the expected and obtained scores 
differ, this might be either because the posttest was affected by the leadership development 
program or knowledge gained at the first testing altered testing on the subsequent testing. 
The RNoNA, as discussed in chapter 8 and can be seen from appendix A, provides the 
cadets with feedback on their team and leadership behavior, using the SPGR, to enhance 
their role-taking abilities. Maturation is a direct goal of the RNoNA’s leadership 
development program, so an ineffective program would not lead to any maturation. By 
applying their own scores (their identities when it comes to leadership behavior), and peer 
ratings (their reputations as result of their leadership behavior), the classical maturation 
threat to this design is limited by data from multiple sources. Consequently, this indicates 
that if the obtained scores differ, it is most likely because of a change in their peers’ 
orientations of team and leadership behavior, resulting in a different score and not because 
of maturation as result of any effects other than the leadership development program. 
Although research on personality does indicate a weak maturation effect as a result of 
aging—for example, people tend to become more agreeable and less extroverted with age—
Costa et al. (2000) showed changes in the five domains of 1 to 2 T-score points in 
nonclinical sample of adults over a 6- to 9- year period, indicating no significant changes. It 
may, therefore, be concluded that any significant change over a one year period would most 
likely be a result of the leadership development program.  
The threat of statistical regression is partly reduced because the leadership development 
program at the RNoNA is given to all the cadets, who are randomly distributed within the 
teams, and not to a special group of them—a group of underachievers, for example. As is 
illustrated in Figure 10.4, several measurements using the SPGR will also be taken during 
the intervention in order to study social interaction within each team. This is important since 
they stay together in teams throughout the program, and so, because they have to function as 
a team over a long time span, the groups become real teams for each cadet. They will, as 
result of this, quickly develop a history, and at the same time, they will also have a future 
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together. In fact, their results and military grades, which become part of their permanent 
record, depend on how well they function as teams and leaders45. In a traditional classic 
experiment, by contrast, the teams would be ad hoc groups composed of people who neither 
had a history of working together nor are supposed to do so in the future. Another important 
aspect of the leadership development program at the RNoNA is that it is designed in such 
way that the cadets are working with novel outcome behavior because they are progressively 
exposed to a higher level of novelty, ambiguity, and complexity, measured by the SPGR at 
the pretest and posttest. This strengthens the internal validity of the study (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979). Furthermore the cadets were not provided any feedback on the pretest 
measurement, except from the SPGR, which is used by the RNoNA during the 
developmental process. There were no changes concerning the instrumentation, questions, or 
scoring system between the pretest and posttest to reduce the threats of internal validity to 
the chosen design. This permits more closely approximating the result of the leadership 
development program at the RNoNA after the exposure. The effect of the leadership 
development could then be estimated by examining the average difference between posttests 
and pretests. 
10.3 Data Collection Instruments 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the chosen data collection 
instruments, including their psychometrics. This is important because measures of low 
reliability could represent a major threat to statistical conclusion validity (Cook & Campbell, 
1979). The chosen measurement instruments will be related to the seven research questions 
that were outlined in section 9.2., whose main purpose is to provide answers that would 
make it possible to drawn a conclusion concerning the effectiveness of the leadership 
development program at the RNoNA. On the basis of my conceptual model and the 
important variables that constitute the orientation part of the OODA loop, three data 
collection instruments were used. These were: 
                                                 
45 An example of this is that the cadets have to answer a written exam within the topic “leadership” as a team, which they 
also have to orally defend as a team. The entire team gets the same grade. 
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1. SPGR, which measures the social interaction within teams, and how each team 
member contributes to this, how they are perceived by their team members (their 
reputation), and how they perceive themselves (their identity).  
2. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) (Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
which measures personality  
3. The Cultural Perspective Questionnaire (CPQ) version 8.0, which measures culture. 
These instruments will now be described. 
10.3.1 The SPGR 
Chapter 4 gave a thorough description of the theoretical and social interaction part of the 
field theory that constitutes the SPGR. This section covers the measurement part of SPGR. 
The SPGR instrument consists of a category system for observation of overt behavior in 
groups and several scales for self and peer ratings (Sjøvold, 1995, 2002).  
As outlined in chapter four, SPGR, in addition to Bales’ (1985, 1999) theory of social 
interaction systems, also includes the thinking of Parsons’ (1953) functional model of group 
development, and Bion’s (1987) theory of group emotionality. The relation to these models 
were confirmed by Sjøvold (1995) and are represented in the four SPGR dimensions; 
Control vs. Nurture (C-N), Opposition vs. Dependence (O-D), Withdrawal vs. Synergy (W-
S), and Influence vs. Passivity (I-P). As a result of this the SPGR dimensions have different 
orientations than SYMLOG in the factor-analytical space of social interaction, with its 24 
combinations of vectors identified from empirical observational data (see Sjøvold, 1995, 
2006, and 2007). 
These dimensions are; (1) P-I, Z, a continuum from Passivity (lack of initiative) to a very 
high level of Influence (dominance), (2) X, which tracks group-oriented behavior to self-
oriented behavior, and (3) Y, which tracks behavior that is task-oriented behavior to that 
which is defined by emotional expressions and spontaneity. These dimensions have different 
names in the SPGR as compared to SYMLOG because of their different orientations in the 
factor-analytical space (Sjøvold, 1995, 2007).  
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Especially worth mentioning here is that the Sjøvold algorithm treats the Z-dimension as 
equal in importance to the X and Y dimensions, while the SYMLOG algorithm treats scores 
along the UD (Up-Down) dimension merely as weights on the scoring along the PN 
(Positive-Negative) and FB (Forward-Backward) dimension. Bales divided the UD 
dimension into three layers of dominance (like a layer cake). The U (Up) level, which is 
dominant (UD score greater or equal to 3.0); the mid level which is neither dominant nor 
submissive (UD score greater than -2.0 and less than 3.0); and the D (Downward) level, 
which is submissive (UD score less than or equal -2.0) (Hare & Hare, 2005). Therefore the 
Bales algorithm is not able to effectively identify the existence of polarization along the 
influence dimension (Sjøvold, 1995, 2005). Here the SPGR is more sensitive than 
SYMLOG, which has an impact on the Influence-versus-Passivity dimension.  
The SPGR dimensions, together with the behavior that support these functions, were 
outlined in section 4.2. This dissertation is based on peer and peer ratings using a 24-item 
scale where each item was rated according to whether the behaviors never or seldom (1), 
sometimes (2), or often or always occurred (3). Each of the 24 items is designed to function 
as a probe that displays the meaning and evaluations of a given image (for example, what is 
a good officer?) along a specific vector from the center of the space. As such the location of 
an image can be measured accurately. The Sjøvold algorithm (1995, 2002) calculates values 
in dimensions similar to two of the SYMLOG dimensions referred to as X and Y but keeps 
the SPGR dimension Z intact.  
The SPGR inherits the psychometrics of the SYMLOG-instrument (Bales & Cohen, 1979, 
Koenigs, Hare & Hare 2002, Koenigs et al., 2005, Sjøvold 2002 ). This gives it an internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) that is reported at .73 and split-half (Spearman-Brown) that 
is reported at .80-.86. Inter-rater reliability is typically reported at .98. Coefficient for pattern 
gestalt is reported to be between .94 and .98. Test-retest typical values are .87, and sample 
reliability values are between .97 and .99. 
Appendix D covers the SPGR analysis applied in this dissertation. 
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10.3.2 The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) 
The NEO PI-R was developed by Costa and McCrae (1992). This 240-item questionnaire 
was developed through rational and factor analytic methods to measure the five major 
factors of personality: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A), 
and Conscientiousness (C). Neuroticism assesses affective adjustment versus emotional 
stability. Individuals that score high on this domain are prone to experiencing psychological 
distress, unrealistic ideas, excessive carving or urges, and maladaptive coping responses 
(Piedmont, 1998). Extraversion is defined by Costa & McCrae (1985) as representing the 
quantity and intensity of interpersonal interaction, the need for stimulation and the capacity 
for joy. This domain contrasts sociable, active, person-oriented individuals with those who 
are reserved, sober, retiring, and quiet. Openness to Experience is defined as the proactive 
seeking and appreciation of experience for its own sake, and as toleration for and exploration 
of the unfamiliar. This domain contrasts curious, original, untraditional, and creative 
individuals with those who are conventional, unartistic, and unanalytical (Piedmont, 1998). 
Agreeableness examines the attitudes an individual holds towards other people. These 
attitudes can be pro-person, compassionate, trusting, forgiving, and soft-hearted on one hand 
to antagonistic, cynical, manipulative, vengeful, and ruthless on the other (Piedmont, 1998). 
Conscientiousness assesses the individual’s degree of organization, persistence, and 
motivation in goal-directed behavior. This dimension contrasts dependable, fastidious people 
with those who are lackadaisical and sloppy (Piedmont, 1998). 
For each of these domains there are six facets that are designed to capture more specific 
traits, see Table 10.1. Items are answered on a 5-point Lickert scale ranging form 0 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and scales are balanced to control for the effects of 
acquiescence. The items themselves are simple statements describing general tendencies 
(e.g., “It is often hard for me to make up my mind,” and “I often crave excitement”). The 
Norwegian normative internal consistency estimates for the Form S scales for the individual 
domain scales range from .92 to .86, and from .54 to .84 on the trait’s facets and it consists 
of 3.468 persons (1717 males and 1751 females) (Martinsen, Nordvik, & Østbø, 2003). 
According to the manual, 6-year stability coefficients range from .68 to .83 for N, E, and O. 
In addition, 6- to 9-year retest coefficients ranging from .67 to .77 were seen for the A and C 
facet scales (Costa, Herbst, McCrae, & Siegler, 2000). 
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Table 10.1 
NEO PI-R; Domains and Facets 
Domains Facets 
N: Neuroticism N1: Anxiety, N2: Angry Hostility, N3: Depression, N4: Self-
Consciousness, N5: Impulsiveness, and N6: Vulnerability. 
 
E: Extraversion E1: Warmth, E2: Gregariousness, E3: Assertiveness, E4: Activity, E5: 
Excitement-Seeking, and E6: Positive Emotions. 
 
O: Openness O1: Fantasy, O2: Aesthetics, O3: Feelings, O4: Actions, O5: Ideas, O6: 
Values. 
 
A: Agreeableness A1: Trust, A2: Straightforward, A3: Altruism, A4: Compliance, A5: 
Modesty, and A6: Tender-Mindedness. 
 
C: Conscientiousness C1: Competence, C2: Order, C3: Dutifulness, C4: Achievement 
Striving, C5: Self-Discipline, and C6: Deliberation. 
 
  
The NEO PI-R has been validated in studies with other self-reports (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 
1991; McCrae & Costa, 1992; Piedmont & Weinstein, 1993). The NEO PI-R has shown 
evidence of convergent and discriminate validity across instruments, methods, and 
observers, and they have been related to a number of life outcomes including frequency of 
somatic complaints, ability to cope with stress, and burnout (Costa & McCrae, 1989; 
Piedmont, 1993). 
10.3.3 The Cultural Perspective Questionaire 
The Cultural Perspective Questionnaire (CPQ) is a survey that that is developed to measure 
the Cultural Orientation Framework (COF). The CPQ measures the following cultural 
orientations: Relation to Environment, Relationship among People, Mode of Activity, 
Human Nature, and Time. The CPQ does not measure the Space orientation. This survey has 
been developed and tested over a period of 12 years, making it possible to measure the COF. 
The early development of this survey is described in Maznevski & DiStefano (1995), and the 
development is still ongoing at the IMD in Lausanne, Switzerland. In the development of the 
CPQ, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (LISREL) and 
other construct validity procedures have been applied to assess the theoretical framework 
and test how closely the data approximate the specified model suggested by the COF (see 
Maznevski, et al., 2002). 
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The previous research done with CPQ 4, which did not include the Time variation, 
demonstrated adequate psychometric properties for early stages of research; see Maznevski 
et al. (2002). In Table 10.2 parts of the latest “goodness-of-fit statistics” provided by IMD 
are reported (Johnsen, 200646): the Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the Adjusted goodness-
of-fit index (AGFI), which give an estimation of how well the model, the COF, fits the data 
(Jörskog and Sörbom, 1996). The difference between the GFI and AGFI is that AGFI is 
adjusted for the degrees of freedom within the model. Although GFI is not an explicit 
function of sample size, the distribution of GFI will depend of sample size (Jörskog and 
Sörbom, 1996). 
Table 10.2  
LISREL GFI and AGFI for CPQ 8.0 
 
Culture orientation and variations 
All countries1 
(N = 5738) 
Norway 
(N = 655) 
  GFI AGFI GFI AGFI 
Relationship     
Collective .96 .92 .95 .90 
Hierarchical .98 .97 .97 .94 
Individualism .96 .94 .95 .91 
Environment     
Harmony .98 .95 .97 .94 
Mastery .94 .90 .95 .90 
Subjugation 1.00 .99 .99 .97 
Human Nature .95 .84 .91 .74 
Activity     
Doing .97 .94 .97 .95 
Being .98 .97 .97 .95 
Thinking .96 .93 .93 .88 
Time     
Past 1.00 1.00 .98 .92 
Present .99 .96 1.00 .98 
Future .99 .93 1.00 .98 
Note: This consists of Canada (294), China (159), France (226), Germany (277), Japan (239), Hong Kong (128), 
India (113), Italy (240), Netherlands (234), Norway (655), UK (381), and US (1009)   
                                                 
46 Johnsen, K. (2006). Personal correspondence, e-mail, from Johnsen to Nissestad, 4 October, 2006, 07:20, providing the 
latest goodness-of-fit index from IMD on the CPQ 8.0. 
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The standard for acceptable goodness of fit and adjusted goodness of fit indices for 
established research is .95 or higher, while .90 is acceptable for early exploratory research 
(Hair, Andersson, Tatham, & Black, 1992). The latest “fit” results, see Table 10.2, indicate 
that the CPQ 8.0 seems to be close to the standards of established research with an exception 
for Human nature and the Thinking variation for the Norwegian sample. This indicates that 
the CPQ 8.0 demonstrates adequate psychometric properties for research. 
Even so, the criticism raised against the CPQ concerns reliability. The critiques generally 
refer to the guidelines of alpha values suggested by Cronbach (1990) as .70 for exploratory 
and .80 for established. However, these were simply guidelines and should not be taken as 
”gospel.” He also stated that constructs that have "high bandwidth", that is, considerable 
richness, would be difficult to capture with a reasonable-length scale and therefore to accept 
that constructs with "high bandwidth" will have lower alpha measures (Cronbach, 1990). 
Mazanevski et al. (2002) have argued that cultural constructs, by definition, are both high 
bandwidth and deep bandwidth, i.e., the CPQ are capturing something that people don't 
usually articulate, so the translation is from unconscious thought to scales in a survey that is 
meant to capture those thoughts across multiple cultures and languages. The CFA results for 
the CPQ is fine, but of course these can be ”manipulated,” e.g., by only including things that 
fit the scale, but Cronbach's alphas can be manipulated too, simply by having more 
measures, for example.  
Because the aim is to measure individuals' cultural values and assumptions, that is, 
individuals' deep-level attitudes and values about how shared cooperation and action should 
take place, then we need to measure these constructs, and for this there is no alternative that 
is superior to CPQ. Other possible instruments for measuring related constructs include 
Hofstede (Hofstede, 1980; Bond & Hofstede, 1989), Trompenaars (Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaars, 1993;  Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998), GLOBE47 (House, et al., 
2004); and Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz and 
Sagiv, 1995). None of these, however, report alphas at the individual level of analysis. The 
first three are only tested at, reported at, and valid to use at the group level of analysis, i.e., 
we have to compare one country to another or at least one subgroup within a country to 
                                                 
47 GLOBE is an acronym for the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior  
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another subgroup.  We cannot use them to look at, for example, any tendency towards 
homogeneity or variance within a group (they assume homogeneity within a group). 
Schwartz is used for the individual level of analysis, but no one using Schwartz's scale 
reports Cronbach's alphas for the scales.  Instead, they do multidimensional scaling and CFA 
using LISREL. 
It's unfortunate that we can't do it better, but we should not automatically use the same 
standards as for highly established, narrow, relatively superficial constructs. We must 
conclude that the results must be considered not-so-robust because of the psychometrics, but 
they are at least an indicator of something that cannot be obtained in any other way.  Other 
scales are available to measure only individualism/collectivism but because I wanted to go 
beyond that, the CPQ was and still is the only option. 
The CPQ 8.0 questionnaire consists of 89 single-sentence statements and asks the 
respondent to record his or her strength of agreement with each, on a scale from “1” 
(strongly disagree) to “7” (strongly agree)48. Variations are measured with from four to eight 
items, depending on the variation. Appendix E shows sample items for each variation.  
10.3.4 Summary 
The purpose of this section is to link the measurement instruments to the seven research 
questions outlined in section 9.2. SPGR will be applied to answer research question 1, 2, 4, 
and 7; the personality measure NEO PI-R will be used to answer research question 3, 4, and 
7, while CPQ will be used to answer question 5 and 6. This indicates that SPGR and NEO 
PI-R will be applied together when answering questions about the social interaction patterns 
within the teams and their influences on the leadership development process. Research 
question 7 will be analyzed by applying both SPGR and NEO PI-R separately and together. 
The next section will discuss some important consideration when it comes to the statistical 
techniques that follow from the chosen One-Group Pretest-Posttest Design and the outlined 
research questions. 
                                                 
48 Five of these questions measure noncultural orientation but instead regard globalization. 
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10.4 Considerations in Choices of Statistical Techniques 
This section will discuss the statistical techniques that will be applied in this dissertation to 
determine statistical conclusion validity. According to Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 39) 
three decisions about covariation have to be made: (1) Is the study sensitive enough to 
permit reasonable statements about covariation? (2) If it is sensitive enough, is there any 
reasonable evidence from which to infer that the presumed cause and effect covary? and (3) 
if there is such evidence, how strongly do the two variables covary? The first of these issues 
concerns statistical power which is covered in section 10.4.4 and appendix F. This covers 
both analyses regarding the sample size required for detecting an effect of desired magnitude 
and of the computation of the magnitude of effects that could have been reasonably detected 
in the this study. According to Cook and Campbell, “Power analyses are desirable in any 
report of a study where the major research conclusion is that one variable does not cause 
another” (1979, p. 13). The most important major threats to statistical conclusion validity 
that are outlined and covered in this section are; (1) Low statistical power and (2) Violated 
assumptions of statistical tests. Another classical threat concerns the reliability of measures, 
which was covered in section 10.3. Three additional threats—the reliability of treatment 
implementation, random homogeneity of respondents, and random irrelevancies in the 
experimental setting—were natural parts of the considerations described in section 10.2, 
where the design was discussed and outlined. 
The guiding principle has been to select the simplest statistical technique that would provide 
a reasonably valid test of the research questions in accordance with the chosen design. This 
approach, however, requires that these considerations must be examined in detail and dealt 
with if possible. I will now outline the most important considerations that concern this 
dissertation, including T-tests, One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and Multiple 
regressions. Finally, statistical power and effect size will be discussed. 
10.4.1 T-tests 
The most commonly used technique to the chosen design is to apply T-tests. T-tests are used 
to compare mean scores on a continuous variable, such as before and after a leadership 
development program. There are two main types of t-tests used in this dissertation: The 
paired sample t-test, or repeated measures, involves two conditions, and the same subjects 
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participate in both conditions. We measure the subjects’ behavior in conditions 1 and in 
condition 2. If there is an experimental manipulation after the first condition, attending the 
leadership development program at the RNoNA, for example, we would expect a person’s 
behavior to be different in condition 2. The difference between conditions 1 and 2 is the 
manipulation, in this case, the leadership development program. Therefore, any difference 
between the means of the two conditions is probably because of the leadership development 
program, if the performance measure is reliable. The samples are ‘related’ because the same 
people are tested each time. In a repeated measure design, differences between the two 
conditions can be caused by two things: (1) the manipulation that was carried out on the 
subjects, or (2) any other factor that might affect the way a person performs from one time to 
the next. The latter factor is likely to be fairly minor compared to the influence of the 
experimental manipulation (Field, 2004). 
Independent sample t-tests are used when there are two different (independent) groups of 
people, and we want to compare their scores, still leaving us with two conditions. In this 
case, we see how these two groups differ at a given occasion. In an independent design, 
differences between the two conditions can have one of two causes: (a) the manipulation that 
was carried out on the subjects or (b) differences between the characteristics of the people 
allocated to each of the groups. The latter factor in this instance is likely to create 
considerable random variation both within each condition and between them. 
The paired sample t-test measures the sample mean, which is adequate for measuring the 
effect of the leadership development program. However, this might give a misleading 
picture, especially when it comes to the effect of the larger program. Therefore, an additional 
analysis was performed, the Reliable Change Index (RCI) (Christensen & Mendoza, 1986; 
Jacobsen & Truax, 1991; Ogles, Lambert, & Masters, 1996). 
The Reliable Change Index 
This section will outline The Reliable Change Index (RCI). “Individual differences in 
change” refers to the magnitude of increase or decrease exhibited by each individual over the 
duration of the study on any given trait. Furthermore, individual differences in change can be 
and often are unrelated to population indices of change. A given population may 
demonstrate robust individual differences in change while showing absolutely no mean-level 
changes. There can also be meaningful individual-level change even when there is 
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substantial differential consistency at the population level (Kohn, 1980; Roberts & 
Chapman, 2000). One might find that a large proportion of the population increases 
substantially, whereas an equally large proportion decreases substantially, so that the groups 
effectively cancel each other out, resulting in no population-level changes in specific 
subgroups of individuals. An example from this dissertation illustrates this, shown in Table 
11.5, where the paired sample t-test results on Self-sacrificing shows a t(72) = .416 and p < 
.670, indicating no change at all. The corresponding RCI analysis, see Table 11.6, however, 
shows that there was a significant 11% decrease and 11% increase, while 78% of the cadets 
stayed the same.  
The RCI was calculated by following the suggestions outlined by Christensen & Mendoza 
(1986), Jacobsen & Truax, (1991) and Ogles, Lambert, & Masters (1996) and the details are 
outlined in appendix F. By applying the RCI it is possible to classify how many cadets as 
having decreased, increased, or stayed the same on the SPGR 12-vector measures and the 
NEO PI-R as result of the leadership development program at the RNoNA.  
10.4.2 One-Way Analysis of Variance 
One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was also used as statistical technique. Here, two 
or more groups are compared in a continuous variable. The ANOVA produces an F-statistic 
or F-ratio, which is similar to the previous t-statistic in that it compares the amount of 
systematic variance in the data to the amount of unsystematic variance. 
The ANOVA tells whether the groups differ, but it will not tell where the significant 
difference is. It is, therefore necessary after conducting an ANOVA to carry out further 
analyses to find which groups differ. There are two options, planned comparison and post 
hoc comparison (Field, 2004). The difference between planned comparison and post hoc test 
can be linked to the difference between one- and two-tailed tests in that planned comparison 
are done when we have specific hypotheses that we want to test, whereas post hoc tests are 
done when we have no specific hypotheses. Because of the exploratory approach in 
answering research question 4, post hoc tests will be applied, and the consideration that was 
done is outlined in appendix F.  
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10.4.3 Multiple Regression 
Multiple regressions were applied to address the question concerning the types of leadership 
behavior the RNoNA rewards through its use of the MD grade. Similar analyses were 
performed for the NEO PI-R data as well. There are several important assumptions 
concerning these statistical techniques: sample size, mulitcollinearity and singularity, 
outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001). Of these, only sample size will be discussed now because sample size 
strongly influences the ability to generalize. With small samples, the result may not 
generalize with other samples. Stevens (2002) recommends that about 15 subjects per 
predictor are needed for reliable equations. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) give the following 
formula for calculating sample size requirements, taking into account the number of 
independent variables: N > 50 + 8m, where m = number of independent variables. Because 
of these considerations, regression analyses will only be performed for all four cohorts 
together.  
10.4.4 Statistical Power and Effect Size 
Statistical significance is one of two pillars upon which the process of accepting or rejecting 
scientific hypotheses rests. The other pillar is statistical power, or the probability that 
statistical significance will be obtained, and that probability is determined by the size of the 
effect that an experiment is most likely to produce. Experiments must be designed with 
sufficient power to detect the intervention’s true effect size (ES). Otherwise, statistical 
significance will not be obtained once the data are collected, and the intervention will be 
declared noneffective, although a clinically relevant difference might actually have occurred 
as a result of the intervention. 
Statistical power is computed before a study’s final data are collected and determines how 
likely a study’s data are to result in a statistical significance before the study is conducted. 
“Power” is the probability of obtaining statistical significance in a properly run study when 
the hypothesized ES is correct, where ES is the standardized measure of size of the mean 
difference(s) among the study’s groups or the strength of the relationship(s) among its 
variables (Bausell & Li, 2002). The primary purpose of a power analysis with a fixed alpha 
level is to estimate one of the three following parameters: (a) the number of subjects needed, 
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(b) the maximum detectable effect size, or (c) the available power at design phase. Two of 
these parameters, the acceptable level of power and the significance criterion (alpha), are 
often set by conventions, and almost without exception the alpha level is set at p ≤ 0.05 and 
the minimum acceptable power level is most often considered to be 0.80 (Bausell & Li, 
2002). A power level, as suggested, of 0.80 means that if everything goes as planned, the 
experiment has an 80% chance of achieving statistical significance and a 20% chance of not 
achieving a statistical significance. 
Choosing an independent sample t-test with an employed level of power of 0.80 with an 
alpha level at 0.05 requires N/group of 64 for a hypothesized ES of .050. The paired sample 
t-test normally yields significantly more power than an independent sample t-test, especially 
when the correlation between the two paired sets of number is relatively high. Cohort 2000 
was the first cohort where the SPGR was tried. Because these data were available, it was 
possible to derive the Pearson r. The average Pearson’s r for the SPGR Humres was r =.58. 
By employing the tables in Bausell and Li (2002) it was estimated that 28 participants would 
be needed to enable the detection of an ES of 0.50 between pre- and post-intervention mean, 
assuming the measures were correlated 0.60. Should the correlation be as low as 0.50 34 
participants would be needed. This indicates that there would be enough statistical power in 
measuring the effect of the leadership development program with the SPGR at the team level 
because this is a 360 degrees measure. A team which consists of six members yields a total 
of 36 ratings, which would be similar to 36 participants, that is higher than the number 
required. 
The effect size statistic indicates the relative magnitude of the differences between means. It 
describes the “amount of total variance in the dependent variable that is predictable from the 
knowledge of the independent variable” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p. 52). This measure is 
important because with large samples, even small differences between groups can become 
statistically significant. In such a case, however, a statistically significant result may not 
have any practical or theoretical significance because of a high N and low ES.  
There are a number of different ES statistics, the most common of which are eta squared 
(η2) and Cohen’s d (d), these are outlined in appendix F, and I will calculate Cohen’s d for 
paired sample t-tests according to the formula provided by Dunlap et al. (1996). The 
discussion outlined in appendix F reveals that there several approaches to calculate Cohen’s 
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d when it comes to the ES of an independent t-test: (a) using means and standard deviations, 
(b) using t values and df, separate groups t-test with equal n in each group, and (c) t values 
and df with unequal n’s in each group. Because a golden standard has not been established 
for this (Van Etten & Taylor, 1998), I calculate and report Cohen’s d by using the t-test 
value and the degrees of freedom when these parameters are available. Otherwise it will be 
calculated by means and standard deviations, and any deviations from this will be footnoted. 
This calculation will also be checked against the η2 statistics for independent t-tests. 
10.5 Sample and Procedure 
The empirical study will follow four cohorts of cadets through their leadership development 
program: 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. By following four cohorts, it would be easier to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the leadership development because this makes it 
possible to discover patterns or mismatches. By doing this it is also possible to see if the 
changes implemented throughout the program have the intended effects. There have been 
several major changes. The first occurred during 2001, when the Academy dramatically 
changed their leadership development program, introducing the use of SPGR starting with 
Cohort 2001 after testing it out on Cohort 2000. The second change was use of the bark 
Statsraad Lehmkuhl for a period of 10 weeks during the first semester. This change was 
implemented with Cohort 2002. Figure 10.2 shows the measurement schedule of this study. 
Data collection followed this schedule by applying the instruments described in section 10.3, 
with measures before and after the leadership development and with three additional follow 
up measures provided with the SPGR. Each cadet was given a unique code number, making 
it possible to follow each respondent throughout this study while preserving anonymity. 
Cohort 2001 represents the Academy’s “old and traditional49” approach to leadership 
development, where the academic part had a larger influence. Cohort 2001 was the first 
Cohort where SPGR was used as leadership tool, while Cohort 2002 was the first cohort 
where the bark Statsraad Lehmkuhl was used as a central part of the leadership development 
program, during the “Magellan” exercise. 
                                                 
49 According to my knowledge, this is the approach that is still applied by Army and Air Force at their academies. 
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Figure 10.1 Measurement Schedule 
 
The RNoNA introduced SPGR as their main tool for leadership development at the time 
Cohort 2001 started their education in August 2001. Data collection and preliminary use, 
however, began in January 2001 with Cohort 2000 (Reitan, 2002)50. Culture data, using the 
CPQ, was only collected for parts of Cohort 2001 and 2002. Culture data was not collected 
for those cadets who either had a civilian bachelor’s degree or were supposed to attend a 
civilian university to obtain one after finishing the one year officer and leadership 
development program at RNoNA. They were not cadets at the RNoNA when these data were 
collected. All measures concerning the pre- and post-measures were handled in cooperation 
with the RNoNA. Each cadet was given an envelope with the questionnaires and a return 
envelope together with oral and written instructions. They were given no feedback on the 
instruments used in the pre- and post-measures during the leadership development program. 
                                                 
50 However, SYMLOG had been used as a research instrument at the RNoNA in 1985 and in 1991, which resulted in an 
article by Polley and Eid (1990). 
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Part VII 
Results and Analysis 
This part consists of three chapters. Chapter 11 presents and discusses the SPGR and NEO 
PI-R results for each of the four cohorts. In this chapter, the culture measured with the CPQ 
is also discussed, together with how the cadets perceived the leadership behavior of th ideal, 
“good officer.” Chapter 12 is devoted to an exploration of the style of leadership that the 
RNoNA actually rewards, while chapter 13 gives a more detailed insight into the social 
interaction of the leadership development process, or, to reframe Goethe, it provides an 
explanation of “becoming”. 
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11. Results and Analysis of the Cohorts 
11.1 Organization of this Chapter 
This aim of this chapter is to provide answers to six of the seven research questions outlined 
in section 9.2. The measurement tools and the appropriate statistical techniques were 
discussed in section 10.2 and 10.4. Each cohort will be analysed separately, starting with 
Cohort 2001, in section 11.2 and continuing through Cohort 2004, which is covered in 
section 11.5. Here, results will be provided to answer research questions one, three and four, 
while research question two will be covered for all the cohorts together in section 11.7, 
which also is the case for research questions five and six, which covers culture. The results 
are presented and discussed in section 11.6 and summarized in section 11.8. 
The results and analyses of each cohort will be presented as follows: 
1. Each section will start with the overall results of the cohort measured by the SPGR. 
SPGR will provide the results both on “reputation”—the average results of other 
team members’ perceptions—and their “identity”—how they perceive themselves. 
The cohorts’ results are the aggregated results of the teams, and these results will 
provide the results necessary to answer research question number one.  
2. Then the personality results provided with the NEO PI-R will be presented and 
discussed to provide an answer to research question number three.  
3. Each team’s SPGR Humres (the SPGR functions) result will also be reported, 
followed by the in-depth analyses of the teams that were performed to gain 
understanding of the complex social interaction process involving the cadets that 
might (or might not) lead to leadership development. This will provide an answer to 
research question number four.  
4. At the end the section, there is a short summary for each cohort. 
The results of each cohort are reported uncoded, while the teams and cadets belonging to a 
specific cohort are coded with letters and numbers to secure anonymity. In addition to the 
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tables that present the most important statistics, the different SPGR diagrams will be used 
throughout this chapter to visualize effects and findings. 
The central demographics are presented in Table 11.1, which also provides the number of 
drop-outs during the leadership development program. 
Table 11.1  
Demography  
Cohort Total N1 Male Female Age Drop outs 
 
    M SD Min Max Male Female 
2001 73 66 7 24.3 4.19 19 41 6 0 
2002 77 68 9 24.3 4.63 20 39 1 1 
2003 66 56 10 24.4 3.78 20 33 7 2 
2004 86 79 7 24.0 4.01 19 39 12 1 
 (302) (269) (33)     (26) (4) 
1 Total N consists the number of cadets that finished the leadership development program, the first year of the RNoNA, 
and the “drop outs” are not included in this number.  
11.2 Cohort 2001 
Cohort 2001 represents the RNoNA’s “old and traditional” approach to leadership 
development. Here the focus was on shorter exercises that lasted from five to six days. The 
only exception was the “Telemakos” exercise, which ran twelve to fourteen days. In 1995, 
the RNoNA began to use a permanent team structure in their approach to leadership 
development. Because of academic needs, however, the team structure was not followed 
during their second semester. This cohort did not use the team organization as its permanent 
structure because after the first semester, they were organized according to their branches. 
As a result, the teams became closer to ad hoc teams, which represented the old tradition. 
Cohort 2001, however, was the first cohort that used a systematic leadership tool in their 
education, the SPGR. 
11.2.1 The SPGR Results 
Table 11.2 shows the average paired sample t-test of Cohort 2001 SPGR Humres results. 
These results show that there was no increase in the cohort’s maturity level, indicating no 
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development of synergetic behavior. There was a significant negative increase of 
Withdrawal behavior. The lack of development is also confirmed by the fact that the overall 
Energy available for doing work did not increase. At the same time, both the Control and 
Opposition functions increased. Unfortunately, this result suggests that the cadets’ abilities 
to play the interaction and isolation game did not increase as a result of RNoNA leadership 
development program.  
Table 11.2  
Cohort 2001: Pre and Post Measures SPGR Humres - Others Rating 
 Pre measure Post Measure  
SPGR Functions M/SD M/SD r t(72) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.31 
(1.20) 
6.40 
(1.50) 
.56 -.720 .474 
Control 3.28 
(1.20) 
3.75 
(1.55) 
.64 -3.313 .001 .13 
Nurture 5.17 
(.92) 
5.15 
(1.14) 
.52 .158 .875 
Opposition 1.07 
(.70) 
1.71 
(.91) 
.54 -6.879 .001 .40 
Dependence 5.68 
(.88) 
5.53 
(1.05) 
.58 1.414 .162 
Withdrawal .73 
(.72) 
1.00 
(.88) 
.63 -3.253 .002 .13 
Energy1 5.58 
(1.70) 
5.40 
(1.80) 
.65 1.018 .312  
1 Energy was calculated by computing the energy available (Synergy with Withdrawal subtracted) within the team.  
Figure 11.1 illustrates the average development of the whole cohort measured by team 
members’ ratings in the field diagram, together with the average the SPGR 12-vector profile.  
 
 
Figure 11.1  The Developement of Cohort 2001 in the SPGR Field Diagram 
and the Cohort’s Average Leadership Behavior - Others Rating 
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The increase of the Control function is clearly illustrated in this figure. This becomes more 
obvious in Table 11.3, which shows the cohort’s development on each vector. The results in 
Table 11.3 reveal a more complex picture than in Table 11.2, e.g., that there is a decrease in 
Empathy while there is an increase in Engagement.  
Table 11.3  
Cohort 2001: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(72) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy 7.41 
(.75) 
6.68 
(1.00) 
.29 5.886 .001 .82 
N1: Caring 6.56 
(1.34) 
6.61 
(1.02) 
.58 -.325 .746  
D2: Acceptance 5.66 
(.92) 
5.61 
(1.10) 
.54 .441 .661  
N2: Creativity 5.17 
(1.51) 
4.65 
(1.66) 
.65 3.294 .002 .32 
O1: Criticism 1.58 
(.70) 
2.33 
(.98) 
.43 -6.919 .001 .86 
W1: Resignation 1.63 
(.73) 
2.05 
(.93) 
.59 -4.528 .001 .48 
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.60 
(.69) 
2.07 
(1.13) 
.40 -3.810 .001 .49 
O2: Assertiveness 2.92 
(1.29) 
3.94 
(1.49) 
.63 -7.298 .001 .73 
C2: Ruling 4.84 
(1.29) 
4.92 
(1.57) 
.59 -.467 .642 . 
D1: Loyalty 6.84 
(.90) 
6.45 
(1.10) 
.42 3.082 .003 .39 
C1: Task orientation 2.87 
(1.38) 
4.40 
(1.48) 
.64 -9.645 .001 .96 
S1: Engagement 6.17 
(1.24) 
6.55 
(1.37) 
.54 -2.635 .010 .30 
  
The most striking result is that the climate for leadership development worsened throughout 
the year. There was less room for Empathy—to listen to and show interest in others with a 
focus on understanding them, which is a necessary condition for development. Instead there 
was more Criticism—self-centered, provocative, and unruly behavior, together with 
Assertiveness, which describes self-sufficient, tough, and utterly competitive behaviors. The 
focus on Task orientation increased: They were trying to be more efficient, analytical and 
rational. The result of this was an increase in Withdrawal behavior—Resignation and Self-
sacrificing. The calculated RCI results presented in Table 11.4 confirm this development. It 
is worrying that 34% had a significant reduction in their empathic behavior, while at the 
 155
same time 36% of the cadets became more critical and self-centered. Such a development in 
organizational climate will, of course, hamper creativity and lead to an increase in 
Withdrawal behavior. Although there was a large increase in Task-oriented behavior, 43% 
had a significant development, it appears that this behavior was focused on getting ahead by 
oneself and not on developing a climate for leadership development.  
Table 11.4  
Cohort 2001: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 73) 
S2: Empathy  34 59 7 309.8*** 
N1: Caring 1 93 6 3.0 
D2: Acceptance 4 92 4 1.6 
N2: Creativity 12 85 3 29.0*** 
O1: Criticism 1 63 36 328.5*** 
W1: Resignation 3 82 15 47.4*** 
W2: Self-sacrificing 3 77 20 97.7*** 
O2: Assertiveness 1 76 23 129.5*** 
C2: Ruling 10 85 6 18.1*** 
D1: Loyalty 8 88 4 10:7** 
C1: Task orientation 1 56 43 478.4*** 
S1: Engagement 4 90 6 3.5 
Note. N =73. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of changers 
and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and increase and 95% 
remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.  
The result is a climate that did not foster maturity because the cadets as a group were not 
able to balance “getting ahead” and “getting along.” The 12-vector figure also reveals an 
unbalanced relationship between the basic functions, Control and Nurture. According to the 
SPGR theory, the Nurture function will be dominant at the lower maturity levels, 
Reservation and Team Spirit. A paired-sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the balance 
between these two functions. There was a statistically significant imbalance between Control 
(M = 3.75, SD = 1.55) and Nurture [M = 5.15, SD= 1.36, t(72) = 6.323, p < .001, d = 1.49]. 
The ES statistics indicates that this is a large imbalance towards Nurture. This together with 
the lack of increase of Synergy and a large increase in self-centered and provocative 
behavior, Criticism, indicates that the cohort’s overall maturity level was Reservation. This 
will be discussed in further detail below. 
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Table 11.5 presents the pre- and post-measures on the cadets’ self-ratings on the SPGR 12-
vector. This result indicates a similar development on Empathy, Criticism, Assertiveness, 
and Task orientation, but the differences are much smaller.  
Table 11.5 
Cohort 2001: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure    
 M/SD M/SD r t(72) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  7.44 
(1.75) 
6.68 
(1.96) 
.13 2.623 .011 .40 
N1: Caring 6.79 
(1.75) 
6.92 
(1.80) 
.28 -.494 .623  
D2: Acceptance 6.05 
(1.89) 
5.84 
(2.17) 
.33 .890 .429  
N2: Creativity 5.64 
(2.00) 
5.25 
(2.33) 
.52 1.587 .117  
O1: Criticism 1.70 
(1.31) 
2.41 
(2.14) 
.20 -2.674 .009 .40 
W1: Resignation 1.89 
(1.48) 
1.60 
(1.29) 
.22 1.416 .161  
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.84 
(1.21) 
1.75 
(1.28) 
.09 .416 .670  
O2: Assertiveness 3.42 
(2.00) 
4.26 
(1.83) 
.31 -3.175 .002 .44 
C2: Ruling 5.25 
(1.85) 
5.16 
(1.77) 
.28 .322 .748  
D1: Loyalty 6.58 
(1.91) 
6.37 
(2.10) 
.52 .890 .376  
C1: Task orientation 3.70 
(2.01) 
4.97 
(2.39) 
.54 -5.111 .001 .57 
S1: Engagement 7.05 
(1.69) 
6.68 
(1.96) 
.16 .315 .754  
  
This is clearly seen by looking at the RCI results presented in Table 11.6, where percentages 
of “increasesers” and “decreasers” are significant in the same direction, but smaller. When 
we look at the Withdrawal behavior, represented with Resignation and Self-sacrificing, there 
was a large difference in perception. The paired t-sample test hides the significant results 
when it comes to Self-sacrificing, where there was an 11% increase and an 11% decrease. 
This also indicates a gap between their self and their reputation. 
It is also worth noticing the difference on Engagement, where others see a minor 
development: They were not able to notice it themselves, which is indicated by the fact that 
the cohort as a whole considered themselves to stay the same. 
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Table 11.6  
Cohort 2001:  Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 73) 
S2: Empathy  16 80 4 59.3*** 
N1: Caring 3 92 5 2.7 
D2: Acceptance 11 81 7 27.7*** 
N2: Creativity 10 88 3 15.1*** 
O1: Criticism 8 64 28 197.8*** 
W1: Resignation 5 90 5 5.4 
W2: Self-sacrificing 11 78 11 44.0*** 
O2: Assertiveness 1 85 14 37.8*** 
C2: Ruling 4 93 4 1.6 
D1: Loyalty 7 89 4 6.6* 
C1: Task orientation 1 86 13 29.2*** 
S1: Engagement 0 100 0  
Note. N = 73. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., 
change greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed 
distribution of changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each 
decreases and increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.   
 
11.2.2 The NEO PI-R Results of Cohort 2001 
According to the NEO PI-R results, see Table 11.7, the cadets in this cohort tended to be 
emotionally stable, Extroverted and Conscientiousness. At the same time, however, they as a 
group tended to be a little less open and Agreeable than the population in general. The most 
striking aspects of the NEO PI-R result are the low Agreeableness score and that the paired 
sample t-test revealed a significant reduction in this domain. Although it was moderate, it 
was in the opposite direction of the intention behind the leadership development program. If 
we look at the RCI results, Table 11.8, however, we see that only 4% of the cadets had a 
significant reduction, which is not a significant result 
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Table 11.7  
Cohort 2001: The NEO PI-R Pre and Post Measures 
 
DOMAINS AND FACETS 
α  
Pre  
measure 
Pre  
measure 
M/SD 
α  
Post 
measure 
Post 
 Measure 
M/SD 
 
r 
 
t(71) 
 
Sig. 
 
d 
N: NEUROTICISM .90 46.29 
(8.06) 
.87 46.36 
(6.87) 
.75 -.108 .914  
N1: Anxiety 
 
N2: Angry Hostility 
 
N3: Depression 
 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
 
N5: Impulsiveness 
 
N6: Vulnerability 
.76 
 
.68 
 
.73 
 
.69 
 
.52 
 
.74 
44.47 
(8.65) 
47.97 
(7.95) 
43.18 
(7.36) 
48.07 
(8.55) 
47.49 
(8.60) 
49.32 
(6.91) 
.63 
 
.67 
 
.73 
 
.63 
 
.62 
 
.71 
44.29 
(7.41) 
48.19 
(7.75) 
43.72 
(6.87) 
47.78 
(7.46) 
49.26 
(8.78) 
48.74 
(6.84) 
.66 
 
.69 
 
.77 
 
.65 
 
.68 
 
.57 
. 
.227 
 
-.306 
 
.794 
 
.365 
 
-2.160 
 
.780 
 
.821 
 
.760 
 
.430 
 
.716 
 
.034 
 
.438 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.20 
 
 
. 
E: EXTRAVERSION .88 53.18 
(7.32) 
.90 53.85 
(7.95) 
.83 -1.254 
 
.214 . 
E1: Warmth 
 
E2: Gregariousness 
 
E3: Assertiveness 
 
E4: Activity 
 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
 
E6: Positive Emotions 
.70 
 
.52 
 
.83 
 
.56 
 
.60 
 
.74 
49.88 
(7.35) 
52.94 
(6.84) 
52.06 
(9.27) 
51.13 
(7.50) 
54.28 
(7.15) 
56.49 
(7.53) 
.70 
 
.65 
 
.83 
 
.68 
 
.48 
 
.80 
50.44 
(6.76) 
52.11 
(7.38) 
54.11 
(9.70) 
52.18 
(8.16) 
55.86 
(6.34) 
54.90 
(8.22) 
.49 
 
.67 
 
.84 
 
.75 
 
.66 
 
.76 
-.679 
 
1.213 
 
-3.229 
 
-1.604 
 
-2.393 
 
2.452 
.499 
 
.229 
 
.002 
 
.113 
 
.019 
 
.017 
 
 
 
 
 
.22 
 
 
 
.23 
 
.20 
O: OPENNESS .86 45.44 
(8.41) 
.89 47.97 
(8.97) 
.83 .-4.239 .005 
 
.29 
O1: Fantasy 
 
O2: Aesthetics 
 
O3: Feelings 
 
O4: Actions 
 
O5: Ideas 
 
O6: Values 
.78 
 
.78 
 
.67 
 
.66 
 
.82 
 
.37 
46.04 
(9.43) 
46.51 
(9.38) 
47.49 
(8.77) 
49.13 
(9.75) 
47.74 
(10.88) 
45.81 
(7.93) 
.77 
 
.77 
 
.67 
 
.69 
 
88 
 
.52 
50.11 
(8.75) 
47.46 
(9.06) 
48.46 
(8.51) 
50.99 
(9.71) 
49.11 
(11.96) 
46.64 
(7.84) 
.53 
 
.80 
 
.59 
 
.78 
 
.84 
 
.75 
-3.889 
 
-1.367 
 
-1.047 
 
-2.425 
 
-1.808 
 
-1.277 
 
.001 
 
.176 
 
.299 
 
.018 
 
.075 
 
.206 
 
.44 
 
 
 
 
 
.19 
 
 
 
 
A: AGREEABLENESS .87 
 
47.63 
(8.97) 
.80 45.81 
(7.31) 
.81 2.929 .005 .21 
A1: Trust 
 
A2: Straightforwardness 
 
A3: Altruism 
 
A4: Compliance 
 
A5: Modesty 
 
A6: Tender-Mindedness 
.71 
 
.76 
 
.64 
 
.62 
 
.72 
 
.63 
49.07 
(7.56) 
49.43 
(9.34) 
50.63 
(9.19) 
46.18 
(8.63) 
48.49 
(8.79) 
47.03 
(8.02) 
.71 
 
.79 
 
.61 
 
.57 
 
.62 
 
.44 
49.63 
(7.26) 
45.92 
(9.82) 
49.33 
(8.74) 
44.86 
(8.34) 
47.03 
(7.46) 
46.61 
(6.72) 
.70 
 
.73 
 
.55 
 
.64 
 
.73 
 
.63 
-.826 
 
4.190 
 
1.357 
 
1.547 
 
2.011 
 
.551 
.411 
 
.001 
 
.179 
 
.126 
 
.048 
 
.584 
 
 
 
.36 
 
 
 
 
 
.17 
C: CONSCIENTIOUSNESS .91 
 
51.78 
(9.19) 
.90 52.43 
(8.48) 
.82 
 
-1.036 .304  
C1: Competence 
 
C2: Order 
 
C3: Dutifulness 
 
C4: Achievement Striving 
 
C5: Self-Discipline 
 
C6: Deliberation 
 
.67 
 
.64 
 
.72 
 
.73 
 
.76 
 
.75 
53.75 
(7.49) 
53.33 
(8.05) 
50.99 
(9.65) 
51.33 
(8.92) 
49.90 
(9.22) 
51.42 
(10.03) 
.61 
 
.66 
 
.68 
 
.79 
 
.80 
 
.76 
54.19 
(6.85) 
54.89 
(8.56) 
50.15 
(9.41) 
51.54 
(9.13) 
52.67 
(8.51) 
49.69 
(9.40) 
.62 
 
.59 
 
.75 
 
.80 
 
.75 
 
.72 
-.599 
 
-1.759 
 
1.058 
 
-.311 
 
-3.723 
 
2.012 
.551 
 
.083 
 
.294 
 
.757 
 
.001 
 
.048 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.31 
 
.05 
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Table 11.8  
Cohort 2001: Individual-Level Change in NEO PI-R Domains and Facets 
 
Domains and facets 
 
Decreased (%) 
 
 
Stayed the same (%) 
 
Increased (%) 
 
χ2 (2, N = 72) 
 
N: NEUROTICISM 
N1: Anxiety 
N2: Angry Hostility 
N3: Depression 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
N5: Impulsiveness 
N6: Vulnerability 
 
E: EXTRAVERSION 
E1: Warmth 
E2: Gregariousness 
E3: Assertiveness 
E4: Activity 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
E6: Positive Emotions 
 
O: OPENNESS 
O1: Fantasy 
O2: Aesthetics 
O3: Feelings 
O4: Actions 
O5: Ideas 
O6: Values 
 
A: AGREEABLENESS 
A1: Trust 
A2: Straightforwardness 
A3: Altruism 
A4: Compliance 
A5: Modesty 
A6: Tender-Mindedness 
 
C: CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
C1: Competence 
C2: Order 
C3: Dutifulness 
C4: Achievement Striving 
C5: Self-Discipline 
C6: Deliberation 
 
1  
1  
1 
0 
1 
0 
7 
 
6 
4 
7 
0 
0 
0 
7 
 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
 
4 
3 
12 
8 
1 
0 
1 
 
3 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
 
92 
98 
93 
97 
98 
97 
89 
 
86 
89 
90 
94 
99 
99 
92 
 
89 
83 
96 
94 
100 
86 
99 
 
96 
93 
88 
92 
98 
100 
99 
 
86 
94 
95 
99 
96 
90 
93 
 
7 
1 
6 
3 
1 
3 
4 
 
8 
7 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
 
11 
14 
4 
6 
0 
10 
1 
 
0 
4 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
 
11 
3 
4 
1 
4 
10 
1 
 
  6.1* 
  .7 
3.1 
.011 
.7 
.011 
6.8* 
 
13.1** 
3.8 
5.9 
 2.61 
.41 
.41 
6.1* 
 
21.1*** 
38.4*** 
.71 
2.61 
 
16.4*** 
.41 
 
.71 
.8 
28.5***1 
9.9**1 
.7 
22.0*** 
.41 
 
22.0*** 
1.2 
3.1 
.41 
.71 
14.8***1 
3.1 
Note: N = 72. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., 
change greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed 
distribution of changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each 
decreases and increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001. 1) χ2 (1, 
N = 72).      
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If we look at the result that is indicated by the facet A2, Straightforwardness, we see that 
there was a significant negative development—12% of the cadets increased their willingness 
to manipulate others through flattery, craftiness, or even by the use of deception. The RCI 
analyses also reveal a significant negative development of 8% on A3, Altruism. Although 
the leadership program contributed to a significant increase in Openness, 11%, this score 
was still lower than the average of the general population, T = 50. 
A closer look at the facets reveals that the paired sample t-test and the RCI analyses differ on 
O4, Actions, and O5, Ideas, which are important components of adaptability (LePine, et al. 
2000). The RCI indicates no development on O4, Actions, but a significant 10% increase on 
O5, Ideas. The NEO PI-R results reveal an important imbalance between Openness (M = 
47.91, SD = 8.82) and Conscientiousness [M = 52.57, SD = 8.71, t(73)= -3.518, p > .001, d = 
.82]. This large difference shows that this cohort as a group preferred a leadership climate 
that was methodical and organized and that leadership development should be performed 
according to step-by-step instructions. As a group they also tended to have problems coping 
with situations that lacked any obviously right answer, indicating a possible lack of coping 
skills in environments characterized by rapid changes, novelty, and ambiguity, which is the 
climate of 4th GW. These results indicate that these cadets as a group did not have the 
necessary maturity level to cope with such challenges, that they were not able to play the 
interaction and isolation game. The RCI of the NEO PI-R results indicates a stable and 
consistent pattern concerning personality: If we look at the average figures over the five 
domains, we find that 90% of the cadets stayed the same throughout the leadership 
development program. 
11.2.3 Cohort 2001: Team Analyses 
Paired sample t-analyses were performed for each of the ten teams on the SPGR Humres. 
These results are presented in Table 11.9.  
These indicate that only one team, Team 01AC, had a significant positive almost moderate 
development on the Synergy score from (M = 6.64, SD = 1.38) to [M = 7.37, SD = 1.72, r = 
.34, t(48)= -2.852, p < .006, d= .47] as a result of the RNoNA leadership development 
program. Four teams; Team 01BG, 01GG, 01JK, and 01ST, showed no development and 
thus no increase in Synergy or Energy. Team 01QL had a significant development on 
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Synergy, but it also had a significant increase on Withdrawal behavior, resulting in no 
development in available Energy for doing work. Four teams had a negative development; 
Team 01TU, 01PP, 01TV, and 01QK.  
Table 11.9 
Cohort 2001: SPGR Humres Results on the Team Level 
  SYNERGY CONTROL NURTURE OPPOSITION DEPENDENCE WITHDRAWAL ENERGY 
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Team N M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD
 
01GG 
 
6 
(36) 
6.10 
(2.26) 
5.97 
(1.84) 
3.35 
(1.85) 
3.57 
(2.19) 
5.00 
(2.12) 
4.19 
(2.00) 
1.50 
(1.76) 
1.50 
(1.52) 
5.47 
(2.15) 
5.00 
(2.09) 
1.03 
(1.27) 
1.03 
(1.43) 
5.06 
(3.14) 
4.94 
(2.67) 
01BG 
 
7 
(49) 
6.43 
(2.63) 
6.84 
(1.83) 
3.24 
(1.70) 
4.34*** 
(1.95) 
5.19 
(1.97) 
5.42 
(1.98) 
.85 
(1.02) 
1.49*** 
(1.56) 
5.51 
(2.32) 
5.31 
(2.27) 
.97 
(1.61) 
1.03 
(1.62) 
5.46 
(2.87) 
5.81 
(2.74) 
01AC 
 
7 
(49) 
6.64 
(1.38) 
7.37** 
(1.72) 
2.78 
(1.51) 
3.26 
(1.71) 
5.57 
(1.40) 
5.86 
(1.75) 
.94 
(.81) 
1.13 
(1.26) 
6.07 
(2.24) 
5.44** 
(2.82) 
.18 
(.48) 
.27 
(1.11) 
6.45 
(1.55) 
7.10 
(2.36) 
01QL 
 
7 
(49) 
5.76 
(1.98) 
6.80** 
(1.40) 
3.52 
(1.71) 
3.45 
(1.90) 
4.85 
(1.85) 
5.35 
(1.58) 
.80 
(1.38) 
1.33* 
(1.43) 
6.18 
(1.75) 
5.67 
(1.66) 
.51 
(1.03) 
1.42*** 
(1.95) 
5.26 
(2.68) 
5.37 
(2.91) 
01JK 
 
7 
(49) 
5.72 
(1.81) 
5.51 
(1.72) 
2.55 
(1.68) 
3.38** 
(2.09) 
4.78 
(1.53) 
4.43* 
(1.93) 
.76 
(1.04) 
1.24*** 
(1.06) 
5.47 
(1.64) 
4.20 
(2.10) 
1.01 
(1.48) 
1.06 
(1.29) 
4.71 
(2.30) 
4.46 
(2.68) 
01TV 
 
8 
(64) 
7.05 
(1.36) 
6.51* 
(1.48) 
3.48 
(1.72) 
3.36 
(1.37) 
5.73 
(1.23) 
5.77 
(1.44) 
1.07 
(.93) 
1.50* 
(1.37) 
6.09 
(1.65) 
5.77 
(1.55) 
.63 
(1.02) 
.49 
(.77) 
6.41 
(2.00) 
6.01 
(2.07) 
01TU 
 
7 
(49) 
6.66 
(2.02) 
6.61 
(1.74) 
4.43 
(1.89) 
3.72** 
(2.07) 
5.10 
(1.81) 
5.24 
(1.76) 
2.14 
(1.06) 
2.30 
(1.75) 
5.70 
(2.17) 
4.49 
(2.18) 
.28 
(.75) 
.83** 
(1.19) 
6.38 
(2.27) 
5.79 
(2.61) 
01QK 
 
8 
(64) 
6.73 
(2.34) 
5.91*** 
(2.23) 
3.17 
(1.75) 
3.87* 
(2.22) 
5.43 
(1.90) 
4.84* 
(1.87) 
.62 
(.80) 
1.88*** 
(1.65) 
5.52 
(1.76) 
6.26** 
(2.00) 
.58 
(1.27) 
.65 
(1.10) 
6.15 
(3.36) 
5.26** 
(2.90) 
01TV 
 
8 
(64) 
7.05 
(1.36) 
6.51* 
(1.48) 
3.48 
(1.72) 
3.36 
(1.37) 
5.73 
(1.23) 
5.77 
(1.44) 
1.07 
(.93) 
1.50* 
(1.37) 
6.09 
(1.65) 
5.77 
(1.55) 
.63 
(1.02) 
.49 
(.77) 
6.41 
(2.00) 
6.01 
(2.07) 
01ST 
 
8 
(64) 
6.70 
(2.04) 
7.05 
(1.46) 
3.62 
(1.82) 
4.64** 
(2.52) 
5.33 
(1.48) 
5.96* 
(1.96) 
1.20 
(1.47) 
2.38*** 
(2.03) 
5.63 
(1.63) 
5.80 
(2.40) 
1.55 
(1.56) 
1.41 
(1.25) 
5.15 
(2.91) 
5.64 
(2.38) 
01PP 
 
8 
(64) 
6.21 
(2.26) 
6.30 
(1.56) 
3.11 
(1.83) 
4.19*** 
(1.97) 
5.14 
(2.02) 
5.14 
(1.99) 
1.06 
(1.19) 
2.08*** 
(1.53) 
5.29 
(2.43) 
5.75 
(2.10) 
.56 
(.96) 
1.21** 
(1.39) 
5.64 
(2.48) 
5.08 
(2.11) 
Note:  A paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the leadership development 
program on the cadets’ SPGR Humres scores. Significant changes are indicated with: *p < .05, **p < 
.01, and ***p < .001. N gives the number of ratings within each team. A team consists of 8 team 
members who rate themselves and each of the others, producing 64 ratings.  
Figure 11.2 shows the field diagram for Team 01AC, with an overall positive development, 
and Team 01QK, which had a negative development. 
 
 
        Team 01AC                                                       Team 01QK  
 
Figure 11.2  The Developement of Team 01AC and Team 01QK  
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The difference on these two teams’ Synergy scores was significant, although moderate. This 
was confirmed by an independent t-test. Team 01AC scored (M = 7.37, SD = 1.72) compared 
to Team 01QK [M = 5.91, SD = 2.23, t(111) = 3.600, p < .001, d = .68].  
A thorough analysis of those teams that either had none or a negative development revealed 
an interesting pattern that could be illustrated with Team 01QL. This team had no significant 
development throughout the leadership development program. The field diagrams in Figure 
12.3, shows that one cadet, Cadet F, dominated the team.  
 
                      
             a)Pre measure                  b) Team sailing                  c) February 
                 
                       d) After Winter             e)   Post  
Figure 11.3  Team 01QL’s SPGR Field Diagrams Throughout the 
Leadership Development Program  
 
This cadet was the main contributor to the available Energy within the team (M = 7.56, SD = 
.85) compared with the team [M = 5.01, SD = 2.97, t(47)= 4.543, p > .001, d = 1.33]. The 
NEO PI-R results also revealed that this cadet scored high on the facet N2, Angry Hostility, 
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T = 60 with a d = 1.23, while the team scored 48.14 (SD = 9.21). At the same time, Cadet F 
was dominant and forceful, which was indicated by the E3, Assertiveness, score, T = 64 with 
a d = 1.57, and the team score was 51.57, SD = 5.03. This cadet’s behavior contributed to 
hampering the team’s performance and to the leadership development process within the 
team. One reason for this was a lack of maturity and the ability to “get along,” which was 
indicated by Cadet F’s low score on the Agreeableness domain, T = 38. Here the team’s 
score is T = 48.29, SD = 6.24, d = 1.35. Such a personality profile, with a high influence on 
Social Interaction tends to create a climate that fosters selfish behavior, where cooperation is 
not a central part of the leadership development process, and the overall result as seen is no 
development within the team. 
Figure 11.4 shows this cadet’s 12-vector self-rating and peer ratings. This figure illustrates a 
lack of self-understanding, adjustment, and role-taking ability. This cadet lacked the 
necessary social capital to create a leadership climate, which, unfortunately, would be 
needed for either 3rd GW or 4th GW. At the same time this cadet was allowed to dominate 
this team throughout the entire leadership development program, and the RCI analyses on 
the SPGR 12-vector showed that the cadet’s only change was in becoming significantly 
more assertive, according to other team-members. The RCI NEO PI-R showed a significant 
development on Conscientiousness (T = 55).  
 
 
 
   Self-rating   Peer-rating  
Figure 11.4  The SPGR 12-Vector Diagrams for the Dominant Cadet in 
Team 01QL 
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The SPGR and the NEO PI-R data indicate that this was not an isolated case: The SPGR 
analysis showed that there was at least one dominant cadet in eight out of the ten teams. The 
only exceptions were Teams 01BG and 01TV.  
Even in Team 01AC, which had positive development, there were dominant cadets. In fact, 
this team had three dominant cadets who partly dominated the team throughout the year. 
Figure 11.5 illustrates the field diagram of this team at the post measure, after exercise 
“Telemakos.”  
 
Figure 11.5  Team 01Ac’s SPGR Field Diagram After Exercise “Telemakos” 
 
The dominant cadets were A, D, and G. Even with these members, the team had a positive 
development because the team was not inhibited by these dominant cadets’ behavior. The 
dominant cadets had a decrease in their Synergetic behavior from M = 6.99 to M = 6.75, 
while the remaining team members increased their synergetic behavior from M = 6.36 to M 
= 7.83. An analysis of the two groups after “Telemakos” comparing the dominant cadets’ 
scores (M = 6.75, SD = 1.81) to the team-members’ [M = 7.83, SD= 1.51, t(47)= -2.280, p < 
.023, d = .67] illustrates this positive development. 
Team 01TV’s field diagram and the team’s average 12-vector diagram are shown in Figure 
11.6. This team had no dominant cadets, but the 12-vector profile reveals that the teams’ 
overall leadership behavior was limited and restricted. In particular, this team had a decrease 
in Synergy. A paired sample t-test of the SPGR 12-vector for this team revealed that this was 
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because of a moderate reduction in Empathy, showing interest in others, listening to and 
understanding their needs. 
 
 
Figure 11.6  Team 01TV SPGR Field Diagram and Average Leadership 
Behavior 
 
Empathy was reduced from (M = 7.80, SD = 1.56) to [M = 6.58, SD = 1.91, r = .42, t(63)= 
4.477, p < .001, d = .60]. The RCI analyses revealed that five out of eight team-members had 
a significant negative development on Empathy. This was the largest change within the 
team. Another significant change was a decreased focus on Loyalty towards accomplishing 
tasks, which might seem like a paradox because the team’s leadership behavior became more 
Task Oriented—efficient, analytical and rational. However, this, together with stronger focus 
on Assertiveness and Criticism, indicates an orientation mostly concerned with “getting 
ahead,” which explains this lack of leadership development and role-taking ability. 
Those teams that showed a negative development seemed to follow the same pattern 
concerning social interaction: They all had a significant increase in Task Orientation, 
Criticism, Assertiveness, Resignation, and Self-sacrificing and also a decrease in Empathy. 
These teams were not able to establish the harmony and trust necessary to cope with an 
environment where they faced new challenges. Because the necessary climate for success 
was not established, the internal entropy, diS, increased due to the external demands created 
by the tasks given, deS. As a result, the teams’ performances were inhibited.  
The positive development in Energy reported on those teams that also had a negative 
development requires an explanation because it gives a misleading picture. The answer can 
be found by analyzing the third SPGR dimension, Influence versus Passivity. Prior research 
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has shown that one dominant person is enough to change the work environment and inhibit 
team performance (Barry & Stewart, 1997; Stewart & Barrick, 2004; Williams & Sternberg, 
1988). According to SPGR theory, a large variance on the Influence versus Passivity 
dimension will make development harder, especially if the dominant cadet scores 
significantly higher on Energy than the remaining cadets of the team. Team 01ST, see Figure 
11.7, which also illustrates how this social interaction might work. 
 
          
               a)Pre measure                  b) Team saling                   c) February 
             
                d) Winter exercise            e) Post measure (After “Telemakos”) 
 
Figure 11.7  Team 01ST SPGR Field Diagram Throughout the Leadership 
Development Program 
 
These field diagrams illustrate how the various team members acted as noncooperative 
centers of gravity throughout the leadership development program. This can be seen by 
studying the cadets’ average positions in the field diagrams, together with the scatter. There 
is obviously no clear direction—no Schwerpunkt—for the development process. Throughout 
the year, this team was dominated by two cadets, B and C. Their scores on NEO PI-R 
showed that they were more emotionally unstable than the remaining team: Their 
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Neuroticism T- score was 54 (SD = 2.83) while the team score was 45.67 (SD = 7.34, d = 
1.50) and the difference was especially large on N2, Angry Hostility (M = 62.00, SD = 7.07), 
compared with the team [M = 45.33, SD = 7.82, t(6)= 4.064, p < .007, d = 3.32]. Because of 
their low score on Agreeableness (M = 36.50, SD = .71) compared with the team [M = 50.50, 
SD = 6.47, t(6)= 5.330, p < .003, d = 4.35], they most likely expressed frustration and 
bitterness toward the team-members. This was probably done in a forceful, dominant, and 
almost abusive way as suggested by their high score on E3, Assertiveness (M = 62.00, SD = 
2.82) compared with the team [M = 50.67, SD = 7.19, p < .04051, d = 2.07]. Based on this, 
one would not expect to see any development because there was no climate that would make 
such a complex endeavor possible.  
11.2.4 Summary: Cohort 2001 
The performed analysis indicates a lack of leadership development because the cadets and 
the RNoNA were not able to create a climate that would result in leadership development. 
The result was no significant improvement in insight, orientation, agility, and initiative. 
Instead, the cadets in their teams tended to coalesce into many noncooperative centers of 
gravity, each of which was trying, more or less successfully, to “get ahead,” or even 
“survive” on their own, individual terms. As previously mentioned, this cohort represented 
the RNoNA’s traditional approach to leadership development. When the post-SPGR results 
of Cohort 2001 were compared with the SPGR results of the pilot study performed on 
Cohort 2000, there was a striking similarity, see Figure 11.8. Cohort 2000 consisted of 68 
cadets when they were finished with the leadership development program in June 2001. 
Independent t-test analyses were performed on both the self and others rating of the SPGR 
12-vector to see if there were any differences. Two significant differences were found both 
on others rating: On Creativity, Cohort 2000 came out higher (M = 5.36, SD = 1.54) 
compared with Cohort 2001 [M= 4.60, SD = 1.67, t(147)= 2.882, p < .005, d = .48], and on 
Empathy, Cohort 2000 also came out higher (M = 7.03, SD = 1.07) compared with Cohort 
2001 [M = 6.67, SD = 1.00, t(147)= 2.152, p < .033, d = .35]. The calculated ES indicates 
that these differences were small, and that the differences between these cohorts were minor. 
                                                 
51 The reported p level is in this case is one-tailed because of the importance and strong impact of the UD dimension in 
SPGR. 
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Cohort 2000 vs. Cohort 2001   Average leadership behavior - others rating  
Figure 11.8  Cohort 2001 Compared with 2000 and Cohort 2000 Average 
Leadership Behavior 
 
These results reinforce the conclusion that Cohort 2001 represents the RNoNA’s old 
approach to leadership development. As can be seen, both cohorts are at low maturity level, 
indicating that the general findings for Cohort 2001 also are valid for Cohort 2000. 
11.3 Cohort 2002 
Cohort 2002 was the first cohort which completed a large part of the leadership development 
program on board the bark Statsraad Lehmkuhl. This, as previously described, was a ten 
week long exercise where the intention was that the cohort should be able to take over the 
command of the vessel in the end of this period. This exercise was conducted in international 
waters, and Cohort 2002 sailed from Las Palmas in the Canary Islands to the U.S. via the 
Caribbean before returning to Bergen via Brest, France. 
The cohort’s SPGR Humres pre- and post-results are presented in Table 11.10. These results 
indicate a significant increase in the cohort’s overall maturity level, a significant increase in 
Synergy, and a significant decrease of Withdrawal, resulting in a significantly higher level of 
Energy available for doing work. There was also a significant increase, as the result of the 
leadership development program, in the Control, Nurture, and Opposition functions. These 
increases, as can be seen in Table 11.11 indicate an increase in Caring, Creativity, and 
Assertiveness.  
Table 11.10 
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Cohort 2002: Pre and Post Measures SPGR Humres - Others Rating 
SPGR function Pre measure Post Measure  
 M/SD M/SD r t(76) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.56 
(1.20) 
7.23 
(.96) 
.60 -5.877 .001 .31 
Control 2.98 
(1.26) 
3.66 
(1.34) 
.65 -5.475 .001 .28 
Nurture 4.68 
(1.01) 
5.66 
(1.15) 
.58 -8.649 .001 .50 
Opposition 1.71 
(.81) 
1.92 
(.84) 
.52 -2.318 .023 .07 
Dependence 6.17 
(1.00) 
6.19 
(1.01) 
.67 -.198 .844  
Withdrawal 1.02 
(.92) 
.76 
(.94) 
.69 3.112 .003 .11 
Energy 5.55 
(1.92) 
6.47 
(1.73) 
.71 -5.748 .001 .30 
  
They also indicate that the cadets as a group have increased their ability to play the 
interaction and isolation game as the result of RNoNA leadership development program. 
However, they are still at a low maturity level, Team Spirit. This is indicated by the 
imbalance between the Control and Nurture functions: the Control function was (M = 3.66, 
SD = 1.34) compared with the Nurture function [M = 5.66, SD = 1.15, t(76)= 9.409, p < 
.001, d = 2.16], while the Dependence function was high. This indicates that the Nurture and 
Dependence functions dominated and inhibited the cohort. This development is illustrated in 
Figure 12.9, which shows the field diagram, together with the average 12-vector peer rating 
at the end of the leadership development program.  
Table 11.11 gives an overview of the cohort’s 12-vector development. The calculated 
Cohen’s d, indicates that the leadership development program had a moderate effect, which 
is considered to be good within the social sciences (Bausell & Li, 2002). This result is 
consistent with the RCI analysis for the SPGR 12-vector presented in Table 11.12, which 
also indicates a positive development. All “increasers” and “decreasers” seemed to be going 
in the “right” directions except for the 10% decrease on Loyalty. 
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Figure 11.9  The Development of Cohort 2002 Illustrated in the SPGR Field 
Diagram and the Cohort’s Average Leadership Behavior - Others Rating 
It is especially worth noting that Acceptance, loyalty towards each other as team members, 
increased and became closer to Loyalty.  
Table 11.11  
Cohort 2002: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(76) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  6.86 
(1.12) 
7.31 
(1.13) 
.55 -3.720 .001 .40 
N1: Caring 6.69 
(1.36) 
7.44 
(1.15) 
.52 -5.266 .001 .59 
D2: Acceptance 5.80 
(1.11) 
6.45 
(1.00) 
.64 -6.350 .001 .61 
N2: Creativity 4.35 
(1.53) 
5.21 
(1.53) 
.66 -5.988 .001 .56 
O1: Criticism 1.74 
(.91) 
1.86 
(.93) 
.44 -1.011 .315  
W1: Resignation 1.93 
(.75) 
1.61 
(.77) 
.53 3.811 .001 .42 
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.70 
(.78) 
1.67 
(.95) 
.64 .364 .717  
O2: Assertiveness 2.92 
(1.29) 
3.94 
(1.49) 
.70 -3.471 .001 .31 
C2: Ruling 3.81 
(1.32) 
4.46 
(1.45) 
.65 -4.293 .001 .41 
D1: Loyalty 7.29 
(.84) 
7.01 
(1.07) 
.49 2.458 .016 .28 
C1: Task orientation 3.11 
(1.52) 
3.71 
(1.44) 
.66 -4.367 .001 .41 
S1: Engagement 7.00 
(1.28) 
7.55 
(1.09) 
.56 -4.264 .001 .46 
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The 9% of the cadets who increased their submissive and trustful behavior moved from M = 
4.34 (SD = 1.53) to M = 6.82 (SD = 1.15). This might indicate that they as a group 
prioritized their internal harmony ahead of achieving their given missions. Their low Task 
oriented behavior might have further contributed to this, indicating the inward focus 
common at the lower levels of maturity. Table 11.13 and Table 11.14 represent the pre-post 
measure of the SPGR 12-vector self-ratings. The most significant developments according to 
these results are that 30% of the cadets became more Caring, 24% became more Empathic, 
23% became more Creative, and 13% reduced their Resignation. When the self-rating is 
compared with their “reputation,” a difference in perception and orientation becomes 
apparent. On Engagement, Task Orientation, and Assertiveness the cadets, according to 
themselves, were not able to perceive how they influenced their team members and how they 
changed their behavior. The same is true for Empathy, Caring, and Creativity, all active 
behaviors. This indicates that they as leaders were not as able as they ought to be to perceive 
how their leadership behavior impacted on their team, a mismatch between the real effect 
and the wanted effect. This indicates a lack of strategic awareness of applied leadership 
behavior, an issue that will be discussed further in chapter 13. 
Table 11.12  
Cohort 2002: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 23-vector - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 77) 
S2: Empathy  1 90 9 14.1** 
N1: Caring 1 81 18 77.9*** 
D2: Acceptance 0 91 9 18.5***1 
N2: Creativity 1 79 20 91.3*** 
O1: Criticism 8 86 6 14.3** 
W1: Resignation 10 87 3 19.7*** 
W2: Self-sacrificing 6 90 4 5.7 
O2: Assertiveness 1 88 11 20.0*** 
C2: Ruling 0 81 19 88.2***1 
D1: Loyalty 10 87 3 19.7*** 
C1: Task orientation 0 87 13 33.5***1 
S1: Engagement 1 82 17 65.6*** 
Note. N=77. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of 
changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and 
increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001. 1) χ2 (1, N = 77).  
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Table 11.13  
Cohort 2002: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(76) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  6.52 
(1.92) 
7.71 
(1.79) 
.43 -4.514 .001 .55 
N1: Caring 6.62 
(1.86) 
8.17 
(1.43) 
.33 -6.040 .001 .80 
D2: Acceptance 6.25 
(2.07) 
6.55 
(2.14) 
.40 -1.139 .258  
N2: Creativity 4.27 
(2.30) 
5.43 
(2.27) 
.42 -4.186 .001 .51 
O1: Criticism 1.78 
(1.29) 
1.60 
(1.23) 
.12 .952 .344  
W1: Resignation 2.16 
(1.34) 
1.55 
(1.14) 
.51 4.330 .001 .49 
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.95 
(1.50) 
1.44 
(.98) 
.29 2.894 .001 .39 
O2: Assertiveness 4.47 
(1.88) 
4.62 
(1.84) 
.42 -.681 .498  
C2: Ruling 4.82 
(1.82) 
4.64 
(1.87) 
.33 .746 .458  
D1: Loyalty 7.42 
(1.81) 
7.00 
(1.99) 
.55 2.008 .258 .22 
C1: Task orientation 4.36 
(2.06) 
4.22 
(2.08) 
.43 .564 .574  
S1: Engagement 7.34 
(1.56) 
8.14 
(1.36) 
.34 -4.171 .001 .55 
  
Table 11.14 
Cohort 2002: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 77) 
S2: Empathy  4 73 24 138.9*** 
N1: Caring 3 67 30 236.8*** 
D2: Acceptance 6 86 8 14.4** 
N2: Creativity 5 72 23 141.0*** 
O1: Criticism 4 96 0 .51 
W1: Resignation 13 86 1 35.0*** 
W2: Self-sacrificing 4 96 0 .51 
O2: Assertiveness 3 96 1 .5 
C2: Ruling 4 93 3 .6 
D1: Loyalty 6 86 8 14.2** 
C1: Task orientation 0 99 1 .51 
S1: Engagement 0 92 8 8.4**1 
Note. N = 77. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of changers 
and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and increase and 95% 
remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.1) χ2 (1, N = 77).  
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11.3.1 The NEO PI-R Results of Cohort 2002 
The paired sample t-test of the NEO PI-R results presented in Table 12.15 indicates that this 
cohort had positive development on Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, and 
Conscientiousness. Cohen’s d indicated a low to moderate change on these domains. The 
RCI performed and the results of the individual level change presented in Table 11.16 give a 
somewhat different and more modest picture of the development that took place. For 
example, 22% of the showed a significant decrease in their overall Neuroticism score, from 
T = 49.41 (SD = 9.20) to T = 40.00 (SD= 8.90), which is a positive development. 24% of the 
cadets became more Open, from T = 45.61 (SD = 7.72) to T = 58.11 (SD = 7.59); 12% 
became more Agreeable, from T = 39.11 (SD = 5.95) to T= 50.00 (SD = 7.01); and 8% 
increased on Conscientiousness, from T = 56.17 (SD = 5.85) to T = 66.83 (SD = 5.42).  
The cohort as a group seemed to be more emotionally stable than the population in general, 
which indicated that they as a group seemed to have the necessary stability to operate in a 
dangerous and stressful environment. The analyses also reveal that they became more 
dominant and forceful—12% of the cadets had significant changes on E3, Assertiveness, 
which was also indicated by an increase in the Z-dimension in the SPGR results. 
Their Conscientiousness score as a group is high (> 55), which is considered to be good 
because this trait seems to be a solid predictor of leadership emergence and effectiveness 
(Judge, et al. 2002; Hogan & Holland, 2003). What might cause a problem for this cohort is 
their relatively lower Openness score, which was below average (< 50). LePine, et al. (2000) 
found that adaptability seems to be a function of Conscientiousness and Openness, 
especially when dealing with situations characterized by sudden changes, novelty, and 
ambiguity. This might indicate that this cohort would have a problem with adaptability, 
because their Openness score (M =48.49, SD = 11.34) was low compared with their 
Conscientiousness score [M = 56.25, SD = 9.18, t(76) = -4.921, p < .001, d = 1.13]. This, 
according to the ES statistics, indicates a large imbalance, which most likely will result in a 
lack of adaptability and a locked orientation resulting in faulty decisions. Le Pine et al., 
(2000) also found that “adaptability was hindered by the tendency to be orderly, 
methodological, and deliberate” (p. 590), which are the C2, Order, C3, Dutifulness, and C6, 
Deliberation, facets, the dependability facets of the Conscientiousness domain.  
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Table 11.15 
Cohort 2002: The NEO PI-R Pre and Post Measures 
 
DOMAINS AND FACETS 
α  
Pre 
measure 
Pre  
measure 
M/SD 
α  
Pre 
measure 
Post 
measure 
M/SD 
 
r 
 
t(76) 
 
Sig. 
 
d 
N: NEUROTICISM .92 45.16 
(8.40) 
.92 
 
41.92 
(7.90) 
.84 6.036 .001 .39 
N1: Anxiety 
 
N2: Angry Hostility 
 
N3: Depression 
 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
 
N5: Impulsiveness 
 
N6: Vulnerability 
.79 
 
.69 
 
.80 
 
.68 
 
.75 
 
.74 
 
44.69 
(8.50) 
46.17 
(7.65) 
43.45 
(7.53) 
46.32 
(7.96) 
47.03 
(10.95) 
48.34 
(7.31) 
.77 
 
.69 
 
.77 
 
.63 
 
.80 
 
.74 
40.81 
(7.40) 
43.65 
(7.25) 
40.86 
(6.87) 
43.64 
(7.31) 
46.91 
(10.94) 
46.25 
(6.92) 
.69 
 
.75 
 
.76 
 
.68 
 
.84 
 
.70 
. 
5.340 
 
4.175 
 
4.551 
 
3.861 
 
.167 
 
3.353 
 
.001 
 
.001 
 
.001 
 
.001 
 
.868 
 
.001 
.48 
 
.34 
 
.36 
 
.35 
 
 
 
.30 
E: EXTRAVERSION .92 53.38 
(8.08) 
.90 55.29 
(7.76) 
.83 -3.644 
 
.001 .24 
E1: Warmth 
 
E2: Gregariousness 
 
E3: Assertiveness 
 
E4: Activity 
 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
 
E6: Positive Emotions 
.77 
 
.78 
 
.84 
 
.40 
 
.60 
 
.81 
49.65 
(8.97) 
52.21 
(8.07) 
54.03 
(9.37) 
52.39 
(6.65) 
55.74 
(7.56) 
53.61 
(9.26) 
.78 
 
.66 
 
.85 
 
.64 
 
.60 
 
.78 
51.22 
(7.36) 
53.22 
(7.38) 
56.94 
(9.20) 
53.42 
(7.67) 
55.14 
(7.31) 
55.52 
(8.41) 
.64 
 
.73 
 
.83 
 
.73 
 
.78 
 
.74 
-1.943 
 
-1.547 
 
-4.673 
 
-1.684 
 
1.053 
 
-2.631 
.056 
 
.126 
 
.001 
 
.096 
 
.296 
 
.010 
 
 
 
 
 
.31 
 
 
 
 
 
.22 
O: OPENNESS .90 45.27 
(10.20) 
.93 48.49 
(9.29) 
.83 .-4.402 .001 
 
.29 
O1: Fantasy 
 
O2: Aesthetics 
 
O3: Feelings 
 
O4: Actions 
 
O5: Ideas 
 
O6: Values 
.80 
 
.85 
 
.85 
 
.63 
 
.84 
 
.58 
43.66 
(9.97) 
45.65 
(11.07) 
46.70 
(11.17) 
50.12 
(9.29) 
47.99 
(11.18) 
48.44 
(8.78) 
.87 
 
.88 
 
.82 
 
.68 
 
.85 
 
.43 
44.32 
(11.10) 
48.19 
(11.04) 
49.35 
(11.38) 
53.34 
(9.39) 
50.52 
(11.31) 
50.23 
(7.49) 
.71 
 
.83 
 
.68 
 
.72 
 
.83 
 
.62 
-.719 
 
-3.496 
 
-2.584 
 
-4.007 
 
-3.417 
 
-.2.200 
 
.474 
 
.001 
 
.012 
 
.001 
 
.001 
 
.031 
 
 
 
.23 
 
.24 
 
.34 
 
.23 
 
.22 
A: AGREEABLENESS .88 49.23 
(9.29) 
.86 50.16 
(8.61) 
.78 -1.356 .179  
A1: Trust 
 
A2: Straightforwardness 
 
A3: Altruism 
 
A4: Compliance 
 
A5: Modesty 
 
A6: Tender-Mindedness 
.85 
 
.64 
 
.66 
 
.64 
 
.67 
 
.46 
52.06 
(9.66) 
50.35 
(9.06) 
51.14 
(9.12) 
45.91 
(9.76) 
48.62 
(8.60) 
47.91 
(7.54) 
.85 
 
.68 
 
.72 
 
.50 
 
.59 
 
.58 
53.81 
(9.51) 
51.13 
(8.13) 
53.26 
(9.62) 
47.30 
(7.89) 
47.38 
(7.66) 
47.49 
(7.89) 
.75 
 
.63 
 
.64 
 
.64 
 
.65 
 
.63 
-.2.268 
 
-.919 
 
-2.323 
 
-1.598 
 
1.603 
 
.548 
.026 
 
.361 
 
.023 
 
.114 
 
.113 
 
.585 
 
.18 
 
 
 
.22 
C: CONSCIENTIOUSNESS .92 53.95 
(9.77) 
.92 56.25 
(9.18) 
.90 
 
-.4.686 .001 .22 
C1: Competence 
 
C2: Order 
 
C3: Dutifulness 
 
C4: Achievement Striving 
 
C5: Self-Discipline 
 
C6: Deliberation 
 
.64 
 
.66 
 
.67 
 
.77 
 
.82 
 
.73 
54.04 
(7.50) 
54.00 
(8.68) 
54.09 
(9.22) 
53.69 
(9.18) 
52.60 
(9.71) 
51.48 
(9.91) 
.63 
 
.68 
 
.66 
 
.81 
 
.80 
 
.64 
. 
58.16 
(8.03) 
53.36 
(8.26) 
54.42 
(8.47) 
56.05 
(9.08) 
55.22 
(8.30) 
52.86 
(9.13) 
.79 
 
.77 
 
.82 
 
.83 
 
.76 
 
.81 
-7.081 
 
.966 
 
-.535 
 
-3.905 
 
-3.597 
 
-2.041 
.001 
 
.337 
 
.595 
 
.001 
 
.001 
 
.045 
.52 
 
 
 
 
 
.26 
 
.28 
 
.14 
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Table 11.16 
Cohort 2002: Individual-Level Change in NEO PI-R Domains and Facets 
 
Domains and facets 
 
 
Decreased (%) 
 
 
Stayed the same (%) 
 
Increased (%) 
 
χ2 (2, N =77) 
 
N: NEUROTICISM 
N1: Anxiety 
N2: Angry Hostility 
N3: Depression 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
N5: Impulsiveness 
N6: Vulnerability 
 
E: EXTRAVERSION 
E1: Warmth 
E2: Gregariousness 
E3: Assertiveness 
E4: Activity 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
E6: Positive Emotions 
 
O: OPENNESS 
O1: Fantasy 
O2: Aesthetics 
O3: Feelings 
O4: Actions 
O5: Ideas 
O6: Values 
 
A: AGREEABLENESS 
A1: Trust 
A2: Straightforwardness 
A3: Altruism 
A4: Compliance 
A5: Modesty 
A6: Tender-Mindness 
 
C: CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
C1: Competence 
C2: Order 
C3: Dutifulness 
C4: Achievement Striving 
C5: Self-Discipline 
C6: Deliberation 
 
22 
13 
5 
8 
4 
0 
7 
 
3 
4 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
 
1 
12 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
4 
3 
 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
77 
87 
94 
92 
96 
99 
92 
 
91 
91 
96 
87 
97 
99 
93 
 
75 
73 
90 
83 
93 
93 
99 
 
86 
88 
92 
91 
97 
96 
94 
 
91 
97 
96 
99 
96 
92 
96 
 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
 
6 
5 
4 
12 
3 
1 
4 
 
24 
15 
10 
16 
6 
6 
1 
 
12 
9 
7 
9 
3 
0 
3 
 
8 
3 
1 
1 
4 
8 
4 
 
121.2*** 
33.5***1 
2.7 
8.4**1 
.51 
.51 
5.4 
 
5.1 
3.0 
.51 
30.0*** 
01 
.51 
.61 
 
137.8*** 
82.8*** 
18.9***1 
54.3*** 
5.4 
5.4 
.51 
 
26.7*** 
13.7*** 
5.4 
13.1***1 
01 
.51 
.0 
 
9.2** 
01 
.5 
.51 
. 51 
8.4**1 
.51 
Note. N =77. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of 
changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and 
increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001. 1) χ2 (1, N = 77).  
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All facets of the Openness domain had influences that were either significant or approaching 
significance, where O3, Feelings, O4, Actions, and O5, Ideas were the most important. A 
16% significant increase on the O3 Feeling facet from T = 39.33 (SD = 9.39) to T = 56.20 
(SD = 11.38) was a positive development. However, because 75% of the cadets’ T-scores 
were below 50, this might represent a potential challenge for these officers in 3rd and 4th GW 
environments, especially in light of the findings of LePine et al. (2000). 
11.3.2 Cohort 2002: Team Analyses 
Because leadership development is based on the development of each team, an in-depth 
analysis of each team and the social interaction within each team was performed by 
conducting a paired sample t-test for each team’s Humres results, which are presented in 
Table 11.17.  
Table 11.17  
Cohort 2002: SPGR Humres Results on the Team Level 
  SYNERGY CONTROL NURTURE OPPOSITION DEPENDENCE WITHDRAWAL ENERGY 
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Team N M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD 
02AS 8 
(64) 
6.86 
(1.72) 
7.05 
(1.91) 
3.73 
(2.03) 
3.76 
(2.08) 
4.99 
(1.52) 
5.63* 
(1.83) 
1.23 
(1.89) 
.79* 
(1.50) 
6.66 
(1.62) 
5.96 
(2.22) 
1.23 
(1.89) 
.79** 
(1.50) 
5.63 
(3.28) 
6.26* 
(3.09) 
02MN 
 
7 
(49) 
6.59 
(1.59) 
7.17* 
(1.67) 
3.19 
(1.71) 
3.91* 
(1.95) 
4.48 
(1.93) 
5.12* 
(2.02) 
1.24 
(1.03) 
1.86** 
(1.16) 
6.02 
(2.48) 
5.58 
(2.53) 
.39 
(.75) 
.80 
(.80) 
.6.20 
(2.07) 
6.82 
(1.69) 
02KK 
 
8 
(64) 
6.65 
(1.59) 
7.16* 
(1.60) 
3.27 
(1.88) 
3.94** 
(1.89) 
4.47 
(1.54) 
5.31*** 
(1.37) 
1.48 
(1.36) 
.82** 
(1.13) 
6.19 
(1.71) 
6.17 
(1.94) 
1.48 
(1.36) 
.81*** 
(1.13) 
5.17 
(2.36) 
6.35*** 
(2.13) 
02BN 
 
8 
(64) 
6.37 
(2.10) 
7.28** 
(1.91) 
3.38 
(1.78) 
3.82 
(1.71) 
5.26 
(1.79) 
5.96* 
(2.05) 
1.23 
(1.67) 
.81 
(1.92) 
5.15 
(2.75) 
4.57 
(2.81) 
1.23 
(1.67) 
.81 
(1.92) 
5.13 
(3.16) 
6.47** 
(3.57) 
02LT 
 
(8) 
64 
7.28 
(1.44) 
8.44*** 
(.80) 
2.25 
(1.27) 
3.38*** 
(1.59) 
4.98 
(1.50) 
6.88*** 
(1.24) 
1.69 
(.90) 
1.74 
(.84) 
7.05 
(1.42) 
7.45 
(1.58) 
.56 
(.80) 
.56 
(.78) 
6.72 
(1.66) 
7.87*** 
(1.06) 
02BV 
 
8 
(64) 
6.22 
(1.71) 
7.38*** 
(1.64) 
3.31 
(1.91) 
3.68 
(1.89) 
3.78 
(1.62) 
5.56*** 
(1.97) 
1.37 
(1.01) 
1.44 
(.72) 
5.22 
(1.85) 
5.94** 
(1.84) 
.98 
(1.01) 
.35** 
(.72) 
5.23 
(2.22) 
7.03*** 
(1.90) 
02XY 7 
(49) 
7.00 
(1.85) 
7.28 
(1.44) 
3.22 
(2.04) 
3.91* 
(2.26) 
4.96 
(2.01) 
5.67* 
(1.93) 
1.98 
(2.04) 
1.89 
(1.61) 
6.73 
(1.55) 
6.84 
(1.76) 
.92 
(1.21) 
1.15 
(1.18) 
6.08 
(2.45) 
6.13 
(2.13) 
02UA 
 
(8) 
64 
7.02 
(1.60) 
7.28 
(1.60) 
3.11 
(2.19) 
4.17*** 
(1.81) 
5.08 
(1.79) 
6.19*** 
(1.54) 
1.37 
(1.57) 
1.48 
(1.49) 
6.93 
(1.74) 
6.93 
(1.88) 
1.37 
(1.57) 
1.48 
(1.49) 
5.64 
(2.59) 
5.80 
(2.51) 
02LA 7 
(49) 
5.79 
(1.70) 
7.10*** 
(1.13) 
3.01 
(2.17) 
3.33 
(1.73) 
4.00 
(1.64) 
5.42*** 
(1.70) 
1.17 
(1.85) 
.55 
(.86) 
6.18 
(1.90) 
6.06 
(1.95) 
1.17 
(1.85) 
.55* 
(.86) 
4.62 
(2.97) 
6.55*** 
(1.52) 
02LK 
 
8 
(64) 
6.27 
(2.18) 
7.07** 
(1.67) 
3.04 
(1.62) 
3.02 
(1.93) 
4.73 
(1.83) 
5.80** 
(2.22) 
1.83 
(1.28) 
1.83 
(1.55) 
6.21 
(1.72) 
6.93** 
(1.89) 
1.16 
(1.42) 
.69* 
(1.32) 
5.12 
(3.14) 
6.38*** 
(2.76) 
Note:  A paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the leadership development 
program on the cadets’ SPGR Humres scores. Significant changes are indicated with: *p < .05, **p < 
.01, and ***p < .001. N gives the number of ratings within each team. A team consists of 8 team 
members who rate themselves and each of the others, producing 64 ratings.  
These results indicate that eight out of the ten teams had a significantly positive 
development, and only two teams, 02XY and 02UA, showed no development. A closer look 
at the pre-Energy scores for Teams 02XY and 02UA indicates overall high scores, M = 6.08, 
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and M = 5.64; only Team 02LT had a higher score. However, the post score reveals that 
Team 02UA scored lowest with M=5.80 and Team 02XY the second lowest with M = 6.13 
indicating that these two teams had no significant development. The in-depth analyses of the 
SPGR 12-vector results indicated that Team 02XY had a significant development on Ruling 
behavior, from (M = 3.78, SD = 2.14) to [M = 4.84, SD = 2.48, r = .48, t(48) = -3.116, p < 
.003, d = .62]. This implies a stronger focus on controlling, autocratic behavior where the 
main focus is on attention to rules and procedures.Because the Ruling behavior (M = 3.65, 
SD = 2.29) was stronger than Task-orientation [M = 4.84, SD = 2.48, t(48) = -4.239, p < 
.001, d = 1.22], this hampered efficient, rational, and analytical behavior and instead resulted 
in controlling and pedantic behavior. The team’s different field diagrams throughout the year 
showed that one cadet, Cadet G, had an overly influential and dominant position within the 
team, as can be seen from Figure 11.10. 
 
Figure 11.10  Team 02XY Post Field Diagram 
 
An independent t-test revealed that the dominant cadet scored significantly higher on Ruling 
(M = 7.71, SD = 2.55) compared with the team-members [M = 4.36, SD = 2.27, t(47) = 
2.979, p < .001, d = .86] and on Criticism ( M= 4.71, SD = .49) compared with the team [M 
= 1.36, SD = .91, t(47) = 9.520, p < .001, d= 2.78]. Cadet G also scored lower on Empathy 
(M = 6.14, SD = 1.95) compared with the team [M = 7.64, SD = 1.81, t(47)= -2.014, p < 
.050, d = .59]. An examination of Cadet G’s personality, measured with the NEO PI-R, 
indicated that this cadet was focused on “getting ahead,” with a T-score on Agreeableness of 
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42, which indicates a tendency to be egocentric, skeptical of others’ intentions and to be 
competitive rather than cooperative (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The team’s average score was 
T = 53 (SD = 7.4), and the difference between Cadet G and the team members was large, d = 
1.25. 
This situation was made worse because of Cadet G’s high N2, Angry Hostility, T = 62, while 
the average for the team was 39.67 (SD = 5.32, d = 2.79). The low Agreeableness score 
suggests that Cadet G tended to express anger towards the other team members, behavior 
made more likely because of that cadet’s high N6, Impulsiveness, T = 66, the team average 
was 48.17 (SD = 8.47, d = 1.92), and by the cadet’s low C6, Deliberation, T = 35, the team 
average was 55.67 (SD = 13.55, d = 1.74), and high E3, Assertiveness, T = 66, while the 
team average was 53 (SD = 8.83, d = 1.38). This paints a picture of a dominant, forceful 
cadet who was not able to control cravings and urges, who was hasty, and who often spoke 
or acted without considering the consequences. 
Cadet G created a climate that became focused on critical, opposing, controlling, and 
autocratic behavior and one not able to show empathy and interest in others. This is not a 
climate that is supportive of leadership development. The team’s field diagram further 
showed that one cadet, Cadet A, had a negative influence score on the Z-dimension of -2. 
This indicates a submissive leadership behavior with no initiative. This cadet showed this 
behavior throughout the year: -4, -1, -2, -2 and -2, indicating a lack of development. Cadet 
A’s personality indicated a person who is closed, the Openness domain T score was 38, 
suggesting a conventional and conservative outlook with little curiosity about either the 
inner or outer worlds (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Compared with the team, the difference, d = 
.78, is close to large (M = 48.67, SD = 16.55). This cadet also scored low on 
Conscientiousness, T = 42, indicating a lack of the purposeful, strong-willed, and determined 
behavior that is necessary to develop as a leader. Here the difference was large, d = 1.60 
(M= 60, SD = 12.35), indicating a need for (a) special incentives to learning and 
development, (b) help in organizing own work, (c) reminders to keep on schedule, and (d) 
problems maintaining attention (Costa & McCrae, 1998). These are certainly not qualities 
desired in an officer in the 21st century. It proved impossible to create a positive climate for 
leadership development in this team, most likely because of the dominant cadet’s behavior. 
This resulted in a team operating at a low maturity level, showing a lack of adjustment and 
role-taking ability, and thus producing no leadership development.  
 179
Figure 11.11 shows the 12-vector profile of the dominant cadet, Cadet G, from both self 
rating and peers’ ratings. This illustrates a behavior that is concerned with “getting ahead,” 
and, as the analysis showed, this cadet lacked the resources needed to contribute to a climate 
that could have made interaction and development possible. 
 
 
                          Self-rating                                                          Peer-rating  
Figure 11.11  Cadet G in Team 02XY SPGR 12-Vector Profiles 
 
Figure 11.12 shows the similar 12-vector profile for the submissive cadet, Cadet A. These 
two profiles, self rating and peer rating, were nearly identical. Here the situation is the 
opposite of the dominant cadet’s. This is a cadet who will not take any initiative—the Z-
dimension was -2—and who lacked the ability to take on and perform those roles that are 
concerned with the control function, Ruling and Task oriented behavior, which this cadet 
sorely needed. As can be seen from Figure 11.11, however, this role was occupied by the 
dominant cadet. 
   
                           Self-rating                                                          Peer-rating  
Figure 11.12  Cadet A in Team 02XY SPGR 12-Vector Profiles 
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From a leadership development perspective, it is worth noting that this pattern was 
established early in the leadership program. This is can be seen by studying Figure 11.13 
that shows the team’s field diagram half way into the leadership development program. 
Unfortunately, these issues were not resolved, and as a result, this team did not mature, and 
no real leadership development took place. 
 
Figure 11.13  Team 02XY SPGR Field Diagram Half Way Through the 
Leadership Development Program 
 
Team 02UA, which also had no developement, showed a similar pattern, although it may not 
be that obvious. Here, two cadets had a dominating and influential role within in the team, 
Cadets C and D.  
 
Figure 11.14  Team 02UA SPGR Field Diagram - Post Measure 
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The scatter (white circles) indicates a polarization tendency among team members, resulting 
in negative energy within in the team (the circles close to opposition). An independent t-
sample test revealed that these two cadets were significantly more concerned with Task-
oriented behavior (M = 6.31, SD = 1.58) compared with their team [M = 3.88, SD = 1.95, 
t(62) = 4.517, p < .001, d = 1.14] and Ruling behavior (M = 6.25, SD = 2.21) compared with 
their team [M = 4.33, SD = 1.64, t(62) = 3.700, p < .001, d = .94]. They were less concerned 
with Caretaking (M = 6.75, SD = 1.73) compared with their team [M = 8.06, SD = 6.76, t(62) 
= -2.868, p < .006, d = .73] and Empathy (M = 6.50, SD = 2.00) compared with their team 
[M = 8.00, SD = 1.54, t(62)= -3.120, p < .001, d = .79]. At the same time, these two cadets 
were significantly more assertive, than the remaining team members; (M = 6.00, SD = 2.19) 
compared with their team [M =4.44, SD = 2.15, t(62)= 2.504, p < .015, d = .64]. Figure 
11.13 shows the self and peer ratings for Cadets C and D in the 12-vector space.  
    
                      Cadet C’s self-rating                                            Cadet C’s peer-rating 
              
    
                  Cadet D’s self-rating                                            Cadet D’s peer-rating  
Figure 11.15  The SPGR 12-Vector Ratings of the Two Dominant Cadets in 
Team 02UA 
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The profiles of Cadet C also suggest that this cadet lacked the ability to perceive and 
understand the impact on those the cadet led. The profile of Cadet D indicates that this cadet 
was aware of this, but did not understand the negative impact of such leadership behavior.  
The NEO PI-R data confirmed the SPGR pattern. These results of the two dominant cadets 
on the Agreeableness domain, T = 42, (SD = 4.24), were low compared to the general 
population, d = 1.46, while the average T-score of the remaining team-members was 49.00 
(SD = 5.27, d = .88). They also scored higher on N2, Angry Hostility, T = 53 (SD = 2.83) 
compared with the team which scored 46.50 (SD = 7.89, d = 1.10), while the cohort scored 
as low as 43.65 (SD = 7.2, d = 1.71). These results suggest that these dominant cadets most 
likely would express their anger towards the other team members, resulting in a negative 
influence on the team climate and its social interaction pattern and role-taking ability. This 
was amplified by their lower scores on C6, Deliberation, T = 45.50 (SD = 4.95) compared 
with the team, which scored T = 54.67 (SD = 6.15, d = 1.65) and their relatively higher score 
on E3, Assertiveness, T= 62 (SD = 8.49) against the team score, which was T = 55.33 (SD = 
6.41, d = .89). This team was dominated by two cadets who were forceful and expressed 
their opinions, even actions, without considering the consequences. At its best, they might be 
able to make snap decisions. Their low scores, however, on Openness, M = 38 (SD = 4.24) 
and high scores on Conscientiousness, M = 56.50 (SD = 9.12), indicate that they will not be 
able to make good decisions in situations, such as warfighting in the 21st century, 
characterized by ambiguity, novelty and unexpected changes in tasks (LePine, et al., 2000). 
They are diligent, methodical, and organized, and they abide by all the rules. But because 
they lack imagination, have a strong need for structure and closure, and prefer step-by-step 
instructions, they will have difficulties in situations that have no right answers (Costa & 
McCrae, 1998). 
The profiles presented in Figure 11.15 also indicate that these two cadets represent a 
challenge for a leadership development program, especially Cadet C, who showed a large 
difference between self understanding and the peer ratings. This pattern was already 
established half way through the leadership development program when there was still time 
to deal with it.  
Several of the others teams that did show significantly positive development also had cadets 
who tended to influence and dominate their team. Within Team 02LK, Cadets A and E had 
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strong influences on the team throughout the year. As the field diagram in Figure 12.16 
shows, it was Cadet E who had the strongest influence on the team showing a score of 6 on 
the Z-dimension. However, both of these cadets’ scores on Synergy were moderately lower 
than the rest of team’s (M=6.68, SD=1.72) compared with (M=7.20, SD=1.65, d = .31). A 
more thorough analyses revealed that these dominant cadets showed more Ruling behavior 
(M = 5.56, SD = 2.98) compared with their team members [M = 2.98, SD = 1.36, t(62)= 
4.442, p < .001, d = 1.13] and they scored lower on Empathy (M = 6.06, SD = 2.18) 
compared with their team members [M = 7.79, SD = 1.87, t(62)= -3.078, p < .003, d = .78]. 
 
Figure 11.16  Team 02LK’s SPGR Field Diagram - Post Measure 
 
The NEO PI-R results were once again consistent with SPGR pattern: The dominant cadets’ 
scores on Agreeableness were low, T = 40.50 (SD = 7.78), the team’s T score was 54.17 (SD 
= 7.17), which was a large difference, d = 1.83. Their personalities also showed a higher N2, 
Angry Hostility, T = 53.50 (SD = 12.02) compared with the team (M = 39.67, SD = 7.23, d = 
1.53). On Conscientiousness, which contains the previously mentioned facet C6, 
Deliberation, the pattern is slightly different. Here, the dominant cadets scored low, d = 1.18, 
T = 41.50 (SD = 4.95) while the team scored 53.67 (SD = 13.66). This is once again a 
negative result because conscientiousness is related to leader effectiveness (Hogan & 
Holland, 2003; Judge, et al., 2002). The major difference between the dominant cadets and 
the remaining team-members, which most likely contributed to the team’s overall positive 
development, was that these two cadets were not as dominant and forceful as the previously 
mentioned dominant cadets in Teams 02XY and 02UA. On E3, Assertiveness, they scored M 
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= 59 (SD = 4.23), while the team scored M = 55 (SD = 10.07). This difference was moderate, 
d = .58, but these cadets did tend to be more dominant and forceful than the general 
population.  
This indicates that it was the ability of the remaining team members to create a positive 
social climate that contributed to this team’s development. Although this team did show a 
positive development, there are some reasons for concern because four cadets; C, F, G, and 
H, scored negative on the Z-dimension. This indicates submissive behavior that lacks 
initiative, and also suggests that they were not eager to try out new leadership behaviors and 
expand their role repertoire. The team’s variance on the Z-dimension, M = 14.98, SD = 3.87, 
with a minimum of -8 to a maximum of 13 (a range of 21), indicates this. This large 
variation was most likely a result of the polarization caused by the two dominant cadets, and 
the negative fluctuation this causes hampers leadership development within the team, 
suggesting that variation on the Z-dimension might provide a significant indicator of 
effective leadership development.  
Team 02BN also had a large variance on the Z-dimension, M = 27.80, SD = 5.27, with a 
minimum of -11 to a maximum of 10 (a range of 21). However, the field diagram in Figure 
11.17 shows that this variation was driven by one team-member, Cadet F.  
 
Figure 11.17  Team 02BN SPGR Field Diagram - Post Measure  
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The team did not have the one or two dominant cadets who hampered the team’s 
performance and the leadership development process, but rather Team 02BN offers a case 
where one cadet clearly lacked the ability to take on and perform leadership roles. The 
scatter diagram, however, shows that although Cadet F did cause negative fluctuations, this 
cadet did not have the influence to hamper the development of leadership within the team. 
When Cadet F was deleted from the analysis, the variance on the Z-dimension was 
dramatically altered, M = 12.88, SD = 3.59, with a minimum of -1 to a maximum of 12 (a 
range of 13). A look at this cadet’s 12-vector profile in Figure 11.18 might indicate why this 
is so. 
    
                            Self-rating                                                           Peer-rating  
Figure 11.18  Cadet F in Team 02BN 12-Vector Profiles 
 
Once again the data reveal that this pattern was established early in the leadership 
development program. This is illustrated by Cadet F’s score on the Z-dimension throughout 
the leadership development program; -2, -6, -5, -6, -2 and finally as shown -6. Also worth 
noting here was this cadet’s low score on NEO PI-R Openness domain, T = 42, while the 
team scored T = 55.43 (SD = 10.57). This difference was large, d = 1.31, and it is also lower 
than the population in general. A low score on Openness indicates lack of ability to adapt to 
change (George & Zhou, 2001). This might be a reason why this Cadet had no development 
during the year. 
The last team that will be discussed is Team 02AS, see Figure 11.17. This team had two 
cadets who showed submissive behavior; Cadets C and G. The team also had one member, 
Cadet E, who exhibited dominant behavior throughout the year. The data revealed that this 
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cadet showed the same behavioral pattern as previously discussed: A significant stronger 
focus on Ruling behavior (M = 7.00, SD = 1.41) compared with the team [M = 4.20, SD = 
1.88, t(62) = 4.450, p < .001, d = 1.13], and a lower focus on Empathy (M = 6.50, SD = 1.85) 
against [M = 7.91, SD = 1.46, t(62)= -2.479, p < .016, d = .63]. Cadet E also scored 
significantly higher on Assertiveness (M = 5.75, SD = 1.67) compared with the team-
members [M = 3.66, SD = 1.65, t(62)= 3.338, p < .001, d = .85], which reinforced a negative 
climate for development that hampers leadership development. This is indicated by the lack 
of development of Synergy, see Table 11.17. Although the team showed an increase in 
Energy (M = 5.63, SD = 3.28) compared to [M = 6.26, SD = 1.52, r = .73 t(63)= -2.172, p < 
.034, d = .20], the effect of that increase was low. 
 
Figure 11.19  Team 02AS’s SPGR Field Diagram - Post Measure 
 
The dominant cadet’s score on E3, Assertiveness, T = 70, was also high compared with the 
team members (M = 59.14, SD = 11.71, d = 1.00). The variance on the Z-dimension within 
the team was also large, M = 21.82, SD = 4.67, with a minimum of -11 to a maximum of 11 
(a range of 22).  
These results, particularly for Teams 02XY, 02UA, and 02AS, clearly indicate that one 
dominant cadet can hamper a team’s leadership development. 
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11.3.3 Summary: Cohort 2002  
These results and the analyses of the teams illustrate that leadership development is a 
complex process. The overall results for Cohort 2002 might appear favorable, especially 
because 22% of the cadets became significantly more emotionally stable (N), 24% became 
more open (O), and 12% became more agreeable (A). This clearly indicates that a leadership 
development program might have a positive effect on the participants’ personalities 
measured with the NEO PI-R. Further analyses of the teams, however, revealed some 
interesting patterns, particularly that the teams did not seem able to reach a maturity level 
higher than Team Spirit. As can be seen from Table 11.18, the predominant function for all 
ten teams was Nurture. Figure 11.20 illustrates the average balance of the four SPGR 
functions, showing that the other predominant function was Dependence. The Synergy score 
is high and the Withdrawal low, see Table 11.10, indicating the maturity level of Team 
Spirit.  
Table 11.18  
Cohort 2002:The Teams’ Balance Between the SPGR Functions, Control and 
Nurture 
Teams Control Nurture     
 M/SD M/SD t df Sig. d 
Team 02XY 3.91 
(2.26) 
5.67 
(1.93) 
-4.016 48 .001 1.15 
Team 02LK 3.02 
(1.93) 
5.80 
(2.22) 
-.7.185 63 .001 1.81 
Team 02MN 3.91 
(1.95) 
5.12 
(2.02) 
-3.160 48 .003 .91 
Team 02KK 3.94 
(1.89) 
5.31 
(1.37) 
-4.266 63 .001 1.07 
Team 02LT 3.38 
(1.59) 
6.88 
(1.24) 
-12.580 63 .001 3.17 
Team 02UA 4.17 
(1.81) 
6.19 
(1.54) 
-5.819 63 .001 1.47 
Team 02BV 3.68 
(1.89) 
5.56 
(1.97) 
-5.790 63 .001 1.46 
Team 02AS 3.76 
(2.08) 
5.63 
(1.83) 
-6.421 63 .001 1.62 
Team 02LA 3.33 
(1.73) 
5.42 
(1.70) 
-.6.438 63 .001 1.62 
Team 02BN 3.82 
(1.71) 
5.96 
(2.05) 
-7.090 63 .001 1.79 
  
The skewed balance between Control and Nurture indicates that these teams will perform 
well in situations and contexts that are well structured, with concrete goals that can be 
broken down to standard operating procedures with well defined roles. Authoritative 
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leadership is not required at this maturity level, although teams at this maturity easily tend to 
such leadership styles (Sjøvold, 2006). This might explain why it seems to be so easy for one 
or two dominant cadets to influence and control the team. Teams at this level are not open to 
change and tend to ignore or minimize impulses from the outside. 
 
Figure 11.20  Cohort 2002: Basic SPGR Functions - Post Measure 
 
Teams at the maturity level Team Spirit definitely do not incorporate cultures that appreciate 
the mismatches that reveal a locked orientation and therefore a predictable OODA loop. This 
is clearly not a maturity level that is suited for 4th GW because it lacks Boyd’s essentials 
asymmetries of insight, orientation, agility, and initiative. To reach higher maturity levels, 
the Control function must come into play, which requires that the stable role structure must 
be broken and a culture instilled where leadership is delegated. Further development also 
requires that the team’s established power structures be challenged, which seems to be a task 
that none of these teams was able to perform. According to Table 11.18, Team 02LT was 
especially inhibited by the Nurture function. The field diagram of the team and the 12-vector 
profile of the team’s average scores illustrate this maturity level. Another important aspect is 
Team 02LT’s high score on Acceptance behavior compared to Loyalty. Both are part of the 
Dependence function, and this result indicates that the team has higher loyalty towards each 
other than to accomplishing the given tasks. As can be seen from the figure, this score is 
much higher than the RNoNA developmental goal. This does not indicate a strong “we” 
culture that allows criticism nor one that values pointing out mismatches. 
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Figure 11.21  Team 02LT’s SPGR Field Diagram and Average 12-Vector 
Profile 
 
At this maturity level, attempts to delegate or lead according to the philosophy of 
Auftragstaktik would be considered a “weak” approach to leadership because there is no 
authoritative leader who will tell them how to solve the task to achieve the intent. This 
maturity level represents a strong culture that is difficult to change (Sjøvold, 2006, 2007). 
From a development perspective, the established role pattern within Team 02LT should have 
been challenged early in the program. This would have increased the focus on Task-oriented 
behavior to reach a higher maturity level by challenging them to try out new leadership roles 
so that they could have expanded their role set. This might have been possible because of 
their high level on the Nurture function. At the same time, the team should also have 
concentrated more on a critical approach towards their own functioning. This team lacked 
fluctuations—there was almost no variation or diversity, making development difficult. 
There was no ability to rapidly change between the basic functions because their orientation 
was “locked” and inhibited by the Nurture and Dependence functions, which led to a high 
level of Synergy within a stable and predictable environment. 
The different SPGR field diagrams reveal that this pattern was established early in the 
leadership development program. This is illustrated by team 02LT’s field diagram and 12- 
vector diagram after exercise Magellan in December. The team’s locked orientation and 
their strong “we” culture managed to dampen out every further leadership development 
attempt from the RNoNA. As Table 11.17 showed, this was representative not just for this 
team but for the entire cohort. This is clearly illustrated by the cohort’s balance between the 
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Control function (M = 3.82, SD = 1.48) and the Nurture function [M = 5.49, SD = 1.04, 
t(78)= -7.437, p < .001, d = 1.68] measured after exercise Magellan. The fact that this 
relationship became more unbalanced throughout the year indicates that most of the external 
perturbations represented with the RNoNA leadership development program after exercise 
Magellan were dampened out. 
 
  
Figure 11.22  Team 02LT SPGR Field Diagram and Average 12-Vector 
Leadership Behavior after Exercise Magellan 
 
This is because of the low degree of fluctuations or variety within in the teams, which 
resulted in little development throughout the last part of the leadership development 
program. This indicates mechanistic OODA loops with a low ability to reorient because the 
cadets as a group lacked the variation and agility that would enable them to continue the 
whirl of reorientation, mismatches, analyses, and synthesis necessary to develop as leaders. 
Although the initial results indicated positive development, their level of maturity suggested 
that they were inward-looking and that they, as officers, will not perform well in a 3rd GW or 
4th GW environment.  
11.4 Cohort 2003 
Cohort 2003 was the second cohort that used the training bark Statsraad Lehmkuhl as a 
major part of their leadership development program. Unlike Cohort 2002, however, they did 
not cross the Atlantic and thereby gain the experience of a long voyage without seeing 
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anything more than blue waters and each other. Instead they sailed in the Mediterranean, 
which allowed more visits into different ports.  
11.4.1 The SPGR Results 
The cohort’s SPGR Humres results are presented in Table 11.19.  
Table 11.19  
Cohort 2003: Pre and Post Measures SPGR Humres - Others Rating 
SPGR functions Pre measure Post Measure    . 
 M/SD M/SD r t(65) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.91 
(1.02) 
6.95 
(1.12) 
.43 -.253 .801  
Control 3.47 
(1.50) 
3.80 
(1.55) 
.79 -2.743 .008 .10 
Nurture 5.05 
(1.00) 
5.40 
(.95) 
.58 -3.130 .003 .13 
Opposition 1.56 
(.76) 
1.97 
(.94) 
.34 -3.351 .001 .14 
Dependence 6.84 
(.96) 
6.77 
(.96) 
.63 .658 .513  
Withdrawal 1.20 
(.85) 
1.20 
(1.33) 
.48 .032 .974  
Energy 5.71 
(1.61) 
5.75 
(2.25) 
.41 -.152 .880  
  
These results indicate a minor increase in the Control and Nurture functions, together with a 
similar minor increase in the Opposition function. This did not, however, lead to an increase 
in the cohort’s overall maturity level: There was no increase in synergetic behavior or 
decrease in Withdrawal behavior. This is confirmed by the absence of any increase in their 
overall Energy available for doing work. These results show that the cadets’ ability as a 
group to play the interaction and isolation game did not increase as the result of RNoNA 
leadership development program. Figure 11.23 illustrates this lack of development; it also 
shows the cohort’s average leadership behavior illustrated with the SPGR 12-vector profile. 
Table 11.20 gives an overview of the development on each vector. These results support the 
overall findings and also show that the main development was an increase in Task-Oriented 
and Assertive behaviors and in behavior related to Criticism.  
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Figure 11.23  The Developement of Cohort 2003 in the SPGR Field 
Diagram and the Cohort’s Average Leadership Behavior - Others Rating 
 
Table 11.20  
Cohort 2003: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(65) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  7.22 
(1.05) 
7.55 
(.85) 
.51 -2.797 007 .34 
N1: Caring 6.77 
(1.54) 
6.80 
(1.02) 
.42 -.162 .872  
D2: Acceptance 6.40 
(1.09) 
6.78 
(1.07) 
.68 -1.347 .183  
N2: Creativity 4.39 
(1.45) 
4.60 
(1.45) 
.70 -1.555 .125  
O1: Criticism 1.69 
(.77) 
2.07 
(1.08) 
.13 -2.442 .017 .40 
W1: Resignation 1.96 
(1.23) 
1.85 
(.74) 
.12 .209 .835  
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.85 
(.74) 
1.98 
(1.23) 
.43 -.911 .366  
O2: Assertiveness 3.55 
(1.33) 
4.07 
(1.23) 
.57 -3.611 .001 .41 
C2: Ruling 4.24 
(1.39) 
3.88 
(1.55) 
.64 2.275 .026 .24 
D1: Loyalty 7.54 
(1.01) 
7.49 
(.90) 
.47 .451 .654  
C1: Task orientation 3.37 
(1.81) 
4.56 
(1.48) 
.71 -7.529 .001 .71 
S1: Engagement 7.34 
(1.07) 
7.16 
(1.44) 
.32 .952 .345  
  
The individual level change analysis presented in Table 11.20 confirms the development 
found on Criticism and Task orientation. However, it also indicates that there was no 
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significant increase on Assertiveness, indicating that none of the cadets became significantly 
more assertive as a result of the leadership development program. The RCI results show an 
11% significant decrease on Engagement, which is clearly a regression and not in 
accordance with the intentions of the leadership development program at the RNoNA. 
Table 11.21  
Cohort 2003: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 66) 
S2: Empathy  2 94 4 1.4 
N1: Caring 3 89 8 7.1* 
D2: Acceptance 0 97 3 .061 
N2: Creativity 2 95 3 .3 
O1: Criticism 3 80 17 54.6*** 
W1: Resignation 3 92 5 1.2 
W2: Self-sacrificing 2 92 8 7.2* 
O2: Assertiveness 0 100 0  
C2: Ruling 8 89 3 7.1* 
D1: Loyalty 3 92 5 1.2 
C1: Task orientation 0 88 12 24.1***1 
S1: Engagement 11 86 3 17.9*** 
Note. N=66. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of 
changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and 
increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.1) χ2 (1, N = 66).  
The cadets’ own self-perception is presented in Table 11.22. These results indicate a 
discrepancy concerning the developmental effects of the leadership development program 
compared to the results in Table 11.20. Specifically, they converge on Task Orientation. 
Otherwise these results, according to the cadets themselves, indicate that they did not change 
their behavior. A better understanding is gained by studying their perceived individual-level 
changes, presented in Table 11.23. Here we can see that there was a significant change on 
Empathy, an 8% decrease and a 15% increase; 18% of the cadets perceived that they became 
significantly more assertive; and 12% reported a decrease in Self-sacrificing behavior. These 
results indicate a lack of willingness to try out and perform the new roles needed to drive 
development. If these results are compared with their reputations, we find the same pattern 
for Criticism and Ruling. There is also a coherent perception on the reduction of 
Engagement within the cohort. This decrease, however, is not so perceived by the other team 
members, indicating a lack of self-awareness.  
Table 11.22 
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Cohort 2003: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(65) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  7.14 
(1.86) 
7.71 
(1.55) 
-.05 -1.895 .063  
N1: Caring 6.77 
(1.94) 
7.39 
(1.64) 
.37 -2.488 .015 .09 
D2: Acceptance 6.82 
(1.92) 
6.86 
(1.95) 
.35 -.167 .868  
N2: Creativity 4.61 
(2.29) 
4.95 
(2.30) 
.49 -1.222 .226  
O1: Criticism 1.58 
(1.16) 
1.82 
(1.45) 
-.07 -1.029 .307  
W1: Resignation 2.11 
(1.64) 
1.68 
(1.34) 
.08 1.697 .094  
W2: Self-sacrificing 2.17 
(1.63) 
1.58 
(1.16) 
.38 2.986 .004 .12 
O2: Assertiveness 3.85 
(1.85) 
4.23 
(1.90) 
.24 -1.331 .188  
C2: Ruling 4.39 
(1.83) 
3.85 
(1.69) 
.30 2.119 .038 .06 
D1: Loyalty 7.65 
(1.63) 
7.52 
(1.83) 
.38 .572 .569  
C1: Task orientation 3.85 
(2.12) 
4.80 
(2.15) 
.44 -3.417 .001 .15 
S1: Engagement 8.00 
(1.52) 
7.76 
(1.63) 
.03 .896 .063  
  
Table 11.23 
Cohort 2003: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 66) 
S2: Empathy  8 77 15 51.2*** 
N1: Caring 3 91 6 3.5 
D2: Acceptance 6 88 6 7.0 
N2: Creativity 0 98 2 .31 
O1: Criticism 9 73 18 79.3*** 
W1: Resignation 6 89 5  4.7 
W2: Self-sacrificing 12 88 0 24.1***1 
O2: Assertiveness 2 95 3 .3 
C2: Ruling 11 89 0 17.1***1 
D1: Loyalty 6 86 8 10.7* 
C1: Task orientation 2 94 4 1.4 
S1: Engagement 12 82 6 29.0*** 
Note: N=66. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of 
changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and 
increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.1) χ2 (1, N = 66).  
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11.4.2 The NEO PI-R Results of Cohort 2003 
The personality results, measured by the NEO PI-R in Table 11.24, indicate that this cohort 
is emotionally stable, scoring roughly at the population average on the remaining domains, 
although they tended to be a bit low on both Openness and Agreeableness. They experienced 
both positive and development on the Neuroticism domain and on the facets N1, Anxiety, 
N3, Depression, and N4, Self-Consciousness. They also showed a significant decrease in the 
E5, Excitement Seeking, facet of the Extraversion domain. The η2 statistics also indicate that 
the effects on the domain and facets were moderate. The results on Neuroticism are 
confirmed by the RCI results in Table 11.25, indicating that 30% of the cadets became 
significantly more emotionally stable. There were also some interesting changes on the 
remaining domains, where the largest increase was a significant 17% on Conscientiousness, 
although 7% decreased.  
The cohort’s overall score on the domains Openness and Agreeableness are of some concern 
because they are important to effective leadership. The Openness domain represents a 
significant element in the ability to adapt, cope, and make appropriate decisions in an 
environment characterized by ambiguity, novelty and rapid change (LePine, et al., 2000), 
which is what we will meet in future conflict. The cohort’s relatively low score on 
Agreeableness might indicate that they lacked the ability to establish a climate that fosters 
trust and cooperation and so would enable them to apply Auftragstaktik.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.24  
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Cohort 2003: The NEO PI-R Pre and Post Measures 
 
DOMAINS AND FACETS 
α  
Pre 
measure 
Pre  
measure 
M/SD 
α  
Post 
measure 
Post 
measure 
M/SD 
 
r 
 
t(68) 
 
Sig 
 
d 
N: NEUROTICISM .91 48.19 
(7.58) 
.92 46.23 
(8.17) 
.75 2.880 .005 .25 
N1: Anxiety 
 
N2: Angry Hostility 
 
N3: Depression 
 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
 
N5: Impulsiveness 
 
N6: Vulnerability 
.87 
 
.63 
 
.75 
 
.65 
 
.69 
 
.81 
47.14 
(10.07) 
47.35 
(6.14) 
45.97 
(6.36) 
45.97 
(6.37) 
48.83 
(9.46) 
50.42 
(7.27) 
.85 
 
.73 
 
.77 
 
.73 
 
.67 
 
.80 
44.70 
(9.12) 
46.41 
(7.42) 
43.97 
(7.12) 
47.91 
(8.36) 
48.07 
(8.32) 
49.68 
(7.13) 
.72 
 
.38 
 
.58 
 
.77 
 
.54 
 
.67 
. 
2.800 
 
1.013 
 
2.687 
 
2.218 
 
.748 
 
1.054 
 
.007 
 
.315 
 
.009 
 
.030 
 
.457 
 
.296 
.25 
 
 
 
.30 
 
.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E: EXTRAVERSION .91 52.55 
(7.91) 
.89 51.93 
(7.13) 
.62 .783 
 
.436  
E1: Warmth 
 
E2: Gregariousness 
 
E3: Assertiveness 
 
E4: Activity 
 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
 
E6: Positive Emotions 
.67 
 
.75 
 
.85 
 
.55 
 
.50 
 
.72 
49.00 
(7.56) 
50.72 
(9.07) 
52.00 
(9.90) 
52.54 
(7.02) 
56.20 
(6.52) 
53.87 
(7.02) 
.65 
 
.76 
 
.77 
 
.49 
 
.59 
 
.74 
48.93 
(7.57) 
50.38 
(8.76) 
52.75 
(7.86) 
51.36 
(6.61) 
54.30 
(7.32) 
54.30 
(7.32) 
.58 
 
.76 
 
.81 
 
.63 
 
.49 
 
.51 
.086 
 
.464 
 
-1.077 
 
1.665 
 
2.244 
 
-.084 
 
.931 
 
.644 
 
.285 
 
.100 
 
.028 
 
.933 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.27 
O: OPENNESS .89 47.88 
(9.26) 
.91 47.42 
(9.33) 
.82 .683 .497 
 
 
O1: Fantasy 
 
O2: Aesthetics 
 
O3: Feelings 
 
O4: Actions 
 
O5: Ideas 
 
O6: Values 
.77 
 
.83 
 
.73 
 
.53 
 
.87 
 
.52 
46.55 
(9.61) 
46.55 
(9.77) 
49.43 
(9.31) 
52.72 
(8.34) 
50.33 
(11.68) 
47.57 
(8.16) 
.80 
 
.85 
 
.74 
 
.57 
 
.88 
 
.58 
46.38 
(8.49) 
45.75 
(9.70) 
48.20 
(8.99) 
52.65 
(7.80) 
50.57 
(11.41) 
47.81) 
(7.96) 
.67 
 
.83 
 
.68 
 
.72 
 
.80 
 
.56 
.194 
 
1.179 
 
1.407 
 
.100 
 
-.264 
 
-.271 
 
.847 
 
.243 
 
.164 
 
.921 
 
.792 
 
.787 
 
 
A: AGREEABLENESS .80 47.52 
(7.41) 
.83 47.39 
(7.88) 
.69 .181 .857  
A1: Trust 
 
A2: Straightforwardness 
 
A3: Altruism 
 
A4: Compliance 
 
A5: Modesty 
 
A6: Tender-Mindedness 
.62 
 
.63 
 
.65 
 
.52 
 
.68 
 
.54 
49.72 
(6.37) 
48.96 
(8.00) 
50.30 
(8.73) 
46.58 
(7.94) 
48.87 
(8.07) 
46.00 
(7.62) 
.76 
 
.65 
 
.65 
 
.45 
 
.63 
 
.52 
49.80 
(8.18) 
48.78 
(7.80) 
48.78 
(8.68) 
47.86 
(6.98) 
48.87 
(7.71) 
45.36 
(7.52) 
.50 
 
.70 
 
.41 
 
.48 
 
.69 
 
.68 
-..080 
 
.158 
 
1.337 
 
-1.378 
 
.001 
 
.872 
.936 
 
.875 
 
.186 
 
.173 
 
1.000 
 
.386 
 
 
C: CONCIENTIOUSNESS .91 51.29 
(8.89) 
.91 52.06 
(8.93) 
.73 
 
-.965 .338  
C1: Competence 
 
C2: Order 
 
C3: Dutifulness 
 
C4: Achievement Striving 
 
C5: Self-Discipline 
 
C6: Deliberation 
 
.77 
 
.58 
 
.58 
 
.77 
 
.79 
 
.64 
51.45 
(8.74) 
50.90 
(7.92) 
52.00 
(8.06) 
52.78 
(8.93) 
50.41 
(8.81) 
50.14 
(8.16) 
.75 
 
.69 
 
.67 
 
.79 
 
.81 
 
.57 
52.75 
(8.44) 
51.78 
(8.34) 
51.54 
(8.97) 
52.65 
(8.73) 
51.52 
(8.87) 
50.84 
(7.45) 
.68 
 
.65 
 
.63 
 
.68 
 
.60 
 
.43 
-1.574 
 
-1.075 
 
.525 
 
.154 
 
-1.175 
 
-.691 
.120 
 
.286 
 
.602 
 
.878 
 
.244 
 
.492 
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Table 11.25  
Cohort 2003: Individual-Level Change in NEO PI-R Domains and Facets 
 
Domains and facets 
 
 
Decreased (%) 
 
 
Stayed the same (%) 
 
Increased (%) 
 
χ2 (2, N = 69) 
 
N: NEUROTICISM 
N1: Anxiety 
N2: Angry Hostility 
N3: Depression 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
N5: Impulsiveness 
N6: Vulnerability 
 
E: EXTRAVERSION 
E1: Warmth 
E2: Gregariousness 
E3: Assertiveness 
E4: Activity 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
E6: Positive Emotions 
 
O: OPENNESS 
O1: Fantasy 
O2: Aesthetics 
O3: Feelings 
O4: Actions 
O5: Ideas 
O6: Values 
 
A: AGREEABLENESS 
A1: Trust 
A2: Straightforwardness 
A3: Altruism 
A4: Compliance 
A5: Modesty 
A6: Tender-Mindness 
 
C: CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
C1: Competence 
C2: Order 
C3: Dutifulness 
C4: Achievement Striving 
C5: Self-Discipline 
C6: Deliberation 
 
 
30 
6 
9 
14 
7 
6 
6 
 
13 
6 
4 
1 
3 
9 
13 
 
7 
6 
7 
4 
0 
7 
6 
 
7 
13 
1 
4 
0 
0 
0 
 
7 
3 
3 
4 
3 
7 
3 
 
61 
90 
83 
80 
88 
93 
90 
 
81 
91 
96 
99 
96 
91 
80 
 
81 
93 
93 
94 
99 
88 
91 
 
83 
75 
96 
93 
96 
100 
100 
 
75 
93 
94 
90 
91 
80 
93 
 
9 
4 
9 
6 
4 
1 
4 
 
6 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
7 
 
12 
1 
0 
1 
1 
4 
6 
 
10 
12 
3 
3 
4 
0 
0 
 
17 
4 
3 
6 
6 
13 
4 
 
234.4*** 
4.1* 
22.2*** 
44.4*** 
7.5* 
3.3 
4.1 
 
35.1*** 
3.1 
.91 
.31 
.4 
10.4***1 
38.6*** 
 
30.4*** 
3.3 
6.1*1 
1.3 
.31 
7.5* 
3.1 
 
32.5*** 
56.3*** 
.4 
1.0 
.91 
 
 
 
70.2*** 
1.0 
.1 
4.1 
3.1 
38.6*** 
1.0 
Note. N = 69. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., 
change greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed 
distribution of changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each 
decreases and increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.1) χ2 (1, 
N = 69).  
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11.4.3 Cohort 2003: Team Analysis 
The Humres pre-post measures are reported in Table 11.2, indicating that none of the teams 
had a significant increase in their Synergy scores. 
Table 11.26 
Cohort 2003: SPGR Humres Results on the Team Level 
  SYNERGY CONTROL NURTURE OPPOSITION DEPENDENCE WITHDRAWAL ENERGY 
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Team N M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD 
03OP 7 
(49) 
6.77 
(1.91) 
7.05 
(1.31) 
3.79 
(2.33) 
4.82 
(1.73) 
4.32 
(1.97) 
4.82 
(1.73) 
1.89 
(1.50) 
1.72 
(1.10) 
7.23 
(1.85) 
7.21 
(1.64) 
1.61 
(1.57) 
1.36 
(1.54) 
5.17 
(2.85) 
6.36** 
(1.66) 
03VG 
 
6 
(36) 
7.22 
(1.46) 
7.56 
(1.56) 
3.16 
(1.90) 
6.10 
(1.09) 
5.85 
(1.68) 
6.10 
(1.09) 
1.35 
(1.23) 
2.41** 
(1.70) 
6.97 
(1.31) 
7.25 
(1.48) 
1.44 
(1.41) 
1.41 
(1.53) 
5.78 
(2.05) 
6.78** 
(2.02) 
03ER 
 
5 
(25) 
6.62 
(1.64) 
7.20 
(1.52) 
3.56 
(2.44) 
5.63* 
(1.08) 
4.50 
(1.45) 
5.63** 
(1.08) 
.99 
(1.05) 
1.53 
(1.52) 
7.02 
(1.46) 
6.80 
(1.47) 
1.04 
(1.38) 
1.35 
(1.49) 
5.58 
(2.58) 
6.89* 
(1.79) 
03UY 
 
7 
(49) 
6.88 
(1.77) 
7.37 
(1.69) 
3.77 
(1.69) 
5.58 
(1.19) 
4.64 
(1.31) 
5.58*** 
(1.19) 
1.61 
(1.27) 
1.84 
(.94) 
6.75 
(1.58) 
7.42** 
(1.64) 
1.20 
(1.57) 
.23*** 
(.61) 
5.69 
(2.82) 
6.96 
(2.08) 
03NB 
 
5 
(25) 
7.47 
(1.45) 
7.74 
(1.43) 
4.95 
(1.95) 
6,71 
(1,64) 
5.85 
(2.00) 
6,71* 
(1,64) 
1.67 
(1.30) 
2,30 
(1,36) 
7.56 
(1.54) 
7,65 
(1,41) 
1.08 
(1.28) 
1.26 
(1.75) 
6.38 
(2.38) 
6.57 
(2.84) 
03KJ 
 
7 
(49) 
7.83 
(1.32) 
6.60*** 
(1.67) 
3.77 
(1.70) 
5.21 
(2.07) 
4.99 
(1.81) 
5.21 
(2.07) 
1.45 
(.97) 
2.05* 
(1.77) 
7.21 
(1.23) 
7.33 
(1.69) 
.81 
(1.00) 
1.52** 
(1.65) 
7.03 
(1.76) 
5.69*** 
(2.41) 
03SX 
 
8 
(64) 
7.12 
(1.64) 
6.52* 
(1.91) 
3.27 
(2.97) 
5.51 
(2.09) 
5.40 
(1.45) 
5.51 
(2.09) 
1.55 
(1.48) 
1.64 
(1.62) 
7.02 
(1.65) 
6.28* 
(1.60) 
.97 
(1.23) 
1.11 
(2.16) 
6.15 
(2.47) 
5.41 
(3.00) 
03FO 
 
7 
(49) 
6.52 
(1.30) 
6.80 
(1.69) 
2.83 
(1.51) 
5.15 
(1.60) 
5.15 
(1.62) 
5.15 
(1.60) 
1.56 
(1.14) 
1.40 
(1.04) 
7.14 
(2.05) 
6.96 
(1.97) 
1.40 
(1.18) 
.78* 
(1.20) 
5.12 
(1.67) 
6.54*** 
(1.93) 
03AA 
 
7 
(49) 
6.80 
(1.99) 
6.43 
(2.05) 
4.07 
(1.72) 
5.51** 
(1.36) 
5.67 
(1.59) 
5.51 
(1.36) 
1.82 
(1.39) 
3.26*** 
(1.63) 
6.75 
(1.54) 
6.45 
(1.82) 
.94 
(1.24) 
1.93*** 
(2.19) 
5.83 
(2.84) 
5.36 
(2.65) 
03UF 
 
7 
(49) 
6.84 
(1.52) 
7.06 
(1.52) 
2.85 
(1.49) 
4.78 
(1.73) 
5.08 
(1.20) 
4.78 
(1.73) 
1.43 
(1.23) 
1.34 
(.68) 
5.88 
(1.88) 
5.21* 
(2.62) 
1.22 
(1.76) 
.55** 
(1.03) 
5.63 
(2.79) 
6.33 
(2.01) 
Note:  A paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the leadership development 
program on the cadets’ SPGR Humres scores. Significant changes are indicated with: *p < .05, **p < 
.01, and ***p < .001. N gives the number of ratings within each team. A team consists of 8 team 
members who rate themselves and each of the others, producing 64 ratings.  
Two teams, Team 03KJ and 03SX, had a negative development, while the eight remaining 
teams had no development at all on Synergy. However, Team 03UY and 03UF had a 
significant reduction in Withdrawal, but that did not increase the teams’ overall Energy 
available for doing work. Four teams—03ER, 03VG, 03OP, and 03FO—showed a 
significant increase in their overall Energy score, which could suggest a small positive 
development. However, this conclusion requires an analysis of the third SPGR dimension, 
Influence versus Passivity, because this dimension is a central contributor to Synergy and 
Withdrawal, hence to the Energy available within the team to do work. As previously 
discussed, one dominant cadet can be enough to inhibit a team’s performance and a large 
variance on the Influence–versus-Passivity dimension will make leadership development 
harder, especially if the dominant cadet scored significantly higher on Energy than the 
remaining cadets on the team.  
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All four of the teams that showed positive development on Energy had one dominant cadet. 
With the exception of Team 03VG, the dominate cadet’s score on Energy was higher than 
the remaining team members’, which indicates that the development results from the 
dominant cadet’s score. This is illustrated by looking at the field diagram of Team 03ER, 
Figure 11.24. The dominant cadet is Cadet A, whose high influence, 4 on the Z-dimension, 
made this cadet the leader of the team. 
 
  
Figure 11.24  Team 03ER Field Diagram and 12-Vector Profile of the 
Dominant Cadet - Peer Rating  
 
Cadet A’s reputation and role flexibility is illustrated by the peer ratings on the SPGR 12-
vector profile. This profile indicates a rigid and authoritative leadership behavior. This cadet 
also scored high on the NEO PI-R facet E3, Assertiveness, T = 68, while the team’s average 
score was 53.60 (SD = 7.98), a difference, d = 1.58, which was large. This cadet’s high 
influence within the team, the Z-dimension, was a major contributor to the lack of 
development by forcing the other cadets into fixed role patterns.  
This pattern of social interaction is well illustrated by Team 03KJ. This team had negative 
development throughout the year, and the field diagrams in Figure 12.25 illustrate their 
negative social interaction patterns. From the premeasure until after the winter exercise, this 
team’s dominant functions were Nurture and Dependence indicating the maturity level of 
Team Spirit. As previously discussed, this maturity level is characterized by a fixed role 
pattern, often with an authoritative leader, together with a “we against them” attitude. 
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      Pre-measure         Mid Magellan     After Magellan 
           
               After Winter ex.         After Telemakos 
  
Figure 11.25  Team 03KJ’ s SPGR Field Diagram Throughout the 
Leadership Development Program 
 
However, already at the mid-Magellan measurement, the polarizations that occurred after 
exercise Telemakos could be observed, where Cadet E tended to dominate the team. This is 
confirmed by a high E3, Assertiveness, score, T = 70, compared with the team’s M = 50.80 
(SD = 4.15) and a d = 2.51, indicating that this difference was large. Cadet E’s low score on 
the Openness domain, T = 43, and high Conscientiousness, T=61, indicated that this cadet 
lacked the ability to adjust. The difference on Openness was moderate, d = .65, while on 
Conscientiousness, it was large, d = 1.34. Once again we see the pattern: a team with leaders 
who are methodical and organized but lack imagination and prefer step-by-step instructions, 
and thereby inhibit every leadership development attempt. 
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The Magellan exercise did not represent a major challenge for the teams because this finding 
is consistent for all teams. The result was a fewer fluctuations among the cadets. This 
indicates that the teams did not develop their maturity levels, resulting in a lack of leadership 
development. The final result of this is seen after exercise Telemakos, where the team was 
fragmented, with Cadet E as the dominant actor. Since the team was not able to break the 
fixed role pattern, they were not able to dampen out the effect of the Academy’s upcoming 
challenges, resulting in increased entropy. The final result, as illustrated with Team 03KJ, is 
that it became dysfunctional because of the lack of social capital. The paired sample t-test 
for Team 03KJ illustrates this lack of development, see Table 11.27.  
Table 11.27  
Team 03KJ: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(48) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  7.22 
(1.05) 
7.55 
(.85) 
.41 -1.547 .128  
N1: Caring 7.65 
(1.32) 
6.98 
(2.24) 
.40 2.250 .029 .35 
D2: Acceptance 6.80 
(1.74) 
7.39 
(1.84) 
.42 -2.140 .037 .33 
N2: Creativity 4.69 
(2.56) 
4.43 
(2.25) 
.09 .570 .571  
O1: Criticism 1.53 
(1.23) 
2.55 
(1.97) 
.33 -3.679 .001 .61 
W1: Resignation 1.65 
(1.32) 
2.22 
(1.83) 
.08 -1.843 .071  
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.67 
(1.16) 
2.27 
(1.63) 
.08 -2.152 .036 .41 
O2: Assertiveness 4.00 
(1.97) 
3.71 
(2.18) 
.27 .800 .428  
C2: Ruling 4.49 
(2.06) 
4.18 
(2.23) 
.61 1.131 .264  
D1: Loyalty 7.94 
(1.48) 
7.90 
(1,66) 
.35 .159 .875  
C1: Task orientation 3.67 
(2.03) 
4.69 
(2.35) 
.45 -3.087 .003 .46 
S1: Engagement 8.18 
(1.47) 
6.59 
(1.99) 
.33 5.434 .001 .90 
  
There is large and significant decrease in Engagement, and the ES statistics indicate a large 
decrease. They also had an increase in self-sacrificing behavior while at the same time the 
protective, sociable behavior was reduced. 
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There was also a large increase in Opposition behavior represented with Criticism, 
indicating a more self-centered, provocative and unruly behavior. It might seem paradoxical 
that there was also a significant increase in Task-oriented behavior, indicating that the team 
is becoming more efficient, analytical, and rational. An independent t-sample analyses 
within the team, however, indicates that the dominant cadet contributes to the task oriented 
behavior (M = 8.14, SD = 1.46) against [M = 4.12, SD = 1.94, t(47) = 6.396, p < .001, d = 
1.87]. A paired sample t-test was conducted among the remaining cadets on Engagement. 
This analysis showed that, because of the dominant cadet, there was a significant reduction 
in engagement and involvement within the team (M = 8.05, SD = 1.55) to [M =6.86, SD = 
1.84, r = .29, t(41) = 5.534, p < .001, d = .98] while they also experienced an increase in W1, 
Resignation behavior (M = 1.69, SD = 1.35) to [M = 2.43, SD = 1.90, r = .06, t(41)= 2.113, p 
< .041, d = .45], which illustrates the importance of social interaction within the team and its 
implications for leadership development. Although this increase was moderate, it illustrates 
that the team and its members were not able to cope with the external entropy that the 
“Telemakos” exercise represented. It is also worth noting that the reduction in Caring is 
mostly a result of a change in the dominant cadet’s reputation: (M = 8.57, SD = .54) to [M = 
6.29, SD = 2.14, r = -.75, t(6)= 2.359, p < .023 one tailed, d = 1.67], which also illustrates 
the importance of the social interaction within the team and its implications for leadership 
development. The dominant cadet’s 12-vector profile, self and peer rating are shown in 
Figure 11.26. 
 
 
                            Self-rating                                                     Peer-rating  
Figure 11.26  The Dominant Cadet’s SPGR 12-Vector Profile 
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11.4.4 Summary: Cohort 2003 
The Magellan exercise for Cohort 2003 differed from the one the RNoNA conducted for 
Cohort 2002. It had more visits to harbors in the Mediterranean area, while Cohort 2002 had 
a much longer voyage from Las Palmas—The Caribbean—Washington and back to Bergen 
across the Atlantic Ocean via Brest in France. The consequence of this was that the 
challenges represented by the exercise for Cohort 2003 was much smaller than the previous 
exercise. The cadets were given many more possibilities to go “backstage” (Goffman, 1959) 
and fix their make up before they once again entered the stage due to shorter intervals at sea. 
This was not possible for Cohort 2002, and the social interaction problems that were created 
as a result of that exercise had to be solved onboard the vessel within the teams. Cohort 2003 
was also often within the working range of their mobile phones, which meant that 
considerable entropy was dissipated in a nonconstructive manner and “solved” outside the 
teams, resulting in fewer fluctuations and less development, see the Humres result of the 
cohort, Table 11.19. 
11.5 Cohort 2004 
Cohort 2004 was the largest of the cohorts in this research, consisting of twelve teams. 
Based on feedback from Cohort 2003, the “Magellan” exercise was changed back to a longer 
period at sea, and the destination was Natal in Brazil. The SPGR Humres pre-post measures 
for the cohort are presented in Table 11.28. These results indicate a very limited change—
there was no increase in synergetic behaviors such as Engagement and Empathy. Figure 
11.27 illustrated the cohort’s average development, as measured by the team members’ 
ratings in the field diagram together with the average leadership behavior illustrated with the 
SPGR 12-vector. As seen both from Table 11.28 and Figure 11.27, development was 
minimal. The Nurture function was dominant, together with Dependence, and the imbalance 
between Control (M = 3.68, SD = 1.62) and Nurture [M = 5.08, SD = 1.17, t(85)= -6.264, p 
< .001, d = 1.36] was very large. This indicates a maturity level of Team Spirit. The most 
positive development was a significant but moderately positive reduction in Withdrawal, 
which led to less self-pitying and complaining, see Table 11.29. 
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Table 11.28  
Cohort 2004: SPGR Humres Pre and Post Measures - Others Rating 
SPGR Functions Pre measure Post Measure  
 M/SD M/SD r t(85) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.87 
(1.18) 
6.90 
(1.06) 
.56 -.093 .926  
Control 3.41 
(1.32) 
3.68 
(1.62) 
.73 -2.307 .023 .06 
Nurture 5.03 
(1.12) 
5.08 
(1.67) 
.61 -.366 .716  
Opposition 1.90 
(.88) 
1.86 
(1.02) 
.59 .434 .665  
Dependence 6.83 
(1.04) 
6.54 
(.99) 
.45 2.508 .014 .07 
Withdrawal 1.20 
(.94) 
.87 
(1.09) 
.65 3.524 .001 .13 
Energy 5.69 
(1.88) 
6.02 
(1.91) 
.63 -1.858 .067  
  
The 12-vector analysis revealed two other significant changes: There was a small reduction 
in unconventional, spontaneous, and amusing behavior (Creativity), and there was a 
moderate increase in sociable and protective behavior (Care taking).  
 
  
Figure 11.27  The Developement of Cohort 2004 in the SPGR Field 
Diagram and the Cohort’s Average Leadership Behavior - Others Rating 
 
The Individual-Level Change results, however, do not support this conclusion, see Table 
11.30. According to these results there was no significant development on Creativity and 
Caring, and the percentages of increasers and decreases were almost the same. Both analyses 
reveal only small and moderate changes. 
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Table 11.29 
Cohort 2004: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(85) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  7.22 
(1.02) 
7.22 
(1.05) 
.57 -.027 .978  
N1: Caring 6.16 
(1.43) 
6.52 
(1.14) 
.58 -2.741 .007 .27 
D2: Acceptance 6.52 
(1.16) 
6.51 
(1.04) 
.44 .081 .935  
N2: Creativity 4.59 
(1.65) 
4.30 
(1.66) 
.71 2.144 .035 .18 
O1: Criticism 1.85 
(.93) 
1.93 
(1.11) 
.54 -.788 .315  
W1: Resignation 1.70 
(1.70) 
1.66 
(1.65) 
.65 .552 .583  
W2: Self-sacrificing 2.14 
(1.02) 
1.73 
(.99) 
.71 4.909 .001 .40 
O2: Assertiveness 3.92 
(1.31) 
3.99 
(1.35) 
.56 -.496 .621  
C2: Ruling 3.41 
(1.49) 
3.64 
(1.62) 
.64 -1.605 .112  
D1: Loyalty 7.66 
(.91) 
7.31 
(.91) 
.29 2.938 .004 .38 
C1: Task orientation 4.08 
(1.23) 
5.56 
(1.71) 
.67 -3.523 .001 .31 
S1: Engagement 7.33 
(1.28) 
7.21 
(1.30) 
.62 1.005 .318  
  
It is also worth noting that the moderate increase in the Control function was a result of more 
efficient, analytical, rational behavior, Task Orientation, which was positive because it 
contributed to a lesser degree of imbalance between the Control and Nurture functions. The 
Individual-Level Change analysis confirms this, indicating a significant development of 23% 
on Task-Oriented behavior.  
A comparison of Tables 11.29 and 11.31 shows that there were both agreements and 
disagreements on how the cadets perceived themselves compared with how others perceived 
them. There was agreement on the Self-sacrificing and Task-Oriented behaviors. Although 
each team member perceived that teammates became more Caring, they did not perceive it in 
themselves, and the picture is the opposite for Engagement. The most striking differences 
between self and peer ratings are found by comparing Tables 11.30 and 11.31. While the 
team members reported a 23% increase in Task Orientation, the cadets’ self-ratings reported 
a significant 11% decrease. 
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Table 11.30  
Cohort 2004: Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Others Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 86) 
S2: Empathy  5 89 6 5.6 
N1: Caring 5 89 6 5.6 
D2: Acceptance 8 85 7 18.8*** 
N2: Creativity 8 86 6  15.4*** 
O1: Criticism 6 87 7 11.2** 
W1: Resignation 0 100 0  
W2: Self-sacrificing 5 95 0 1.51 
O2: Assertiveness 5 88 7 8.9* 
C2: Ruling 3 85 12 29.9*** 
D1: Loyalty 12 85 12 29.9*** 
C1: Task orientation 5 72 23 154.5*** 
S1: Engagement 5 93 2 1.6 
Note. N = 86. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of changers 
and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and increase and 95% 
remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001. 1) χ2 (1, N = 86).  
 
Once again we see that the RCI provides additional information that is not covered by the 
traditional t-analyses, especially the significant increase on Acceptance and Creativity. This 
also shows that these cadets lacked the ability to perceive how their own behavior affected 
their team members, suggesting a lack of strategic awareness. This lack of strategic 
awareness represents a challenge for the leadership development program at the RNoNA 
because it is a large contributor to the lack of development.  
The cohort’s maturity level was Team Spirit, indicating that the cadets’ ability as a group to 
play the interaction and isolation game did not increase as a result of the RNoNA leadership 
development program, as was illustrated in Figure 11.27. This result and finding is 
consistent with and in accordance with the previous findings. 
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Table 11.31  
Cohort 2004: SPGR 12-Vector Pre and Post Measures - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Pre Measure Post Measure     
 M/SD M/SD r t(85) Sig. d 
S2: Empathy  7.59 
(1.78) 
7.60 
(1.92) 
.36 -.051 .959  
N1: Caring 6.80 
(1.95) 
6.79 
(1.70) 
.45 .056 .956  
D2: Acceptance 7.37 
(1.73) 
6.55 
(1.88) 
.15 3.248 .002 .46 
N2: Creativity 4.91 
(2.10) 
4.86 
(2.35) 
.54 .201 .841  
O1: Criticism 1,92 
(1.66) 
1.81 
(1.36) 
.20 .505 .615  
W1: Resignation 1.98 
(1.31) 
1,42 
(.87) 
.19 3.626 .001 .50 
W2: Self-sacrificing 2.05 
(1.44) 
1.45 
(.98) 
.32 3.771 .001 .47 
O2: Assertiveness 4.33 
(1.90) 
4.53 
(1.99) 
.38 -.892 .375  
C2: Ruling 3.72 
(2.25) 
3.93 
(2.01) 
.37 -.810 .420  
D1: Loyalty 7.42 
(1.72) 
7.58 
(1.75) 
.26 -.714 .477  
C1: Task orientation 4.41 
(1.97) 
5.17 
(2.07) 
.42 -3.259 .002 .38 
S1: Engagement 7.52 
(1.66) 
7.95 
(1.51) 
.22 -2.009 .048 .27 
  
Table 11.32  
Individual-Level Change for the SPGR 12-Vector - Self Rating 
SPGR Vectors Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 86) 
S2: Empathy  3 91 6 4.3 
N1: Caring 2 93 5 1.6 
D2: Acceptance 7 80 14 54.1*** 
N2: Creativity 0 86 14 44.7***1 
O1: Criticism 2 89 9 16.3*** 
W1: Resignation 0 94 6  3.61 
W2: Self-sacrificing 0 93 7 6.7*1 
O2: Assertiveness 4 95 1 1.0 
C2: Ruling 0 99 1 .71 
D1: Loyalty 7 86 7 14.5*** 
C1: Task orientation 11 87 2 22.4*** 
S1: Engagement 0 91 9 15.6***1 
Note. N=86. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of 
changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and 
increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001. 1) χ2 (1, N = 86).  
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11.5.1 The NEO PI-R Results of Cohort 2004 
The NEO PI-R results are reported in Table 11.33. The Cohort’s personality score was 
consistent with the population in general. During the year, the cadets became more 
emotionally stable, which was a positive development, and the Individual-Level Change 
results presented in Table 11.34 indicate that 13% of the cadets became significantly more 
emotionally stable. The significant reduction on N1, Anxiety (11%), and N6, Vulnerability 
(9%), were the major contributors to this development. The paired sample t-test showed a 
moderate to large decrease in their overall Agreeableness score, resulting in 9% who 
decreased and 5% who increased. This was, however, a negative development because the 
Agreeableness domain is important in cooperation. Especially worth noting was the 
significant 17% decrease on A1, Trust, and the 8% decrease on A2, Straightforwardness. 
These were negative developments because Auftragstaktik requires a high degree of trust 
that is created through cooperation. How this played out within the teams will be discussed 
in section 11.5.2. Overall, this result is consistent with SPGR findings indicating a partly 
dysfunctional development because of a decrease in Agreeableness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.33  
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Cohort 2004: The NEO PI-R Pre and Post Measures 
 
DOMAINS AND FACETS 
α  
Pre  
measure 
Pre  
measure 
M/SD 
α  
Post 
 measure 
Post 
 measure 
M/SD 
 
r 
 
t(84) 
 
Sig 
 
d 
 
N: NEUROTICISM 
 
.91 
 
49.76 
(8.39) 
 
.90 
 
48.53 
(7.61) 
 
.78 
 
2.151 
 
.034 
 
.15 
N1: Anxiety 
 
N2: Angry Hostility 
 
N3: Depression 
 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
 
N5: Impulsiveness 
 
N6: Vulnerability 
.73 
 
.72 
 
.79 
 
.62 
 
.68 
 
.80 
49.64 
(8.24) 
47.78 
(8.13) 
48.00 
(7.44) 
49.67 
(8.18) 
50.75 
(10.17) 
50.42 
(8.12) 
.75 
 
.68 
 
.72 
 
.68 
 
.71 
 
.77 
 
46.64 
(7.87) 
49.49 
(7.71) 
46.45 
(6.46) 
49.49 
(8.39) 
50.00 
(9.97) 
50.41 
(7.14) 
.68 
 
.67 
 
.78 
 
.67 
 
.62 
 
.57 
. 
4.281 
 
-.688 
 
2.985 
 
.240 
 
.788 
 
.015 
 
.001 
 
.506 
 
.004 
 
.811 
 
.433 
 
.988 
.37 
 
 
 
.21 
E: EXTRAVERSION .86 52.34 
(7.56) 
.86 53.20 
(7.71) 
.78 -1.572 
 
.120  
E1: Warmth 
 
E2: Gregariousness 
 
E3: Assertiveness 
 
E4: Activity 
 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
 
E6: Positive Emotions 
.71 
 
.52 
 
.76 
 
.61 
 
.56 
 
.76 
49.58 
(8.43) 
51.46 
(7.98) 
52.89 
(8.58) 
51.28 
(7.90) 
55.01 
(7.88) 
53.21 
(8.07) 
.77 
 
.69 
 
.78 
 
.63 
 
.23 
 
.81 
50.25 
(8.36) 
50.82 
(8.43) 
53.98 
(8.04) 
51.47 
(5.89) 
55.01 
(8.74) 
54.29 
(8.64) 
.66 
 
.63 
 
.74 
 
.64 
 
.75 
 
.72 
-.898 
 
.828 
 
-1.634 
 
-.256 
 
-1.992 
 
-1.565 
 
.372 
 
.410 
 
.106 
 
.799 
 
.050 
 
.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.15 
O: OPENNESS .85 47.69 
(8.81) 
.86 48.65 
(2.29) 
.82 -1.700 .093 
 
 
O1: Fantasy 
 
O2: Aesthetics 
 
O3: Feelings 
 
O4: Actions 
 
O5: Ideas 
 
O6: Values 
.75 
 
.83 
 
.74 
 
.59 
 
.78 
 
.45 
48.09 
(9.14) 
46.55 
(11.17) 
48.51 
(10.74) 
51.09 
(8.90) 
48.65 
(10.71) 
49.36 
(8.02) 
.75 
 
.84 
 
.78 
 
.40 
 
.85 
 
.45 
48.82 
(8.64) 
47.01 
(10.32) 
49.85 
(10.30) 
50.99 
(7.35) 
50.06 
(10.91) 
49.88 
(8.28) 
.68 
 
.83 
 
.66 
 
.64 
 
.83 
 
.47 
-.948 
 
-.677 
 
-1.432 
 
.139 
 
-2.087 
 
-.571 
 
.346 
 
.500 
 
.156 
 
.890 
 
.040 
 
.570 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.13 
A: AGREEABLENESS .88 50.08 
(8.94) 
.84 47.51 
(8.40) 
.69 3.463 .001 .30 
A1: Trust 
 
A2: Straightforwardness 
 
A3: Altruism 
 
A4: Compliance 
 
A5: Modesty 
 
A6: Tender-Mindness 
.78 
 
.65 
 
.77 
 
.53 
 
.52 
 
.70 
51.99 
(8.17) 
49.00 
(8.71) 
52.07 
(10.13) 
48.48 
(8.67) 
49.34 
(7.22) 
49.09 
(9.19) 
.79 
 
.71 
 
.70 
 
.38 
 
.66 
 
.49 
50.49 
(8.82) 
46.60 
(9.83) 
50.21 
(9.67) 
47.73 
(7.34) 
47.51 
(7.93) 
47.72 
(7.00) 
.47 
 
.63 
 
.58 
 
.64 
 
.67 
 
.60 
1.578 
 
2.758 
 
1.893 
 
1.005 
 
2.734 
 
1.684 
.118 
 
.007 
 
.062 
 
.318 
 
.008 
 
.632 
 
 
 
.26 
 
 
 
 
 
.24 
C: CONCIENTTIOUSNESS  
.91 
 
49.86 
(9.03) 
 
.91 
 
50.16 
(9.22) 
 
.79 
 
 
-.478 
 
.634 
 
C1: Competence 
 
C2: Order 
 
C3: Dutifulness 
 
C4: Achievement Striving 
 
C5: Self-Discipline 
 
C6: Deliberation 
 
.65 
 
.65 
 
.71 
 
.68 
 
.70 
 
.73 
52.56 
(8.74) 
50.07 
(7.92) 
51.62 
(8.06) 
49.84 
(8.93) 
49.96 
(8.81) 
48.34 
(8.16) 
.73 
 
.67 
 
.68 
 
.79 
 
.73 
 
.63 
52.94 
(8.94) 
50.76 
(8.99) 
51.44 
(9.39) 
50.58 
(9.60) 
49.96 
(8.39) 
47.62 
(8.76) 
.63 
 
.74 
 
.67 
 
.72 
 
.67 
 
.67 
-.481 
 
-.971 
 
.238 
 
-.999 
 
.001 
 
.872 
.632 
 
.334 
 
.812 
 
.320 
 
1.000 
 
.385 
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Table 11.34  
Cohort 2004: Individual-Level Change in NEO PI-R Domains and Facets 
 
Domains and facets 
 
 
Decreased (%) 
 
 
Stayed the same (%) 
 
Increased (%) 
 
χ2 (2, N = 85) 
 
N: NEUROTICISM 
N1: Anxiety 
N2: Angry Hostility 
N3: Depression 
N4: Self-Consciousness 
N5: Impulsiveness 
N6: Vulnerability 
 
E: EXTRAVERSION 
E1: Warmth 
E2: Gregariousness 
E3: Assertiveness 
E4: Activity 
E5: Excitement Seeking 
E6: Positive Emotions 
 
O: OPENNESS 
O1: Fantasy 
O2: Aesthetics 
O3: Feelings 
O4: Actions 
O5: Ideas 
O6: Values 
 
A: AGREEABLENESS 
A1: Trust 
A2: Straightforwardness 
A3: Altruism 
A4: Compliance 
A5: Modesty 
A6: Tender-Mindness 
 
C: CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
C1: Competence 
C2: Order 
C3: Dutifulness 
C4: Achievement Striving 
C5: Self-Discipline 
C6: Deliberation 
 
 
13 
11 
2 
2 
2 
4 
9 
 
1 
4 
5 
2 
0 
0 
2 
 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
9 
17 
8 
5 
0 
5 
1 
 
8 
5 
1 
6 
0 
4 
7 
 
82 
88 
96 
98 
96 
92 
85 
 
92 
88 
94 
93 
96 
100 
88 
 
93 
91 
97 
87 
98 
91 
96 
 
86 
75 
90 
94 
100 
94 
98 
 
83 
93 
96 
93 
91 
92 
93 
 
5 
1 
2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
 
7 
8 
1 
5 
4 
0 
8 
 
5 
7 
2 
11 
0 
7 
2 
 
5 
8 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
 
9 
2 
1 
1 
9 
4 
0 
 
40.2*** 
23.2*** 
.2 
.21 
.2 
.8 
21.1*** 
 
7.8* 
12.0** 
2.3 
1.7 
.31 
 
16.7*** 
 
1.7 
3.3 
6.1*1 
22.8*** 
.31 
7.5* 
3.1 
 
18.6*** 
81.0*** 
11.5** 
2.3 
 
2.3 
1.3 
 
28.6*** 
1.7 
.6 
4.5 
16.0*** 
.8 
6.9** 
Note. N=85. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., change 
greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed distribution of 
changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each decreases and 
increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.1) χ2 (1, N = 85).  
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11.5.2 Cohort 2004: Team Analysis 
The pre-post measures of the SPGR Humres results are presented in Table 11.35. These 
results indicate that that four out of the twelve teams, Team 04UT, 04XY, 04DA, and 04HB, 
had significant positive development; four teams, Team 04JK, 04LF, 04SN, and 04KV, had 
no development; while four teams, Team 04NN, 04QP, 04PO, and 04KZ, had significant 
negative development. Team 04UT and 04HB had one dominant cadet each, but the overall 
Synergy for the remaining team members was higher than the dominant cadets’.  
Table 11.35  
Cohort 2004: SPGR Humres Results on the Team Level 
  SYNERGY CONTROL NURTURE OPPOSITION DEPENDENCE WITHDRAWAL ENERGY 
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 N M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD 
04JK 
 
7 
(49) 
6.64 
(2.06) 
7.05 
(1.97) 
4.34 
(1.76) 
4.32 
(2.05) 
4.92 
(5.07) 
5.08 
(2.19) 
2.41 
(1.69) 
2.57 
(1.49) 
6.84 
(1.81) 
7.12 
(1.93) 
1.10 
(1.36) 
1.45 
(2.00) 
5.53 
(2.93) 
5.60 
(3.55) 
04QP 
 
9 
(81) 
8.12 
(1.34) 
7.39*** 
(1.72) 
2.72 
(1.24) 
3.61*** 
(1.75) 
6.22 
(1.49) 
6.14 
(1.73) 
1.21 
(1.19) 
1.57* 
(.95) 
7.21 
(1.40) 
6.79* 
(1.85) 
.49 
(.69) 
.46 
(.90) 
7.64 
(1.68) 
6.93** 
(2.04) 
04HB 
 
7 
(49) 
6.32 
(1.55) 
6.75 
(1.92) 
2.85 
(1.82) 
3.74** 
(1.97) 
4.59 
(1.75) 
5.24* 
(1.70) 
1.75 
(1.92) 
1.61 
(1.30) 
6.52 
(2.10) 
6.18 
(1.63) 
1.59 
(1.23) 
.92** 
(1.60) 
4.73 
(2.30) 
5.83** 
(2.96) 
04LF 
 
8 
(64) 
6.71 
(1.56) 
6.15** 
(1.58) 
3.08 
(1.89) 
3.69 
(2.38) 
5.17 
(1.92) 
4.96 
(1.99) 
1.93 
(1.34) 
1.43** 
(1.21) 
6.75 
(1.21) 
5.17*** 
(1.66) 
.78 
(1.38) 
.32*** 
(1.03) 
5.92 
(2.08) 
5.83 
(1.85) 
04NN 
 
7 
(49) 
6.91 
(1.45) 
6.25** 
(1.54) 
3.40 
(2.30) 
4.32** 
(2.85) 
4.57 
(1.77) 
4.30 
(1.74) 
2.02 
(1.67) 
3.06** 
(2.03) 
6.71 
(1.57) 
6.45 
(1.90) 
1.22 
(1.12) 
1.40 
(1.31) 
5.69 
(2.09) 
4.84* 
(2.24) 
04PO 
 
8  
(64) 
7.14 
(1.32) 
6.61* 
(1.68) 
2.97 
(1.81) 
2.87 
(1.92) 
5.13 
(1.31) 
4.52* 
(1.66) 
1.57 
(1.23) 
1.30 
(1.10) 
6.52 
(1.86) 
5.94* 
(1.84) 
1.37 
(1.14) 
1.51 
(1.76) 
5.77 
(2.04) 
5.10 
(2.92) 
04KV 
 
8 
(64) 
6.79 
(1.66) 
6.77 
(1.79) 
3.69 
(2.31) 
3.73 
(1.96) 
4.84 
(1.64) 
4.61 
(1.96) 
1.90 
(1.43) 
2.02 
(1.46) 
6.40 
(1.68) 
6.01 
(2.04) 
1.53 
(1.78) 
1.27 
(2.05) 
5.26 
(2.92) 
5.50 
(3.35) 
04SN 
 
6 
(36) 
6.47 
(1.71) 
7.03 
(1.64) 
2.85 
(1.65) 
4.53*** 
(1.77) 
4.88 
(2.19) 
4.78 
(1.62) 
1.66 
(1.06) 
2.16 
(1.58) 
7.00 
(1.40) 
7.35 
(1.43) 
1.25 
(1.26) 
.81 
(1.06) 
5.22 
(2.30) 
6.22* 
(2.13) 
04UT 
 
8 
(64) 
7.26 
(1.68) 
7.65 
(1.41) 
3.83 
(1.64) 
4.13 
(1.62) 
5.40 
(1.38) 
5.79 
(1.33) 
2.78 
(1.92) 
2.39 
(1.14) 
7.44 
(1.26) 
7.89* 
(1.09) 
1.41 
(1.57) 
.55*** 
(.80) 
5.85 
(2.32) 
7.10*** 
(1.84) 
04XY 
 
7 
(49) 
6.25 
(2.00) 
7.88*** 
(1.38) 
3.79 
(2.11) 
3.90 
(1.63) 
4.87 
(1.81) 
6.45*** 
(1.70) 
2.25 
(1.69) 
1.68* 
(1.30) 
6.73 
(1.58) 
6.94 
(2.03) 
1.51 
(1.33) 
.48*** 
(.92) 
4.73 
(2.57) 
7.39*** 
(1.91) 
O4KZ 
 
6 
(36) 
8.07 
(1.03) 
6.69*** 
(1.50) 
2.78 
(1.33) 
3.44* 
(1.82) 
5.94 
(1.55) 
4.66*** 
(1.75) 
1.44 
(.83) 
.94** 
(.87) 
8.43 
(.87) 
6.50*** 
(1.55) 
.31 
(.51) 
.47 
(.57) 
7.78 
(1.15) 
6.22*** 
(1.44) 
04DA 
 
6 
(36) 
6.60 
(1.70) 
7.41* 
(1.13) 
3.82 
(2.17) 
3.78 
(1.73) 
4.44 
(1.64) 
4.97 
(1.70) 
1.97 
(1.85) 
1.72 
(.86) 
6.47 
(1.90) 
6.37 
(1.95) 
1.88 
(1.85) 
.28*** 
(.86) 
4.72 
(2.97) 
7.13*** 
(1.52) 
Note: A paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the leadership development program on the 
cadets’ SPGR Humres scores. Significant changes are indicated with: *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001. N 
gives the number of ratings within each team. A team consists of 8 members who rate themselves and each others, 
producing 64 ratings.  
Team 04DA showed positive development. Figure 11.28 illustrates the team’s development 
throughout the leadership development program. What appeared to cause this positive 
development was that the troublesome Cadets, C and F, were not members of the team 
during the demanding “Telemakos” exercise. 
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             Pre measure         Midway “Mallegan”            After “Mallegan” 
  
             After the Winter exercise                            Post “Telemakos”  
Figure 11.28  The SPGR Field Diagrams of Team 04DA Throughout the 
Leadership Developement Program 
 
This seems to have reduced the inward focus of the team. The field diagrams, however, 
show that team was still dominated by one cadet, Cadet A. The field diagrams also reveal 
that this cadet was located in approximately the same position throughout the year, 
indicating a lack of flexibility in leadership behavior. Figure 11.29 shows Cadet A’s SPGR 
12-vector profiles after “Telemakos.” The 12-vector, together with the field diagrams, 
indicate that this cadet lacked the ability necessary to perform different leadership roles, 
which resulted in a lack of development in that cadet’s role repertoire. The balance between 
Control and Nurture is skewed for the team: Control was (M = 3.78, SD = 1.73) compared 
with Nurture [M = 4.97, SD = 1.70, t(35)= -2.674, p < .011, d = .90], which was a large 
imbalance, indicating that Nurture is the dominant function. The Dependence function is 
also high (see Table 11.35) indicating the maturity level of Team Spirit. 
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                            Self-rating                                             Peer-rating  
Figure 11.29  The Dominant Cadet A in Team 04DA’s SPGR 12-Vector 
Profiles 
 
Team 04XY, which showed positive development, and Team 04QP, which had negative 
development, appear according to the statistics to have the “opposite” development. Both 
teams, however, reached the maturity level Team Spirit, but via a different path. The pre 
measure showed that Team 04XY, see Figure 11.30, had four cadets with a submissive 
behavior, lacking initiative.  
 
 
  Pre measure  After ”Telemakos” Average SPGR 12 vector after ”Telemakos  
Figure 11.30  Team 04XY: Their Development and Average Leadership 
Behavior  
 
During the leadership development program, this changed, and by the end there was only 
one cadet who showed submissive behavior, Cadet G (one dropped out). The 12-vector 
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diagram illustrates the imbalance between Control and Nurture, which was large t(47)= -
8.644, p < .001, d = 2.52. At the start of the program it was also unbalanced (M = 3.36, 
SD=2.09) against [M= 4.78, SD =1.84, t(63)= -4.748, p < .001, d = 1.20], but not as large as 
in the end of the program, which is indicated by the ES statistics. 
Team 04QP, as the field diagram in Figure 11.31 indicates, started with a strong focus on 
nurturing behaviors, which are the most common things to do. Table 11.35 also shows a 
strong Dependence function, indicating that this team, after a short time together, was at the 
maturity level of Team Spirit. The development issue for this team was to challenge its role 
structure before it could begin to inhibit the team’s performance.  
 
 
Pre measure     After ”Telemakos”       Average SPGR 12 vector after ”Telemakos  
Figure 11.31  Team 04OP: Their Development and Average Leadership 
Behavior 
 
This was accomplished, to some degree, because there were significant increases in 
controlling behavior and opposition behavior, which, according to 12-vector analyses, were 
on (a) Task-oriented behavior (M = 3.90, SD = 1.60) to [M = 4.86, SD = 1.85, r = .19, t(80)= 
-3.921, p < .001, d = .55], (b) Rule oriented behavior, (M = 2.44, SD = 1.70) to [M = 3.36, 
SD = 2.00, r = .51, t(80)= -4.472, p < .001, d = 49], (c) Criticism (M = 1.19, SD = .78) to 
[M= 1.53, SD = 1.30, r = .39, t(80)= -2.537, p < .013, d = .31], and (d) Assertiveness (M = 
3.44, SD = 2.28) to [M = 4.23, SD =1.87, r = .34, t(80)= -3.069, p < .001, d = .39]. The 
reduction in Synergy was a result of less behavior related to inspiring and motivating, 
Engagement; (M = 8.19, SD = 1.45) to [M = 7.27, SD = 2.03, r = .42, t(80)= 4.229, p < .001, 
d = .51]. The ES statistics indicate that these changes were moderate, and the field diagram 
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reveals these changes were not enough to challenge the role structure. The established 
imbalance between the Nurture and Control functions, which at the end of the program was 
t(81)= -8.209, p < .001, d = 1,82, was reduced but still large; at the pre-measure it was: 
t(81)= -15.359, p < .001, d = 3.41. 
The last team that will be covered in detail is Team 04NN, which had negative development. 
This is a case which requires special attention because it represents a fundamental lack of 
understanding concerning leadership behavior and leadership development. Figure 11.32 
shows the field diagrams for this team throughout the leadership development program.  
 
 
                 Pre Measure                       Midway “Mallegan”    After “Mallegan” 
 
 
       After the Winter exercise                            Post “Telemakos”  
Figure 11.32  The SPGR Field Diagrams of Team 04NN Throughout the 
Leadership Development Program 
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This team was dominated by one cadet, Cadet H, who was Cadet G in the last measurement 
because the original Cadets G and I dropped out before or during the “Telemakos” exercise. 
The dominant cadet was closely followed by Cadets E and F. The team was polarized from 
the beginning with four cadets showing submissive behavior. This relationship became more 
polarized whenever the team was put under pressure. The external challenges created an 
internal entropy, diS, and because the team had not, or was not able to, or did not care to 
create the internal harmony necessary to dampen out the external entropy, represented by 
new and demanding leadership tasks, the team experienced a negative development as a 
result of the social interaction within the team. The result, unfortunately, was a team that 
fragmented into many noncooperative centers of gravity and thus lacked the mutual trust and 
cohesion necessary to implement Auftragstaktik.  
How could this happen? One answer might be that the RNoNA did not know what they were 
doing because the facilitators should have been able to control this. Insights from complexity 
theory, however, suggest that complex group behavior can not be explicitly controlled 
(Stacey, 2001; Stacey & Griffin, 2005; Streatfield, 2001). Therefore it is of the utmost 
important to understand what happened and what led to this lack of development or negative 
bifurcation. A look at the dominant cadet’s personality score on the NEO PI-R provides an 
explanation, and it shows the same pattern as previously discussed. This dominant cadet, H, 
was exceptionally forceful, as indicated by that cadet’s score on E3, Assertiveness, T = 64, 
while the team score was M = 54.67 (SD = 9.44). This was a large difference, d = .96. This 
cadet also scored high on N2, Angry Hostility, T = 55, compared to the team (T = 47.83, SD 
= 3.25, d = .96), and together with an even higher score on N5 Impulsiveness (T = 60), 
compared with the team M = 45.17 (SD = 9.30, d = 1.54), indicated a lack of tolerance for 
frustration. Because of Cadet H’s low C6, Deliberation, T = 35, compared to the team score 
of M = 54.67 (SD = 3.20, d = 2.65), Team 04NN had a leader who lacked the personal 
discipline necessary to control this kind of behavior. Because Cadet H’s T-score was as low 
as 38 (both on pre- and post-measure) on the Agreeableness domain the cadet’s frustration 
was directed toward the team (Piedmont, 1998), whose score was M = 50.83 (SD = 9.07), 
and the ES statistics of d = 1.34 indicates a large difference. The result, as illustrated by 
SPGR, was the creation of a negative climate that hampered leadership development. This 
cadet’s SPGR 12-vector profiles are shown in Figure 11.33. 
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                               Self-rating                                                      Peer-rating  
Figure 11.33  The SPGR 12-Vector Profiles of the Dominant Cadet in Team 
04NN 
 
The behavior of Cadet H revealed in Figure 11.33 represents a dysfunctional leadership 
focusing on “getting ahead.” It appears, however, that this cadet was followed by the 
majority of the team, which illustrates the weakness and danger of a culture that at the 
maturity level of Team Spirit. How this could happen will be further discussed in chapter 13. 
11.5.3 Summary: Cohort 2004 
The performed analysis indicates a lack of leadership development as a result of a low level 
of maturity, producing an unfavorable climate for leadership development. The results are 
similar to those of Cohort 2001. These results indicate, as was also the case with Cohort 
2001, see section 11.2.4, no significant improvement in insight, orientation, agility, and 
initiative, hence no leadership development. The cadets in their teams tended to coalesce 
into many noncooperative centers of gravity, each of which was trying more or less 
successfully to “get ahead,” or even survive on their own, individual terms. The SPGR 
results clearly indicate the maturity level of Team Spirit, which consists of behaviors 
appropriate for 2nd GW, that is, for a centralized, bureaucratic hierarchy, where decisions go 
from the top down, information is reported up, and there is little trust. The leadership 
development has not resulted in a development of adaptive leaders suited for 4th GW. 
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11.6 Culture 
This section provides the result and analyses necessary to answer research questions 5 and 6. 
Culture is an important element of the orientation phase of the OODA loop because it 
influences perceptions, decisions, and actions. As such it is of utmost importance when it 
comes to Auftragstaktik and developing a climate for operational success. For Cohorts 2001 
and 2002, culture data was collected with the CPQ 15 months and three months respectively 
after they had finished exercise “Telemakos.” Cohorts 2003 and 2004 were measured when 
they started their leadership development and again after exercise “Telemakos.” The results 
for Cohort 2001 and 2002 are presented in Table 11.36 while the pre- and post-measures for 
Cohort 2003 and 2004 are presented in Table 11.37 and 11.38 respectively. The important 
within orientation, following the procedure from Maznevski et al. (1995), is also reported 
either as a part of the table or as notes following the table. 
These results reveal a culture that is patriarchic when it comes to Relationship, with high 
Collectivism and Hierarchy. They indicate a culture with a strong tendency to Control and 
Master its environment through a preferred mode of Doing by applying yesterday’s solution 
to today’s and tomorrow’s problems. It is also worth noting that there was little variation 
within the orientation, indicating a homogenous culture. The Relationship-among-People 
orientation and the pattern of Collectivism > Hierarchy > Individualism is consistent with a 
culture that values being part of a group and sharing responsibility and serving society, 
through a hierarchy and distributed power. The importance of individual responsibility and 
empowerment, which is the essence of Auftragstaktik, is not strong. The higher collectivism 
is consistent with Norwegian and Scandinavian culture, but the higher hierarchy and lower 
individualism are not. According to Maznevski: 
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The pattern of collectivism > hierarchy > individualism is consistent with a culture that 
values being a part of a group and sharing responsibility and serving society, through a 
hierarchy of distributed power. The importance of the individual responsibility and 
empowerment, although not negative, is not very strong. […] This is more like the pattern 
we see in Latin American cultures and East Asian cultures, very patriarchal cultures (a 
patriarch looks after the family for the good of everyone, but also has the power over every 
one)52. 
Table 11.36  
Culture Results for Cohorts 2001 and 2002 
Culture orientation and 
variations 
Cohort 2001 (N = 44) Cohort 2002 (N = 49) 
 M 
(SD) 
Within  
Orientation and Patterna 
M 
(SD) 
Within  
Orientation and Patterna 
Relationship     
Collective 4.92 
(.49) 
 4.98 
(.48) 
 
Hierarchical 4.69 
(.57) 
 
C* >H*> I 
4.79 
(.64) 
C≥  H > I, 
C*> I 
Individualism 4.41 
(.67) 
 4.51 
(.67) 
 
Environment     
Harmony 4.59 
(.54) 
 4.57 
(.58) 
 
Mastery 5.19 
(.56) 
 
M**> Ha**> S 
5.31 
(.58) 
 
M*> Ha*> S 
Subjugation 2.88 
(.92) 
 
 
2.62 
(.71) 
 
Human Nature 4.53 
(.89) 
 4.79 
(.83) 
 
Activity     
Doing 4.66 
(.76) 
 4.86 
(.64) 
 
Being 4.09 
(.78) 
D**> B ≥ T 3.83 
(.49) 
 
D*≥  B> T 
Thinking 3.69 
(.84) 
 3.50 
(.77) 
 
Time     
Past 4.89 
(.57) 
 4.78 
(.69) 
 
Present 4.57 
(.70) 
 
Pa>Pre ≥ F, 
4.40 
(.74) 
Pa ≥  Pre ≥ F, 
Pa> F 
Future 4.30 
(.69) 
 4.40 
(.74) 
 
a Significance tested using paired t-tests of pairs within each orientation. Initials denote variations within the same 
orientation.  
Variation Abbreviations: C = Collective, H = Hierarchical, I = Individualism, M = Mastery, Ha = Harmony, S= 
Subjugation, D = Doing, B= Being, T = Thinking, Pa = Past, Pre = Present, and F = Future. 
Patterns show preference in rank order from highest to lowest. A “≥ ” sign indicates that preferences, although 
ordered this way, are not statistically significantly different from each other. A “>” sign indicates that the 
differences are statistically significant different according to **> at p < .001, *> at p < .01, and  > at p <.05  
                                                 
52 Personal communication, e-mail, from Maznevski to Nissestad, October 22, 2003, 23:35. 
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The Activity dimension also reveals a strong Doing culture, with preference for taking action 
instead of spending time on analysis. Today’s conflicts, however, require officers who can 
outthink their adversary, and these findings reveal a culture that does not prefer to work at 
the mental level of conflict. The preference for past over present and future is 
understandable in terms of tradition. However, this orientation is counterproductive when 
the overall aim is to implement Auftragstaktik, requiring empowerment through 
individualism and collectivism. Not only will the current relationship culture prove resistant, 
as these analyses show, but the preference for the past and for tradition will reinforce this 
resistance. 
The more fundamental the grouping, the deeper the culture, the greater its influence on 
members’ values and beliefs, and the less the members are aware of this influence. The low 
preference for Individualism indicates a lack of concern about leadership based on 
commitment to the mission. Instead we see a pattern where the focus is on regulated, formal, 
clear leadership and norms based on status of the membership in the group, which in the 
military organization is obvious because it will always be toward the highest ranking officer. 
It is almost impossible in such a culture to implement a leadership practice founded on the 
philosophy of Auftragstaktik because this philosophy is a trade-off between hierarchy and 
initiative, focusing on commitment to the mission, as defined by the Schwerpunkt and the 
commander’s intent. The culture found and reported is a culture that fits 2nd GW, which is 
dysfunctional in implementing Auftragstaktik and in succeeding in 3rd and 4th GW, because 
of its low ability to adapt and cope with dynamic and ambiguous environments.  
The culture found might be a result of recruitment and or socialization. Table 11.36 and 
11.37 reports the results of the RNoNA socialization process. The results for Cohort 2003 
indicate that the leadership development program had a minor, insignificant impact on the 
cadets’ general cultural orientation; they even had a small decrease in their thinking 
variation. For Cohort 2004 there seems to have been some small changes, but the main trend 
is kept. This Cohort showed a moderate reduction in both the Collectivism and Hierarchical 
variations within the Relationship-among-People orientation, resulting in the pattern 
Collectivism > Hierarchy ≥ Individualism, which indicates a change in a more positive 
direction. There has, however, been no change in individualism, indicating that the RNoNA 
has not been able to create an empowering culture. This finding is consistent with the 
reported SPGR findings. The most worrying issues are the large negative changes in Human 
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Nature, indicating a move towards a more dominant autocratic leadership approach with 
closer supervision.  
Table 11.37  
Cohort 2003: Pre and Post Culture Measures 
 
Culture orientation and variation Pre Post     
 M/SD M/SD r t(67) Sig. d 
Relationship 
Collective 
 
Hierarchical 
 
Individualism 
 
 
4.93 
(.52) 
4.67 
(.69) 
4.46 
(.62) 
 
4.91 
(.45) 
4.55 
(.69) 
4.34 
(.61) 
 
.44 
 
.53 
 
.37 
 
 
.224 
 
1.478 
 
1.479 
 
.824 
 
.144 
 
.144 
 
Environment 
Harmony 
 
Mastery 
 
Subjugation 
 
4.78 
(.68) 
5.22 
(.59) 
3.07 
(.82) 
 
4.55 
(.64) 
5.17 
(.64) 
3.01 
(.83) 
 
.45 
 
.35 
 
.43 
 
2.780 
 
.637 
 
.603 
 
.007 
 
.527 
 
.549 
 
.36 
Human Nature 
 
4.70 
(.77) 
4.86 
(.75) 
.36 -1.493 .140  
Activity 
Doing 
 
Being 
 
 
Thinking 
 
4.87 
(.64) 
4.05 
(.54) 
4.12 
(.77) 
 
4.92 
(.52) 
3.98 
(.48) 
3.88 
(.65) 
 
.46 
 
.48 
 
.61 
 
 
-.735 
 
1.007 
 
3.200 
 
.465 
 
.317 
 
.002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.34 
Time 
Past 
 
Present 
 
Future 
 
4.92 
(.69) 
4.46 
(.80) 
4.61 
(.78) 
 
4.75 
(.71) 
4.47 
(.67) 
4.69 
(.75) 
 
.46 
 
.29 
 
.29 
 
1.901 
 
-.138 
 
-.701 
 
.062 
 
.891 
 
.486 
 
Note: The variation within each orientation, significance tested using paired t-test. Variation Abbreviations: C = 
Collective, H = Hierarchical, I = Individualism, M = Mastery, Ha = Harmony, S= Subjugation, D = Doing, B= 
Being, T = Thinking, Pa = Past, Pre = Present, and F = Future. Patterns show preference in rank order from highest 
to lowest. A “?” sign indicates that preferences, although ordered this way, are not statistically significantly 
different from each other. A “>” sign indicates that the differences are statistically significantly different according 
to ** > at p < .001, *> at p < .01, and  > at p <.05. 
In the Pre measure the variation within each orientation was as follow (N = 73): Relationships: C > H *> I, 
Environment: M **> Ha **> S, Activity: D **> T ≥  B , and Time: Pa > F ≥  Pre.  
In the Post measures (N = 71): Relationships C > H* > I, Environment: M *> H *> S, Activity: D *> T = B, and 
Time: Pa > F > Pre.   
 
This is consistent with the NEO PI-R results of Agreeableness for this cohort. It could also 
be argued that these cadets, as a result of the leadership development program, had a more 
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realistic understanding of the human nature. The mode of Activity showed that the desired 
state of focus was Doing, which indicates a relentless striving to achieve, followed by Being, 
which is characterized by spontaneity.  
Table 11.38  
Cohort 2004: Pre and Post Culture Measures 
Culture orientation and variations Pre Post     
 M/SD M/SD r t (87) Sig. d 
Relationship 
Collective 
 
Hierarchical 
 
Individualism 
 
 
5.04 
(.64) 
4.55 
(.64) 
4.25 
(.63) 
 
4.90 
(.57) 
4.39 
(.57) 
4.29 
(.59) 
 
.61 
 
.51 
 
.67 
 
2.479 
 
2.544 
 
-.587 
 
.015 
 
.013 
 
.559 
 
.21 
 
.27 
 
Environment 
Harmony 
 
Mastery 
 
Subjugation 
 
4.55 
(.61) 
5.23 
(.64) 
2.73 
(.77) 
 
4.37 
(.61) 
5.17 
(.63) 
2.73 
(.79) 
 
.27 
 
.45 
 
.26 
 
2.269 
 
.862 
 
.000 
 
.026 
 
.391 
 
1.000 
 
.29 
Human Nature 
 
4.62 
(.80) 
4.20 
(.76) 
.45 4.853 .001 .54 
Activity 
Doing 
 
Being 
 
 
Thinking 
 
4.74 
(.67) 
3.86 
(.65) 
3.73 
(.91) 
 
4.81 
(.61) 
4.41 
(.53) 
3.68 
(.67) 
 
.54 
 
.56 
 
.60 
 
-1.043 
 
-9.232 
 
.773 
 
.300 
 
.001 
 
.441 
 
 
 
.92 
Time 
Past 
 
Present 
 
Future 
 
4.95 
(.84) 
4.40 
(.70) 
4.40 
(.89) 
 
4.97 
(.71) 
4.37 
(.69) 
4.66 
(.68) 
 
.51 
 
.36 
 
.30 
 
-.343 
 
.389 
 
-2.643 
 
.733 
 
.698 
 
.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.33 
 
Note: The variation within each orientation, significance tested using paired t-test. Variation Abbreviations: C = 
Collective, H = Hierarchical, I = Individualism, M = Mastery, Ha = Harmony, S= Subjugation, D = Doing, B= 
Being, T = Thinking, Pa = Past, Pre = Present, and F = Future. Patterns show preference in rank order from highest 
to lowest. A “≥ ” sign indicates that preferences, although ordered this way, are not statistically significantly 
different from each other. A “>” sign indicates that the differences are statistically significantly different according 
to **> at p < .001, *> at p < .01, and  > at p <.05. 
In the Pre measure the variation within each orientation was as follow (N = 97): Relationships; C *> H > I, 
Environment: M *> Ha *> S, Activity: Do *> Be  ≥ T, and Time: Pa *> Pre ≥  F.  
In the Post measure (N = 88) it was: Relationships: C *> H ≥  I, Environment: M *> Ha *> S, Activity: D *> B 
*>T, and Time: Pa *> F > Pre.   
It is also worth noting the large change on the Being variation, indicating that they 
appreciated the moment much more, and valued their time off to a greater extent. Their low 
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Thinking orientation indicates that they did not prefer to make decisions on criteria that were 
highly logical and that it was not even worth the while to create a good argument for the 
chosen decision. This is indicated by the thinking score, which is below the midpoint of 4, or 
into the “disagree” range, a result that indicates a major challenge when it comes to the 
mental part of the conflict spectrum that is dominant in 3rd GW because their desire is so 
dominated by the Doing mode. The culture reported here is a culture that is not well suited to 
cope with an environment that is characterized by ambiguity, novelty, and changing 
contexts. It is more suited for stable and predictable environments, which can be broken 
down to standard operating procedures. It is a culture that is highly counterproductive to 3rd 
GW, with its high focus on mental content (thinking mode), and 4th GW, which has a high 
moral content and which requires the ability play to the interaction theme. 
The culture is patriarchic because of its high Collectivism and Hierarchy and low 
Individualism. It is a conforming culture with little appreciation for initiative. It is also 
concerned about mastering its environment through a preferred Doing activity by applying 
already proven solutions. This makes it possible for a forceful cadet to take charge, control, 
and dominate the team through authoritative leadership behavior. This corresponds well to 
the maturity level Team Spirit in SPGR terms because the hierarchy tends to promote and 
focus on “one-person-one-functional-role.” 
According to these results, the leadership development program has not been able to 
influence the cadets’ general assumptions about how work and interaction with other people 
should proceed. The leadership development program has not been able to change the value 
system, beliefs, assumptions, and norms among these cohorts of cadets. There has been no 
reorientation and the results on culture are consistent with the maturity level found with 
SPGR that also indicates a lack of ability to perform the leadership roles necessary to cope 
and strive in a dynamic environment. 
11.6.1 Summary of the Culture Findings 
The results from the RNoNA indicate that the cadets educated at the RNoNA do not inhabit 
a culture that enables Auftragstaktik, a result that was consistent across all four cohorts. The 
results from Cohort 2003 and Cohort 2004 also indicate that the leadership development 
program at the RNoNA had only a minor impact on the cadets’ cultural orientations and 
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variations, and that this impact was mostly negative. However, the CPQ results presented in 
Table 11.39 demonstrate that the culture found at the RNoNA is not in any way unique to 
the RNoNA but appears to be consistent across all services and ranks. Furthermore, the 
results reported here appear to differ with the general Norwegian culture on the Relationship 
among people orientation. The Within orientation that is found is Collectivism > Hierarchy 
> Individualism, which indicates a culture lacking empowerment, and this lack will 
influence leadership. This is important because Dorfman, Hanges, and Brodbeck (2004) 
found that culture influences leadership in several ways. They found that leadership 
attributes from the Charismatic/Value-Based53 and Team-Oriented54 leadership dimensions 
were universally seen as positive within their 10 clusters, which were: (a) Eastern Europe, 
(b) Latin America, (c) Latin Europe, (d) Confucian Asia, (e) Nordic Europe, (f) Anglo, (g) 
Sub-Saharan Africa, (h) Southern Asia, (i) Germanic Europe, and (j) the Middle East, see 
Gupta and Hanges (2004). Human-Oriented55 leadership was reported among cultures to be 
somewhat of a contributor to effective leadership, but not nearly as important as the two 
previously mentioned ones.  
Participative56 leadership was found to contribute to effective leadership for all culture 
clusters. The Germanic Europe, Anglo, and North Europe clusters were particularly attuned 
to Participative leadership according to the GLOBE results, whereas this was not the case for 
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Confucian Asia, and Southern Asia. They further found 
that both societal and organizational culture values had significant links to beliefs about 
effective leadership.  
 
 
                                                 
53 Charismatic/Value-Based leadership is a broadly defined leadership dimension that reflects the ability to inspire, 
motivate, and to expect higher performance from others on the basis of firmly held core values (Dorfman, Hanges, & 
Brodbeck, 2004). 
54 Team-Oriented leadership is a leadership dimension that emphasizes effective team building and implementation of a 
common purpose or goal among team members (Dorfman, Hanges, & Brodbeck, 2004). 
55 Human-Oriented leadership is a dimension that reflects supportive and considerate leadership but also includes 
compassion and generosity (Dorfman, Hanges, & Brodbeck, 2004). 
56 Participative leadership is a dimension that reflects the degree to which managers involve others in making and 
implementing decisions (Dorfman, Hanges, & Brodbeck, 2004). 
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Table 11.39  
Culture Results from the Norwegian Armed Forces 
 Army Cadets Level I 
N = 63 
Army Cadets Level II 
N = 48 
Navy Cadets Level II 
N= 34 
Operational Military Unit 
N =93 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Within 
Orientation 
Mean 
(SD) 
Within Orientation Mean 
(SD) 
Within Orientation Mean 
(SD) 
Within Orientation
Relationship        
  Collective 4.96 
(.53) 
 4.86 
(.48) 
 4.92 
(.53) 
 5.01 
(.62) 
 
  Hierarchical 4.82 
(.60) 
 
C ≥  H **> I 
4.56 
(.61) 
 
C *>H > I, 
4.61 
(.71) 
 
C> H **> I 
4.84 
(.64) 
 
C > H ** >I 
  Individualism 4.53 
(.60) 
 4.36 
(.49) 
 4.15 
(.70) 
 4.35 
(.59) 
 
Environment         
  Harmony 4.72 
(.61) 
 4.61 
(.55) 
 4.51 
(.69) 
 4.63 
(.62) 
 
  Mastery 5.19 
(.62) 
 
M **> H **> S 
5.04 
(.45) 
 
M *> H *> S 
5.06 
(.60) 
 
M **> H **> S 
5.26 
(.50) 
 
M ** >H **> S 
  Subjugation 2.97 
(.70) 
 
 
2.85 
(.81) 
 2.64 
(.84) 
 2.90 
(.81) 
 
Human Nature 4.53 
(.80) 
 4.80 
(.60) 
 4.71 
(.77) 
 4.51 
(.86) 
 
Activity         
  Doing 4.65 
(.68) 
 4.46 
(.63) 
 4.43 
(.56) 
 4.60 
(.61) 
 
  Being 4.04 
(.61) 
 
D **> B **> T 
3.77 
(.63) 
 
D **> B ≥T 
3.57 
(.68) 
 
D **> B ≥  T 
3.82 
(.58) 
 
D **> B≥  T 
  Thinking 3.90 
(.94) 
 3.61 
(.71) 
 3.53 
(1.00) 
 3.80 
(.77) 
 
Time         
  Past 5.06 
(.63) 
 4.90 
(.72) 
 4.45 
(.73) 
 4.77 
(.72) 
 
  Present 4.34 
(.73) 
 
Pa **>Pre ≥  F 
4.07 
(.91) 
 
Pa **> Pre ≥  F 
4.44 
(.67) 
 
Pa ≥  Pre≥ F 
4.29 
(.76) 
 
Pa **> Pre ≥ F 
  Future 4.33 
(.63) 
 4.4 
(.81) 
 4.35 
(1.14) 
 4.26 
(.86) 
 
 
 Applicant Navy OFC, 2004 
N = 275 
Applicant Navy OFC, 2005 
N = 72 
Applicants Air OFC  
2006  
N= 62 
Applicants Mil Acad. 
 2005 
N= 199 
Applicants Mil Acad., 2006 
N= 226 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Within Orientation Mean 
(SD) 
Within Orientation Mean 
(SD)
Within Orientation Mean 
(SD)
Within Orientation Mean 
(SD) 
Within Orientation 
Relationship         
  Collective 5.08 
(.51) 
 4.99 
(.51) 
 4.86 
(.65)
 4.84 
(.53)
 4.91 
(.58) 
 
  Hierarchical 4.76 
(.66) 
 
C **>H **> I 
4.94 
(.66) 
 
C ≥  H **> I 
4.92 
(.58)
 
H ≥ C **> I 
4.87 
(.57)
 
H≥ C**>I 
4.82 
(.57) 
 
C > H **> I 
  Individualism 4.41 
(.60) 
 4.13 
(.61) 
 4.42 
(.55)
 4.22 
(.61)
 4.26 
(.61) 
 
Environment         
  Harmony 4.95 
(.58) 
 4.81 
(.59) 
 4.72 
(.63)
 4.68 
(.62)
 4.66 
(.59) 
 
  Mastery 5.18 
(.55) 
 
M **> Ha **> S 
5.23 
(.49) 
 
M **> Ha **> S 
5.13 
(.58)
 
M **> Ha **> S 
5.28 
(.56)
 
M**> Ha**> S 
5.20 
(.57) 
 
M **>Ha **> S 
  Subjugation 3.01 
(..88) 
 
 
2.67 
(.77) 
 2.90 
(.82)
 2.63 
(.77)
 2.66 
(.79) 
 
Human Nature 3.99 
(.56) 
 4.11 
(.84) 
 3.81 
(.68)
 4.28 
(.75)
 4.23 
(.70) 
 
Activity         
  Doing 4.76 
(.56) 
 4.77 
(.54) 
 4.74 
(.63)
 4.70 
(.60)
 4.65 
(.58) 
 
  Being 4.05 
(.56) 
 
D **> T **> B 
4.22 
(.50) 
 
D ** > B≥  T 
4.42 
(.56)
 
D *> B **> T 
4.20 
(.50)
 
D**> B **>T 
4.10 
(.51) 
 
D **> B **>T 
  Thinking 4.29 
(.78) 
 4.20 
(.73) 
 3.92 
(.85)
 3.96 
(.70)
 3.88 
(.78) 
 
Time         
  Past 4.98 
(.71) 
 5.25 
(.66) 
 5.19 
(.78)
 5.27 
(.66)
 5.19 
(.65) 
 
  Present 4.52 
(.69) 
 
Pa *> F> Pre 
4.19 
(.91) 
 
Pa **> Pre> F 
4.55 
(.75)
 
Pa **> F≥  Pre 
4.19 
(.77)
 
Pa **> F **> Pre 
4.13 
(.79) 
 
Pa **> F **> Pre 
  Future 4.65 
(.72) 
 4.53 
(.79) 
 4.60 
(.67)
 4.60 
(.74)
 4.71 
(.70) 
 
Note: Those officers who attended level II at the Academies were officers who were commissioned and specially selected for this educational level. Normally 
they had the rank of Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander. 
Those who applied for the Officer Candidate School are recruited with a high school background. 
The variation within each orientation, significance tested using paired t-test. Variation Abbreviations: C = Collective, H = Hierarchical, I = Individualism, M = 
Mastery, Ha = Harmony, S= Subjugation, D = Doing, B= Being, T = Thinking, Pa = Past, Pre = Present, and F = Future. Patterns show preference in rank order 
from highest to lowest. A “≥ ” sign indicates that preferences, although ordered this way, are not statistically significantly different from each other. A “>” sign 
indicates that the differences are statistically significantly different according to **> at p < .001, *> at p < .01, and > at p <.05.  
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The most important negative cultural value was Uncertainty Avoidance57 which refers to the 
extent that members of collectives seek orderliness, constancy, structure, formalized 
procedures, and laws to cover situations in their daily lives. Technology, rules, policies, and 
rituals are all means used by organizations to deal with uncertainty.  
Another way to look at this is through Pelto’s (1968) concept of tight and loose cultures. 
Tight cultures are characterized by many rules supervising actions, and individuals are 
expected to conform to standard practices (Trandis, 1989). DeLuque and Javidan (2004) 
found that uncertainty avoidance had implications for which leadership styles were 
perceived to be the most effective. Higher Uncertainty Avoidance values were associated 
with higher Team-Oriented, Human-Oriented, and Self-Protective leadership58 and with 
lower Participative and Charismatic and Value-Based leadership. Both Southern-Asia and 
Latin America scored relatively high on GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance values measures. 
Here Self-protective leadership is more likely to be a part of the shared leadership belief 
system and the GLOBE study found that this leadership style generally impeded outstanding 
leadership. Also worth noting is that both Future Orientation and Human Orientation 
(values) were positive predictors of Human-Oriented, Team-Oriented, and Charismatic and 
Value-Based leadership. The CPQ results, which indicate a military culture that is 
patriarchic, not especially high on Human Nature, and past oriented, fits the Self-protective 
leadership style as defined in the GLOBE study. Military organizations have a high power 
distance, which is assertive and intolerant of uncertainty. The military culture reported in 
this dissertation seems to represent a subculture, because in general, organizations tend to 
mirror the culture of power distance practices and values in their society so they can gain 
legitimacy and also appeal to people from their host societies. However, military 
organizations do most of their business with other military organizations and within a 
Norwegian culture that tends to be highly egalitarian. This might lead to a need to buffer 
themselves from the Norwegian societal culture and values. 
                                                 
57 Uncertainty Avoidance involves the extent to which ambiguous situations are threatening to individuals, to which rules 
and order are preferred, and to which uncertainty is tolerated in society (DeLuque & Javidan, 2004). 
58 Self-protective Leadership focuses on ensuring the safety and security of the individual or group members. The GLOBE 
Self-protective Leadership dimension included five primary subscales labeled (a) self-centered, (b) status conscious, (c) 
conflict inducer, (d) face saver, and (e) procedural (Dorfman, Hanges, & Brodbeck, 2004). 
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Zander (1997) found that employees in the Nordic countries59 preferred a high degree of 
empowering, but with a low intensity when it came to interpersonal leadership. She labeled 
this leadership approach as empowering coaching. Furthermore, the employees in the Nordic 
countries had the lowest preference for supervision of all employees in her study which 
included 18 countries and a total of 15.679 respondents.  According to Zander, a 
paternalistic type of management, where managers or leaders are authoritarian and autocratic 
in their decision-making style, is not compatible with empowering. The Nordic societies 
tend in general to be high on collectivism, relatively high on individualism, but low on 
hierarchy. Additional CPQ data collected outside the military seems to confirm this, N 
=12660, these results gave the following within orientation; C** > I *> H. These findings 
were consistent with results reported by Whitener et al. (1999). This might indicate that the 
culture found at the RNoNA and in the Norwegian Armed Forces differs from the culture of 
the larger society and as such it represents a subculture, which is not an uncommon 
phenomenon (Lane et al., 2006). However, this is a subculture that is not constructive. Smith 
(2005) goes as far as to claim that: “On the whole our armies, navies, and air forces—for in 
essence air forces as military entities were in one way or another spawned from the other 
two services—still carry much of the structure and organization Napoleon created when he 
remodeled the armies of France and set out to conquer Europe” (p. 30). This is isomorphism, 
where the, in this case military, organizations are pressured to become isomorphic with, or 
conform to, a set of institutional beliefs and processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). There 
are three types of isomorphism: (a) coercive, (b) mimetic, and (c) normative. Coercive 
isomorphism is a response to formal and informal pressures exerted on the organizations by 
other organizations on which they are dependent, for example, in the case of Norway, 
NATO, and the United States. Mimetic isomorphism generally involves a transformation that 
takes place in face of uncertainty, where an organization may model itself after another, 
more successful organization. An example might be the adoption of network-centric warfare 
because the U.S. military is also adopting it. Finally, educational or professional pressures to 
conform to a set of rules and norms characterize normative isomorphism. Educational or 
training programs and professional societies or associations influence members operating 
                                                 
59 The Nordic countries include Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
60 This group consisted of civilian consultants (N = 41), students at a psychology course at the University in Bergen (N = 
59), and the remaining (N = 26) from different companies. 
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within those professions. These isomorphic processes have caused the Norwegian military to 
become a subculture that separates them from the general Norwegian culture on some 
important values. This development, which follows Schneider’s (1987) ASA model, has led 
to a lack of variance within the subculture that can cause difficulties when attempting to 
implement Auftragstaktik. 
The findings in this dissertation, confirmed by the SPGR team analysis, the NEO PI-R, and 
the CPQ, indicate that that the members of the military organization definitely form an 
organization with higher power distance. Carl, Gupta, and Javidan (2004) found that 
organizational power distance had positive associations with Self-Protective leadership, 
which focuses on behaviors that are status and class conscious, ritualistic, procedural, 
normative, secretive, evasive, indirect, and self-centered. Thus, organizational members 
from high power distance and assertive organizations, and organizations intolerant of 
uncertainty, are not likely to use participative leadership effectively, and the result is an 
organization at a low maturity level. 
The military culture found in this empirical study is a culture that is deficient in the key 
qualities of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative that permit the organization to shape 
and adapt to an ever-changing environment. It is a closed and shared culture with little 
variance. This might be one of the reasons why change and leadership development has 
proven so difficult—the culture might be too closed. These findings are of concern because 
one of the important functions of a culture is to act as “software” for the group, allowing its 
members to interact with each other efficiently and with a relatively smooth flow of activity, 
and to provide guidance for decision making and scripts for behavior. 
11.7  The Good Officer - the Cadets’ Implicit Theories 
This section will provide the answer to whether the leadership development program at the 
RNoNA was able to influence the cadets’ orientations of the leadership behavior needed to 
be an officer in the 21st century. The “good officer” was defined by asking the cadets in 
Cohorts 2002, 2003 and 2004 to describe what they considered to be the leadership behavior 
of such an officer, using the SPGR questionnaire. Unfortunately this was not done for 
Cohort 2001. According to implicit leadership theory, individuals have implicit beliefs, 
convictions, and assumptions concerning those attributes and behavior that distinguish a 
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“good officer” from an ordinary one. It is argued that the implicit leadership theories held by 
individuals influence the way they view selected leadership behavior and attributes. Implicit 
leadership theory postulates that leadership perceptions are a function of the overlap 
between the observer’s leadership belief system and the attributes of the person being rated. 
Substantial experimental evidence supports this theory (Hanges, Braverman, & Rentsch, 
1991; Hanges et al., 1997; Lord & Maher, 1991; Sipe & Hanges, 1997). Implicit leadership 
theory also implies that there ought to be a significant within-society agreement with respect 
to the effectiveness, attributes, and behavior of leadership. These are, in other words, 
culturally connected, and it is considered important for a leader to exhibit behavior 
consistent with cultural specific expectations.  
Figure 11.34 illustrates these three cohorts’ perceptions of the “good officer” at the end of 
the leadership development program, while Figure 11.35 shows the leadership behaviors of 
the “good officer” for each of the cohorts. The changes in their perceptions as a result of the 
leadership development program for both the SPGR Humres and 12-vector are reported in 
Table 11.40.  
 
Figure 11.34  Cohorts 2002, 2002, and 2003 SPGR Field Diagram of the 
“Good Officer” - Post Measure 
 
These results indicate that the “good officer” is one where the Nurture and Dependence 
functions are dominate, indicating that such an officer will be operating at the maturity level 
of Team Spirit. These findings also suggest that the cadets’ ideal officer will need to know 
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what is wanted, when it is wanted, and how it will be evaluated. For such an officer, it is 
structure that matters. Because Dependence is dominant, the “good officer” also values a 
high degree of conformity and obedience. This is the SPGR characterization of the same 
patriarchic culture found by the use of the CPQ.  
 
 
 
Cohort 2002 
                          Cohort 2003                                                       Cohort 2004 
 
Figure 11.35  Cohorts 2002, 2003, and 2004 12-Vector Post Perception of 
the Leadership Behavior of the “Good Officer”  
 
This “good officer” will function well at lower maturity levels because at these levels there 
is no need for a highly developed role taking ability and no need to play the interaction and 
isolation game—a game which this officer is not able to play.  
 
Table 11.40  
 231
Cohorts 2002, 2003, and 2004: SPGR Pre and Post Measures of the “Good Officer” 
 
SPGR Functions and vectors 
 
Cohort 2002, N= 74 
 
Cohort 2003, N = 70 
 
Cohort 2004, N = 85 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD 
Synergy 7.56 
(1.31) 
8.53*** 
(.67) 
7.06 
(2.12) 
8.10*** 
(1.02) 
7.67 
(1.18) 
8.19*** 
(.98) 
Control 4.50 
(1.25) 
4.40 
(1.31) 
5.77 
(1.66) 
4.00*** 
(1.46) 
4.09 
(1.44) 
4.63** 
(1.16) 
Nurture 5.28 
(1.68) 
6.43*** 
(1.51) 
4.73 
(2.04) 
6.85*** 
(1.56) 
6.94 
(1.39) 
6.32** 
(1.45) 
Oposition 1.51 
(.86) 
1.42 
(.87) 
1.92 
(1.31) 
1.87 
(1.28) 
2.28 
(1.24) 
1.80* 
(1.00) 
Dependence 5.82 
(2.17) 
6.04 
(2.14) 
6.41 
(1.60) 
5.71 
(2.35)** 
5.93 
(2.25) 
6.17 
(2.02) 
Withdrawal .17 
(.48) 
.09 
(.31) 
.88 
(1.05) 
.48* 
(1.06) 
1.03 
(1.03) 
.21*** 
(.66) 
       
S2: Empathy  6.32 
(2.07) 
7.81*** 
(1.58) 
6.31 
(1.92) 
7.74*** 
(1.60) 
8.04 
(1.41) 
7.84 
(1.66) 
N1: Caring 6.51 
(1.95) 
8.19*** 
(1.40) 
7.21 
(1.68) 
7.93** 
(1.48) 
7.67 
(1.69) 
7.45 
(1.62) 
D2: Acceptance 5.51 
(1.93) 
6.12* 
(2.09) 
6.26 
(1.55) 
5.30** 
(2.57) 
5.20 
(2.77) 
6.05* 
(2.21) 
N2: Creativity 5.10 
(2.08) 
5.61 
(1.66) 
4.81 
(2.08) 
6.41*** 
(2.00) 
6.31 
(1.94) 
5.60** 
(1.95) 
O1: Criticism 1.18 
(.69) 
1.28 
(.88) 
1.17 
(.70) 
2.67*** 
(2.46) 
3.47 
(2.77) 
1.75*** 
(1.52) 
W1: Resignation 1.05 
(.23) 
1.01 
(.12) 
1.03 
(.24) 
1.41*** 
(1.00) 
1.92 
(1.12) 
1.18*** 
(.68) 
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.18 
(.63) 
1.18 
(.69) 
1.49 
(1.14) 
1.16*** 
(.69) 
1.16 
(.65) 
1.15 
(.70) 
 O2: Assertiveness 4.65 
(1.90) 
4.32 
(1.90) 
4.27 
(1.51) 
3.53** 
(1.93) 
3.12 
(2.10) 
4.58*** 
(1.96) 
C2: Ruling 4.47 
(1.62) 
4.47 
(1.36) 
4.96 
(1.65) 
4.20*** 
(1.41) 
4.75 
(1.65) 
4.64 
(1.45) 
D1: Loyalty 6.66 
(2.23) 
6.81* 
(2.18) 
7.77 
(1.71) 
6.89*** 
(2.29) 
7.27 
(1.71) 
6.93 
(1.87) 
C1: Task orientation 5.69 
(1.65) 
5.59 
(1.48) 
6.20 
(1.39) 
5.33*** 
(1.66) 
5.19 
(1.52) 
5.74** 
(1.09) 
S1: Engagement 8.56 
(.92) 
8.91** 
(.50) 
8.93 
(.26) 
8.20*** 
(1.38) 
7.49 
(1.93) 
8.65*** 
(.97) 
Note: Paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the leadership development program on the 
cadets’ implicit theories of what characterizes a good officer. Significant changes are indicated with: *p < .05,  
**p < .01, and  ***p < .001  
 
The cadets do in fact hold an ideal of an officer who is not suited for participation in 
environments that are characterized by 3rd and 4th GW warfare because this officer lacks the 
ability to adapt to ambiguity and novelty. This officer will most likely only perform well in a 
stable and predictable environment. This indicates that leadership development program was 
not able to reorient the cadets to bring their orientations of a good officer into accordance 
with what is needed in the 21st century when they are facing 4th GW. 
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Another interesting finding is that the cadets’ leadership development seems to follow the 
changes in the cadets’ orientation, or Schwerpunkt, of the “good officer” as a result of the 
leadership development, although the path is weaker. Figure 11.36 illustrates this by 
showing post measures of these cadets’ other ratings, and their perception of the “good 
officer.” This once again emphasizes the importance of the orientation aspect of the OODA 
loop. The RNoNA has not been able to reorient the cadets’ orientations towards the 
requirements of today’s and tomorrow’s conflicts. One important contributing factor to the 
overall lack of development seemed to be the cadets’ strongly held and unfortunately 
outdated social cognition applied to what it means to be an officer in the 21st century. 
 
 
         The cohort’s average leadership behavior        Their average perception of “The Good officer”   
Figure 11.36  Cohorts 2002, 2003, and 2004 average leadership behaviors 
- others rating, and their perception of the “good officer” 
11.8 Summary  
This chapter has presented and analyzed the results of the leadership development program 
at the RNoNA for four cohorts with the purpose of answering research questions 1 to 6. 
Measured by the SPGR, only one cohort, Cohort 2002, had a positive, although minor, 
development. Eight out of that cohort’s ten teams had a positive development, but 
unfortunately none of the teams reached a maturity level higher than Team Spirit. The three 
remaining cohorts showed no development, hence no increase in role-taking ability. The 
results at the team level were supported, as can be seen from Table 11.41. 
Table 11.41 
Summary of SPGR Humres Results 
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Cohort SPGR Humres  results on team level 
 Negative developement No developement Positive developement 
2001 4 5 1 
2002 0 2 8 
2003 2 8 0 
2004 4 4 4 
  
Here Cohort 2004 had the most mixed results. A striking pattern was that none of the teams 
were able to reach a higher maturity level than Team Spirit, which indicates a restricted role-
taking ability. The predominant functions at this maturity level are Nurture and Dependence, 
which indicates that these commissioned officers will most likely perform well only in 
situations and contexts that are well structured, with concrete goals that can be broken down 
to standard operating procedures with well defined roles. The personality results measured 
with the NEO PI-R also support this: The large imbalance between Openness and 
Conscientiousness indicates that they, as a group, would have trouble in a dynamic 
environment characterized by novelty and ambiguity. As seen through the in-depth team 
analyses, personality plays an important role in the maturity and development of both the 
team members and the teams. This important issue will be further addressed and covered in 
chapter 13. 
Although authoritative leadership is not required at the Team Spirit maturity level, teams at 
this maturity easily tend to such leadership styles (Sjøvold, 2006). This might explain why it 
is common for one or two dominant cadets to influence and control a team, which centralizes 
it, makes its actions predictable, and makes it easier for an adversary to operate inside its 
OODA loops. The cadets, together with the RNoNA, have not been able to create a climate 
for leadership development. The result, as seen above, was no improvement in insight, 
orientation, agility, and initiative. Instead, there seems to be a pattern where the cadets in 
their teams tended to coalesce into many non-cooperative centers of gravity, each trying 
more of less successfully, to “get ahead,” or even “survive” on its own terms. 
These cadets and their teams have only reached a maturity level, Team Spirit, that is 
definitely not suited for 4th GW because it lacks Boyd’s essential asymmetries of insight, 
orientation, agility, and initiative. Instead they tend to ignore or even minimize impulses 
from the outside. Team Spirit represents a culture that does not appreciate the mismatches 
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that indicate a locked orientation, and this maturity level results, therefore, in a predictable 
OODA loop.  
These findings were supported by the results on SPGR measuring the type of leadership 
behavior that characterizes the good officer. These results revealed an officer on the maturity 
level of Team Spirit, which indicates that the cadets have a strongly, but unfortunately 
outdated, social cognition, or orientation, of what it means to be an officer facing the 
challenges of 4th GW. The culture found, as measured with the CPQ, confirms this pattern. 
These findings indicate that the shared, commonly held body of general beliefs among the 
cadets (and most likely within the Armed Forces in Norway) represents a outdated 
“software” to cope with 4th GW or even 3rd GW because it is simply not well suited to deal 
with an environment characterized by changing contexts, novelty, and ambiguity. The low 
Thinking orientation, mostly on the negative side since it was less than four, also indicates a 
major challenge when it comes to mental part, the ch’i/cheng part, of the conflict spectrum, 
because their desire is so dominated by the Doing mode. The result is that they prefer not to 
make decisions based upon highly logical criteria, and their attitude is that it is even not 
worth the while to create a good argument for the chosen decision, an attitude that is at 
complete odds with the German approach. Especially telling, the importance of individual 
responsibility and empowerment—the essence of Auftragstaktik—is not strong. The low 
preference for Individualism (always the last preferred) indicates lack of concern for 
leadership based on commitment to the mission. Instead, a cultural pattern was found that 
indicates a Self-protective leadership style where the focus is on regulated, formal clear 
leadership and norms based on the status of the membership in the group, which is the level 
of rank in the military. 
When all these findings are summarized, it appears that the leadership development program 
has not been able to reorient the cadets, that the leadership development program has not had 
the impact that it was supposed to have. In particular, the RNoNA has not been able to 
implement a leadership practice founded on the philosophy of Auftragstaktik, which requires 
a culture that can perform trade-offs between hierarchy and initiative, focusing on 
commitment to the mission as defined by the Schwerpunkt and the commander’s intent. 
Development of such a culture was effectively blocked out by the dominant Self-protective 
leadership style. The dominant organizational climate is one that is deficient in key qualities 
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of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative that permit organizations to shape and adapt to 
an ever-changing environment. It is actually a climate with little variance. 
To reach maturity levels higher than Team Spirit, the Control function must come into play, 
which requires that the stable role structure be broken and a culture instilled where 
leadership is delegated. Further development also requires that the team’s established power 
structures be challenged, which seems to be a task that none of these teams was able to 
perform. 
 
 236
12. What You Reward is What You Get 
12.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an answer to research question number 7 outlined 
in section 9.2. The stated strategic objective at the RNoNA is to educate, train, and develop 
officers that are able to apply Auftragstaktik as solutions within today’s and tomorrow’s 
conflicts. As such the RNoNA must “walk the talk” through their reward system. The 
Academy can not operate in contradiction to its own statements because to do so would be to 
attack its own strategic objective, and the result will be confusion and the emergence of 
many noncooperative centers of gravity among both the faculty and cadets. What they 
reward is supposed to express itself in the military development grade (MD grade), which 
according to the Academy is an evaluation of how well each cadet is suited to become as an 
officer in the 21st century. This requires both self-awareness and strategic awareness when it 
comes to performing leadership. The RNoNA further states that: 
A central aspect of the assessment of each cadet’s suitability as an officer is determined by 
ability and willingness to work systematically towards development as an officer. 
Suitability is a result of how much insight and knowledge cadets as officers have about 
themselves and how they apply this when leadership is performed (Sjøkrigsskolen, 2006, p. 
10, my translation) 
To find out what kind of leadership behavior the RNoNA actually rewards, several multiple 
regressions, where the MD grade is the dependent variable, were performed. The first one, 
outlined in section 12.2, applied the SPGR 12-vector and the cadets’ reputations (others 
rating). The second, section 12.3 determined how strongly personality, as measured with 
NEO PI-R, explains the given MD grade. Finally, the SPGR-others and NEO PI-R were 
combined in section 12.4. 
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12.2 The MD Grade and SPGR 
A standard multiple regression was performed between MD Grade as the dependent variable 
and 12-vector SPGR as independent variables. Analysis was performed using SPSS 
REGRESSION and SPSS FREQUENCIES for evaluation of assumptions. Criticism had a 
small positive skewness (1.79) while Resignation and Self-sacrificing had small positive 
skewness (2.13 and 1.98) and a positive kurtosis (5.91 and 4.33). These variables were not 
transformed because in a large sample, a variable with significant skewness often does not 
deviate enough from normality to make a substantive difference in the analyses. 
Underestimation of variance associated with positive kurtosis disappears with samples of 
100 or more cases; with negative kurtosis, underestimation of variance disappears with 
samples of 200 or more (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). The number of outliers was reduced 
by applying the Mahalanobis distance and multivariate outliers were determined by applying 
χ2 at α = .001 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), resulting in deleting two outliers. This resulted 
in an immediate improvement of the model. The next step was to look at measure of 
influence. This was done by applying Cook’s D and students residuals E, cut off by using Di 
> 4 /n—k - 1 and E* = ±2 and (Fox, 1997), resulting in deleting nine influential cases which 
gave a new N of 291. Table 12.1 displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the 
standardized regression coefficients (β), the semi partial correlations (sri2), R2, and adjusted 
R2.  
The R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F(12, 278) = 14.09, p < .001. 
For the three regression coefficients that differed significantly form zero, 95% confidence 
limits were calculated. The confidence limits for Engagement were 0.168 to 0.353, for 
Caring were 0.041 to 0.221, and those for Ruling were 0.009 to 0.162.  
Only three of the IV’s contributed significantly to prediction of the MD grade, (a) 
Engagement (sri2 = .07), (b) Caring (sri2 = .02), and (c) Ruling (sri2 = .02). The SPGR 
vectors in combination contributed another .24 in shared variability. Altogether 38% (35% 
adjusted) of the variability in MD grades was predicted by knowing how others perceived 
each cadet, measured by the SPGR. Although the correlations between MD grade and Task 
orientation (r = .296), Creativity (r = .248), Acceptance (r = -.138), Assertiveness (r = .336), 
Resignation (r = -.342), and Self-sacrificing (r = -.342) were significant, they did not 
contribute significantly to regression. Apparently, the relationship between the MD grade 
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given at the RNoNA and the cadets’ behavior is mediated by the relationship between 
Engagement, Caring, and Ruling.  
Table 12.1 
Multiple Regression of The MD Grade and SPGR 12-Vector - Others Rating 
Variable B SE B β sr2 (unique) 
Engagement 
Caring 
Ruling 
Self-sacrificing 
Assertiveness 
Empathy 
Criticism 
Loyalty 
Creativity 
Acceptance 
Task-orientation 
Resignation 
.260 
.131 
.085 
-.108 
.025 
-.024 
.014 
-.012 
-.013 
-.035 
-.063 
-.108 
.047 
.046 
.039 
.064 
.040 
.055 
.054 
.048 
.029 
.051 
.039 
.067 
.436*** 
.202** 
.180* 
-.127 
.045 
-.032 
.018 
-.016 
-.027 
-.051 
-.135 
-.127 
.07 
.02 
.02 
 
 
 
  Intercept = 0.846  
   R2 = .38a 
Adjusted R2 = .35 
R = .62*** 
.a Unique variability = .11; shared variability = .24. 
Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001  
A similar regression analysis was also performed by applying their SPGR 12-vector self-
ratings as independent variables. R for this regression was also significantly different from 
zero, F(12, 276)= 6.88, p < .001. Here, four of the IV contributed significantly to the 
prediction of the MD grade: Engagement (sri2 = .04), Caring (sri2 = .03), Self-sacrificing 
(sri2 = .03), and Empathy (sri2 = .02). These four IV contributed uniquely 12% of the 
variability, while together with the eight remaining IV they contributed another 11% in 
shared variability. Altogether, 23% (20% adjusted) of the variability in the MD grade was 
predicted by the self-rating on the SPGR 12-vector. This reveals, however, a difference 
between self-rating and observers rating. The most interesting part is that Empathy is 
negatively related to the MD grade, which should be of some concern. This also tells us that 
the reputation (peer ratings) explained much more of the variability of the MD grade than 
the cadets’ own perception. It also indicates that the RNoNA perception, represented 
primarily by their facilitators, of the cadets’ reputations explains much more of the 
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variability of this grade than their own identities. This finding also supports the findings that 
their “identity” is not in alignment with their “reputation” as measured with the SPGR. It 
also indicates that the MD grade is a result largely of visible behavior, which implies a lack 
of connoisseurship and appreciation among the facilitators because they only reward visible 
leadership behavior.  
12.3 The MD Grade and Personality 
An analysis was performed by applying a standard multiple regression between MD Grade 
as the dependent variable and NEO PI-R facets as independent variables. Initial analyses 
were performed on both domain and facet levels. These analyses revealed that the facets 
predicted the MD grade much more accurately than did the domains. Outliers were checked 
by applying the Mahalanobis distance and multivariate outliers were determined by applying 
χ2 at α = .001 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). The initial step indicated 8 outliers. Deletion of 
these, however, did not improve the model, and as a result they were retained. The next step 
was to look at measure of influence. This was done by applying Cook’s D and students 
residuals E, cut off by using Di > 4/ n—k - 1 and E* = ±2 and (Fox, 1997), resulting in 
deleting those cases with a high influence, resulting in a new N of 295. Table 12.2 displays 
the M and SD, unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression 
coefficients (β), the semipartial correlations (sri2) and R2, and adjusted R2 for the best model. 
The R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F(12, 28) = 9.03, p < .001. 
For the ten regression coefficients that differed significantly form zero, 95% confidence 
limits were calculated. The confidence limits for Assertiveness were 0.027 to 0.050; for Self-
Discipline, 0.008 to 0.035; Activity, 0.005 to 0.030; Values, 0.002 to 0.023; Self-
Consciousness, 0.003 to 0.030; Dutifulness, -0.028 to -0.005; Ideas, -0.018 to -0.003; 
Gregariousness, -0.027 to -0.002; and those for Tender-Mindedness were -0.027 to -0.002. 
Ten of the IV’s contributed significantly to a positive prediction of the MD grade: 
Assertiveness (sri2 = .11), Self-Discipline (sri2 = .03), Activity (sri2 = .02), Values (sri2 = 
.02), Self-Consciousness (sri2 = .01), Dutifulness (sri2 = .02), Ideas (sri2 = .02), 
Gregariousness (sri2 = .01), and Tender-Mindedness (sri2 = .01). The remaining NEO PI-R 
facets in combination did not contribute to the variability. Altogether 25% (22% adjusted) of 
the variability in MD grades was predicted by NEO PI-R facets. 
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Table 12.2  
Multiple Regressions of the MD Grade and the NEO PI-R Facets 
Variable M/SD B SE B β sr2 (unique) 
E3 Assertiveness 
 
N4 Self-Consciousness 
 
E4 Activity 
 
O6 Values 
 
E1 Warmth 
 
C5 Self-Discipline  
 
A6 Tender-Mindedness 
 
C3 Dutifulness 
 
O5 Ideas 
 
A2 Straightforwardness 
 
C6 Deliberation 
 
E2 Gregariousness 
 
54.64 
(8.98) 
47.18 
(8.21) 
52.21 
(7.62) 
48.85 
(8.02) 
50.17 
(7.60)  
52.27 
(8.81) 
46.79 
(7.31) 
51.94 
(9.23) 
50.22 
(11.32) 
 
48.01 
(9.12) 
50.10 
(8.95)  
51.69 
(8.01) 
.040 
 
.023 
 
.019 
 
.013 
 
.016 
 
.013 
 
-0.16 
 
-.015 
 
-.008 
 
 
.010 
 
.009 
 
-.011 
 
.006 
 
.006 
 
.006 
 
.005 
 
.006 
 
.006 
 
.006 
 
.005 
 
.004 
 
 
.005 
 
.005 
 
.006 
 
.484*** 
 
.261*** 
 
.198** 
 
.144** 
 
.166* 
 
.161* 
 
-.162** 
 
-.182* 
 
-.125* 
 
 
.118 
 
.161 
 
-.120 
 
.13 
 
.04 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
.01 
 
.02 
 
.01 
 
.01 
 
 
   Intercept = -1.610 
    R2 = .28a 
Adjusted R2 = .25 
R = .53*** 
a Unique variability = .28; shared variability = .0 
Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.  
Apparently, the relationship between the MD grade given at the RNoNA and personality is 
mediated by the relationship between these ten facets. They reveal an interesting pattern. 
The Academy rewards those who are dominant, forceful, and decisive—cadets who speak 
without hesitation. As seen in the previous analyses on team level, sections 12.2 to 12.5, a 
pattern emerged characterized by a few dominant and submissive cadets, with a group of 
cadets in-between, also see Chapter 13 for a detailed discussion of this pattern. A one-way 
between-groups ANOVA with post hoc test revealed that there was a statistically significant 
difference at the p < .01 level in MD grade for the three groups of cadets [F(2,299) = 17.96, 
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p <.001, η2 = .11]. Post hoc comparison using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean 
MD grade for the “dominant” cadets (M=3.44, SD= .69) was significantly higher than for the 
“submissive” cadets (M= 2.70, SD= .81). The “dominant” cadets did not differ significantly 
from the “other” cadets (M= 3.32, SD= .76), but the “other” cadets were given significantly 
better MD grades than the “submissive” ones. This indicates that the “dominant” are 
rewarded, even if the difference was not statistically significant. 
The facet O6, Openness to Values, indicates the readiness to reexamine social, political, and 
religious values. When the cadets with the outstanding MD grade, A, (N = 16) were 
compared with those given low MD grades, D and E (N = 33), the outstanding ones had an 
average higher score on Values (M = 49.44, SD = 10.58) compared with the low MDs’ [M = 
46.73, SD = 6.82]. This difference, however, was not significant. High scorers on Values are 
generally described as tolerant, broad-minded, nonconforming, and open-minded. It would 
be difficult, however to describe those given the highest MD grade, A, in this manner. To 
further investigate this potential discrepancy, an independent t-sample test was carried out to 
see how those high on this facet, T > 55, were MD-graded compared to the others cadets. 
The high O6 (Openness to Values) scorers were given a significantly lower MD grade (M = 
3.2, SD = .77) against [M = 3.5, SD = .77, t(297) = 2.219, p < .027, d = .26, η2 = .02]. 
Although the magnitude in the means was small, I believe it would be misleading to 
conclude that the academy rewards those who are tolerant, broad-minded, nonconforming, 
and open-minded. The average scores in these areas as seen in Table 12.2 are also below 
average, T = 50, which indicates that these traits are not highly rewarded by the Academy. 
The regression analyses also indicate a significantly negative relationship between the MD 
grade and the neurotic facets Depression and Self-Consciousness because low scores are 
perceived as being better than high scores. A one-way between-group ANOVA where the 
cadets were classified according to NEO PI-R’s low (< 45), normal (45-55) and high (56 > ) 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992) revealed that those high on both Depression and Self-
Consciousness received better MD grades, but the difference was not significant. It is 
important to keep in mind that low scorers on N4, Self-Consciousness, do not necessarily 
have grace or good social skills; they are simply less disturbed by awkward social situations 
(Piedmont, 1998). 
The most interesting part of this result was that Dutifulness, Ideas, Gregariousness, and 
Tender-Mindedness influenced the MD grade negatively. High Gregariousness and Tender-
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Mindedness make sense because too much of other people’s company, always seeking social 
contact, might indicate a lack of independence, while being friendly, warm, kind, and gentle 
might give the impression of not being able to cope with demanding situations. More 
surprising was that to be perceived as dependable, mannerly, organized, and thorough 
influenced the MD grade negatively. Being too open for ideas indicates that a cadet is 
intellectually curious, analytical, and theoretically oriented, which are traits that traditionally 
do not fit in well in a Doing culture. By rewarding a high energy Doing culture, the reward 
system at the RNoNA does not support the transformation towards managing conflicts on the 
more subtle mental level. Instead, the Academy tends to reward only that which is visible 
and which represents the traditional focus on the physical level.  
12.4 MD Grade and the SPGR and Personality Combined 
The last regression that was performed was the SPGR others rating and NEO PI-R in 
combination. Table 12.3 displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the 
standardized regression coefficients (β), the semipartial correlations (sri2) and R2, and 
adjusted R2 for the best model. 
The R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F(12, 269) = 12.46, p < .001. 
This regression confirms the previous ones. It also illustrates, once again, that reputation 
provides the strongest impact. Both E3, Assertiveness, and S1, Engagement, explained the 
MD grade, but now to a lesser degree, which is only normal because there is correlation 
between these two of r =.43, see Appendix G and Table G4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 243
Table 12.3  
Multiple Regressions of MD Grades and SPGR 12-Vector and NEO PI-R Facets. 
Variable B SE B β sr2 (unique) 
N1 Caring 
C2 Ruling 
S1 Engagement 
W1 Self-sacrificing 
N4 Self-Consciousness 
E3 Assertiveness 
E1 Warmth 
C5 Self-Discipline 
C1 Competence 
A2 Straightforwardness 
O6 Values 
E4 Activity 
C3 Dutifulness 
O5 Ideas 
A6 Tender mindedness 
E2 Gregariousness 
.142 
.064 
.092 
-.077 
.024 
.019 
.017 
.015 
.014 
.009 
.009 
.010 
-.015 
-.009 
-.012 
-.012 
.035 
.027 
.042 
.044 
.006 
.006 
.006 
.006 
.029 
.005 
.005 
.006 
.005 
.004 
.005 
.006 
.224*** 
.137* 
.158* 
-.101 
.252*** 
.226** 
.177** 
.168* 
.145* 
.110* 
.092 
.105 
-.185** 
-.142** 
-.116* 
-.124* 
.03 
.01 
.01 
 
.03 
.02 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.01 
 
 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.01 
  Intercept = -2.029  
   R2 = .43a 
Adjusted R2 = .39 
R = .65*** 
a Unique variability = .20; shared variability = . 23. 
Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001  
12.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of the performed regression analyses and the discussion above suggest that what 
the RNoNA says it values and what it actually rewards differ greatly. The stated objective is 
to develop leaders who can apply Auftragstaktik and who therefore can command groups 
capable of dealing successfully with the types of unstructured, rapidly developing 
“asymmetric” situations that most strategists predict will characterize future conflicts. In 
fact, the RNoNA tends to reward only highly visible, forceful, and aggressive styles and it 
does not seem to appreciate the deeper and more complex aspects of leadership behavior. 
This indicates almost none or little has changed since the “Lieberg commission” evaluated 
the educational programs at the Norwegian service academies in 1990. Although this was 
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not an academically rigorous undertaking, the commission concluded that the education 
focused too much on “system thinking” and conformity to rules. They stated that: 
The cadets’ learning process is a continuous search for the Academy or the “system’s” 
solutions, or the “correct” solution instead of searching for optimal solutions on 
complicated problems. This conformity and rule obedience does not enhance creativity or 
stimulate leadership development (Forsvarsdepartementet, 1990, p. 49, my translation) 
The result reported here seem to support their statement. One possible explanation to these 
results might be found at looking at the leadership facilitators at the Academy. These results 
suggest that they lack the ability to be connoisseurs of leadership, at least of the style of 
leadership required for future conflict in the Gap. This becomes apparent when we look at 
their own orientation of what behavior that constitutes a “good officer”, see Figure 12.161. 
Their ideal officer clearly points toward an officer at the maturity level of Team Spirit, 
indicating an outdated social cognition of the behaviors needed to perform well in a 4th GW 
environment.  
 
Figure 12.1  The SPGR 12-Vector Profiles of the Facilitators at the RNoNA 
Perception of the “Good Officer” 
 
                                                 
61 This 12-vector SPGR profile is 13 officers’ average rating of what they considered to be a “good officer.” These officers 
worked as facilitators at the RNoNA during the time these data were collected. 
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This officer showed a large imbalance between Control (M = 3.81, SD = .86) and Nurture [M 
= 6.41, SD = 1.68, t(12 )= -4.518, d = 2.61], which indicates a dominating Nurture function. 
It is also worth noting that Acceptance is almost as high as Loyalty. This together with a low 
Control function might indicate that they as facilitators, are not willing to or able to facilitate 
when the teams need to challenge their role structures, something that is necessary in order 
to develop and reach a higher maturity level. In particular, facilitators must challenge their 
teams to examine and if necessary change their orientations. This might be one explanation 
why the “dominant” cadets tend to be rewarded. At the maturity level Team Spirit, these 
cadets will stand out because within this culture, these energetic cadets are perceived as 
leader-like. They are organized, thorough, energetic, capable and efficient, which fits well 
with a high Doing and Mastery culture, and they consider themselves to be energetic, fast-
paced, and vigorous, which is fully in accordance with what is needed at the maturity level 
Team Spirit. Because both Nurture and Dependence are dominant functions at this level, 
these teams tend to expect and to accept that someone will act as strong leader, taking and 
showing responsibility, while trying to solve the challenges they are currently facing. These 
are things the “dominant” cadets will do. These cadets’ leadership behaviors are filling the 
teams’ “gaps” at the Control function, Ruling and Task-Orientation, which is carried out in 
combination with a high level of Engagement. Their leadership behaviors, although flawed, 
are intended to make a positive impression on an outside observer, and they do, as these 
regression analyses confirm. They do not, however, necessarily have a positive effect on 
those who experience their leadership behavior first hand. Dominant cadets might seem 
confident and even charismatic, but over time as this dissertation has shown, these features 
turned into a sense of entitlement and an inability to learn from mistakes and develop—
behavior for which they have been rewarded. 
Another possible explanation might be that because the facilitators must grade the cadets’ 
suitabilities as officers, they tend to look for the hard facts that can be defended in the 
grading process. This need for recordable data might well influence what they perceive to be 
good leadership, and once again their own orientation becomes central. These explanations 
may also work together, and in any case, they aggravate the challenge of leadership 
development at the RNoNA. 
A facilitator’s primary task is to assist the cadets in the leadership development process. In 
this case, as illustrated with Figure 12.1, they are supposed to enhance a development that 
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goes against their own perception of what defines a good officer, which makes this a hard if 
not an impossible endeavor. It should be pointed out, however, that the facilitators’ 
perception and orientation is found in throughout the Navy (Fauskanger, 2006; Larsen & 
Johannessen). Simply put, their appreciations are not able to provide assessment when it 
comes to developing those officers needed in future conflicts. They are not connoisseurs of 
that leadership style and their criticisms do not function as midwives for it. Their implicit 
understanding and orientation of what defines a good officer do not align with the 
Academy’s official Schwerpunkt. As a result, the RNoNA has several Schwerpunkts: the 
official one from the Academy (Auftragstaktik), the facilitators’, and the cadets’. Because 
the facilitators themselves are not reoriented but bring the conventional orientation with 
them, they lack the ability to perceive the desired leadership behavior, which is a subtle and 
complex undertaking that requires them to question their own definition and labeling of 
leadership.  The facilitators’ orientation is more in alignment with the cadets’ and such it is 
difficult to appreciate and spot the necessary mismatches need to enhance development. This 
issue could most likely be solved by training and preparing the facilitators to appreciate the 
required leadership style. 
The result and the answer to research question number seven is that the reward system 
represented with the MD grade at the RNoNA does not promote leadership behavior that is 
in accordance with Auftragstaktik. It tends to reinforce the existing culture, which makes 
change even harder. This is a theme of utmost importance because it addresses the 
Norwegian Armed Forces’ ability to engage successfully in future conflict and must be dealt 
with in a constructive way. 
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13. Leadership Development and the Social 
Interaction Pattern 
13.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the complex process of leadership development in 
greater detail, and as such, it is an elaboration of research question number 4 outlined in 
section 9.2. The focus will be on the social interaction pattern found in chapter 11, where in 
each team, one or two cadets tended to dominate, and they most likely hampered the 
leadership development, resulting in a maturity level of Team Spirit. The question of the 
type of behavior that will emerge as a result of the leadership development program at the 
RNoNA must be asked with each new cohort, with each new situation, and with each new 
team and new team member. This is the situation that every leader confronts on a daily basis 
and the Academy instructor every hour. This issue will be addressed in section 13.2, which 
will focus on the pattern that was found as a result of the in-depth team analyses in chapter 
11. Section 13.3 focuses on the implications of the imbalance found in personality traits, 
while section 13.4 addresses the importance of strategic self-awareness and its 
consequences. Section 13.5 will discuss the necessary ingredients for any leadership 
development program aiming at expanding role-taking ability. The chapter is summarized in 
section 13.6  
13.2 The Essentials of Social Interaction  
The aim of this section is to apply the SPGR data to analyze the dominant social interaction 
pattern found in chapter 11. Leadership development could be characterized as releasing a 
type of potential energy, making it available for doing work and thereby dissipating entropy.  
As discussed in chapter 4, an effective strategy for leadership development is to increase the 
role repertoire of group members, which enables the degree of role swapping that leads to 
the maturity level Innovation required for Aufstragtaktik. When applied to leadership 
development, this requires the ability to see beyond the current roles of the members—
beyond what the group is currently capable of—and to develop a deep understanding, to 
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become a connoisseur, of leadership and appreciate the more subtle interactions. This 
requires reorientation, which is a change in the characterization of what is relevant toward an 
attitude of “becoming relevant.” It is the team’s dynamic social interaction patterns that 
determine how process and interaction will matter and matter together. I will first turn to the 
SPGR results and then the NEO PI-R results found in chapter 11. 
13.2.1 The SPGR Results  
The SPGR analyses at the team level for the different cohorts presented in sections 11.2 to 
11.5 revealed a disturbing yet consistent pattern, where one or several dominant cadets 
inhibited the leadership development process. The analyses also demonstrated how this 
dynamic, or more precisely lack of dynamic, tended to create a static social interaction 
pattern with fixed roles within the teams, resulting in submissive and accepting behavior by 
some of the cadets. A thorough analysis of the different SPGR field diagrams revealed that 
this pattern was established early in the leadership development program, and thus it should 
have and could have been dealt with in a more constructive manner that could have led to 
leadership development. The different SPGR analyses covered four different cohorts, 42 
teams, and 302 cadets. Out of these 302 cadets, 45 were classified to be relatively dominant 
within their teams, while 60 were considered to be submissive (with an average score lower 
than -.50 on the Z-dimension). This left a group of 197 cadets between “dominant” and 
“submissive.” The average positions of these three groups in the SPGR field diagram are 
illustrated in Figure 13.1.  
The dominant cadets were less group-oriented (the X-axis), more task oriented (the Y-axis), 
and more influential (the Z-dimension, Z-axis) compared to the two other groups of cadets. 
The group labeled “others” seems to balance the different basic functions better than both 
the dominant and submissive cadets, see Figure 13.1.  
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Figure 13.1  The SPGR Field Diagram of the “Dominant,” “Others,” and 
“Submissive” Cadets 
 
The 12-vector profiles, Figure 13.2, and analyses presented in Table 13.1 show a large 
difference on Empathy, and the post hoc comparison applying the Games-Howell indicated 
that the Dominant cadets showed significantly less of this behavior than both the “others” 
and the “submissive” ones at the p < .01 level.  
As officers, they were not interested in understanding and listening to their team members. 
Their behavior moved the team away from satisfaction with interpersonal relations, and they 
were more critical, self-centered, provocative, and self-sufficient (Criticism) than the two 
other groups, showing a high level of disagreement and unfriendly behavior that was 
significant at the p < .01 level compared with both groups. As team members and leaders, 
these cadets tended to reject, refuse, or even purposefully ignore their other team members. 
At the same time, they showed much more assertive, tough, and competitive behaviors that 
were significant at the p < .01 level. This behavior contributed to moving the team away 
from the satisfaction that could have been obtained from positive interpersonal relationships 
and climate. 
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                                                                 “Dominant” 
       
                             “Others”                                                              “Submissive”  
Figure 13.2  The Average SPGR 12-Vector Profiles of the ”Dominant-” 
“Others-” and “Submissive” Cadets 
 
This was further fueled by an authoritarian, controlling, and pedantic leadership behavior 
that did not inspire positive feelings among the other team members. These cadets as group 
were unable to reward others, focusing only on getting the job done even at considerable 
cost. They willingly sacrificed satisfaction with interpersonal relations for satisfaction with 
task-achievement. Task-achievement was gained by trying to be efficient, analytical, and 
rational while they controlled (micromanaged) their team members in their pursuit of 
assigned goals. Because of their lower Loyalty, which was significant at the p < .01 level 
compared with both other groups, these cadets were less willing to carry out tasks when they 
were not in the formal leadership role. This was reinforced by their lesser Acceptance of 
their team members, which was significant at the p < .01 level. Only when the “dominant” 
cadets were compared with the “submissive” ones were there significant differences at the p 
< .01 level on inspiring and inviting others to contribute.  
 251
Table 13.1  
SPGR 12-Vector One-way ANOVA of the “Dominant,” “Others,” and “Submissive” 
Cadets,  
SPGR vectors Dominate Others Submissive    
 M/SD 
(N = 45) 
M/SD 
(N = 197) 
M/SD 
(N = 60) 
F Sig. η2 
S2: Empathy  6.07 
(.85) 
7.30 
(1.01) 
7.65 
(.78) 
40.68 .001 .21 
N1: Caring 6.52 
(.93) 
7.14 
(1.12) 
6.07 
(1.33) 
22.78 .001 .13 
D2: Acceptance 5.22 
(.86) 
6.41 
(1.07) 
6.93 
(.91) 
38.24 .001 .20 
N2: Creativity 5.23 
(1.22) 
4.88 
(1.60) 
3.63 
(1.46) 
19.12 .001 .11 
O1: Criticism 2.90 
(1.17) 
1.84 
(.88) 
2.05 
(1.10) 
18.70 .001 ..11 
W1: Resignation 1.60 
(.70) 
1.59 
(.77) 
2.67 
(1.43) 
31.23 .001 .17 
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.48 
(.61) 
1.64 
(.80) 
2.82 
(1.53) 
26.82 .001 .15 
O2: Assertiveness 5.35 
(1.02) 
4.14 
(1.22) 
2.89 
(.99) 
59.42 .001 .28 
C2: Ruling 5.81 
(1.47) 
4.29 
(1.43) 
2.76 
(.96) 
65.63 .001 .31 
D1: Loyalty 6.42 
(.96) 
7.10 
(1.01) 
7.44 
(1.11) 
13.08 .001 .08 
C1: Task orientation 6.06 
(1.31) 
4.36 
(1.36) 
2.83 
(1.25) 
75.73 .001 .34 
S1: Engagement 7.57 
(.96) 
7.49 
(1.05) 
5.58 
(1.34) 
73.62 .001 .33 
Note: The Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance indicates a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance for vectors: C2: Ruling, S2 Empathy, O1: Criticism, O2: Assertiveness, W1: Resignation, and W2: Self-
sacrificing. O1, W1, and W2 were transformed according to the guidelines in Tabachnik & Fidell (2001) so they 
did not violate this assumption, while this could not be done for C2, S2, and O2, which indicates that an inaccurate 
F value is reported for these vectors.  To confirm these results a Kruska-Wallis Test was performed on C2, S2 and 
O2. This test confirmed the results reported above.   
 
The “submissive” cadets’ profiles indicate that these cadets needed to be told or even 
ordered what to do. They lacked initiative and were not able to balance the basic SPGR 
functions: They were low on task-oriented behavior, they were not sociable, warm nor 
protective, and they also lacked the ability to inspire others. At the same time they were 
obedient and conforming and accepted those tasks they were ordered to do, but these were 
often carried out in a sacrificing, self-pitying, and complaining way. Perhaps the most 
worrying pattern with this group of cadets was that they possessed a self-centered, 
provocative and unruly behavior in combination with Resignation and Self-sacrificing. 
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Because of their low influence, which most likely was a result of a high Withdrawal 
function, they did not state their opinions about the different issues within in the team. This 
might indicate a dysfunctional behavior, where they moved away from their team members 
because their strategy for managing their own security was primarily by avoiding contact 
with others and, when needed, to be obedient and conforming. 
In general these findings revealed a pattern that did not and could not foster a development 
towards implementing Auftragstaktik, and as shown, it defiantly hampered the leadership 
development process. To gain further insight into this pattern, a similar analysis was carried 
out on the NEO PI-R data applying the categorization found with the SPGR.  
13.2.2 The NEO PI-R Results 
The NEO PI-R result was consistent with the SPGR findings, revealing a pattern in which 
the dominant cadets lacked the maturity needed to expand their leadership roles. They 
seemed unable to think about themselves from the perspective of others and they lacked 
role-taking ability. This strongly points toward a lack of dynamic balance—the ability to 
shift rapidly among the basic SPGR functions, as described in section 4.4—that is necessary 
if increased Synergy is the goal. This lack of agility indicates a static leadership behavior, 
which results in predictable OODA loops and they are not, and most likely will not become, 
able to play the interaction and isolation game in modern conflict situations. Alport (1961) 
noted that maturity involves tolerance, a capacity to develop and maintain close 
relationships, and self-insight. The mature person is perceived as resilient, unselfish, and 
able to laugh at himself or herself. We know, according to Hogan and Roberts (2003), that 
maturity as seen from the inside is reflected in greater adjustment and role-taking ability, 
which within the FFM translates to higher Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness, and 
Emotional stability/Neuroticism.  
Maturity from the outside is reflected in a reputation for being Agreeable, 
Conscientiousness, and Emotionally Stable (N) (Hogan & Roberts, 2003). This indicates that 
Agreeableness is an important domain for effective leadership. As can be seen in Table 13.2, 
the “dominant” cadets scored significantly lower on this domain than the two other groups, a 
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difference significant at the p < .01 level62. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Barrick et al., (1998) that when a team member lacked desirable interpersonal traits, that 
member could negatively affect team processes and performance.  
Table 13.2  
NEO PI-R One-way ANOVA Between “Dominant,” “Others,” and “Submissive” 
Cadets 
 Dominate Others Submissive    
 M/SD 
(N=43) 
M/SD 
(N=203) 
M/SD 
(N=60) 
F Sig. η2 
N2: Angry Hostility 50.79 
(8.83) 
46.37 
(7.80) 
44.70 
(6.62) 
8.68 .001 .05 
N4: Self-Consciousness 44.72 
(9.03) 
47.15 
(8.00) 
49.40 
(7.94) 
4.18 .016 .03 
N6: Vulnerability 47.00 
(4.65) 
48.69 
(7.54) 
50.48 
(7.24) 
3.05 .049 .02 
EKSTRAVERTION 55.63 
(7.43) 
53.98 
(7.60) 
50.67 
(7.58) 
6.29 .002 .04 
E3: Assertiveness 61.58 
(6.78) 
54.73 
(8.45) 
48.37 
(7.85) 
 33.54 .001 .18 
E4: Activity         55.07 
(7.36) 
52.60 
(7.36) 
48.35 
(7.62) 
11.59 .001 .07 
AGREEABLENESS 41.37 
(6.30) 
48.33 
(8.12) 
50.28 
(7.41) 
18.30 .001 .11 
A1: Trust 46.63 
(8.18) 
51.54 
(8.56) 
52.05 
(8.28) 
6.23 .002 .04 
A2: Straightforwardness 43.98 
(8.22) 
48.56 
(9.26) 
49.55 
(8.69) 
5.54 .004 .04 
A3: Altruism 42.98 
(8.84) 
51.63 
(9.04) 
51.65 
(8.08) 
17.74 .001 .10 
A4: Compliance 40.60 
(6.64) 
47.36 
(7.61) 
50.38 
(5.85) 
24.07 .001 .14 
A5: Modesty 46.21 
(8.16) 
47.25 
(7.81) 
49.70 
(6.98) 
3.14 .045 .02 
C1: Competence 54.00 
(6.26) 
55.25 
(8.78) 
52.18 
(8.14) 
3.20 .042 .02 
C6: Deliberation 45.44 
(10.35) 
50.85 
(8.51) 
50.19 
(8.20) 
7.48 .001 .05 
  
This becomes more pronounced when the least agreeable member is also the one with most 
influence, E3, Assertiveness. The “bad apples’’” results on Agreeableness were also 
significantly lower than for people in general, Cohen’s d = 1.03. This indicates that they had 
                                                 
62 The Games-Howell procedure was applied in the post hoc procedure.  
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trouble balancing their egoistic and altruistic impulses because they had problems trusting 
and accepting other people.  
They were not able to be self-critical and restrain their own self-accepting tendencies. They 
also experienced higher levels of anger and related states such as frustration and bitterness 
(N2), and on these, their level was significantly higher than the two other groups at the p < 
.01 level. Their low score on Agreeableness implies that this anger was expressed toward the 
team. Although their score was within the normal range compared with the general 
population, the effect was not strong. Their low Agreeableness was made worse by their 
high E3, Assertiveness, and their lack of any tendency to think carefully before acting. This 
is indicated by their low score on C6, Deliberation. On both of these two facets, the 
difference was significant at the p < .01 level. The NEO PI-R results also revealed that 
submissive cadets’ scores as a group were within the “norm” range (T scores from 45 to 55). 
They were significantly less Assertive than the remaining cadets at the p <. 01 level, 
although these cadets as a group seemed to be as assertive as people in general. 
This might indicate that personality scores within the “norm” range may not be a valid 
predictor of leadership behavior63, and from a selection point of view, this indicates a need 
for multiple selection approaches. 
13.2.3 Summary 
The SPGR results, together with the NEO PI-R results, revealed a clear and striking result. 
Approximately 50% of the cadets64 (103 of 207) seemed to lack role-taking ability. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a lack of role-taking ability leads to lack of adaptation, which will 
restrict the group’s performance in highly unstructured situations. An outward focus would 
have manifested itself in a commitment to social causes, putting aside one’s own selfish 
interests for a collective effort. Another important finding was a uniformly low maturity 
level. An important indication of maturity according to Hogan and Roberts (2003) is the 
degree to which a person is self-accepting while at the same time realizing that people are 
                                                 
63 Foster & Hogan (2006) used scores above the 65th percentile on the Hogan Personnel Inventory when they labeled 
individuals as having high leadership potential, which would indicate a T-score lower than 45 on Neuroticism, and higher 
than 55 on the remaining domains 
64 The figures applied here are from Table 11.2  
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not perfect. Within the context of leadership development, mature cadets will listen carefully 
to negative feedback from others and especially others with less status than themselves. This 
is an attitude that too many (35%) of these cadets lacked, and if it had been present it would 
most likely have resulted in a significantly more positive leadership development at the 
RNoNA.  
These results points toward the importance of balance among the SPGR functions, Influence 
versus Passivity. In appendix G two Pearson’s product moment correlations tables between 
SPGR (self and peer ratings) and NEO PI-R are presented. It is especially worth noticing 
how strong the correlations were between the NEO PI-R facet E3 Assertiveness and the Z-
dimension, r = .55, and r = 52 for the Control function for peer ratings. But as shown, the 
important issue is where the dominant cadet is located in the SPGR Field diagram. The 
SPGR functions seem to cover the related behavioral aspects of the FFM very well, the 
overall correlations are in general below medium, indicating a small to medium overlap, 
which indicates that the SPGR, which measures behavior, and NEO PI-R, which measures 
personality traits, are different but related. 
The next section will examine more closely the three personality matrixes found at the 
RNoNA—The Learning style Matrix, The Attitude Matrix, and The Character Matrix—that 
might contribute to the lack of leadership development. 
13.3 The Importance of the Openness, Agreeablenes and 
Conscientiousness Domains 
The results on personality measured with the NEO PI-R indicated a strong imbalance 
between the Openness and Conscientiousness domains. The same imbalance was also found 
by Nordvik, Moldejord, and Gravråkmo (2005). They reported the average NEO PI-R score 
of 516 cadets at Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, (p. 152-153), which on 
Conscientiousness was 55.1 (SD = 9.0), while their score on the Openness domain was 46.9 
(SD = 9.8). This gives a large imbalance, indicated by a large Cohen’s d = .87. Their results 
are consistent with the findings in this dissertation concerning these issues. The findings 
among those who have applied for the Officer Candidate School in the Navy since 2004 and 
the services academies since 2005 show exactly the same pattern. The patterns found are 
interesting and important when it comes to leadership development. 
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The Consciousness and Openness domains make up the “Learning style” matrix (Costa & 
McCrae, 1998). By dividing the cadets by their T score using the values of 48 and 52, which 
was done to avoid including too many who lacked a clear style or preference, some 
interesting patterns were found, as can be seen in Table 13.3. The results show that a 
majority of the cadets, because of their low score on Openness, are not willing to let outer 
events—like the leadership development program at the RNoNA—impact their inner lives 
or let the potential of such an impact on their inner dynamics find expression in their outer 
behavior.  
Table 13.3  
The NEO 4 Learning Style Matrix 
 
O+ C-; Dreamers O+ C+; Good Students 
12.1 % 26.7 % 
They are attracted to new ideas with imaginative 
elaborations, but they may get lost in flights of 
fancy. They are good at starting innovative 
projects, but they are less successful in completing 
them and may need help in staying focused. They 
are able to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 
Although they are not necessarily more intelligent 
than others, they combine a real love of learning 
with the diligence and organization to excel. They 
have a high aspiration level and are often creative in 
their approach to solving problems. They are likely 
to go as far academically as their gifts allow. 
O- C- ; Reluctant Scholars O- C+; By-the-Bookers 
24.2 % 37.1 % 
Academic and intellectual pursuits are not their 
strengths or preference. They need special 
incentives to start learning and to stick with it. 
They may need help in organizing their work and 
reminders to keep them on schedule. They may 
have problems maintaining attention. 
 
These individuals are diligent, methodical and 
organized, and they abide by all the rules, but they 
lack imagination and prefer step-by-step 
instructions. They excel at rote learning but have 
difficulties with questions that have no right answer. 
They have a need for structure and closure. 
Note: N = 240 of 306, indicating that 22 % of the cadets are likely to show some features of any or of all the styles.  
 
Those high on Openness, on the other hand, have a value system that is available for 
evaluation and modification: Their inner world is always being “updated” as new 
information becomes available. Their internal orientations tend to match well with the 
ongoing events in the environment. Closed individuals, in contrast, have more rigid and 
fixed orientations, where the commitment to tradition and respect for authority restrict 
opportunities for change and development. Such fixed orientations do not need nor will they 
accept updates. Their belief appears to be that what is already in place will protect them, no 
matter what happens in their environments. The results in Table 13.3 indicate that the 
majority of the cadets lack the ability to adapt: Only 26.7% of them are well suited and 
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might be able to thrive in uncertainty, make sense of complex environments, provide 
solutions in ambiguous situations, and help others to do the same. Such adaptability involves 
the capacity to quickly learn one’s way out problems and not expect to be able to simply 
apply previous solutions. 
Judge et al. (2002) showed in their review that there was no relationship between Leadership 
and the traits Openness and Agreeableness when the study setting was government or 
military. One of the reasons, they speculated, was that Openness is not considered to be 
important within military organizations because these cultures tend to be highly rule 
oriented, which might suppress dispositional effects (Judge et al., 2002), Such cultures are 
often characterized by a low level of discretion where the shared assumption is that the 
situation (rules and regulations), rather than their personalities, controls how organizational 
members behave. As has been shown, however, in modern conflict the Openness trait is 
important because open leaders are more creative and divergent thinkers, they are risk 
takers, and because their tendencies for esoteric thinking and fantasy (McCrae, 1996) make 
them more likely to be the type of visionary leaders needed for future conflict.  
When the Openness domain is combined with the Agreeableness domain, they make up the 
“Attitude matrix” (Costa & McCrae, 1998), which is presented in table 13.4. Agreeableness 
reflects a style or philosophy towards life and reflects one’s orientation toward others, an 
evaluation of how one perceives the motives, intentions, and goals of others. Agreeable 
people tend to see the best in others and wish to reach out to them, while those with low 
Agreeableness tend to see others as being disingenuous and self-oriented, and therefore view 
others with suspicion and distrust (Piedmont, 1998). The Attitude matrix reveals that the 
Navy will have a great challenge when it comes to playing the interaction and isolation game 
because there are too few “adapters” and too many rigid and inflexible officers. The results 
presented in the Table 13.4 must be seen together with the “Character matrix” presented in 
Table 13.5. 
 
 
Table 13.4  
NEO 4 Attitude Matrix 
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O+ A-; Free Thinkers O+ A+; Progressives 
22.0 % 18.1 % 
They are critical thinkers who are swayed neither by 
tradition nor by sentimentality. They consider all 
views but then make their own judgments about 
right and wrong, and they are willing to disregard 
others’ feelings in pursuing their own idea of the 
truth. 
They take a thoughtful approach to social problems 
and are willing to try new solutions. They have faith 
in human nature and are confident that society can 
be improved through education, innovation, and 
cooperation. They believe in reason and being 
reasonable. 
 
O- A-; Resolute Believers O- A+; Traditionalists 
41.8 % 18.1 % 
These individuals have strong and unchanging 
beliefs about social policies and personal morality. 
Because they view human nature with considerable 
skepticism, they support strict discipline and a get-
tough approach to social problems. They expect 
everyone to follow the rules. 
 
These individuals rely on the values and beliefs of 
their family and heritage in seeking the best way for 
people to live. They feel that following the 
established rules without questions is the best way 
to ensure peace and prosperity for everyone. 
 
Note: N = 232 of 306, indicating that 24 % of the cadets are likely to show some features of any or of all the styles.  
 
The Character matrix consists of the two domains, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness 
(Costa & McCrae, 1998). The character matrix indicates that only 29.2% of these cadets 
could be classified as officers with character (see Piedmont, 1998), which combine high A 
and high C. Low Agreeableness and Low Conscientiousness, 7.2% of the cadets, represent a 
selfish, manipulative style that tries to find immediate gratification for personal needs. Other 
people are valued only in terms of what they can offer. This is a combination that is 
frequently found with the Antisocial and Passive-Aggressive Personality disorders 
(Piedmont, 1998).  
On the other hand, Effective Altruists, who are mature and able to balance the “getting 
ahead” with “getting along,” may be described as the antithesis of the psychopath. Self-
promoters are only concerned with getting ahead, and there is an overwhelming possibility 
that their lack of interpersonal skills might derail the team’s performance.  
The results shown in the Learning style, Attitude, and Character matrixes define a climate 
that was not suited for leadership development. The cadets’ rigid and fixed value systems 
and their suspicion of and distrust towards other people kept the leadership development 
program from being able to penetrate the cadets’ orientations, making reorientation and 
development impossible and limiting their role-taking abilities. 
Table 13.5  
 259
NEO 4 Character Matrix 
A+ C-: Well-Intentioned A+ C+: Effective Altruists 
29.7 % 29.2 % 
They are giving, sympathetic, and genuinely 
concerned about others. However, their lack of 
organization and persistence means that they 
sometimes fail to follow through on their good 
intentions. They may be best at inspiring kindness 
and generosity in others. 
 
They are individuals who work diligently for the 
benefit of the group. They are high in self-
discipline and endurance, and they channel their 
efforts to the service of others. As volunteers, they 
are willing to take on difficult or thankless tasks 
and will stick to them until they get the job done. 
 
A- C-: Undistinguished A- C+: Self-Promoters 
7.2 % 33.9 % 
They are more concerned with their own comfort 
and pleasure than with the well-being of others. 
They tend to be weak-willed and are likely to have 
some undesirable habits they find difficult to correct.
They are concerned first and foremost with their 
own needs and interests, and they are effective in 
pursuing their own ends. They may be highly 
successful in business or politics because of their 
single-minded pursuits of their own interests. 
 
Note: N = 236 of 306, indicating that 23 % of the cadets are likely to show some features of any or of all the styles.  
This indicates that they are not able to play the interaction and isolation game because they 
seem to lack the strategic self-awareness need to do so, an issue that will be addressed in the 
next section. 
13.4 Strategic Self-awareness and the Interaction and 
Isolation Game at the Individual Level 
This section addresses strategic self-awareness and its importance in a leadership context. 
Mature people and those with a high leadership potential tend to continuously seek 
information and feedback on themselves. They consider this as the only way to get better. 
We all have these opportunities, but it seems that only the most capable people will learn 
how to address the feedback that is given (Hogan & Warrenfeltz, 2006). They have, or 
develop, strategic self-awareness, which means that they can align their identities with their 
reputations and fulfill the Delphic admonition to “Know thyself!” Perhaps the essence and 
importance of strategic self awareness is best summarized by Sun Tzu: 
Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in 
a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will 
sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy 
nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement (1984, p. 52). 
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The leadership development program at the RNoNA, as exemplified by the leadership 
development report in appendix A, addresses this topic and provides the necessary 
assessment and feedback to develop this awareness. An effective leadership development 
program should contribute to an increased self-awareness, and one indication of success of 
both the program and the maturity of those who participate would be the degree of overlap 
between the cadets’ self-rating, their “identities”, and the peer-ratings, their “reputations.” It 
would be reasonable to expect a high degree of overlap between the changes that occurred 
during the leadership program, expressed through the Individual-Level change on the SPGR. 
Table 13.6 gives an overview of the Individual-Level change (RCI) for the four cohorts 
SPGR 12-vector self-rating while Table 13.7 shows the SPGR 12-vector results of their 
reputation presented by the “others ratings.”  
If we examine Tables 13.6 and 13.7, and use Empathy as an example, one should expect to 
find that the 7% of the cadets who reported a significant increase in Empathy would also be 
found among the 12% group of the team members considered as having a significant 
development. There should be a fit between the “increasers,” “decreasers,” and “stayed the 
same.” To control for this, a cross-tabulation was performed, and the results are reported in 
Table 13.8.  
To illustrate these results, I will continue to use Empathy. Out of those 20 cadets (7%) who 
reported a significant increase on Empathy, only four (1%) were perceived by their team 
members to have shown significant development. Fourteen of these (5%) were considered to 
have “stayed the same,” while two (.06%) were considered to have had significant negative 
development. Out of those 251 cadets (83%) who reported that they stayed the same on 
Empathy, 30 (10%) were considered to have had significant positive development, while 17 
(6%) had a significant negative development, leaving 204 (68%) who stayed the same. For 
those who self-reported a negative development, two (.06%) were perceived as having 
significant positive development, 25 (8%) stayed the same, and four (1%) had a significant 
negative development. 
Table 13.6 
Cohorts 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004: Individual-Level Change on the SPGR 12-
Vector - Self Rating 
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 Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 302) 
S2: Empathy  10 83 7 97.9*** 
N1: Caring 3 88 9 56.9*** 
D2: Acceptance 3 91 6 15.8*** 
N2: Creativity 6 86 8 52.8*** 
O1: Criticism 4 80 16 239.2*** 
W1: Resignation 4 91 5  12.7** 
W2: Self-sacrificing 3 88 8 42.5*** 
O2: Assertiveness 2 87 11 81.3*** 
C2: Ruling 5 85 10 83.5*** 
D1: Loyalty 9 88 4 48.3*** 
C1: Task orientation 2 75 23 513.1*** 
S1: Engagement 5 88 7 32.8*** 
Note. N= 302. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., 
change greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed 
distribution of changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each 
decreases and increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.  
 
Table 13.7  
Cohorts 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004: Individual-Level Change on the SPGR 12- 
vector - Others Rating 
 Decrease (%) Stayed the same (%) Increase (%) χ2 (2, N = 302) 
S2: Empathy  8 80 12 145.5*** 
N1: Caring 3 87 10 69.7*** 
D2: Acceptance 7 79 14 204.8*** 
N2: Creativity 4 89 7 27.7*** 
O1: Criticism 6 81 13 157.4*** 
W1: Resignation 6 90 4 19.3*** 
W2: Self-sacrificing 6 89 5 24.0*** 
O2: Assertiveness 3 93 4 4.1 
C2: Ruling 4 94 2 4.3 
D1: Loyalty 6 88 6 43.2*** 
C1: Task orientation 4 91 5 9.3** 
S1: Engagement 3 91 6 14.9** 
Note. N= 302. Number of cadets for decrease, increase, and staying the same were based on the reliable change index (i.e., 
change greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is considered a reliable change). The chi-square tests whether the observed 
distribution of changers and nonchangers would differ from the expected distribution if changes were random (e.g., 2.5% each 
decreases and increase and 95% remain the same). Significance levels indicated as: *p <.05, **p <.01, and ***p < .001.  
The lack of consistency is seen with a low Cramer’s V value. The illustrated results on 
Empathy are consistent with the overall finding, indicating that the cadets lacked strategic 
awareness. The exception tends to be on Criticism, Resignation, and Assertiveness, where 
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the Cramer’s V values were significant. However, although these reached a significant 
value, the Cramer’s V statistics were not higher than .208 out of the maximum possible 
value of 1, indicating a weak but significant association between their self rating and their 
reputation on these three SPGR vectors.  
Table 13.8  
The Fit Between Self Perception and Others Perception 
 Cramer’s V Exact Sig. 
S2: Empathy  .078 .457 
N1: Caring .062 .719 
D2: Acceptance .043 .933 
N2: Creativity .020 1.000 
O1: Criticism .173 .004 
W1: Resignation .208 .002 
W2: Self-sacrificing .129 .056 
O2: Assertiveness .152 .030 
C2: Ruling .037 1.000 
D1: Loyalty .060 .722 
C1: Task orientation .114 .093 
S1: Engagement .117 .100 
  
In Table 13.9 the results of the correlation between the self rating and others ratings at the 
beginning of the leadership development program and the post measures are reported. This 
was the result after one year of intensive leadership development and extensive feedback. 
During this period the cadets had received at least five leadership development reports as 
shown in appendix A. 
The average correlation for the SPGR 12-vector was, at the pre measure, .33, which 
indicates a shared variance of 10.9% while the average correlation at the end was .39, which 
indicates a shared variance of 15.2%. This indicates a modest increase of shared variance of 
4.3%. The highest shared variance at the end was 29.2%, which was found on Creativity, 
while the lowest was on Loyalty with an only 3.6% shared variance. Table 13.9 also 
suggests that the cadets as a group tended to perceive themselves as better than their 
reputations. This pattern confirms a lack of strategic awareness, which indicates that they as 
a group lacked the ability to perceive how their leadership behavior affected those whom 
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they led. Of great concern to the future of the Norwegian Navy, the cadets did not appear to 
be interested in better understanding themselves. Let me just requote a part of Sun Tzu: 
“One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every 
engagement.” The consequences will be addressed implicitly in the next section.  
Table 13.9  
Mean, SD, and Correlation Between SPGR Self Rating and Others Rating  
 Pre Measure Post Measure 
      S P G R Vectors Self-Rating “Reputation”  Self-Rating “Reputation”  
         M/SD M/SD r M/SD M/SD r 
S2: Empathy  7.19 
(1.87) 
7.17 
1.01 
.47 7.43 
(1.86) 
7.19 
(1.06) 
.26 
N1: Caring 6.75 
(1.87) 
6.53 
(1.43) 
.45 7.30 
(1.73) 
6.84 
(1.22) 
.48 
D2: Acceptance 6.65 
(1.96) 
6.15 
(1.15) 
.18 6.44 
(2.06) 
6.34 
(1.31) 
.25 
N2: Creativity 4.86 
(2.22) 
4.63 
(1.57) 
.50 5.22 
(2.33) 
4.68 
(1.59) 
.54 
O1: Criticism 1.75 
(1.39) 
1.72 
(.84) 
.28 1.90 
(1.59) 
2.03 
(1.04) 
.36 
W1: Resignation 2.02 
(1.43) 
1.80 
(.77) 
.22 1.55 
(1.16) 
1.80 
(1.02) 
.28 
W2: Self-sacrificing 1.98 
(1.43) 
1.82 
(.83) 
.25 1.56 
(1.02) 
1.85 
(1.10) 
.40 
O2: Assertiveness 4.05 
(1.93) 
3.59 
(1.36) 
.36 4.42 
(1.89) 
4.08 
(1.36) 
.36 
C2: Ruling 4.52 
(2.04) 
4.04 
(1.47) 
.41 4.39 
(1.62) 
4.21 
(2.03) 
.49 
D1: Loyalty 7.27 
(1.80) 
7.35 
(.97) 
.14 7.21 
(1.06) 
7.07 
(2.19) 
.19 
C1: Task orientation 4.13 
(2.06) 
3.38 
(1.55) 
.47 4.80 
(2.19) 
4.31 
(1.63) 
.52 
S1: Engagement 7.47 
(1.63) 
6.97 
(1.31) 
.24 7.68 
(1.64) 
7.12 
(1.34) 
.49 
Note: N = 302. 
Strength of the correlation, r: .10 to .29 = small, .30 to .49 = medium, .50 to .69 = large, and .70 to 1.0 = 
very large  
13.5 A Key to Leadership Developement; Entropy 
The SPGR analyses of all the cohorts showed that only Cohort 2002 had a significant 
positive development. To gain a better understanding and further expand the insight into the 
leadership development process, the different cohorts will be compared with each other. 
According to Hogan and Roberts (2004) development is a result of the individual’s maturity, 
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suggesting that one explanation of why Cohort 2002 had significant positive development 
might be a result of the cadets’ personalities: They simply were more mature, hence they 
scored better on the NEO PI-R at entrance of the program and therefore they would benefit 
more from it because they would have a higher role taking ability. Another explanation 
might be that Cohort 2002 managed to create a climate more favorable for leadership 
development. These issues will be investigated in this section by applying one-way analyses 
of variance between groups with post hoc tests. First the pre measures of both the SPGR and 
NEO PI-R will be analyzed followed by the post measures. 
13.5.1 The Pre Measures 
Table 13.10 presents a one-way ANOVA of the SPGR Humres data between the four 
cohorts at the beginning of the leadership development program. These results reveal 
significant differences for Synergy, Nurture and Withdrawal. These differences, however, 
are small, as indicated by the η2 statistics. The Games-Howel post hoc statistics showed that 
on Synergy, Cohort 2001 scored significantly lower than both Cohort 2003 at the p < .01 
level and Cohort 2004 at the p < .05 level. On Withdrawal, both Cohorts 2003 and 2004 
scored significantly higher than Cohort 2001 at the p < .01 level. But if we look at the 
available Energy within each cohort there was no difference between the cohorts. On the 
Opposition function, Cohort 2001 scored significantly lower than the three other cohorts at 
the p < .01 level, while there was no difference between Cohorts 2002 and 2004 and 
between Cohorts 2002 and 2003 on this function.  
The largest difference was found on the Dependence function, where the only nonsignificant 
difference was between Cohorts 2003 and 2004; all other differences were significant at the 
p < .01 level. 
From a leadership development perspective, this difference might indicate that Cohorts 2003 
and 2004 were more in need of clear cut directives and development goals at the initial phase 
of the development.  
Similar analyses were performed for NEO PI-R to control any differences in personality at 
the pre measures that could explain the difference after one year of leadership development. 
The analyses of the NEO PI-R -measure revealed only small to moderate differences, where 
the most interesting difference was on Neuroticism, F(3, 322) = 5.36, p < .005, η2 = .05. The 
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Games-Howell post hoc test revealed a significant difference between Cohort 2004 (M = 
49.90, SD = 8.24), Cohort 2001 [M = 46.17, SD = 7.82, p < .025], and Cohort 2002 [M = 
45.24, SD = 8.40, p < .003].  
Table 13.10  
SPGR Humres One-way ANOVA Between Cohorts 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 at 
the Beginning of the Leadership Development Program 
 2001 2002 2003 2004    
 M/SD 
(N=80) 
M/SD 
(N=79) 
M/SD 
(N=76) 
M/SD 
(N=97) 
F Sig. η2 
Synergy 6.23 
(1.22) 
6.53 
(1.21) 
6.82 
(1.09) 
6.76 
(1.25) 
4.16 .007 .04 
Control 3.33 
(1.21) 
2.98 
(1.25) 
3.33 
(1.49) 
3.27 
(1.42) 
1.24 .297  
Nurture 5.10 
(.94) 
4.65 
(1.03) 
5.06 
(.98) 
6.82 
(1.09) 
3.10 .027 .03 
Opposition 1.11 
(.78) 
1.71 
(.80) 
1.53 
(.74) 
1.91 
(.92) 
14.77 .001 .12 
Dependence 5.61 
(.91) 
6.17 
(.99) 
6.85 
(.93) 
6.79 
(1.04) 
29.64 .001 .21 
Withdrawal .80 
(.84) 
1.03 
(.94) 
1.27 
(.90) 
1.29 
(.98) 
5.15 .002 .05 
Energy 5.42 
(1.83) 
5.50 
(1.95) 
5.55 
(1.73) 
5.47 
(1.33) 
.07 .978  
  
Both of the one-way between-groups ANOVA with post hoc tests indicate that there was 
nothing measured either with the SPGR or with the NEO PI-R that could contribute to an 
explanation of why Cohort 2002 had the development they had compared with the three 
other cohorts.  
13.5.2 The Post Measures 
Table 13.11 gives a complete overview of the post differences measured by the SPGR 
Humres. As can be seen, the differences are mostly small and moderate except for the 
Dependence function. The Games Howell post hoc analyses revealed that Cohort 2002 had 
the highest results on Synergy. It was significantly higher than Cohort 2001 at the p < .01 
level and at the p < .05 level for the Cohorts 2003 and 2004.  
Cohort 2002 also scored lowest on Withdrawal behavior. Although the difference was not 
significant, it contributed to the highest Energy available for doing work (lowest entropy), 
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which was significantly higher than Cohort 2001 at the p < .05 level. It is also worth noting 
that Cohort 2001 came out with the least favorable result. These results indicate that all four 
cohorts were on the same low maturity level, Team Spirit, because the dominant functions 
were Nurture and Dependence. Cohort 2002 was the best functioning at this maturity level. 
Unfortunately none of the Cohorts were suited for 3rd and 4th GW for reasons previously 
stated, see especially the discussion in section 11.3.3. 
Table 13.11  
SPGR Humres One-way ANOVA Between Cohorts 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 
After Exercise “Telemakos” 
 2001 2002 2003 2004    
 M/SD 
(N = 73) 
M/SD 
(N = 77) 
M/SD 
(N = 66) 
M/SD 
(N = 86) 
F Sig. η2 
Synergy 6.40 
(1.15) 
7.22 
(.96) 
6.95 
(1.11) 
6.90 
(1.06) 
7.65 .001 .07 
Control 3.75 
(1.55) 
3.66 
(1.34) 
3.80 
(1.55) 
3.68 
(1.62) 
.13 .629  
Nurture 5.15 
(1.14) 
5.66 
(1.15) 
5.40 
(.95) 
5.08 
(1.17) 
4.44 .005 .04 
Opposition 1.71 
(.91) 
1.92 
(.84) 
1.97 
(.94) 
1.86 
(1.02) 
.1.02 .385  
Dependence 5.53 
(1.05) 
6.19 
(1.01) 
6.77 
(.96) 
6.54 
(.99) 
21.02 .001 .17 
Withdrawal 1.00 
(.88) 
.76 
(.94) 
1.20 
(1.33) 
.87 
(1.09) 
2.19 .089  
Energy 5.40 
(1.80) 
6.46 
(1.73) 
5.75 
(2.25) 
6.02 
(1.91) 
4.12 .007 .04 
  
The differences found on the NEO PI-R are presented in Table 13.12. Although these 
differences were small to modest, there is a striking pattern: Cohort 2002 always showed the 
most favorable results. They were, according to the Games-Howell post hoc test, 
significantly more emotionally stable (N) than the three other cohorts, all at the p < .01 level. 
They were more Agreeable than Cohort 2001 at the p < .01 level, and more Conscientious 
than Cohort 2004 at the p < .01 level and at p < .05 level compared with both Cohorts 2001 
and 2003. 
The same pattern was found on the Agreeableness facets, A1, Trust, A2, 
Straightforwardness, and A3, Altruism. This might indicates that Cohort 2002 was able to 
build a climate that promoted a certain level of mutual trust, which contributed to their 
positive leadership development process. This conclusion is consistent with Hogan’s 
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statement that the ability to balance the needs of “getting along” with “getting ahead” 
requires a certain maturity level. This finding, seen together with the SPGR results, supports 
Hogan and Roberts (2004), who claim that Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism are important elements of maturity when it comes to a person’s reputation. 
These findings are illustrated in Figure 13.3. Leadership is a collective phenomena and when 
defined in terms of the ability to build and maintain a team that performs well compared to 
its competitors, leadership concerns building cohesive and goal oriented teams that are 
effective by relating their own maturities to task and context. If they are not able to do so, 
and team members do not reorient but remain as a “one-person-one-role” group as was the 
case at most of the teams at the RNoNA, the team will be less flexible and much less 
competitive.  
The analysis in section 13.3 discusses the importance of the Openness domain. This domain 
also has a significant influence on adjustment and role-taking ability (The overall openness 
score for all the cohorts were M = 48.20 (SD = 9.49, N = 306)). As discussed in section 6.7.3 
maturity from the inside, the identity part that decides which roles we are willing to take on, 
depends on openness as well as on agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. 
Open individuals are curious about their inner and outer worlds. They are willing to entertain 
novel ideas and willing to questions authority. Those who score low on Openness tend to be 
conventional in behavior and conservative in outlook, and they tend to have a narrower 
scope of interests (Costa & McCrae, 1992). This might explain the results found at the 
individual level change reported for the SPGR 12 vector in Table 13.6. These results indicate 
a lack of willingness to take on new roles and expand the leadership behavior repertoire. The 
behaviors that support Synergy—Empathy and Engagement—show a decrease, and 
furthermore there is an increase in Withdrawal behavior (Resignation and Self-sacrifice), all 
negative results when it comes to the willingness to take on new roles and expand their 
leadership behavior repertoire. These findings support that this domain is important when it 
comes to leadership development.  
Figure 13.3 illustrates the causal link between leadership and team performance. It also 
illustrates the interdependence of leadership and team development. As team members 
expand their behavioral repertoire and skills through expanded role-taking ability, the team 
becomes a better arena for learning and development. The individual needs the team to 
develop, and the team will only develop through its members (Mills, 1984).  
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Figure 13.3 The Relationship Between SPGR and Socioanalytic Theory 
 
This finding also gives strong support to the general leadership development approach taken 
at the RNoNA, which was outlined in chapter eight.  
 
 
 
Table 13.12  
NEO PI-R One-way ANOVA Between Cohorts 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 after 
Exercise “Telemakos” 
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Domains and facets 2001 2002 2003 2004    
 M/SD 
(N=74) 
M/SD 
(N=77) 
M/SD 
(N=70) 
M/SD 
(N=85) 
F Sig. η2 
NEUROTICISM 46.39 
(7.09) 
41.92 
(7.90) 
46.19 
(8.12) 
48.53 
(7.61) 
10.33 .001 .09 
   N1: Anxiety 44.26 
(7.38) 
40.81 
(7.40) 
44.59 
(9.10) 
46.64 
(7.87) 
7.40 .001 .07 
   N2: Angry Hostility 48.18 
(7.64) 
43.65 
(7.26) 
46.47 
(7.39) 
48.25 
(7.71) 
6.42 .001 .06 
   N3: Depression 43.78 
(6.88) 
40.86 
(6.87) 
43.94 
(7.07) 
46.45 
(8.82) 
9.09 .001 .09 
   N4: Self-Consciousness 47.81 
(7.72) 
43.64 
(7.31) 
47.91 
(8.36) 
49.49 
(8.39) 
7.82 .008 .07 
   N6: Vulnerability 48.82 
(7.06) 
46.25 
(6.92) 
49.66 
(7.08) 
5.51 
(8.82) 
5.19 .002 .05 
   E3: Assertiveness 53.89 
(9.80) 
56.94 
(9.20) 
52.86 
(7.84) 
50.41 
(7.14) 
2.95 .033 .03 
   O1: Fantasy 49.97 
(8.77) 
44.32 
(11.10) 
46.54 
(8.55) 
48.82 
(8.64) 
5.52 .001 .05 
   O6: Values 46.73 
(7.76) 
50.23 
(7.49) 
48.06 
(8.17) 
49.88 
(8.28) 
3.25 .022 .03 
AGREABLENESS 45.92 
(7.29) 
50.16 
(8.60) 
47.27 
(7.89) 
47.51 
(8.40) 
3.65 .013 .03 
   A1: Trust 49.66 
(7.18) 
53.81 
(9.51) 
49.73 
(8.14) 
50.49 
(8.82) 
4.04 .008 .04 
   A2: Straightforwardness 46.14 
(9.78) 
51.13 
(8.13) 
48.71 
(7.80) 
46.60 
(9.83) 
5.01 .002 .05 
   A3: Altruism 49.27 
(8.69) 
53.26 
(9.62) 
48.76 
(8.62) 
50.21 
(9.67) 
3.62 .014 .03 
CONSCIEOTIOUSNESS 52.27 
(8.71) 
56.25 
(9.18) 
51.99 
(8.82) 
50.16 
(9.22) 
6.41 .001 .06 
   C1: Competence 54.03 
(7.07) 
58.16 
(8.03) 
52.74 
(8.38) 
52.49 
(8.94) 
7.35 .001 .07 
   C2: Order 54.73 
(8.56) 
53.36 
(8.26) 
51.47 
(8.68) 
50.76 
(8.99) 
3.37 .019 .03 
   C3: Dutifulness 50.08 
(9.40) 
54.42 
(9.47) 
51.50 
(8.91) 
51.44 
(9.39) 
3.10 .027 .03 
   C4: Achievement Striving 51.38 
(9.30) 
56.05 
(9.08) 
52.71 
(8.69) 
50.58 
(9.60) 
5.43 .001 .05 
   C5: Self-Discipline 52.49 
(8.62) 
55.22 
(8.30) 
51.46 
(8.39) 
49.96 
(8.39) 
5.37 .001 .05 
   C6: Deliberation 49.73 
(9.45) 
52.86 
(9.13) 
50.86 
(7.39) 
47.62 
(8.76) 
5.04 .002 .05 
Note:  The Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance indicates a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance for the A2 Straightforwardness facet, which indicates that an inaccurate F value is reported for A2. To 
confirm these results a Kruska-Wallis Test was performed on A2 Straightfowardness (p < .005). This test 
confirmed the results reported above.   
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13.5.3 Creating a Climate for Leadership Development 
This section will focus on entropy—an important element affecting leadership development. 
Entropy seems to be a topic that is difficult to comprehend, which makes it difficult to 
understand how important it is for effective leadership development. In the introduction, 
leadership development was defined as building the capacity for groups of people to learn 
their way out of problems that could have not predicted or that arise from disintegration of 
traditional organizational structures and associated loss of sense-making. As mentioned the 
RNoNA has experimented several times with the Magellan exercise, where, as noted above, 
differences between the cohorts at the pre measures were minor and small. Because the 
teams were composed the same way each time, and they were exposed to the same treatment 
under similar equal conditions, these experiments performed by the RNoNA represent a 
change of the dependent variable that was adjusted equally for the teams within each cohort, 
see section 10.2. The Magellan experiments will now be discussed in further detail. 
As previously explained, leadership development requires assessment, commitment, and 
support to be effective. SPGR was introduced for Cohort 2001 and provided the necessary 
tool to gain both assessment and support. Because of the way the program was structured, 
however, it might not have been possible to gain the needed commitment and support for 
each cadet’s development because those who were supposed to support and facilitate the 
development were organized into different organizational entities after each exercise, hence 
the individual and team were separated. Then the training bark, Statsraad Lehmkuhl, was 
introduced as a replacement for the military training vessel, KNM Horten. The initial focus 
for the Statsraad Lehmkuhl was seamanship, navigation, and the experience of being at sea 
for a longer time span, and leader and leadership development was not seen as the primary 
target. However, it soon became clear that the use of the Lehmkuhl had a significant, 
although unintended, impact on the cadets’ leadership development, as measured by the 
SPGR (see Table 13.13).  
As a consequence of these uplifting SPGR results, team interviews were conducted so that 
the cadets could explain in their own words this development in SPGR and their experience 
onboard the Statsraad Lehmkuhl. However, the outcome of these interviews was surprising 
and suggested that this development was more a result of coincidence than an intended, 
planned, and structured program. In particular, the cadets described the situation on board 
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the Lehmkuhl as chaotic and unstructured, indicating and that the Academy lacked insight 
into what was happening on board the vessel.  
Table 13.13  
Cohort 2002: SPGR Humres, Pre and Post Exercise “Magellan” - Others Rating 
 Pre Magellan Post Magellan  
 M/SD M/SD r t(76) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.54 
(1.22) 
7.16 
(.97) 
.60 -5.400 .001 .53 
Control 2.97 
(1.25) 
3.82 
(1.49) 
.57 -5.758 .001 .61 
Nurture 4.64 
(1.04) 
5.50 
(1.15) 
.69 -9.174 .001 .82 
Opposition 1.71 
(.79) 
1.90 
(1.03) 
.52 -1.824 .072  
Dependence 6.21 
(.97) 
6.14 
(1.07) 
.69 .712 .478  
Withdrawal 1.04 
(.95) 
.76 
(.70) 
.58 2.019 .047 .21 
Energy 5.50 
(1.97) 
6.30 
(1.44) 
.61 -4.475 .001 .45 
  
According to the cadets, the Magellan exercise lacked an overall Schwerpunkt and this 
contributed to a huge frustration among the cadets. As one cadet said: “Nothing happened, 
there was no development, and nobody challenged us. … I had expected that there was a 
plan, that someone had an idea of what I was supposed do. I had not expected that I should 
be onboard for ten weeks wasting my time.”  
This statement sums up the frustration, or the internal entropy, onboard the vessel, even if 
most of it was unintended (and, as will be shown below, the end result was actually 
positive). As can be seen in Table 13.13 there is moderately significant increase in Synergy 
as a result of the moderate increase in Controlling behavior by becoming more analytical, 
task-oriented, or even autocratic if needed, and a large change in Nurturing behavior by 
becoming caring, empathic, or even spontaneous. This development points to an expansion 
of behavioral repertoire and skills as a result of reorientation during the exercise. 
What was unique with the Magellan exercises, in contrast to most other leadership 
development exercises at the RNoNA, was that it lasted for ten weeks, not the five to eight 
days allotted to previous exercises. In the interviews, the teams also reported that it took 
about four weeks before they saw the need to deal with behavior among themselves, which 
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also contributed to increased level of entropy. Although this entropy frustrated some of the 
cadets, it is important to recognize that it had an overall positive effect on the program. As 
previously discussed, some level of entropy is needed because it creates the fluctuations 
needed for growth and development. As seen with Cohort 2002, and as Boyd (1976) 
described in “Destruction and Creation,”, the entropy resulted in a high level of 
fluctuation—within each team, among the teams, and against the staff—and contributed to 
an increased level of complexity that in the end led to a positive development. What led to 
success and a positive outcome was how the teams chose to deal with each other through 
their social interaction, which is a process that can not be controlled from the outside. So 
there were a considerable number of unintended actions that led to development. It should be 
noted, however, that because this increase in entropy was coincidental and not the intended 
result of a well-designed program, it could as well have resulted in negative development or 
no development at all. That is, entropy is necessary for leadership development, but it is 
certainly not sufficient. 
With Cohort 2003, the RNoNA swung to the other extreme of trying to control all parts of 
the Magellan exercise. This approach was adopted as a result of the negative feedback from 
the previous year. The approach chosen by the RNoNA represented an understanding of 
leadership development that resembles an engineer’s notion of control, building on the 
implicit assumption that successful change only occurs when the program is properly 
designed. Any lack of leadership development would represent a failure in engineering. 
From a research perspective, the stimuli were changed for the whole group in a real life 
setting. The result of this change in the dependent variable can be seen in Table 13.14. The 
SPGR Humres result indicates no development on Synergy, but because of a reduction of 
Withdrawal, the Energy available for doing work had a small, but significant positive 
development representing a decrease in entropy. With this “engineering” approach, in 
combination with its dominant Dependence function, see Table 13.10, this cohort was given 
an exercise that did not create the fluctuations necessary to get move cadets out their comfort 
zones. As mentioned above, one of the strongest criticisms that were raised against the 
RNoNA after the initial use of the Statsraad Lehmkuhl was lack of planning and control of 
the exercise, that it was not methodical and organized, that there were no step-by-step 
instructions. What all analyses have shown so far is that this is not a valid criticism when the 
goal is leadership development. The RNoNA showed the ability to learn from this 
experience and for Cohort 2004 the Magellan exercise was changed again. 
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Table 13.14  
Cohort 2003: SPGR Humres Pre and Post Exercise “Magellan” - Others Rating 
 Pre Magellan Post Magellan  
 M/SD M/SD r t(74) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.80 
(1.09) 
6.85 
(.92) 
.55 -.437 .663  
Control 3.34 
(1.50) 
3.40 
(1.15) 
.78 -.552 .583  
Nurture 5.04 
(.98) 
5.34 
(.90) 
.57 -2.991 .004 .32 
Opposition 1.53 
(.74) 
1.51 
(.78) 
.35 .230 .819  
Dependence 6.85 
(.94) 
6.53 
(.98) 
.65 3.426 .001 .33 
Withdrawal 1.27 
(.91) 
.87 
(.99) 
.60 4.032 .001 .42 
Energy 5.53 
(1.74) 
6.03 
(1.49) 
.60 -2.911 .005 .30 
  
The result of this can be seen in Table 13.15. Although Cohort 2004 was dominated by a 
strong Dependence function at the pre measures, the exercise managed to create the 
necessary fluctuations, resulting in a small, but significant positive development. As can be 
seen, there was a significant, but small increase in both the Control and Nurture functions, 
Opposition was reduced, and there was a positive decrease of Withdrawal behavior. The 
Dependence function remained the same, which indicates that their Loyalty and Acceptance 
had not changed (which was positive). Even if these changes were small, they indicated an 
expansion in role taking capability, which resulted in a moderate but significant increase of 
Synergy. When these positive post-Magellan results are compared with the results after the 
complete leadership development program, however, see Table 11.28, we can see that this 
cohort was not able to take advantage of the positive development that occurred as a result of 
the Magellan exercise. 
This finding is best illustrated by the change in Synergy, which at the end of the program 
was M = 6.90 (SD = 1.06), a significantly negative development [r = .70, t(85) = 4.113, p 
<.001, d = .34]. Although this development was small, it was significantly negative. One 
reason might be that the second semester represents a high degree of stability—a traditional, 
lecture-based program—making it difficult to continue practicing the newly acquired skills 
and knowledge that they had gained through real world practice onboard Lehmkuhl. 
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Table 13.15  
Cohort 2004: SPGR Humres Pre and Post Exercise “Magellan” - Others Rating 
 Pre Magellan Post Magellan  
 M/SD M/SD r t(96) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.76 
(1.25) 
7.14 
(.97) 
.59 -3.544 .001 .33 
Control 3.27 
(1.42) 
3.66 
(1.32) 
.71 -3.649 .001 .28 
Nurture 4.98 
(1.16) 
5.31 
(1.20) 
.69 -3.408 .001 .27 
Opposition 1.91 
(.92) 
1.60 
(.68) 
.52 3.680 .001 .37 
Dependence 6.79 
(1.04) 
6.84 
(.95) 
.60 -.562 .575  
Withdrawal 1.29 
(.98) 
.98 
(.75) 
.58 3.570 .001 .33 
Energy 5.47 
(2.01) 
6.14 
(1.54) 
.62 -4.117 .001 .36 
  
They regressed significantly, and the end result as we have seen was no leadership 
development. The results for Cohort 2001, Table 13.16, with a post measure in January 2002 
confirms this.  
Table 13.16   
Cohort 2001: SPGR Hurmres Result Pre Measure - January 2002 - Others Rating 
 Pre Measure 01 January 02  
 M/SD M/SD r t(77) Sig. d 
Synergy 6.23 
(1.23) 
6.39 
(1.15) 
.62 -1.355 .179  
Control 3.29 
(1.20) 
3.79 
(1.68) 
.64 -3.408 .001 .33 
Nurture 5.12 
(.94) 
4.94 
(1.01) 
.55 1.717 .090  
Opposition 1.11 
(.79) 
1.79 
(1.04) 
.45 -6.098 .001 .72 
Dependence 5.64 
(.89) 
5.83 
(1.06) 
.54 -1.731 .088  
Withdrawal .82 
(.85) 
1.16 
(1.03) 
.65 -3.758 .001 .56 
Energy 5.41 
(1.85) 
5.23 
(2.02) 
.69 1.061 .292  
  
These results reveal a significant development of critical, assertive, and even self-sufficient 
behavior represented with the Opposition function, together with a small increase in the 
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Control function, which led to a restriction in contributing to the common team work.  This, 
in turn, resulted in a moderate, but significant more passive leadership behavior among the 
cadets. 
Summary 
The theories of Sun Tzu, Boyd, and the SPGR all imply that the effectiveness of a leadership 
development program depends on internal dynamics and in particular, on how social 
interaction dissipates the entropy created within a team by interaction with its environment. 
Figure 13.4 illustrates the Synergy while Figure 13.5 illustrates the Energy for all the cohorts 
throughout the leadership development program (the differences were discussed in section 
13.5.1 and 13.5.2).  
Both Cohorts 2002 and 2004 had, as measured half way into the Magellan exercise, either a 
significant reduction in their Synergy (or Energy available for doing work) as is illustrated 
clearly in Figure 13.4 and 13.5, while Cohort 2003 stayed the same. This indicates that the 
approach chosen for the Magellan exercise for Cohort 2003 was not able to create the 
necessary entropy needed for effective leadership development, which also seemed to be the 
case with the RNoNA traditional approach to leadership development.  
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Figure 13.4 Average Synergy Results for the Four Cohorts - Others Rating 
This cohort did not create the organizational climate necessary to handle entropy, simply 
because the exercise did not challenge them sufficiently. So when they were challenged 
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during the demanding exercise “Telemakos,” they did not have the necessary role-taking 
ability to cope these challenges—they were not able to dissipate entropy. 
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Figure 13.5 Average Energy Results for the Four Cohorts - Others Rating 
 
As previously discussed Cohort 2004 had a positive development until after exercise 
Magellan, as both figures illustrate, but they were not able to internalize the new behavior 
into their repertoire. When they were exposed to more entropy, they regressed to their old 
leadership behavior. What is worth noticing with the Energy score for Cohort 2001 is the 
result, which was measured after a long, stable period with academic subjects at the RNoNA 
(from late September), showing that there was no increase in Synergy. There was, however, 
a large increase in Energy, which resulted from fewer cadets showing withdrawal-like 
behavior. As the figures illustrates, this changes when they have to perform as teams again, 
and after exercise “Telemakos” they are back on the same level as they started—
demonstrating no increase in their leadership behavior repertoire. This indicates that that the 
key to development seems to be an internal dynamic or organizational climate that enables 
cooperation and expansion of role-taking ability by balancing the basic functions, “getting 
ahead” and “getting along,” in an environment characterized by some degree of chaos, 
complexity, ambiguity, and novelty.   
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13.6 Summary 
The first aim of this chapter was to provide an insight to how personality influenced the 
social interaction pattern within the teams and how it influenced the leadership development 
process. The second aim was to gain a better understanding of leadership development in 
general. It is obvious that personality matters, and particularly those traits that constitute the 
maturity part of personality because they are important for an effective leadership 
development process, as illustrated with Figure 13.3. This becomes especially important 
when the aim is to develop leaders that are supposed to lead according to Auftragstaktik, a 
technique requiring high discretion, see Figure 6.3, and high mutual trust. Personality 
directly influences the team development and as such the overall role-taking ability. 
However, it is difficult to judge beforehand how each individual personality will affect 
social interaction because there will be some moderating effects, where discretion is very 
important. As the in depth team analyses showed, and that was confirmed here, there is a 
connection between personality and actual leadership behavior. The correlation between 
SPGR and NEO PI-R results, see appendix G, indicate that although they are different, they 
are related and therefore provide added valued when used together. The results presented 
here support the findings on personality reported in chapter six. It is important, however, to 
emphasize the following observations concerning personality: 
1. Agreeableness seems to be an important trait for creating a positive climate within a 
team, especially if the team must mature in order to cope with an environment 
characterized by high levels of complexity, novelty, and ambiguity. 
2. Openness to Experience is an important trait affecting the willingness to take on new 
roles as part of the effort to expand each cadet’s leadership behavior. 
3. A balance is required between Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness. 
Openness to Experience is related to creativity, divergent thinking abilities, being 
able to “think outside the box,” and it influences the ability to adapt to change 
(George & Zhou, 2001; LePine, Colquitt, & Erez, 2000; McCrae, 1987). Lack of this 
trait hampered leadership development at the RNoNA. By remaining receptive to 
different ideas, people, and situations, open people have at their disposal a wide 
range of thoughts, feelings, and problem-solving strategies, the combination of which 
may lead to novel and useful solutions or ideas (McCrae, 1987). However this 
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requires that Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness must be balanced, 
especially if the organizational culture simultaneously encourages conformity, being 
self-controlled, meeting predetermined expectations, and lacking support for creative 
behavior, as was the case at the RNoNA. 
4. Extraversion is also important, and particularly the facet E3, Assertiveness. This 
must be considered together with the balance of the profile, and especially, if 
available, together with the SPGR peer or subordinate ratings, as this study has 
shown. 
This dissertation has also shown that major personality “flaws” are captured by the SPGR 
and its measurement of social interaction. The existing organizational culture, however, 
might reinforce or even amplify these flaws, turning team and leadership development into 
an almost impossible mission. 
This chapter has also provided additional insights on leadership development. Leadership 
development requires situations where organizational members can collectively engage in 
leadership roles in an environment (depending on the organizational context) characterized 
by the entropy needed to create fluctuations so they can build the capacity through expanded 
role-taking ability to learn their way out of problems that they could not have predicted.  In 
other words, to learn to operate in a chaotic environment, the cadets must experience such 
environments during their training. Such an approach to leadership development will prevent 
disintegration of traditional organizational structures and the associated loss of sense making 
in 21st century conflicts.  
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Part VIII 
Conclusion 
This part consists of one chapter. In chapter 14, results of the overall findings from the 
empirical study are summarized and possible implications outlined. At the end of the 
chapter, limitations of the present study are discussed and directions for future research on 
leadership are proposed. This chapter also provides suggestions for improving leadership 
development in both the RNoNA and the Norwegian Armed Forces. Finally, it offers 
speculation and discussion concerning the future of warfare. 
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14. Conclusions 
14.1 Introduction 
The objective of this dissertation was to examine leadership and the effectiveness of the 
leadership development program at the RNoNA and to gain insight into the complexity of 
leadership development, generating propositions for leadership development in general. This 
was accomplished by conceptualizing leadership and leadership development in terms of the 
ability to build and maintain teams, groups, and organizations that outperform their 
competition, which, in turn, depends on the ability to “play the interaction and isolation 
game.” When leadership is defined in terms of the ability to build and maintain high 
performing teams—persuading people to give up, for a while, their selfish pursuits and 
purposes for a common goal—leadership becomes a function of personality and social 
interaction rather than organic status (Judge et al., 2002).  
Leadership and leadership development are important for two primary reasons. First, with 
good leadership, organizations thrive and prosper. Second and even more important, from a 
moral perspective, bad leaders perpetrate terrible misery on those subject to their dominion. 
The theory applied in and the findings of this dissertation strongly support that leadership 
matters, that it is an adaptive tool for individual and group survival, where the OODA loop 
and the ability to remain a relatively more open “system” than the competition are keys to 
success.  
Unlike most studies, which define leadership in terms of emergence—the person in a group 
of strangers who exerts the most influence—or in terms of ratings—of an individual “leader” 
by more senior “leaders”—the focus of this research has been on the maturity both of the 
members of the team and of the team itself. Both of these strongly affect team performance. 
Section 14.2 summarizes my findings and outlines some of its consequences. In section 14.3 
some suggestions are made that might help to improve this situation. Section 14.4 discusses 
limitations of this study, while section 14.5 provides a few suggestions for further research, 
and finally, section 14.6 speculates a bit further on the future of warfare. 
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14.2 Certain to Lose? 
The aim of this dissertation was determine whether the leadership development program at 
the RNoNA is effective. To answer this question, I described the context of the military 
profession of the 21st century, primarily the need for understanding war “in the context of 
everything else,” within (a) Boyd’s strategic framework and (b) his concept of the primacy 
of orientation. From this, I outlined a theoretical foundation that resulted in seven additional 
research questions that would contribute to answering the main research question. An 
empirical investigation was conducted to answer these questions by gathering data from four 
cohorts of cadets at the RNoNA during their leadership development programs. Chapters 11, 
12, and 13 discussed and analyzed these results.  
I can now summarize the answer to my main question: 
Is the leadership development program at the Royal Norwegian Academy effective in 
preparing officers to execute leadership in today’s conflicts and the conflicts in the years 
ahead? 
The data and analyses demonstrate that only Cohort 2002 showed a significant positive 
development. None of the cohorts or teams, however, was able to reach a higher maturity 
level than Team Spirit, a level characterized by stable, fixed, and predictable role patterns. 
Figure 14.1 illustrates the imbalance between the Control and Nurture functions by applying 
the t-value to illustrate how dominant the Nurture function actually is. This imbalance was 
large, which is indicated by the Cohen d value at the post measure; 1.49, 1.84, 1.86, and 1.37 
for the four cohorts beginning with Cohort 2001. This suggests that the cadets were only 
capable of efficient performance in stable environments with clearly stated goals. The 
leadership preferred at this level tends to be authoritative, and although it may not be 
optimal, at this maturity level the teams accepted it.  
The results reported here are striking and straightforward. The leadership development 
program at the RNoNA has not been effective because there was no increase in the cadets’ 
role repertoires. They lacked, and are lacking, those qualities that would make them 
significant contributors to resolving the types of unstructured, asymmetric conflicts that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces are likely to face. 
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Figure 14.1 The Imbalance between the Control and Nurture Function 
Illustrated with the t-value - Others Rating. 
 
The main reason for this is that they, together with RNoNA, were not able to uncover those 
interactions that foster the harmony and initiative that would have made it possible to reach a 
maturity level higher than Team Spirit. The initiative that was observed was mostly 
performed by the dominant cadets, which left little room for increasing variety and rapidity 
by tapping the initiative and creativity of all team members, as illustrated with Team 04NN, 
Figure 11.29. The result was an overall increase of entropy—energy unavailable for 
performing work—which led to a reduction, or at best preservation, of Synergy. The result 
was leadership behavior that was rigid, micromanaging, uniform, and predictable.  
The teams reached a stability or equilibrium by settling into fixed role patterns, without the 
ability to balance dynamically the basic SPGR functions that would have produced an 
adequate capacity for adaptability. The leadership development program was not able to 
reorient the cadets, and the results found in this research indicate that they would struggle 
very hard to handle the type of dynamic, organic, and unpredictable adversary that they are 
likely to encounter in the future. The ability to reorient the teams to better deal with such 
adversaries would have required the maturity level of Innovation.  
 283
Instead of morally isolating their 4th GW adversary by connecting with the local population 
faster than their adversary, these results indicate that they most likely will isolate themselves 
from the local population, and ultimately from their own, because they are not able to 
maintain the peoples’ trust and confidence by interacting with them. This is moral isolation 
as seen both in Afghanistan and Iraq, a process facilitated by actions that violate the codes of 
conduct or behavior patterns that they profess to uphold and others expect them to uphold, 
These violations, some of which are inevitable in 4GW and counterinsurgency, include 
brutality against civilians, bombing of wrong houses, and misconduct against prisoners. 
Each violation of the moral code of conduct that is performed and then reported by the 
media drains away support among both the local population and the people at home (Boyd, 
1987, p. 49). At the level of Team Spirit, the teams will not be able to detect and correct 
these mismatches faster than their adversaries can exploit them.  
Unfortunately the findings in this dissertation indicate that we lack this competitive 
advantage throughout the Norwegian Armed Forces. The same maturity level, Team Spirit, 
has been found among Norwegian submarine commanders and their crews (Larsen & 
Johannessen, 2005) and within the Coast Guard (Fauskanger, 2006). The ability to cope with 
morally-charged situations requires rapid OODA loop speed and leadership by 
Auftragstaktik using “implicit guidance and control,” which operates fully only at the 
maturity level Innovation. At this level, effective actions can flow smoothly and 
instantaneously from orientation.  
As Richards (2004) has pointed out, the OODA loop is a way of thinking of about 
organizational behavior. Boyd in fact, used to refer to the loop as “an operational scheme for 
organizational success” because it provides a common framework to help individuals and 
organizations focus on ways to improve their competitiveness. The essential purpose of the 
OODA loop model is help people understand how to change their environments before their 
opponents can comprehend, that is, how to operate inside their opponents’ loops. It can be 
manifested in different ways depending on the form of conflict: 
1. In business it will be the ability to change markets before competitors can offer more 
alluring products and services as, for example, Apple has done with the iPod line. 
2. In 3rd GW, it is the ability to employ cheng/ch’i maneuvers against state military 
forces to create and exploit ambiguity and deception. 
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3. In 4th GW it provides a moral foundation for our efforts to win over the population by 
ensuring that our actions align with our stated intentions.  
Perhaps the most important observation regarding the OODA loop is that we get the 
quickness we deserve. Our ability, in other words, to operate inside the opponents’ OODA 
loops is largely a function of the organizational climate or the culture that we have done the 
hard work to instill. This is important because the general model is that leader personality 
influences the dynamics and culture of the top management team, and the characteristics of 
the top management team influence the performance of the organization (Hogan, 2006). 
Peterson, Smith, Martorana, and Owens (2003) showed that personality of the CEOs of 17 
very large corporations powerfully affected the dynamics and culture of the top management 
team, with correlation in the .50 range for the most hypothesized relationship between 
personality and various aspect of team functioning. Moreover, the characteristic of the top 
management team was substantially correlated with business outcomes. 
The culture found among the cadets, which seems to be representative of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, indicates a major challenge. It is a culture that is rigid and lacks variety, 
making adaptability a hard and demanding enterprise. These findings are in accordance with 
Schneider’s (1987) ASA model. The Norwegian Armed Forces have evolved into a 
homogenous organization that struggles severely to adapt to and respond to change. On the 
issue of conflict resolution, Norwegian officers follow the traditional logic of the sequence 
peace-crisis-war-resolution, which will result in peace again. In this sequence, war, the 
military action, is the deciding factor. This is an understanding of war within the context 
only of war. The problem with this approach in the 21st century is that we are generally not 
able to identify the enemy—typically an opposing army, navy, or air force—that we need in 
order to form a strategy, and without a strategy it is impossible to make a plan to use military 
force (Smith, 2005). It should be emphasized that “terrorism” is not a formulated enemy; it is 
a threatening concept or a tactic, occasionally implemented by individuals, some of whom 
work together in loosely defined organizations, as described in section 2.3.  
Without a defined enemy, hence a centralized organization, it has not proven possible for 
Western militaries to formulate strategies, and without a strategy it is not possible to make 
anything but the broadest decisions on training, education, leadership development, weapons 
and equipment. This has resulted in a situation where we have allowed technological 
 285
development to drive policy and strategy, which can be seen in the information pamphlet 
from the ongoing Defense Study 07 (FS 07) in Norway. Here we read that: “New technology 
and the new doctrines that follow from the technological development transform the Armed 
Forces in a fundamental way” (FS 07, p. 5, [my translation]). The fundamental argument in 
this approach is that some unknown adversary might, at some time, acquire this technology, 
and to be safe we need it too. In a world of limited resources, though, this is neither a viable 
nor a sustainable strategy. We also tend to forget what actually determines the outcomes of 
wars. As Boyd stated it: “Machines don’t fight wars. People do, and they use their minds.” 
Instead of chasing technology for technology’s sake, we should follow the advice of Sun 
Tzu: “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Tao to survival or 
extinctions. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed” (1984, p. 40, emphasis added). 
Because of our lack of examination, we tend to replace as much of the old equipment as we 
can with new high tech equipment for as long as we can afford it. The result is that our 
forces enter the world of the “few and costly,” too few to matter and too expensive to use, 
resulting in risk adverse leadership behavior and limiting initiative. 
In the concept of war “within the context of everything else,” on the other hand, the enemy 
is an international social, political, and economic condition—disconnectedness, for example 
(Barnett, 2004). Under this concept, the ends for which we are fighting change from defense 
of own territory to eliminating the causes of disconnectedness. This is a highly moral 
endeavor because we fight to extend connectivity in every way possible in order to provide a 
better life for the people involved. Although such connectivity is also in our ultimate best 
interest, to achieve it we must show the populations involved that we are willing to die not 
just by example but for example. To interact with the people and isolate our adversaries, we 
have to be in among the people; we should be in the villages, not assaulting the villages, 
realizing that the people are not the enemy but the objective (Smith, 2005). When we fight 
among the people on a highly moral (and mental) level, eventually, they will stop supporting 
the criminals, “terrorists,” and other 4th GW opponents who threaten the prosperity and well 
being of all parties involved. 
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14.3 Suggestions: Hope After All? 
These results and their consequences may not be uplifting, but they represent important 
mismatches. I would also argue that in contrary to most other institutions that claim that they 
are developing leaders the, RNoNA, in spite of these results, has a sound academic approach 
and solid foundation to what they do. Their framework is unique and represents an 
outstanding approach that is in accordance with “best practices” within this field. The results 
of this research, however, have raised several issues that require attention and must be 
solved. I will address four of these. 
1. The Navy and the Armed Forces in general must be able to attract a wider variety of 
people. The results regarding culture and personality traits indicate that the majority 
of those who apply to become officers are attracted to an organization with an 
outdated identity, making the necessary changes more difficult. The Navy must also 
recognize that “who you are, is how you lead,” which implies a need for a more 
rigorous selection procedure. This dissertation has pointed to the importance of both 
Agreeableness, for creating effective teams and leadership development, and 
Openness to experience, which is necessary for adaptability. 
2. The RNoNA, together with the Navy, must reorder their priorities. Leadership 
development is a complex endeavor that requires a well defined Schwerpunkt. The 
unity of purpose represented by a Schwerpunkt will be difficult to achieve while 
many of the noncooperative centers of gravity that the Lieberg commission (1991) 
identified still function at the RNoNA. The most important element in defining this 
Schwerpunkt concerns the question, “Training to do what?” Answering this question 
requires achieving a balance between traditional academic subjects and what 
constitutes leadership development and officer training. About this topic, the Lieberg 
commission feared that because the emphasis at that time was in favor of traditional 
academic subjects, an imbalance could result that would lead to lack of adaptability 
within the military academies and that could serve as the basis for dysfunctional 
goals and content (1991, p. 44). That noncooperative centers of gravity are forming 
around this issue is evident from the fact that those who teach within in the Sea 
Power subject area do not, in general, agree with this dissertation’s approach of 
defining training with reference to the question of “Training to do what?” Those 
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responsible for leadership development, however, understand the fundamentals of 
this approach and agree with it. If basic disagreements over purpose are allowed to 
persist within the RNoNA, the institution will be attempting to function with several 
noncooperative Schwerpunkts, a situation that will diffuse the focus of the leadership 
development process and limit its effectiveness.  
3. Another serious issue that the Academy must address involves the selection and 
training of facilitators. Facilitators are supposed to be connoisseurs and appreciators 
of leadership, arts that require extensive experience as well as specialized education 
and training. This is perhaps the most complex undertaking at the Academy, and 
officers who are chosen to perform it should receive at least a half year, preferably 
one year, of focused education and preparation before they start facilitating and 
coaching cadets. Today they are assigned to the Academy as to any other posting 
within the Navy, which suggests that any training they do receive, they get on the 
job. 
4. The worst thing that the Navy and the RNoNA could do with this research would be 
to put it a drawer. Such an action would be understandable, because this dissertation 
represents a sharp break with the predominant mindset of state-versus-state attrition 
warfare. However, the leadership of the Navy and of the Academy should reassess 
this mindset, taking into account events in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, where 
several significant armed conflicts are always in progress and threatening to ignite 
wider confrontations65. In particular, they should address the fundamental finding of 
this research, that today’s cadets, are not receiving the type of leadership 
development they will need to represent Norway’s interests in conflict with nonstate 
and other Third World opponents. 
I believe that this dissertation offers an answer to the question of how much impact the 
Academy now has on its targets (the cadets), and as such, it represents an opportunity to do 
something about it. Unfortunately, history indicates that until something comes along and 
                                                 
65 As of this writing, a partial list of significant conflicts includes Israel-Palestinians, Israel-Hezbollah, the Horn of Africa, 
civil wars in Sri Lanka, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Georgia, the Philippines, and Moldava, and guerrilla-style uprisings in 
Russia (Chechnya), India (Naxalites and Assam), Iran (Baluchis), Algeria, and Thailand. 
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destroys the validity of the existing orientation, it is almost impossible to change. Ohno’s 
(1988) writing on this is worth reflecting upon:  
Modern industry also seems stuck in this way of thinking. A person in business may feel 
uneasy about survival in this competitive society without keeping some inventory of raw 
materials, work-in-progress, and products. …This requires what I call a revolution in 
consciousness, a change of attitude and viewpoint by business people (p. 15). 
Top management must change its way of thinking and make a commitment to reverse the 
conventional flow of production, transfer, and delivery. This will meet with lots of 
resistance and requires courage. …Production workers have a good deal of psychological 
resistance to the idea that simply producing as much as possible in no longer a priority (p. 
30) . 
By just changing a few words this could have been a description of the military culture and 
leadership behavior found in this dissertation. My biggest fear is that we will have to take 
major losses to shatter the existing orientation, which is becoming increasingly driven by 
technology.  
14.4 Limitations of the Present Study 
There will be limitations to any study of leadership. Although some of these can be 
eliminated through proper design, others are inherent to the nature of the subject. The most 
important ones were discussed in chapter 10. Here, I will focus on two issues: (1) the extent 
to which one can generalize the results of this study to other organizations outside the 
military realm, and (2) I will also address the issue of possible maturity effects at the 
RNoNA.  
The most obvious criticism that could be raised against this study is that it might have little 
value outside the military community: “This just concerns war. How can these data be 
generalized to business?” I believe this dissertation contains valuable knowledge that could 
be applied to business and other fields because leadership was defined in terms of the ability 
to build and maintain effective teams. Defined in this way, leadership is amenable to 
improvement as a result of training, feedback, and other developmental experiences. This 
research has also contributed to answering Hogan and Kaiser’s (2005) question of “Who 
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should rule?” I will also mention that the essentials of Boyd’s theories could be measured by 
the SPGR for those who wish to instil a culture that provides a competitive advantage in any 
highly competitive environment characterized by novelty and ambiguity. The part of this 
dissertation that covers the essentials insights of entropy and its function in leadership 
development provides a valuable insight into what is needed if the target is effective 
leadership development.  
This study also confirms the importance of dynamic balance among the various leadership 
traits and functions. Hogan and Berry (2006), for example, found that successful Australian 
leaders had a burning desire to outperform others. They had strong interpersonal skills so 
they could motivate and sustain high performing teams. They created positive climates that 
generated energy and fostered “buy in” of the agenda. They had the maturity and emotional 
strength to cope with problems and setbacks and still focus positively on the big picture. 
They were appropriately conscientious, reliable, and structured, and they planned ahead—
neither obsessed with control nor micromanagers of compulsive risk takers living on the 
edge. They also pushed themselves to stay up to date and enjoyed learning for continuous 
improvement, innovation and competitive advantage. These CEOs seemed to be able to 
uncover the combinations of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative and their interaction 
that permitted them to shape and adapt to ever-changing environments. There are individual 
differences among leaders, but we know that good leaders differ from poor leaders in 
consistent and measurable ways, independent of their leadership level (Hogan, 2006). Those 
who are “good” leaders, like these Australian CEOs or those U.S. Navy officers found in 
Bachman (1987), confirm the need to balance the basic SPGR functions.  
Figure 14.2 illustrates the SPGR position in the field diagram of 173 Norwegian leaders. 
These are leaders at high levels who have performed well66. The SPGR 12-vector profile 
indicates a good balance between the Control and Nurture. They are perceived to have a high 
role-taking ability, and their self-rating indicates a willingness to take on different roles. This 
is a different and strikingly more balanced leadership behaviour than what was found in this 
research. 
                                                 
66 Sjøvold, E. (2006). Personal communication, e-mail, from Sjøvold to Nissestad, 6 November, 2006, 10:28, providing 
SPGR data on Norwegian leaders: self- and subordinate ratings. 
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                           The SPGR Field diagram of Norwegian leaders 
 
 
    Self-rating      Subordinates perception  
Figure 14.2  Norwegian Leaders 
 
Figure 14.3, by comparison, illustrates what a small group of high ranking officers in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces considered to be a “good officer.” In contrast to the leaders shown 
in Figure 14.2, this is an officer who lacks balance and role taking ability and is therefore at 
the maturity level Team Spirit. The difference between high performing civilian leaders and 
the ideal military leader shows the magnitude of the challenge facing the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. However, it also suggests that significant improvement in military leadership is 
possible within the context of Norwegian culture. 
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Figure 14.3  Norwegian High Ranking Officers’ Perception of the “Good 
Officer” 
 
Another limitation with this dissertation could be the chosen design, an experimental design 
as close as it could be to a classical design. It was, however, carried out in authentic work 
settings, such as climbing into the rigging of the bark Statsraad Lehmkuhl during a storm in 
the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Under conditions such as these, the leadership 
environment is quite realistic, and success depends on both good leadership and teamwork. 
Another consideration reinforcing the validity of the study was that it followed four cohorts 
instead of just one. The team interviews that were performed after the first Magellan 
exercise, however, confirmed that information given by the SPGR, together with the other 
chosen measurement instruments, captured the essentials of the social interaction to answer 
the main research question and gain understanding of the social interaction process that 
enhances leadership development.  
At the start of the study it was decided to follow these four cohorts throughout their 
leadership training, which occurred primarily during the first year of their education at the 
RNoNA. It could be argued that there was a maturity effect as result of what they 
experienced. For those who continued for the last two years, however, the focus was on the 
academic subjects needed to finish their bachelor’s degrees. These last two years, therefore, 
provided a stable and predictable environment. A few leadership development exercises did 
take place during this period because leadership development at the RNoNA is supposed to 
be a three year endeavour. These exercises, however, were not likely to make much 
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difference in the cadets’ leadership behaviour because their stability failed to generate 
sufficient entropy for leadership development, see chapter 12. This conclusion is confirmed 
by the results shown in Table 14.1, the SPGR Humres results of the four cohorts reported 
after exercise “International Operation” (Int Ops), which occurred 16 months after they had 
finished the one year leadership development program and eight months before they were 
commissioned as officers.  
Cohort 2004 had a moderately significant positive development. Unfortunately this resulted 
in an even stronger Team Spirit, and the imbalance between Control and Nurture is large, 
which was indicated with a Cohen’s d of 1.84. This development indicates an even stronger 
“we against them” attitude—an inward focus—which made interaction with their 
environment even more difficult. It is also worth mentioning that this cohort had a very high 
drop-out rate during this 16 month period. Because Cohort 2002 was not able to continue 
their leadership development after the initial one-year program, these 16 months resulted in a 
regression towards the initial state. These results emphasize the importance of continued 
practice in newly acquired leadership skills. For the two remaining cohorts, these results 
indicate no development at all. 
Table 14.1 
Cohorts 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2004 SPGR Humres Measure - Others Rating - 16 
Months After “Telemakos” 
  SYNERGY CONTROL NURTURE OPPOSITION DEPENDENCE WITHDRAWAL ENERGY 
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Cohort N M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD M/SD
2001 44 6.28 
(1.26) 
6.38 
(1.27) 
3.39 
(1.49) 
3.65 
(1.64) 
5.08 
(1.20) 
5.06 
(1.05) 
1.59 
(.79) 
1.73 
(.86) 
5.78 
(1.06) 
5.78 
(.92) 
1.02 
(.83) 
1.18 
(.98) 
5.26 
(1.92) 
5.20 
(2.13) 
2002 
 
49 7.22 
(.74) 
6.79**1 
(1.01) 
3.97 
(1.27) 
3.95 
(1.47) 
5.60 
(1.09) 
5.30*2 
(1.21) 
2.05 
(.86) 
1.71 
(.97) 
6.07 
(.97) 
5.89 
(1.11) 
.64 
(.65) 
.74 
(.67) 
6.58 
(1.20) 
6.04**3 
(1.46) 
2003 
 
45 6.97 
(1.06) 
6.96 
(1.01) 
3.84 
(1.63) 
3.84 
(1.27) 
5.49 
(.88) 
5.22 
(1.07) 
2.02 
(.99) 
1.77 
(.74) 
6.84 
(.92) 
6.21***4 
(.94) 
1.16 
(.65) 
.73*5 
(.67) 
5.82 
(2.09) 
6.23 
(1.42) 
2004 
 
57 6.88 
(1.04) 
7.33**6 
(1.03) 
3.47 
(1.52) 
3.97**7 
(1.38) 
5.05 
(1.26) 
5.64***8 
(1.19) 
1.71 
(.88) 
1.63 
(.81) 
6.62 
(.99) 
6.84 
(1.07) 
.80 
(.98) 
.65 
(.60) 
6.09 
(1.79) 
6.68*9 
(1.37) 
Note:  A paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the education and training measured with the SPGR Humres – 
others rating - at the RNoNA of the 16 months period from the end of “Telemakos” exercise and until after the “Int-ops” exercise 
which was carried out 8 months before the cadets are commissioned.  
Significant changes are indicated with: *p < .050 **p < .010 ***p < .001 
The ES measured with Cohen’s d where; 1) d = .48, 2) d = .26, 3) d = .36, 4) d = .67, 5) d = .38, 6) d = .43, 7) d = .34, 8) d = 47, and 
9) d =.37  
There does not, therefore, appear to have been a maturity effect. These results also support 
the conclusion that entropy is an essential element of leadership development. It is our 
climate, culture, social interaction, and maturity that determine whether we are able to 
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dissipate the entropy created in our environment. This entropy is essential to leadership 
development. Without it, a group becomes stable and no development will take place. 
Another potential weakness is that throughout the period covered by this study, the RNoNA 
has learned and, as a result, has changed parts of the exercises. The improvements to the 
Magellan exercises illustrate the positive effects of this learning. Because these changes 
affected entire cohorts and all the teams, the cohorts experienced different stimuli, and so 
results could be compared as was done in section 13.5. This could easily have become a 
challenge for this study, but instead of a potential weakness, it contributed to our knowledge 
of leadership development. 
14.5 Future Research on Leadership and Leadership 
Development 
Since 2001, as part of this study, systematic data has been collected on those officers who 
will play important roles in the Navy for the next several decades. These data provide a 
golden opportunity for follow-up studies to see how they perform as leaders in the Navy. As 
mentioned, there have been studies that have applied SPGR both in the Submarine 
community (Larsen & Johannessen, 2005) and in the Coast Guard (Fauskanger, 2006) that 
indicate that the findings reported in this dissertation appear to be valid throughout the Navy. 
It would be wise to investigate this topic further before final conclusions are drawn. There is 
also a need to do a study similar to this one at the Staff College in Oslo to measure the effect 
of this education because they are educating the officers for higher positions within the 
Norwegian armed forces. 
The culture found throughout this dissertation also appears to represent a military subculture 
that is not representative of Norwegian society in general. This especially concerns the 
orientation Relationship-among-People, where the variation Individualism always comes out 
as the least preferred, which indicates a patriarchal and dysfunctional culture when it comes 
to interpersonal relationship. This finding was supported conceptually by both cadets’ and 
officers’ implicit understandings of their ideal officer, which revealed a strong Team Spirit 
focus. When compared with civilian leaders this pattern is striking and should be 
investigated further. 
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14.6 Some Words on the Future of Warfare 
Is there a 5th generation of warfare? There have been several attempts to define a fifth 
generation. However as Lind (2004) notes, many of those who try to figure out what a 5th 
generation might be have not fully grasped the vast change embodied by the 4th generation. 
This statement seems to pin down some of the trouble with a 5th generation. Although the 4th 
generation has been around for a while, it is still evolving, and it still has surprises for us. 
Robb (2006) suggests that the forms of warfare that are emerging in Iraq could be 
characterized as either 4th GW “on steroids” or as the start of a 5th generation, but he claims 
that these semantic distinctions are not important. What Robb considers to be “on steroids” 
might as easily be an adversary that is becoming more decentralized and organic. What is 
important is that armed conflict is quickly developing in directions that are not favorable for 
conventional military forces. Robb sees three such ominous directions: 
1. Open source war, which is the ability to decentralize beyond the limits of a single 
group (far beyond cellular structures) using new methodologies for development 
and coordination. 
2. System disruption, which is a method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple 
destruction of physical infrastructure and is intended to adversely affect, at least 
for a while, the functioning of entire states. Examples could include recent attacks 
against vulnerable nodes in the petroleum industries in Nigeria and Iraq that 
greatly degrade the economies of those states. 
3. Virtual states. Unlike the guerilla movements of the past, many 4GW forces of 
today have found ways of integrating their activities with global “crime.” These 
“black globalizations” are already vast, and they are gaining further momentum 
through the weakening and disruption of states. 
Others, e.g. like Hammes (2004) claim that the emergence of a 5th generation is observable 
today and is characterized by the following aspects: 
1. Technological advances represented by the Internet 
2. Scalability of impact 
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3. Information as an empowering and leveling force 
4. The media as an independent organ that is stronger, more pervasive, and more 
independent than ever before 
5. Borders that no longer impede data flow67. 
The 5th generation must not be mistaken for “information operations,” although the Internet 
is an extremely powerful tool in combination with scalability and the decreased effectiveness 
of borders. Scalability is of immense importance. At no other time in human history has it 
been possible for one person to destroy the functional productivity of a world economy with 
a push of button, as, for example, the “love bug” computer virus did for approximately a 
week in 2000, before being eradicated. The media has effectively become a sort of “nonstate 
actor” itself on the world stage, and the mere fact of publication in a particular country no 
longer means that that nation endorses the contents. This was vividly illustrated by the 
international disruptions following publication in Denmark of drawings of the Prophet 
Mohammed. This “weaponization of the media” is a dangerous tool and one that at least our 
adversaries have mastered. Government involvement with the media, however, for the 
express purpose of controlling the hearts of minds of people is an inherently dangerous 
activity if one wishes to preserve free speech as one of our fundamental values. Balancing 
the rights of citizens with the need to influence others will represent a huge challenge 
because our adversaries have no such constraints. 
Technological change alone has never been sufficient to produce a major change in how man 
wages war. Any 5th generation, therefore, will require societal change—political, economic 
social and technological—to create the conditions necessary for major changes in war 
(Hammes, 2004). This further points to the necessity of defining the enemy correctly, which 
I claim is disconnectedness and those who promote and enforce it. This becomes even more 
important if Hammes is correct in his speculation that “5GW will be a super empowered 
small group that is loyal to a cause rather than a nation using bio tech to create WMD68” 
(2006). 
                                                 
67 This is an inevitable result of globalization.  
68 WMD is “weapons of mass destruction.” 
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Hammes’s (2004) answer to this challenge is flexibility (see his chapter 17) while 
Vandergriff (2006) in his latest book focuses on adaptability. Vandergriff argues that, in the 
case of the U.S. Army, “… it will have to change its culture, particularly its leader 
development paradigm” (2006, p. 11). Both authors offer excellent arguments. As this 
research has shown, however, making such changes requires a major and demanding effort, 
and it is of the utmost importance to get it right.  
The theoretical foundation presented in this dissertation, and the way the elements of it are 
combined, represents a “blueprint” for action leading to a future worth creating that covers 
considerably more than either Hammes’s or Vandergriff’s answer. I have deliberately 
written “blueprint” in quotes because, according to the results presented here, we cannot 
stand on the outside and control this development. If that becomes the answer, then this 
dissertation would represent only creative rewriting, which simplifies leadership 
development into processes where those who are being developed become just users of 
templates and not free-thinking individuals whom we can influence to become better 
officers. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: A Leadership Development Report—an 
Example 
This shows the average score of each team member measured with the SPGR 360. This 
example will follow Member B of this group, who has an average position in the field 
diagram of X = 4, Y = 3, and  Z = 4 (including Member B’s own scores). 
 
Figure A 1 The Team Average 
 
The scatter—white circles—indicates the different perceptions of the team members. 
Depending on how long the team has been working together, this provides useful 
information about the team’s cohesion. It also provides a picture of the polarization within 
the group. As we can see, there is only one member in a subgroup, dependence. 
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Figure A 2 The Group Average Polarization 
 
This member is still within the large group, indicated by the small circle that is almost in the 
middle of the larger group circle. This indicates that this is not a major problem, but from a 
leadership development perspective it might become a challenge for this member’s 
development process because Dependence suggests a low degree of initiative.
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Figure A 3 Member B’s Assessment of the Team 
 
This diagram shows how Member B assesses the team members. It indicates that according 
to Member B, only Members A and B, represented by the large yellow circles, contribute to 
teamwork. The remaining members are inhibited by the Dependence function (as a result 
they are marked with grey color). This perception is also different from the average 
perception shown above, indicating a different orientation of the social interaction within the 
team. This might, depending how large this mismatch is, become a problem for Member B 
as a leader.
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Figure A 4  The Team Members’ Assessment of Member B 
 
This diagram shows Member B as viewed by the other team members. This diagram also 
includes Member B’s own assessment. Member C assesses B as inhibited by the Control 
function, blue color, while Member D assesses B on the opposite side, indicating Nurture, as 
shown by the green color. This indicates two quite different perceptions of Member B. As 
we see, the assessments by the other members are gathered somewhere in between these 
two. It also shows, in a good way, between the difference between this member’s identity 
(B’s theory of B, expressed in SPGR terms) and B’s reputation as provided by the other 
team members.
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Figure A 5 Member B’s Self-image 12-Vector Profile 
 
This diagram shows the 12 vectors. The black line indicates the Naval Academy’s leadership 
profile, while the white is Member B’s self image (5-3-1). The scores range from 0 to 9. This 
indicates that this cadet is concerned with controlling behavior, ruling (9), which is the C2 
vector in the SPGR space. Member B’s result is much lower on caring (5). We also see that 
B’s ruling behavior is at the maximum level and well above the Academy’s desired state, 
leading to a rigid behavior and a strict focus on rules and procedures, while on caring it is 
lower. This profile indicates a cadet who is skewed toward the controlling part of the SPGR 
space, and it suggests that according to this self-assessment, Member B is more comfortable 
with control roles than nurture roles. This indicates a lack of balance and should as such 
represent an obvious target for development.
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Figure A 6 Others Average Perception of Member B 12-Vector Profile 
 
This diagram represents the average 12-vector reputation of Cadet B according to the team-
members. As we can see, they have much in common, indicating that Cadet B’s self-image is 
fairly correct, but that there is some deviation, as we saw above, that is worth serious 
discussion during the team’s feedback sessions. 
Natural development goals for this cadet would be to focus on the Synergy roles—S1, 
Engagement, and S2, Empathy. Overall, this profile indicates a limited role repertoire for 
this cadet at this stage of development.
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Figure A 7 Member B’s Self-image 8-Vector Profile 
 
This is a different diagram than the 12-vector profile, above. If we compare this diagram 
with the previous 12-vector self-image, we see that Member B’s largest circle lies in the 
Control sector. This is also the one of the circles which is farthest away form the center, 
although there is a small grey circle at Care-taking that is further away from the center.  
This information gives the receiver additional important feedback on that person’s behavior. 
The size of the circle, for example, indicates influence: A large circle indicates a high 
influence and concern for this behavior, while a small, grey circle indicates the opposite. The 
distance from the center indicates the frequency of the behavior: the further away, the more 
common is this behavior.
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Figure A 8  Others Average Perception of Member B 8-Vector Profile 
 
This diagram adds some important aspects. For example, Cadet B is perceived stronger on 
Care-taking by team members than by the cadet, although Care-taking behavior is not that 
common.  
 326
 
Figure A 9  Member B’s Self-image Behaviors 
 
This diagram adds to the complexity, although it also makes leadership development easier. 
It provides a detailed picture of Member B’s self rating on the different behaviors within the 
SPGR space. The different colors (that form a pattern resembling a butterfly) are the 
academy’s chosen leadership profile. The black line indicates the score. If we look at the 
behavior labeled constructive exchange, which is a part of Synergy, we see that the black 
line is on the middle. This indicates that to increase the effectiveness of own leadership 
behavior, Member B should try to behave more constructively. This is also in agreement 
with the team’s feedback, as shown on the next diagram. 
It is important to observe how colors are used in a systematic way throughout the report. A 
blue color indicates behaviors that are in accordance with the Control function, green the 
Nurture function etc. 
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Figure A 10  Others Perception of Member B’s Behavior 
 
This diagram provides the cadet with the average ratings on behavior as assessed by the 
other team members. As previously seen, and which is also indicated here with the black 
lines, this cadet has a limited role repertoire to apply in different leadership contexts.
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Figure A 11 Member B’s Assessment of the Polarization within the Team 
 
This is the polarization diagram of this cadet’s assessment of the team, which is another 
picture of the assessment of the team in the SPGR space, see Figure A3. This diagram 
indicates that according to Member B, only Members A and B belong to the work group, 
while the remaining members are passive, lack initiative, and need to be told what to do. 
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Appendix B: The Factors of Assessment, Challenge, and 
Control 
Assessment at the RNoNA 
Assessment is an important part of the leadership development program at the RNoNA 
because it provides the cadets with an understanding of where they are now—their current 
strengths, the level of their current performance or leader effectiveness, and their primary 
developmental needs. The leadership development program is built on assessment, because 
“if you don’t know where you are going, any road will lead you there” (Hogan & 
Warrenfeltz, 2003). Assessment information identifies gaps in a cadet’s current performance 
and provides a benchmark for future development as a result of the gap between the 
assessment and the RNoNA’s goal. The driving idea is that these gaps identify one of the 
keys to why developmental experiences motivate learning, growth, and change. Assessment 
also enhances the power of leadership development because assessments help the cadets to 
understand their situations fully and become motivated to capitalize on the learning 
opportunities created by the RNoNA. Assessment addresses the topic of insight in the 
development pipeline and the two questions of “How do others view you?” and “How do 
you view yourself?” It is supposed to help the cadets bring their identities into alignment 
with their reputations by helping them develop a orientation that is continually shaped by 
their interactions with those they lead. This is an important alignment because poor leaders 
tend to overevaluate their performance (Atwater & Yammarino, 1992; Van Velsor, Taylor, 
& Leslie, 1992). In particular, a major goal of the leadership development program concerns 
bringing self-views of one’s competence as a leader into alignment with others’ views 
(Hogan & Warrenfeltz, 2003).  
Assessment at the RNoNA is based on a 360-degree feedback from the team members after 
each of the five major leadership exercises. The Academy applies the SPGR (Sjøvold, 2007, 
1995; Sjøvold & Nissestad, 2005) as their main tool for leadership development because 
SPGR contains both a model and a procedure to visualize how organizations, teams, and 
individual team members can contribute to the development of the organization, the team, 
and team member. When an exercise is finished the cadets will get individualized reports 
indicating (a) how mature and how well they function as a team, (b) their own opinions of 
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themselves, which are their identities expressed in SPGR terms, of their team members, and 
(c) the team members’ individual opinions of each other, which are their reputations in 
SPGR terms. These reports are also compared with the academy’s desired state of leadership 
behavior. An example of such a report was given in Appendix A. 
Challenge at the RNoNA 
The idea behind challenge is to move the cadets out of their comfort zones, which is what 
challenging experiences are suppose to do (Van Velsor & McCauley, 2004). They must 
create fluctuations or disequilibrium, causing the participants to question the adequacy of 
their skills, orientation, and approaches. Novelty is a common source of challenge, and 
experiences that require new skills and new ways of understanding oneself in relation to 
others can be most challenging. People feel challenged when they encounter variations of 
situations that demand skills and abilities beyond their current capabilities or when the 
situation is confusing and ambiguous, and current ways of making sense of the world no 
longer seem to work. In these circumstances, their orientations no longer match the real 
world. They have become disoriented. 
Just to be given systematized feedback from peers, which done by the SPGR, might 
represent a challenge in itself and an opportunity to learn. These situations are important 
because they provide opportunities to learn that require the cadets to engage the challenge 
and to interact with the environment in ways that produce the information, observations, and 
reactions needed to learn. Learning, however, requires that the participants engage in the 
challenge and are motivated to interact with the environment in ways that produce the 
information, observations, and reactions needed to learn. 
Simply stated, cadets will not develop their capacity for leadership without being in the 
throes of the challenge of leadership. People do not learn to cope with stress without feeling 
stress and discovering ways to cope with it. The program at the Academy puts each cadet in 
positions where they have to participate in leadership roles and processes that are full of 
novelty, difficulty, and conflict. Leadership itself, in other words, is regarded as a 
developmental challenge at the RNoNA.  
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Support at the RNoNA 
The support elements of leadership development send the message that the participants will 
find support and help for their developmental process. Support helps them to handle the 
struggle and pain of developing (Van Velsor & McCauley, 2004). The support elements of a 
leadership program or an experiment are supposed to send the message that the cadets will 
find support and help for their developmental process. The SPGR reports, the team itself, 
and the facilitators/coaches are the most important support tools at the Academy, and they 
provide key factors in maintaining cadets’ motivations to learn and grow. According to Mills 
(1984), this growth does not occur automatically but depends upon members who are 
capable of both personal growth and commitment. It helps them bear the weight of 
experience and maintain a positive view of themselves as capable, worthy, and valuable 
people who can learn and grow. Support must help engender a sense of self-efficacy about 
learning, a belief that one can learn, change, and develop. Support mechanisms also provide 
learning resources. By systematically talking about and sharing current struggles with others, 
openly examining mistakes, and ensuring that the environment reacts positively to the 
changes they make, cadets have the opportunity to confirm and clarify the lessons they are 
learning (Van Velsor & McCauley, 2004). Through support, they get the sense that they are 
on the right track, that the feedback they are receiving both through the SPGR reports and 
orally is legitimate, and that the new ways they are making sense of their situations are 
shared by others and will make them more effective as future leaders. 
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Appeddix C: The SPGR Questionnaire 
SJØKRIGSSKOLEN  Skala:   [AGNR] 
 
 
INSTRUKSJON for utfylling LAG 
 
 
Ditt navn: 
 
 
Lagsnummer: 
 
Nedenfor finner du 24 beskrivelser av adferd/egenskaper som kan forekomme i 
samarbeidssituasjoner. For hvert av linjene med adjektiver skal du ta stilling til om det 
objektet du beskriver viser denne adferden SJELDEN  (merk med  0), NOEN GANGER (merk 
med 1) eller   OFTE (merk med 2). 
 
Du skal  fylle ut kollonnene for hver person i gruppen, inkludert deg selv 
 
Hver kolonne angir et objekt.  Beskriv et objekt av gangen og  ta stilling til alle 24 
påstandene for  dette objektet før du går over til neste objekt (kolonne). 
 
Du skal ta stilling til alle 24 leddene i skjemaet nedenfor.  Se alle adjektivene på hver enkelt 
linje som en helhet , selv om du synes dette i enkelte tilfeller kan være vanskelig.  Ikke dvel 
for lenge ved hver beskrivelse.  Det er ditt umiddelbare inntrykk som skal markeres. 
 
(Husk:   fyll ut alle 24 påstandene for alle kolonnene) 
 SJELDEN = 0, NOEN GANGER = 1, OFTE= 2   A     B    C    D    E    F    G    H 
1 Utadvendt,  Åpen, Selskapelig         
2 Engasjert, Målrettet, Konstruktiv i samarbeid         
3 Upersonlig, Effektiv, Styrende         
4 Autoritær, Kontrollerende, Kritisk         
5 Tøff, Konkurranseinnstilt, Påtrengende         
6 Selvsentrert, Provoserende, Umedgjørlig         
7 Dramatisk, Innfallsrik, Underholdende         
8 Beskyttende, Omsorgsfull, Varm         
9 Vennlig, Uformell, Ser alle som likeverdige         
10 Samarbeidsvillig, Støttende, Oppmuntrende         
11 Analytisk, Saklig, Rasjonell         
12 Påståelig, Pedantisk, Ubøyelig         
13 Lukket, Selvdrevet, Er seg selv nok         
14 Irritabel, Egenrådig, Likegyldig         
15 Utradisjonell, Umiddelbar, Spontan         
16 Omgjengelig, Medfølende, Smidig         
17 Omtenksom, Trofast, Ser opp til andre         
18 Varsom, Aksepterer oppgaver, Pålitelig         
19 Lydig, Strevsom, Lojal         
20 Selvoppofrende, Selvmedlidende, Klagende         
21 Innesluttet, Avvisende, Tilbakeholden         
22 Motløs, Oppgitt, Giddesløs         
23 Engstelig, Anspent, Betviler egne evner.         
24 Tillitsfull, Stillferdig, Fornøyd         
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Appendix D - SPGR Analysis Applied in this Dissertation  
The SPGR instrument consists of a set of analyses taken from the study of social fields 
applied to patterns of polarization and group typology. In this study we base our discussion 
on the Average Field analysis, Group functions, and Vector analysis. 
The average field analyses 
The SPGR field analyses are presented on a three-sector template. In the upper sector 
behaviors that support the “Control” group function(s) (blue color) are plotted, in the lower 
right sector behaviors that support “Nurture” (green color) and the lower left behaviors that 
support “Opposition” (red color) are plotted (Figure 2). In Figure 10.2 the primary focus of 
each sector (“System,” ”Relations” and “Myself”) is marked. For feedback purposes the 
results that form a group analyses can be presented by drawing the members of the group as 
circles of different sizes. The size of the circle indicates a person’s influence in the group 
and the Euclidian distance between the circles represents the relational closeness between 
group members. 
 
Figure D.1 The SPGR Space 
As can be seen in appendix A, the location of each member is also given by coordinates, 
where the “X” coordinate tracks group-oriented behavior to self-oriented behavior, the “Y” 
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coordinate tracks behavior that is task-oriented behavior that is defined by emotional 
expressions and spontaneity, and the “Z” coordinate indicates a continuum from passivity, 
hence lack of initiative, to none too a very high level of influence (dominance). These values 
might range from -18 to 18 where 0 is the origin. 
The aggregate results may be displayed for a team, several teams, an organization, or even a 
national culture if one wishes to do so. This dissertation will apply individuals, team(s) and 
cohort(s). 
The group function analysis 
To measure the maturity and the development of a team or a cohort the group functions as 
discussed in chapter four and described in Table 4.1 are plotted. In SPGR these are given 
values from 0 to 9. 
The vector analysis 
While each of the circles in a field analyses represents the average location in the SPGR 
space, vector analysis gives a more detailed picture of the behavior that one group member 
displays. The field analyses are efficient for feeding back results when the topic is the 
dynamics of the group, while the vector diagram is more efficient for feedback to individual 
members of the group. The SPGR space consists of the twelve different vectors described in 
Table 4.3 and illustrated in Figure 4.1. Here the measurement scale goes from 0 to 9.  
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Appendix E: CPQ 8 Sample Items 
 
Scale 
# of Items  
Sample Items 
Relationships   
 Individualism 8 Young people should be taught to be independent 
People should expect to look after themselves 
 Collective 8 Everyone’s responsibility is to do what is best for society as a whole 
The interests of the group take priority over the interests of any individual within the 
group 
 Hierarchy 7 People at higher levels of an organization must look after those below them 
Organizations work best with clear and formal hierarchies 
Environment   
 Subjugation 5 Organizational success is largely determined by natural or supernatural forces. 
The outcomes of most events are predetermined 
 Mastery  8 Given enough time and resources, people can do almost anything. 
The most successful businesses control their own environment 
 Harmony  7 It is critical to maintain harmony in social situations 
Good managers make changes only when they understand the implications for the 
whole organization. 
Activity   
 Doing 8 Hard work is rewarding in itself. 
People prefer jobs that are meaningful and important. 
 Being 8 Plans should always be changed if more interesting possibilities arise 
Taking the necessary time to do things is more important than meeting deadlines 
 Thinking 8 People always need to approach life thoughtfully. 
The most successful people are the ones who always carefully reflect on the meaning of 
their actions 
Time   
 Future 4 A realistic time horizon for organizational planning is five years or more. 
People should always look ahead rather than worry about today or yesterday. 
 Present 4 A realistic time horizon for organizational planning is one year or less. 
Today is more important than yesterday and tomorrow 
 Past 4 It is important to honor traditions 
People should always take into account the past when making decisions about the 
future. 
Human Nature 5 People can be trusted to do the right thing 
People are basically good. 
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Appendix F: Statistical Considerations 
Calculation of the Reliable Change Index 
The Reliable Change Index (RCI) is calculated by following the suggestions outlined by 
Christensen and Mendoza (1986), Jacobsen and Traux (1991), and Olges, Lambert, and 
Masters (1996). The RCI is calculated as follows: 
RC = (x2—x1)/Sdiff 
where x1 represents a subject’s pretest score, x2 represents that same subject’s posttest score 
and, and Sdiff is the standard error of difference between the two test scores. Sdiff is computed 
from the standard error of measurement SE according to: 
Sdiff =
2)(2 ES  
SE is calculated according to: SE = s1 xxr−1 , where s1 is the standard deviation of either 
control group, normal population, or pretreatment experimental group, and rxx is either 
Cronbach’s alpha (or another parameter of internal consistency) or test-retest reliability of 
this measure. Using Cronbach’s alpha is probably the most theoretically consistent approach 
because the theory behind this is classical reliability theory. By contrast, a test-retest 
reliability measure always includes not only simple unreliability of the measure but also any 
real changes in whatever is being measured. This means that internal reliability is almost 
always higher than test-retest and generally results in more people being assessed as having 
changed reliably (Evans, 1998). The Cronbach’s alpha was used on the NEO PI-R, while on 
the SPGR, because of lack of Cronbach’s alpha measures on the SPGR, the correlation on 
each vector was summed for the five measurements and the average correlation used. This 
correlation was higher than the Pearson’s r for the paired sample t-test, resulting in more 
people being seen to have changed reliably. 
Sdiff describes the spread of the distribution of change scores that would be expected if no 
actual change had occurred. Reliable change scores smaller than -1.96 or larger than 1.96 are 
unlikely to occur without true change, and are thus considered reliable. If change were 
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random, then we would expect the distribution of the RCI scores to be normal, with 
approximately 2.5% below -1.96, 2.5% above 1.96, and 95% of the cadets remaining the 
same. To control whether this distribution of “decreasers,” “nonchangers,” and “increasers” 
differs significantly from this random-change pattern, chi-squared statistics were applied. 
Considerations Concerning the Use of One-Way Anova and Post 
Hoc Comparisions 
This section covers the elements that must be considered concerning the choice of post hoc 
procedures. The post hoc tests consist of pair-wise comparisons that are designed to compare 
all different combinations of the treatment groups. There are three things that must be 
considered  
1 Does the test control the type I error rate?  
2 Does the test control the type II error rate (i.e. does the test have good statistical 
power)?  
3 Is the test reliable when the test assumptions of ANOVA have been violated? 
The type I error rate and the statistical power of the test are related, so there is a trade-off 
consideration: A conservative test, where the probability of type I error is small, is likely to 
lack statistical power, that is, the probability of a type II error will be high. It is important, 
therefore, that the multiple comparison procedures control the type I error rate without 
substantial loss in power. If a test is too conservative, it might miss differences between 
means that are, in reality, meaningful. 
Most of the multiple comparison procedures perform relatively well under small deviations 
from normality. They perform badly however when group sizes are unequal and when 
populations’ variances are different. There are several general guidelines to choosing which 
procedure to use:  
1. With equal sample size and similar populations’ variance, the The Ryan, Einot, 
Gabriel and Welsh Q procedure (REGWQ) could be applied because it has good 
power and tight control of the type I error.  
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2. If the sample sizes are slightly different, the Gabriel’s procedure could be applied 
because it has greater power. It can, however, become too liberal when the sample 
sizes are different. 
3. If the sample sizes are different, the Hochberg’s GT2 could be used. 
4. In doubt, and if the population variances are equal, then the best thing is to use the 
Games-Howell procedure because it generally seems to offer the best performance. 
Field (2004) recommend running the Games-Howell procedure in addition to any of 
the others tests. 
These guidelines were followed when these analyses were performed in this dissertation. 
Calculation of Effect Size 
There are a number of different ES statistics, the most common of which are eta squared 
(η2) and Cohen’s d (d), this section will outline these beginning with the eta squared. 
The eta squared η2 statistic provides an indication of the magnitude of the differences 
between groups, not just whether the difference could have occurred by chance. Values for 
η2 can range from 0 to 1 and represent the proportion of variance in the dependent variable 
that is explained by the independent variable. The formula for calculating the η2 for an 
independent sample t-test is: [ ])2(/ 21222 −++= NNttη , where t is the t-value, and N is the 
sample size. For paired sample t-test the formula is: [ ])1(/ 222 −+= Nttη  
The η2 statistics can also be calculated for the measures in analysis of variance. For one-way 
analysis of variance the formula is: 
η2 = Sum of squares between-groups/Total sum of squares, or η2= SSeffect/SS total. 
The strength of η2 values is interpreted according to the following guidelines: .01= small 
effects, .06= moderate effects; and .14= large effects.  
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the η2 is a rough estimate, and this measure is 
flawed for two reasons when there are two levels of independent variables. The first is that 
η2 for a particular independent variable depends on the number and significance of the other 
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independent variables in the design. The η2 for an independent variable in a one-way design 
is likely to be larger than η2 for the same independent variable in a two-way design where 
the other independent variable and the interaction increase the size of the total variance, 
especially if one or both of the additional effects are large. This is because of the 
denominator of η2 contains systematic variance for other effects in addition to the error 
variance and systematic variance for the effect of interest. This could be avoided by applying 
an alternative form of η2, called partial eta square (ηp2), in which the denominator contains 
only variance attributable to the effect of interest plus error: ηp2 = Seffect/(Seffect + SSerror). 
However, for one-way analyses of variance η2 = ηp2. With this alternative, η2s for all 
significant effects in the design do not sum to the proportion of systematic variance in the 
dependent variable. This sum might sometimes be greater than 1.0. 
The second flaw with the η2 is that it describes the proportion of systematic variance in a 
sample with no attempt to estimate proportion of systematic variance in the population. A 
statistic developed to estimate strength between independent variables and the dependent 
variable is omega squares (ω2); ω2 = SSeffect-(dfeffect)(SSerror)/SStotal + MSerror. This is the 
additive form of ω2, where the denominator represents total variance, not just variance 
because of the effect plus error, and is limited to between-subjects analysis of variance 
design with equal sample sizes in all cells. 
Cohen (1988) defined d as the difference between the means, M1-M2, divided by the standard 
deviation, SD (σ), of either group; d = M1-M2/SD, where  
SD = ( )[ ]NMX /2−∑ , where X is the raw score, M is the mean and N is the number of 
cases. Cohen argued that the standard deviation of either group could be used when the 
variance of the two groups are homogeneous. In practice, the pooled SD, SDpooled, (σpooled) is 
commonly used (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996); d = d = M1-M2/ SDpooled. The pooled standard 
deviations are found as the root square of the two standard deviations (Cohen, 1988). That is, 
the pooled standard deviation is the square root of the average of the squared standard 
deviations; SDpooled = ( )[ ]2/2221 SDSD + . When the two standard deviations are similar, the 
root mean square will not differ much from the simple average of the two variances. This 
gives the following formula for Cohen’s d: 
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Cohen’s d can also be computed from the value of the t-test of the differences between the 
two groups (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991); )(/2 dftd =  or [ ])2121 )(( )( nndf nntd += , where df is 
the degrees of freedom for the t-test. The “n’s” are the number of cases for each group. The 
formula without the n’s should be used when the n’s are equal, and the formula with separate 
n’s should be used when the n’s are not equal. Cohen’s d can also be computed from r, the 
ES correlation; d = 2r/ )1( 2r− .  
There are some controversies about how to compute ES when we have repeated measures, 
e.g., the paired sample t-test as used in this dissertation. Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, and Burke 
(1996) argue that the original standard deviations, or the between-group t-test value, should 
be used to compute ES for correlated designs. They argue that if the pooled standard 
deviation is corrected for the amount of correlation between the measures, then the ES 
estimate will be an overestimate of the actual ES. The overestimate is dependent upon the 
magnitude of correlation between the two scores. It is only when the correlation between 
measures is zero that the ES is not overestimated, which makes the above η2 calculation 
flawed and misguiding and the result will in most cases result in reporting a too high ES. 
Cohen’s d for the paired sample t-tests is calculated by using the formula presented by 
Dunlap et al. (1996): 
d = tc[2(1—r )/n]1/2 
Where tc is the correlated pairs t value, r is the correlation between scores for the two groups 
or the retest coefficient, and n is the number of pairs. 
Cohen (1988) hesitantly defined ESs as “small, d = .2,” “medium, d = .5,” and “large, d = 
.8,” stating that “there is a certain risk inherent in offering conventional operational 
definitions for those terms for use in power analyses in as diverse fields of inquiry as the 
behavioral sciences” (p, 25). According to Cohen (1988) ES can be interpreted in terms of 
the percent of nonoverlap of the treated group’s score compared with those of the untreated 
group. An ES of 0 indicates that the distribution of scores for the treated group overlaps 
completely with the distribution of scores for the untreated group, that there is 0% of 
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nonoverlap. A small ES of 0.2 indicates a nonoverlap of 14.7% in the two distributions, a 
medium ES of 0.5 indicates an overlap of 33.3% in the two distributions, while a large ES of 
0.8 overlap of 47.4% in the two distributions. 
Reporting of p Values  
According to the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines (2001), there are 
two methods of reporting p values. One way is to use the alpha level, which is typically .05 
or .01. The exact p value may also be reported. If the exact p value is less than .001 it is 
conventional to state merely “p < .001.” 
In this dissertation both methods are used, depending on the type of inference being 
performed. 
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Appendix G: Correlation Between SPGR and NEO PI-R 
This appendix presents the correlation results between the personality inventory NEO PI-R 
and both SPGR self and peer ratings.  
The following abbreviations are used in the tables: SPGR Abbreviations: X = Group-
oriented behavior to Self-oriented behavior; Y = Task-oriented behavior that is defined by 
emotional expressions and spontaneity; Z = A continuum from passivity and lack of 
initiative too a very high level of influence; Syn = Synergy; Con = Control, Nur = Nurture; 
Op = Opposition; De = Dependence; Wit = Withdrawal; C1 = Task orientation; C2= Ruling; 
N1= Care-taking, N2 = Creativity; D1 = Loyalty, D2 = Acceptance; O1 = Criticism; O2 = 
Assertiveness; W1 = Resignation; W2 = Self-sacrificing; S1 = Engagement; S2= Empathy.   
NEO PI-R Abbreviations: N = Neuroticism; E = Extraversion, O = Openness to 
experience, A = Agreeableness, C = C= Conscientiousness; N1 = Anxiety, N2 = Angry 
Hostility, N3 = Depression; N4 = Self-Consciousness; N5 = Impulsiveness; N6 = 
Vulnerability; E1 = Warmth; E2 = Gregariousness; E3 = Assertiveness; E4 = Activity; E5 = 
Excitement Seeking; E6 = Positive Emotions; O1 = Fantasy; O2 = Aesthetics; O3 = 
Feelings; O4 = Actions; O5 = Ideas; O6 = Values; A1 = Trust, A2 = Straightforwardness; 
A3 = Altruism; A4 = Compliance; A5 = Modesty; A6 = Tender-Mindedness; C1 = 
Competence; O2 = Order, C3 = Dutifulness; C4 = Achievement Striving; C5 = Self-
Discipline; C6 = Deliberation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table G.1 
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Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Between SPGR Dimensions and Functions 
Self-rating and NEO PI-R 
          
 PN FB UD Syn Con Nur Op De Wit 
          
N -.16** -.13* -.19** -.27** -.07 -.15** .06 .03 .27** 
E .05 .04 .39** .26** .18** .29** .10 -.08 -.21** 
O -.02 -.02 .20** .12* .13* .18** .11 -.11 -.04 
A .26** -.13* -.23** .07 -.25** -.07 -.16** .12* -.02 
C .11 .32** .07 .20** -.19** -.01 .09 .12* -.16** 
          
N1 -.10 -.05 -.20** -.20** -.04 -.17** .03 .06 .24** 
N2 -.30** .06 .09 -.23** .17** -.11 -.20** -.10 .09 
N3 -.16** -.10 -.20** -.24** -.03 -.14* .08 .08 .24** 
N4 -.05 -.12* -.28** -.21** -.17** -.15** -.07 .02 .23** 
N5 -.07 -.15* -.02 -.05 -.06 .04 .05 .01 .14* 
N6 -.05 -.21** -.24** -.23** -.23** -.13* -.04 .04 .25** 
          
E1 .18** -.01 .18** .21** -.01 .26** -.08 -.02 -.09 
E2 .08 -.07 .21** .16** .01 .20** .00 -.07 -.15* 
E3 -.06 .27** .47** .23** .40** .18** .19** -.10 -.26** 
E4 -.03 .13* .34** .20** .20** .16** .17** -.08 -.18** 
E5 -.07 -.05 .11 .02 .08 .10 .09 -.03 -.02 
E6 .12 -.09 .19** .23** .00 .24** -.01 -.02 -.11* 
          
O1 -.13 -.15** .11 -.01 .01 .17** .02 -.14* -.01 
O2 -.01 .03 .17** -.09 .15** .01 .07 -.09 -.06 
O3 -.01 -.04 .09 .18** .06 .15** .07 .00 .01 
O4 -.03 -.02 .30** -.08 .10 .12* .11 -.16** -.11 
O5 .02 .08 .10 .07 .13* .13* .10 -.03 -.03 
O6 .01 .00 .04 .10 .06 .03 .07 .01 .04 
          
A1 .19** -.07 -.06 .21** -.09 .17** -.01 .10 -.04 
A2 .18** -.02 -.20** -.04 -.21** -.08 -.14* .10 -.03 
A3 .28** -.17** -.04 .20** -.16** .21** -.14* .7 .00 
A4 .18** -.12* -.31** -.03 -.32** -.02 -.16** .11 .04 
A5 .12* -.04 -.27** -.10 -.17** .14* -.13* .08 .09 
A6 .08 -.11 -.02 .11 .01 .18** .02 .06 -.03 
          
C1 .05 .28** .23** .23** .26** .09 .11 .02 -.20** 
C2 .03 .30** -.01 .08 .17** -.09 .04 .12* -.07 
C3 .09 .27** .00 .14* .20** -.05 .10 .15** -.14* 
C4 .08 .24** .15** .17** .20** .06 .13* .07 -.14* 
C5 .02 .26** .15* .17** .17** ..02 .13* .03 -.18** 
C6 .19** .12* -.18** .09 -.08 -.07 -.08 .14* -.03 
Note: N = 297. **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
Table G.2 
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Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Between SPGR 12-Vector Self-rating and 
NEO PI-R. 
             
 C1 C2 N1 N2 D1 D2 O1 O2 W1 W2 S1 S2 
 
             
N -.02 -.08 -.21** -.09 -.03 -.02 .05 -.03 .27** .13* -.14* -.15** 
E .17** .14* .27** .27** -.07 .05 .06 .20** -.17** -.19** .21** .03 
O .10 .07 .10 .12* -.12* -.08 .10 .09 -.01 -.11 .07 .05 
A -.27** -.27** .09 -.03 .13* .23** -.16** -.13* .00 -.02 -.04 .21** 
C .07 .19** .05 -.09 .14* .07 -.01 .13* -.23** -.10 .19** .07 
             
N1 -.03 -.07 -.17** -.13* .00 -.01 -.04 -.06 .24** .11 -.10 -.05 
N2 .21** .17** -.18** -.05 -.07 -.15* .21** .12* .12* .06 -.05 -.28 
N3 -.01 -.06 -.20** -.07 -.01 .02 .05 -.01 .23** .14* -.15* -.11 
N4 -.13* -.20** -.21** -.13* .00 .01 -.06 -.14* .20** .09 -.12* -.07 
N5 .01 .03 -.02 .08 -.04 .00 .02 .03 .17** .06 -.03 -.07 
N6 -.14** -.20** -.11 -.08 .00 .04 -.07 -.10 .24** .11 -.16** -.08 
             
E1 .02 -.08 .26** .22** -.04 .06 -.04 .07 -.09 -.09 .09 .12* 
E2 -.01 -.01 .22** .18** -.06 -.04 .04 .09 -.12* -.09 .07 .07 
E3 .35** .33** .20** .21** -.06 -.11 .13* .24** -.14* -.20 .32** -.07 
E4 .17** .16** .16** .15** -.06 -.10 .09 .21** -.17** -.19** .21** -.04 
E5 .09 .08 .01 .12* -.05 -.03 .03 .09 .01 -.08 .03 -.02 
E6 .04 .01 .22** .18** -.01 .05 -.02 .08 -.14* -.09 .11 .08 
       .      
O1 .02 -.02 -.02 .16** -.17 -.09 .04 .08. .05 .03 -.07 -.03 
O2 .12 .12 .04 .07 -.12* -.09 .07 .06 -.06 -.10 .07 .01 
O3 .05 -.01 .15** .06 -.02 -.05 .03 .07 .02 -.08 .09 .11 
O4 .13* .07 .20** .13* -.14* -.14* .08 .08 -.07 -.14* .09 -.06 
O5 .08 .06 .03 .08 -.01 -.05 .06 .06 -.04 .10 .06 .12* 
O6 -.01 .03 .08 -.01 .00 .02 .02 .02 .05 -.06 .07 .03 
             
A1 -.10 -.16** .16** .03 .12* .17** -.03 -.03 -.01 -.04 .02 .23** 
A2 -.25** -.16** -.02 -.13* .09 .11 -.16** -.14* -.08 -.01 -.06 .05 
A3 -.16** -.18** .26** .12* .08 .17** -.17** -.02 .02 -.05 .02 .21** 
A4 -.33** -.32** -.02 -.07 .10 .14* -.17** -.22** .03 .06 -.07 .20** 
A5 -.17** -.17** -.09 -.16** .08 .16** -.09 -.16** .11 .07 -.04 .06 
A6 .01 -.08 .11 .13* .05 .17** -.01 .03 -.03 -.04 -.01 .12* 
             
C1 .14* .21** .10 .03 .03 .01 .08 .16** -.25** -.13* .23** .05 
C2 .08 .22** -.05 -.13* .15* .04 .05 .05 -.16** .00 .09 -.02 
C3 .08 .15** -.03 -.09 .17** .11 -.03 .12* -.19** -.06 .14* .03 
C4 .14* .15** .10 .01 .08 .04 .01 .18** -.16** .13* .19** .05 
C5 .09 .19** .06 -.04 .05 -.03 .05 .16** -.23** -.08 .17** .02 
C6 -.16** -.01 .00 -.18** .15* .14* -.18** -.05 -.01 -.04 .04 .18** 
Note: N = 297. **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
Table G.3 
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Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Between SPGR Dimensions and Functions 
Peer-ratings and NEO PI-R 
          
 PN FB UD Syn Con Nur Op De Wit 
          
N -.04 -.15** -.14* -.14* -.16** -.01 -.04 -.01 .11 
E .03 .02 .33** .28** .16** .20** .21** -.13* -.13* 
O .09 .01 .14* .18** .12* .10 .08 -.06 -.08 
A .18** -.20** -.22** .03 -.23** .04 -.12* .21** .14* 
C -.02 .23** .06 .06 .19** -.19** .11 .06 -.04 
          
N1 -.02 -.15* -.18** -.15* -.13* -.01 -.04 .02 .17** 
N2 -.20** .04 .12* -.10 .10 -.05 .16** -.19** .00 
N3 -.02 -.10 -.15* -.10 -.12* .04 -.04 .07 .10 
N4 -.03 -.13* -.25** -.20** -.20** -.11 -.11 .04 .16** 
N5 -.03 -.11 .06 .05 -.11 .12* -.03 -.09 -.06 
N6 -.07 -.22** -.23** -.15** -.28** -.02 -.17** .10 .10 
          
E1 .15* -.19* .06 .20** -.12* .21** -.01 .01 .00 
E2 -.02 .09 .13* .10 .04 .14* .17** -.11 .01 
E3 -.09 .33** .55** .36** .52** .15* .34** -.24** -.28** 
E4 -.01 .13* .34** .23** .21** .09 .21** -.13* -.13* 
E5 -.01 -.05 .06 .02 -.04 .03 .08 .01 -.06 
E6 .13* -.14* .11 .20** -.06 .18** .00 -.02 -.03 
       .   
O1 .03 -.09 .07 .05 -.01 .14* .00 -.07 -.05 
O2 .03 .02 .14* .12* .13* .04 .09 -.08 -.08 
O3 .13* -.08 .11 .21** .01 .14* .04 -.02 -.03 
O4 .05 .02 .18** .18** .11* .14* .10 -.11 -.08 
O5 .07 .10 .05 .11 .14* .02 .05 .03 -.05 
O6 .06 .03 .01 .05 .09 -.04 .03 .00 -.01 
          
A1 .15** -.13* -.08 .08 -.10 .03 -.03 .08 .02 
A2 .06 -.06 -.17** -.06 -.16** -.07 -.09 .18** .11 
A3 .21** -.19** -.10 .17** -.19** .19** -.11 .18** .08 
A4 .18** -.16** -.30** -.02 -.22** .04 -.18** .27** .15* 
A5 .02 -.08 -.20** -.07 -.11 -.02 -.03 .14* .17** 
A6 .08 -.21** -.04 .03 -.13* .05 .01 -.01 .08 
          
C1 -.01 .25** .21** .16** .26** -.08 .14* -.04 -.17** 
C2 -.12 .20** -.03 -.11* .09 -.21** .03 .00 .07 
C3 -.04 .17** .02 .02 .15** -.18** .15** .13* -.04 
C4 .02 .12* .13* .13* .19** -.08 .17** .04 -.04 
C5 -.04 .25** .13* .13* .23** -.16** .13* .01 -.09 
C6 .07 .06 -.15** -.15** -.03 -.17** -.11 .12* -.04 
Note: N = 297. **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
Table G.4 
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Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Between SPGR 12-Vector Peer-rating and 
NEO PI-R. 
             
 C1 C2 N1 N2 D1 D2 O1 O2 W1 W2 S1 S2 
 
             
N -.05 -.18** -.11* .00 -.02 -.04 .05 -.09 .09 .08 -.15** .04 
E .15* .17** .26** .23** -.17** -.07 .10 .28** -.11 -.12* .23** -.02 
O .11 .10 .16** .06 -.11 -.02 .04 .12* -.07 -.10 .13* .03 
A -.28** -.23** .06 -.07 .15* .27** -.09 -.16** .11 .15** -.08 .23** 
C .12* .19** -.04 -.20** .10 .10 .05 .15* -.06 -.04 .19** -.09 
             
N1 -.04 -.17** -.14* -.04 .03 .02 .07 -.12 .11 .15* -.13* .10 
N2 .17** .06 -.10 .06 -.16** -.26** .20** .13* .05 -.03 -.02 -.18** 
N3 -.04 -.13* -.08 .00 .07 .05 .03 -.08 .09 .12 -.11 .07 
N4 -.12* -.19** -.18** -.13* .06 .00 -.03 -.17** .10 .10 -.18** .04 
N5 -.02 .09 .09 .14* -.13* -.05 .01 .01 -.03 -.03 -.04 .03 
N6 -.19** -.27** -.07 -.04 .08 .09 -.07 -.19** .06 .07 -.21** .14* 
          .   
E1 -.12* -.11 .22** .17** -.09 .10 -.01 .01 .01 .02 .06 .15** 
E2 .02 .07 .11 .14* -.14* -.13* .11 .13* .02 .05 .03 .03 
E3 .46** .48** .23** .27** -.21** -.27** .16** .45** -.18** -.23** .43** -.24** 
E4 .21** .24** .19** .13* -.08 -.13* .10 .32** -.14* -.17** .28** -.08 
E5 -.02 -.05 .04 .05 -.07 .05 .03 .11 -.07 -.05 -.02 -.05 
E6 -.05 -.04 .26** .12* -.08 .06 -.19** .05 -.05 -.06 .07 .15** 
             
O1 05 -.01 .06 .13 -.09 -.07 .02 .02 .00 -.02 .00 .05 
O2 .11 .13* .12* .04 -.12* -.03 .07 .12* -.07 -.10 .09 -.04 
O3 .03 .00 .23** .07 -.09 .05 -.01 .11 -.01 -.05 .11 .09 
O4 .10 .11 .23** .09 -.14* -.06 .04 .13* -.03 -.10 .14* -.01 
O5 .09 .10 .06 -.01 .02 .01 .05 .06 -.09 -.09 .12* .04 
O6 .03 .06 .00 -.08 -.02 .03 -.04 .02 -.05 -.01 .09 .01 
             
A1 -.17** -.09 .08 -.05 .04 .14* -.04 -.05 .03 .03 -.02 .18** 
A2 -.19** -.14* -.05 -.11 .18** .17** -.04 -.09 .06 .10 -.06 .09 
A3 -.25** -.16** .24** .06 .08 .25** -.11 -.11 .06 .11 -.02 .25** 
A4 -.26** -.25** .01 -.13* .23** .29** -.17** -.25** .10 .14* -.11 .28** 
A5 -.08 -.16** -.04 -.09 .11 .17** .00 -.09 .14* .18** -.07 .08 
A6 -.11 -.11 .06 .04 -.07 .05 .03 -.03 .07 .07 -.03 .10 
             
C1 .16** .26** .10 -.04 -.03 -.06 .03 .19** .14* -.14* .28** -.11 
C2 .05 .13* -.11 -.23** .05 -.03 .05 .03 .04 .06 .02 -.13* 
C3 .10 .13* -.08 -.14* .15** .08 .08 .17** -.06 -.02 .13* -.12* 
C4 .14* .17** .08 -.08 .05 .03 .09 .20** -.04 .08 .20** -.02 
C5 .18** .23** -.04 -.14* .06 -.05 .07 .17** -.09 -.09 .22** -.13* 
C6 -.10 .00 -.07 -.23** .14* .11 -.08 -.09 .01 .06 .04 .06 
Note: N = 297. **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 
level (2-tailed).  
